Judgment Pratap Kumar Ray,J. Both these two appeals, the connected applications and one cross appeal arose out of judgment and order dated 27th July, 2006, directing detention in civil prison passed in G.A. No. 4223 of 2004, by learned Trial Judge in an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on the allegation of disobedience of the order of injunction passed by Trial Court on 3rd September, 2004 on an interlocutory application of the plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 registered as G.A. No. 3392 of 2004 in connection of the suit being C.S. No. 235 of 2004. Both appeals, applications and cross appeal is taken up for analogous hearing and a common judgment is delivered. The said suit was filed by Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Limited (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘Glaxo’) against Heinz India Private Limited (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘Heinz’) and Zee Telefilms Limited (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘Zee’) alleging airing of a disparaging advertisement aiming at and to undermine the reputation and efficacy of the product “Horlicks”, which is the product of Glaxo in the mind of the public at large by preparing a story board depicting the sequential benefit of health improvement by consuming health drink “Complan”, a product of Heinz in comparison to the health drink “Horlicks” with the following reliefs: “(a) Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants and each of them and their servants, agents or assigns from publishing by telecast or otherwise the aforesaid advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 herein or any advertisement or publicity similar thereto and in any form reflecting adversely on the plaintiff’s product ‘Horlicks’ in any manner whatsoever. (b) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no. 1 and its servants, agents or assigns from publishing any advertisement similar or substantially similar to the advertisement published in Ananda Bazar Patrika being annexure “E1” hereto and from continuing to telecast or causing to be telecast only further the advertisement/publicity similar to or substantially similar to the advertisement mentioned in paragraph 13 hereof, a copy whereof is annexure “E1” hereto or containing any comparison with Brand “H” or any brand referring to HORLICKS directly or indirectly. (c) Special damage as claimed in Paragraph 41. (c) Special damage as claimed in Paragraph 41. (d) In addition to injunction, enquiry into damage and Decree for damages for such sums and in respect of such periods as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper. (e) Receiver, (f) Injunction; (g) Costs (h) Further or other reliefs.” An interlocutory application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 was moved on service of the copy of the said application to the defendant no. 1 of the suit, the Heinz, by the plaintiff, said Glaxo, registered as G.A. No. 3390 of 2004 on the following reliefs: “(a) A fit and proper person be appointed Receiver to take possession of the Production Master Copy and the Artworks of the said advertisement material lying with various television channels all across India including Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and keep the same in his safe custody until disposal of the suit. (b) An order of injunction restraining the Respondents and each of them and their servants, agents or assigns from publishing by telecast or otherwise the aforesaid advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 herein or any advertisement or publicity similar thereto and in any from reflecting adversely on the plaintiff’s/petitioner’s product “Horlicks” in any manner whatsoever; (c) An order of injunction restraining the Respondent No.1 and its servants, agents or assigns from publishing any advertisement published in Ananda Bazar Patrika being Annexure “E1” hereto and from continuing to telecast or causing to be telecast any further advertisement/publicity similar to or substantially similar to the advertisement mentioned in paragraph 13 hereof a copy whereof is annexure “E” or containing composition with Brand “H” or any brand referring to HORLICKS directly or indirectly; (d) Leave be granted with the petitioner to serve a copy of the petition on owners of various television channels through which the said misleading advertisements, with or without variation, is being telecast all over India, upon discovery; (e) Ad-Interim order in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) above; (f) Costs of and/or incidental to this petition be directed to be paid by the Respondent No.1. (g) Such further or other order or orders be made and/or direction or directions be given as your Lordships may deem fit and proper.” The Hon’ble Trial Judge on 3rd September, 2004 passed an ad-interim order in the said interlocutory injunction application, which reads such: “The plaintiff and the defendant no. (g) Such further or other order or orders be made and/or direction or directions be given as your Lordships may deem fit and proper.” The Hon’ble Trial Judge on 3rd September, 2004 passed an ad-interim order in the said interlocutory injunction application, which reads such: “The plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 are both manufacturers of well-known health drinks; while the plaintiff is manufacturing its health drink under the trade name Horlicks, the defendant no. 1 is manufacturing its health drink under the trade name Complan. It is alleged by the plaintiff that the plaintiff had noticed in the first week of August, 2004 that the defendant no. 1 started a huge advertisement campaign for its brand Complan principally through television channels. In the advertisement two cups are projected, one brown cup with alphabet H written thereon and a white cup with Complan written thereon. In both the said cups liquid is poured and there is a visual depiction of the white cup growing in height and becoming almost the double in height of the brown cup, which registers nil growth. It is alleged that advertisement is shown for the purpose of disparaging Horlicks, a product of the plaintiff. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior advocate, appearing for the plaintiff, prays for interim order in terms of the prayers made in this application till the disposal of this application. Mr. Satyabrata Mukherjee, learned senior advocate, appearing for the defendant no. 1, submits that this advertisement was not for disparaging Horlicks, a product of the plaintiff. Mr. Mukherjee, further, submits that the defendant no. 1 is only projecting the qualities of its product. Taking the allegation as contained in the plaint and in the application for injunction, I feel that unless an ad interim order is passed in terms of prayer (b) of this application, the situation will become irreversible by the time the application is decided finally on merits, particularly, when a case of loss of business has been made out in the application. I am convinced that, at least for the purpose of the said interim order, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. However, this order will not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter H in the said advertisement. The defendant no. I am convinced that, at least for the purpose of the said interim order, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. However, this order will not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter H in the said advertisement. The defendant no. 1 is already entered appearance in this matter, but the defendant nos. 2 to 4 are required to be served. I propose to hear the application in details after exchange of affidavits. Let affidavit-in-opposition to this application be filed by September 10, 2004, reply, if any, by September 15, 2004. Put up this matter under heading ‘motion adjourned’ on September 17, 2004. The plaintiff is directed to serve copies of the plaint and the application for injunction on non-appearing respondents and to inform the aforesaid directions for filing affidavit to them. The plaintiff is, further, directed to file affidavit-of-service to that effect on the next date of hearing. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on usual undertaking.” An application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was moved by the plaintiff of the suit registered as G.A. No. 4223 of 2004 alleging that from 5th October, 2004 in wanton disregard of the order dated 3rd September, 2004, the respondent no. 1 of the said application, the Heinz, resumed telecasting of the cup marked “H” in an abridged and truncated form of the original advertisement by retaining some of the frames and skipping all other frames of the original advertisement and prayed for following order: “(a) Properties of respondent Nos. 1 and 4 as described in Annexure “N” be attached for having disobeyed the orders of this Hon’ble Court; in the event of the disobedience is continued for a year or repeated in the meantime, attached properties be sold and appropriate compensation be awarded to your Petitioner out of the sale proceeds; (b) Respondents 1 and 4 be directed to disclose the names of their respective officers responsible for such violation and they be sentenced to imprisonment as provided for in Rule 2A or Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (c) leave be granted to your Petitioner to serve a copy of this petition to Ms. Seema Modi, General Marketing Manager of the respondent no. 1. (d) Ms. Seema Modi, General Marketing Manager of the respondent no. 1. (d) Ms. Seema Modi, General Marketing Manager of the Respondent No. 1 be suitably punished for having instructed counsel to make a statement before this Hon’ble Court known to her to be false; (e) The Respondents, their servants agents and assigns be restrained from telecasting the advertisement described in paragraph 16 herein; (f) Ad-interim order in terms of prayer d) above; (g) Costs of and/or incidental to this application be paid by the respondents; (h) such other or further order or orders be given and/or directions be given as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper.” Said application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of Civil Procedure Code was affirmed on 2nd December, 2004 by one Sri Surinder Kumar, G.M. – Legal and Company Secretary of the petitioner company, Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Limited. Parties exchanged their affidavit-in-opposition and reply. Said application was opposed by the defendants-opposite parties, Heinz and Zee aforesaid, by contending that the telecasting of truncated version of the impugned advertisement, which in the field of advertising is known as ‘tag’, inadvertently continued till 11th November, 2004, though steps were taken to stop it. The reason assigned that due to human error and technicality of processing through different agency, a genuine and bonafide mistake on the part of a junior officer of Zee, the tag appeared till 11th November, 2004. Both the two respondents-opposite parties, accordingly, tendered unqualified apology before the learned Trial Judge for such human error to stop the advertisement of tag, though all steps were taken to stop it. It is the case of the defendant-opposite party, Heinz that by the communication of a junior officer, Ms. Seema Modi, on 3rd September, 2004, a letter was send giving instruction to the Starcom to withdraw the airing of advertisement in the Zee TV channel, as the Starcom being advertising agent with whom there was a contract for telecasting the advertisement. This letter of Ms. Seema Modi to stop airing of storyboard was received on 6th September, 2004 by the Starcom, the advertising agent of Heinz, who issued a letter forthwith to the concerned TV Channel, namely, Alfa Bangla. The Zee confirmed the receipt of such letter of Starcom on 7th September, 2004 and it was contended therein that with effect from 10 P.M., 6th September, 2004, the main advertisement was withdrawn. The Zee confirmed the receipt of such letter of Starcom on 7th September, 2004 and it was contended therein that with effect from 10 P.M., 6th September, 2004, the main advertisement was withdrawn. Similarly, the Starcom also on 7th September, 2004 informed the Heinz confirming the cancellation of advertisement. But the ‘tag’ continued due to human error and communication to technical department of TV channel till 11th November, 2004, the date, which has been confirmed by the “Mindshare”, an agency engaged by the Glaxo, the plaintiff, to ascertain the last date when such telecasting of tags continued. Before the learned Trial Court, accordingly, it was a positive submission made along with tendering of unconditional apology that even if there was any disobedience of injunction order for which application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was filed, the said disobedience did not continue with effect from 12th November, 2004 by curing the technical mistake. This fact that disobedience did not continue after 12th November, 2004 also is admitted by the plaintiff-applicant of the said application with a supporting document issued by their agent, ‘Mindshare’, who was engaged to ascertain it. From the records of the Trial Court the following facts emerge, namely, “the truncated version of the advertisement which is called as tag in advertising parlance continued till 11th November, 2004”, that application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was affirmed on 2nd December, 2004 and it was moved by serving the notice of “Motion” on 6th December, 2004 and that at the time of hearing even, there was no existence of any disobedience of the injunction order as also when the impugned judgment under appeal was passed. On the aforesaid factual matrix, which is very well could be considered as jurisdictional fact to exercise the jurisdiction for entertaining an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, these appeals are being considered first to see whether there was any existence of jurisdictional fact and/or existence of any relevant materials to entertain any application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code under the anvil of the contextual and jurisprudential concept of said provision, which came into statute with effect from 1st February, 1977 as a remedial measure to implement the injunction order when allegation of disobedience or breach of injunction order is alleged. As the learned trial Judge passed order of detention in civil prison for disobedience of an order, though it ceased its effect long before judgment was delivered, the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which deals with willful disobedience of any order to impose punishment also is analyzed to under stand the operational field of Order XXXIX Rule 2A in comparison with Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Contextual purpose of Order XXXIX Rule 2A: Order XXXIX Rule 2A inserted by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 104 of 1976 with effect from 1st February, 1977, reads such: “2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.- (1) In the case disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.” Along with the insertion of aforesaid provision, namely, Order XXXIX Rule 2A by the said Amendment Act 104 of 1976, the erstwhile provision, namely, Sub-rule (3) to Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of Civil Procedure Code was deleted. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 was to this effect: “In case of disobedience or of breach of any such terms the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.” From the aforesaid provision, it appears that the remedial measures to compel compliance of the order passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1, was not available by earlier provision. Having regard to such it appears from “objects and reasons” for Amendment Act 104, 1976, that the legislatures intended to cover up the remedial measures of such disobedience, namely, implementation of the orders passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and also for empowering the transferee Court to exercise such power. The jurisprudential concept and purpose of the Order XXXIX Rule 2(3) was not at all punitive to impose a penalty for default but it was for the purpose of effecting enforcement and execution of the order, which has simile with the law prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code for execution of the decree of a permanent injunction under Order XXI Rule 32, a provision whereby such decree could be executed. Such concept has been exhaustively dealt with by a Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case The State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, reported in AIR 1961 SC 221 . To appreciate the issue, we are quoting relevant portion of paragraph 23 from the said report, Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra), which reads such: “Though undoubtedly proceedings under O. 39, R. 2(3) Civil Procedure Code have a punitive aspect – as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order. This is clearly brought out by their identity with the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction. Order 21, R. 32 sets out the method by which such decrees could be executed – and Cl. (1) enacts – “where the party against whom a decree ………. This is clearly brought out by their identity with the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction. Order 21, R. 32 sets out the method by which such decrees could be executed – and Cl. (1) enacts – “where the party against whom a decree ………. For an injunction has been passed, has had an opportunity for obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced, in the case of a decree ……… for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property or by both.” Clauses 2 and 3 of this rule practically reproduce the terms of Cls. 4 & 3 respectively of O. 39, R. 2, and the provisions leave no room for doubt that O. 39, R. 2(3) is in essence only the mode for the enforcement or effectuation of an order of injunction.” Molecular elements of the provision under Order XXXIX Rule 2 Sub-rule (3) as was existing prior to deletion of the said Sub-rule by the Act 104 of 1976, is almost the same as Rule 2A with a slight distinction by covering up the contingency of disobedience even in respect of the order passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 also, as expressed by the Apex Court in the case Samee Khan vs. Bindu Khan, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2765 , wherein in paragraph 16 the Apex Court discussed the views analyzing the views expressed by different High Courts to that effect, which reads such: “It is pertinent to point out that Rule 2(3) of Order 39 of the Code before that sub-rule was deleted by Act 104 of 1976, has been interpreted by different High Courts in India and in almost all such decisions the High Courts have adopted a similar construction as we have made above. (That sub-section has been quoted earlier). It is almost the same as Rule 2A and the slight distinction is not material for us in this case. Vide a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ottapiurakkal Thazath Suppi v. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya (AIR 1917 Madras 448); a single Judge of the Patna High Court in Nawal Kishore Singh v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, AIR 1976 Patna 56, which was subsequently approved by a Division Bench of the same High Court. Vide a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ottapiurakkal Thazath Suppi v. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya (AIR 1917 Madras 448); a single Judge of the Patna High Court in Nawal Kishore Singh v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, AIR 1976 Patna 56, which was subsequently approved by a Division Bench of the same High Court. Kapildeo Upadhyay v. Raghunath Pandey, AIR 1978 Patna 212.” Having regard to the aforesaid legal proposition as settled by the Apex Court by the Constitution Bench judgment, Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra) and the subsequent judgment, Samee Khan (supra), there is no doubt that the provision under Order XXXIX Rule 2A has been inserted by deleting the earlier provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2 Sub-rule (3) only with the purpose to implement the interlocutory order, namely, the order of injunction passed by the civil Court in a pending suit. Contextual and purposive field of Contempt of Courts Act: The object of the legislation, namely, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is primarily to protect the dignity and majesty for due administration of justice of the Court and for that reason there is punitive provision under Section 12 of the said Act of 1971 prescribing the punishment of simple imprisonment for a term, which may extends to six months or a fine, which may extend to Rs. 2,000/- or with both. Section 12 of the said Act reads such: “Punishment for contempt of court.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Explanation.-An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. (4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer. Explanation.- For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5).- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” Comparative Analysis of ‘field of operation’ of said two provisions/statute: Having regard to the concept of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and having regard to the provision under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the said Code, this Court is of the view that for disobedience of any injunction order it could be the subject matter of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A for remedy of such disobedience by way of implementation of the order for removing the breach and for that purpose the punitive provisions have been stipulated as a mode by empowering the Court to pass coercive order of attachment or detention to civil prison or both. The power of the Court to pass the order of attachment and/or detention to civil prison, both or anyone of them is not contoured by any limitation but it depends upon the exigency of the situation when such breach of disobedience continues. That issue has been decided by the Apex Court in the case Samee Khan (supra) by holding in paragraph 15 to that effect. The relevant portion of which reads such: “The pragmatic interpretation, therefore, must be this; it is open to the Court to attach the property of the disobeying party and at the same time the Court can order him to be detained in civil prison also if the Court deems it necessary. Similarly the Court which orders the person to be detained in civil prison can also attach the property of that person. Both steps can be resorted to or one of them alone need be chosen. It is left to the Court to decide on consideration of the fact situation in each case.” Under the Contempt of Courts Act aforesaid, the civil contempt has been defined under Section 2(b) as willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. It is left to the Court to decide on consideration of the fact situation in each case.” Under the Contempt of Courts Act aforesaid, the civil contempt has been defined under Section 2(b) as willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Since the issue involved before the learned trial Court below was the violation of the order passed in the interlocutory application of injunction in the said civil suit instituted in the High Court at Calcutta, Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act has no applicability, but Section 11 of the said Act has empowered the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction on any allegation of contemtuous conduct relating to the civil contempt under section 2(b). Section 11 of the said Act reads such: “11. Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside jurisdiction A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself or of any court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of contempt is within or outside such limits.” In the instant case, we are not concerned at all to decide as to whether the impugned allegation of disobedience of the order passed in the interlocutory application of the civil suit, would attract the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act for exercising the jurisdiction by the High Court or not. But we are concerned in this appeal to find out the purposive concept of the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the said Code. The provision of the Contempt of Courts Act have been discussed only to identify the difference in the angle of adjudication and the determining factors as well as the applicability of the penal provision by comparative analysis of the Contempt of Courts Act, vis-à-vis the provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code. It appears from the definition of civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act that the word “disobedience” has been qualified with the word “willful”, whereas the word “willful” is absent to qualify the word “disobedience” in the provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2A. It appears from the definition of civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act that the word “disobedience” has been qualified with the word “willful”, whereas the word “willful” is absent to qualify the word “disobedience” in the provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2A. This particular framing of word in the said two different statutes, to identify the meaning of the word “disobedience”, has a great significance. As per our reading, the following could be explained in the manner, namely, that the provision of the said Code stipulating the consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction though may provide a logical idea to agitate a defence that the disobedience was not willful but the same has a little effect while deciding the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, so long the order of injunction subsists and breach or disobedience thereof, exists. In the application under said Rule 2A, the question of lowering the dignity and majesty of the Court at the esteem of the common people by such breach and/or disobedience, ipso facto is not the foundational ground to pass the order, but Court has to consider only whether there is any disobedience, which may be willful or may not be willful, for implementation of the injunction order, which is the only object thereof and for that reason, the Court is armed with the penal provision of attachment of the property or detention of someone in the civil prison as mode to implement/execute injunction order. While under the Contempt of Courts Act, which is a complete Code to deal with the contemtuous act and conduct, the prime consideration of the Court is to upright the dignity and majesty of Court for which the statute has armed the Court to pass necessary order of imprisonment to jail for a longer period of six months and the imposition of fine to the extend of Rs. 2,000/- or both. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, even if, there is a situation of purging of contempt by taking necessary action by the alleged contemnor, still then, the Court may pass order of punishment by finding him guilty of the contempt to upright the dignity and majesty of the Court. 2,000/- or both. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, even if, there is a situation of purging of contempt by taking necessary action by the alleged contemnor, still then, the Court may pass order of punishment by finding him guilty of the contempt to upright the dignity and majesty of the Court. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, there is a scope also to tender apology for which a specific provision has been stipulated by adding a proviso to Section 12 Sub-section (1) of said Contempt of Courts Act. Further under Section 12 of the said Contempt of Courts Act, a provision also has been made by proviso of Sub-section (4) thereof, providing a scope of exemption from imprisonment, if the alleged contemnor satisfies the Court that he exercised due diligence to prevent the alleged commission of offence. Under Order XXXIX Rule 2A there is no such provisions like tendering of apology and exemption from suffering the punishment by taking a defence that “there was exercise of all due diligence to prevent the commission of offence”. Under the Contempt of Courts Act the position of the alleged contemnor when is found guilty for commission of the Contemtuous Act and conduct, changes his status to an accused, which has similar connotation with the definition of the word “accused” under Indian Penal Code, whereas, the status of the defendants and/or respondents in a civil suit against whom any application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is filed never changes their status as accused, even if, any person is found guilty of such disobedience or breach of injunction. On a comparative analysis of the said two statutes, namely, Contempt of Courts Act and the Civil Procedure Code, it is crystal clear that the word “disobedience” as is appearing in the Code is not identical with the word “disobedience” appearing in the Contempt of Courts Act, so far as its contextual meaning. Furthermore, having regard to the impact of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2A of Order XXXIX it appears further that the punitive measures to direct attachment of the property has a limitation of one year to follow a direction of sale of the property attached after such limitation is over, for a remedy to award the compensation to the injured party. Furthermore, having regard to the impact of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2A of Order XXXIX it appears further that the punitive measures to direct attachment of the property has a limitation of one year to follow a direction of sale of the property attached after such limitation is over, for a remedy to award the compensation to the injured party. On a conjoint reading of the Sub-rule (1) and (2) of the said Rule 2A of the Code it is explicit that order of attachment is only a coercive device/mode to secure implementation of the injunction order, whose breach was alleged in the application and consequential effect of continuing such breach are attachment of properties and thereafter sale of property for payments of compensation, if such contingency arises. Similarly, detaining in a civil prison not exceeding three months is contoured with a clause “unless in the meantime the Court directs his release” as it appears from Sub-rule (1) of the Said Rule 2A of Order XXXIX. The sentence “unless in the meantime the Court directs his release” has a significant effect on the order of detention in the civil prison limiting the period not exceeding three months, which as per our reading is a coercive provision to pressurize by curtailing the personal liberty for the time being for the purpose of compelling him to implement the Court’s order. As per our reading of the said statutory provision, the sentence, “unless in the meantime the Court directs his release” has given a wide statutory power to the Court, to change/modify/vary/withdraw the detention order, which is also in exercise of original power and not a reviewing power, as and when such contingency will arise by the changed situation, namely, removal of the breach of injunction and/or curing of disobedience factors by the person concerned guilty of such disobedience or breach of the injunction order. The view expressed by us that the order of detention under the said provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2A is only for the purpose of enforcing the injunction order in view of the reasoning that under the statute there is a rider that the detention period would be not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime Court directs release. The view expressed by us that the order of detention under the said provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2A is only for the purpose of enforcing the injunction order in view of the reasoning that under the statute there is a rider that the detention period would be not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime Court directs release. The word “unless in the meantime the Court directs his release” has been explained by us in the angle that same is with a purpose to lift the detention order, as and when the breach to be rectified, we are getting a support of our views from the judgment passed in the case Sitaram vs. Ganesh Das, reported in AIR 1973 Allahabad 449. Under the Contempt of Courts Act it appears that under Section 12 of the said Act, the word “imprisonment” has been used, whereas, under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2A, the word “detention” has been used under the contingency as mentioned in the respective statutes. The word “imprisonment” is not synonymous with the word “detention”. The word “imprisonment” as per the meaning of Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition by Bryan A. Garner, Editor-in-Chief is “the act of confining a person, specially in a prison”, whereas the meaning of the word “detention” is “the act or fact of holding a person in custody”. From the very nature of the word as used, namely, the “detention” in the Code and “imprisonment” in the Contempt of Courts Act, we are of the view that the nature of confinement is not identical and the word “imprisonment” though is conceived with the ingredients of “detention”, but the word “detention” is not conceived with ingredients of “imprisonment”. As for example, the investigative “detention” means “the holding of a suspect without formal arrest during the investigation of the suspect’s participation in a crime”. Having regard to the aforesaid analysis it appears before us that Order XXXIX Rule 2A was inserted in the Code by the said amendment only to arm the Court to compel someone to implement the order of Civil Court passed in an interlocutory application under Order XXXIX. Having regard to the aforesaid analysis it appears before us that Order XXXIX Rule 2A was inserted in the Code by the said amendment only to arm the Court to compel someone to implement the order of Civil Court passed in an interlocutory application under Order XXXIX. As already discussed that disobedience word also has a significant differential edge in respect of the two Codes due to qualifying of the word “disobedience” by the word “willful” in the Contempt of Courts Act and non-qualifying the same in the provision of the said Code, which may lead us to think that once any order of the Court is passed under Order XXXIX either Rule 1 or Rule 2, till the same is vacated by appropriate order, there is little scope to explain the disobedience by identifying the Act of disobedience as “unwillful”. The Civil Court is concerned to decide the civil litigation of the parties and in interlocutory stage under Order XXXIX, orders may be passed, which until is vacated, the implementation of such is a matter of course for which Order XXXIX Rule 2A is the statutory provision arming the Court to pass necessary order of attachment and detention in civil prison, both or alternatively. So, there is no question of considering the issue, namely, “dignity and majesty” of the Court as a focal point of adjudicative process in such type of application, which albeit is available for decision under the Contempt of Courts Act, for administration of justice. Hence, considering the aforesaid finding, we are of the view that so long disobedience of any injunction order and/or breach of such order exists, there is scope to file an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A for remedial measures and in the event, such disobedience of any injunction order and/or breach thereof, ceases to have any effect by purging the breach and/or disobedience, the Court ceases to exercise his jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, which is not the case, so far as the adjudication of application under Contempt of Courts Act, whose purposive object is not for execution of order but the administration of justice and to maintain dignity, majesty and authority of Courts/Tribunals. Jurisdictional fact – whether it was satisfied: Having regard to such, now we have to test whether at the material date, i.e. 6th December, 2004, when the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was filed by the plaintiff of the suit against the defendants-appellants before us, such jurisdictional fact, namely, the existence of disobedience factor and/or breach of injunction order was existing/subsisting or not and also further as to whether even on the date of judgment, such disobedience of the order was continuing or it was rectified/corrected prior to that date by complying with the injunction order or not. Before deciding that point, we have further to consider another point, namely, the factual existence of injunction order, if any. In the event, it appears that there was no positive injunction order passed by the Court on analyzing the order, naturally, the absence of such may also be attracted in the field of jurisdictional fact. The order of injunction passed in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 filed by the plaintiff of the suit on 3rd September, 2004 by the learned Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 235 of 2004, reads such: “The plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 are both manufacturers of well-known health drinks; while the plaintiff is manufacturing its health drink under the trade name Horlicks, the defendant no. 1 is manufacturing its health drink under the trade name Complan. It is alleged by the plaintiff that the plaintiff has noticed in the first week of August, 2004 that the defendant no. 1 started a huge advertisement campaign for its brand Complan principally through television channels. In the advertisement two cups are projected, one brown cup with alphabet H written thereon and a white cup with Complan written thereon. In both the said cups liquid is poured and there is a visual depiction of the white cup growing in height and becoming almost the doubt in height of the brown cup, which registers nil growth. It is alleged that advertisement is shown for the purpose of disparaging Horlicks, a product of the plaintiff. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior advocate, appearing for the plaintiff, prays for interim order in terms of the prayers made in this application till the disposal of this application. Mr. Satyabrata Mukherjee, learned senior advocate, appearing for the defendant no. It is alleged that advertisement is shown for the purpose of disparaging Horlicks, a product of the plaintiff. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior advocate, appearing for the plaintiff, prays for interim order in terms of the prayers made in this application till the disposal of this application. Mr. Satyabrata Mukherjee, learned senior advocate, appearing for the defendant no. 1 submits that this advertisement was not for disparaging Horlicks, a product of the plaintiff. Mr. Mukherjee, further, submits that the defendant no. 1 is only projecting the qualities of its product. Taking the allegation as contained in the plaint and in the application for injunction, I feel that unless an ad interim order is passed in terms of prayer (b) of this application, the situation will become irreversible by the time the application is decided finally on merits, particularly, when a case of loss of business has been made out in the application. I am convinced that, at least for the purpose of the said interim order, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. However, this order will not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter H in the said advertisement.” On a bare reading of the said order it appears that Court recorded a finding by using the word “prima facie case made out” and the feeling of the Court that “there should be an order of injunction in terms of prayer (b)”. But it has been noticed by us while hearing the appeal that there was no positive order of injunction passed by the Court below directing the defendants to restrain their action of airing the story board in the manner as alleged in the injunction application in terms of prayer (b). Hence, it is clear that no positive order of injunction was passed by the learned Trial Judge, save and except that “this order will not prevent the defendants to air the story board by changing the letter ‘H’ to ‘X’ in the cup”. This Court, suo motu raised a question to the learned advocates appearing for appellants and the respondents both as to whether there was at all any injunction order passed by the learned Trial Court for whose breach allegation was made in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. This Court, suo motu raised a question to the learned advocates appearing for appellants and the respondents both as to whether there was at all any injunction order passed by the learned Trial Court for whose breach allegation was made in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. It is the submission of both the learned advocates appearing for the parties that there was no positive injunction order. However, learned advocates for the respondents-plaintiff submitted before this Court that the context and tenor of the order impliedly expressed it as an order of injunction and as such, the breach thereof, became the subject matter of application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, as the parties of the suit understood the order as an injunction order, as per their reading. Here we have to consider the statutory provision, namely, Order XXXIX Rule 2A again and afresh. The wording of said Rule 2A Sub-rule (1) speaks that in case of disobedience of any injunction order granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms in which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court may pass appropriate direction of attachment of the property and detention in the civil prison, both or alternative. Hence, the condition precedent of applicability of Order XXXIX Rule 2A is the existence of an order of injunction. In the instant case, as we have noticed, there is no such positive order of injunction passed by the learned Trial Court by the Order dated 3rd September, 2004. Learned advocate for the respondent-plaintiff, however, has placed strong reliance to support his view of implied injunction order since it was not in specific language relying upon the judgment passed in the case State of West Bengal & Anr. Vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors., reported in AIR 2005 SC 1646 . Para 57 of the said report relied to contend that “real contention of the Court to pass an order to be ascertained”. Para 57 of the said report reads such: “57. In the first sentence the word ‘royalty’ occurring in the expression – ‘royalty is a tax’, is clearly an error. What the majority wished to say, and has in fact said, is – ‘cess on royalty is a tax’. The correct words to be printed in the judgment should have been ‘cess on royalty’ in place of ‘royalty’ only. In the first sentence the word ‘royalty’ occurring in the expression – ‘royalty is a tax’, is clearly an error. What the majority wished to say, and has in fact said, is – ‘cess on royalty is a tax’. The correct words to be printed in the judgment should have been ‘cess on royalty’ in place of ‘royalty’ only. The words ‘cess on’ appear to have been inadvertently or erroneously omitted while typing the text of judgment. This is clear from reading the judgment in its entirety. Vide paras 22 and 31, which precede para 34 above – said, their Lordships have held that ‘royalty’ is not a tax. Even the last line of para 34 records ‘royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land’. The very first sentence of the para records in quick succession ‘… as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State Legislature..’ What their Lordships have intended to record is’… that cess on royalty is a tax and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty is beyond the competence of the State Legislature..’ That makes correct and sensible reading. A doubtful expression occurring in a judgment, apparently by mistake for inadvertence, ought to be read by assuming that the Court had intended to say only that which is correct according to the settled position of law, and the apparent error should be ignored, far from making any capital out of it, giving way to the correct expression which ought to be implied or necessarily read in the context, also having regard to what has been said a little before and a little after. No learned Judge would consciously author a judgment which is self-inconsistent or incorporates passages repugnant to each other. Vide para 22, their Lordships have clearly held that there is no entry in Schedule II which enables the State to impose a tax on royalty and, therefore, the State was incompetent to impose such a tax (cess). The cess which has an incidence of an additional charge on royalty and not a tax on land, cannot apparently be justified as falling under Entry 49 of List II.” The appellant has referred the judgment passed in the case Margao Municipal Council & Anr. Vs. The cess which has an incidence of an additional charge on royalty and not a tax on land, cannot apparently be justified as falling under Entry 49 of List II.” The appellant has referred the judgment passed in the case Margao Municipal Council & Anr. Vs. Pandurang Kusta Alve & Ors., reported in AIR 2000 Bombay 78 to contend that order of injunction must be clear and specific. Reliance has been placed to the paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, which reads such: “9. An injunction which is a judicial process has necessarily to be by proper exercise of its jurisdiction by the Court. A proper exercise of jurisdiction would certainly mean the application of mind to the facts involved and the law applicable thereto and not a mechanical process of scribbling few words on a sheet of paper, be it a roznama or otherwise. It should necessarily be on the basis of rights of the parties and the law applicable to it and not merely because the party fancies to be armed with such an injunctive order against the other party who does not mind to gift the plaintiff with such injunctive order against itself. It cannot be an order just for somebody’s pleasure. Bearing in mind the same, if one peruses the order dated 6-3-73 it is ex-facie apparent that the same does not disclose any adjudication of the matter by the Court nor it discloses any specific direction to the petitioners and for that matter to any other person. It simply states that the order was passed and injunction order was confirmed. Moreover, the records disclose and it is an undisputed fact that no ex parte order of injunction was ever granted in the said suit by the trial Court and therefore there was no occasion for confirmation of any order of injunction passed ex parte. It is also a matter or record that the trial Court has never passed any other order on 6-3-73 apart from the one entered into the rozname sheet of the said day. In fact, it is mere endorsement in the roznama sheet regarding the proceedings in the Court. The roznama sheet of a suit or any miscellaneous proceedings is primarily meant to disclose the happenings in the Court in a particular matter on a particular date. In fact, it is mere endorsement in the roznama sheet regarding the proceedings in the Court. The roznama sheet of a suit or any miscellaneous proceedings is primarily meant to disclose the happenings in the Court in a particular matter on a particular date. Of course, nothing forbids the Court from recording any order of injunction in the roznama sheet; but it has to be an order of injunction and not merely a narration of having passed an order. A narration of the fact of having passed an order does not amount to an order of injunction. The act of passing an order is one thing and the order of injunction itself is another thing. 10. It is seen that the entire proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure were initiated on the premise that there was an order dated 6-3-73 and that the same was disobeyed by the petitioners. As already seen above there was no order of temporary injunction passed against the petitioner in the case in hand on 6-3-73 and mere narration of the fact of having passed the order of injunction does not tantamount to the order of injunction itself. Having proceeded in the matter without considering this basic aspect of the case, both the Courts below have acted with material irregularity and in illegal exercise of its jurisdiction. 11. It was sought to be argued that from 1973 till 1998, the petitioners did not proceed to demolish the suit shops. If there was no order of injunction or that the petitioners had no knowledge of any such order of injunction, there was no reason for the petitioners not to take any action in respect of the suit shops for all those years. The contention is devoid of substance. The fact whether there was any order injunction passed by the Court or not is to be established by exhibiting such order on record. The existence of an order of the Court cannot be established merely by referring to the conduct of the parties. The respondents cannot reap bonus from the negligence on the part of the petitioners and their officers in taking timely action in the matter. The existence of an order of the Court cannot be established merely by referring to the conduct of the parties. The respondents cannot reap bonus from the negligence on the part of the petitioners and their officers in taking timely action in the matter. The decisions sought to be relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents are of no help to the respondents in the matter.” Having regard to the aforesaid contention as raised on issue as to whether, in fact, any order of injunction was passed, the point as raised by this Court, suo motu, the said order is scanned, to identify, whether, in fact, there was any order of injunction passed by the Court in the true conceptual sprit of the ingredients of an injunction order by satisfying its molecular elements as already quoted above. It appears that the learned Trial Judge observed in the order to this effect “taking the allegation as contained in the plaint and in the application for injunction, I feel that unless an ad-interim order is passed in terms or prayer (b) of this application, the situation will become irreversible by the time the application decided finally on merits, particularly when a case of loss of business has been made out in the application. I am convinced that, atleast for the purpose of said interim order, plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. However, this order will not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of the product without showing the cup marked as “H” in the said advertisement”. (Underlining by us) From the underlined portion aforesaid it appears that simply the Court below had a feeling in mind that there should be an order of injunction and also the Court was convinced, a mental phenomenon, to the situation, to pass such an injunction order by holding that “a prima facie case was made out”, but except such, there was no injunction order passed by the Court based upon such reasoning of Court’s feeling and the Court’s positive conviction about a prima facie case. As already observed in the earlier paragraphs that Order XXXIX Rule 2A prescribes modes of punitive consequences of attachment of property and/or detention in civil prison or both to enforce and execute such order of injunction when disobedience of such is proved in any application under the said provision. As already observed in the earlier paragraphs that Order XXXIX Rule 2A prescribes modes of punitive consequences of attachment of property and/or detention in civil prison or both to enforce and execute such order of injunction when disobedience of such is proved in any application under the said provision. Having regard to the very nature of consequences of such disobedience of order of injunction, this Court is of the view that there must be and should be a specific order of injunction mandating the parties concerned to do or not to do something. Unless and until, there is such specific order explicitly by mandating to do or not to do something, there would be no material ground in support of “foundational fact of disobedience” of the said order. Unless there is an order specific in the nature of injunction, this Court is of the view that the statutory material ingredients as would attract the said provision would be remaining absent and as a result, the application seeking remedy of alleged breach, itself would not be maintainable. The judgment of the Supreme Court as referred to by Mr. Sarkar, learned senior advocate of the respondent-plaintiff, namely, Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Anr. (supra) was not in the context of any penal consequences similar to Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Since the Order XXXIX Rule 2A directs the existence of foundational fact with material elements of disobedience of injunction order, we are of the view that the condition precedent of such application must fulfill the basic two ingredients, namely, (1) existence of an injunction order specifically and explicitly but not by any elaborate reasoning/interpretation or by self understanding of the parties as per their reading; (2) fact of disobedience thereof. The judgment passed by the Goa Bench of Bombay High Court Margao Municipal Council & Anr. (supra) as referred to by the learned advocate for the appellants to satisfy the Court’s suo motu question as to whether there was any injunction order at all passed by the Court, has a persuasive value for our consideration. The judgment passed by the Goa Bench of Bombay High Court Margao Municipal Council & Anr. (supra) as referred to by the learned advocate for the appellants to satisfy the Court’s suo motu question as to whether there was any injunction order at all passed by the Court, has a persuasive value for our consideration. There, the Court held that as the interim order, which faced the natural death long back, there was no scope to pass any extension of such interim order and as such, there could not be any allegation of violation of the order of injunction, though the parties thereof were of the view as per their reading about existence of injunction order. From the prayer (b) of the injunction application it appears that plaintiff of the suit prayed for an order of injunction restraining the respondents and each of them and their servants, agents or assigns from publishing by telecast or otherwise, the aforesaid advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 or any advertisement or publicity similar thereto and in any form reflecting adversely on the plaintiffs-petitioners product “Horlicks” in any manner whatsoever. On a bare reading of such prayer it appears that the prayer (b) relates to an order of injunction in the nature of prohibition or restriction seeking an order restraining the doing or continuance of some alleged wrongful act. The restraining order is an order granted to maintain the subject of controversy in status quo until the hearing of an application for a temporary injunction and its purpose is merely to suspend proceedings until there may be an opportunity to enquire whether any injunction should be granted. The term “restraining order” no doubt sometimes used as a synonym of “injunction” and a restraining order has been held in effect an injunction. The test to identify whether any order is a restraining order or a temporary injunction is determined from its form and substance, the restrain, which the order purports to impose and not the name given to it determines the character. On reading of the prayer (b) in the angle of the aforesaid discussion of the meaning of the word “injunction” and the material ingredients or the molecular elements consist therein to form crystallization of an order as an injunction, it is clear that it requires a positive and specific order of restrain. On reading of the prayer (b) in the angle of the aforesaid discussion of the meaning of the word “injunction” and the material ingredients or the molecular elements consist therein to form crystallization of an order as an injunction, it is clear that it requires a positive and specific order of restrain. There is no doubt that order of a Court is not interpreted applying the principle of statutory provisions. But when any issue is involved to test whether any injunction order was passed by the Court to attract the liability under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the said Code, naturally, the Court has to identify whether such injunction order at all was granted by the Court or not, by scanning the order. Analysis of concept of Order XXXIX Rule 2A under anvil of Human Rights, Constitutional Rights and International Charters: As per our reading, on interpreting the order dated 3rd September, 2004 passed in the injunction application being no. G.A. 3392 of 2004, though the learned Trial Judge felt and was convinced that a prima facie case was made out to pass ad-interim order in terms of prayer (b), but no specific order of injunction restraining the defendants from doing something, namely, the airing of the said story as alleged was passed by the learned Trial Judge. In our considered view that finding of learned Trial Court “Taking the allegation as contained in the plaint and in the application for injunction, I feel that unless an ad interim order is passed in terms of prayer (b) of this application, the situation will become irreversible by the time the application is decided finally on merits, particularly, when a case of loss of business has been made out in the application and I am convinced that, at least for the purpose of the said interim order, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case” cannot be identified as a specific order of injunction restraining the defendants and their servants, agents, assigns etc. from publishing by telecast or otherwise the advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 of the application. from publishing by telecast or otherwise the advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 of the application. In view of such position, the basic ingredients and/or the basic molecular components of the foundational fact of disobedience in respect of any order of injunction, which is the subject matter of a decision under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, as per our reading was absent for the simple logic that there was no order of restrain/injunction passed by the learned Trial Judge from airing the advertisement, in its strict application, which is required to be considered while deciding any application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A to resort the punitive modes of attachment of the property, which in the broader aspect on analysis of the rights to hold “property”, a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India as well as a right under the domain of human rights concept in terms of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which under Clause (2) of Article 17 speaks “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property”. The concept attributing status of human rights in the “right to property” on its multifaceted approach in the right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. has also entered into the field of property rights, whereby even the legal principle of adverse possession theory is contoured with the human rights concept, as viewed by the European Courts of Human Rights, which has been discussed in details by Apex Court of India in the case PT Munchikkanna Reddy vs. Renamma, reported in 2007 (6) SCC 59 and in the case Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhibaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2007 (8) SCC 705 . Since the right to property is now within the arena of human rights concept and by attachment of the property, there is deprivation of enjoyment of such property rights, in our view, the Court should be more cautious and careful even in passing any order of attachment of the property, a mode to execute the injunction order, on allegation of disobedience thereof, under Order XXXIX Rule 2A by analyzing and testing strictly that the material ingredients to attract such statutory provision of the Code have been fulfilled, namely, (1) existence of an order of injunction; (2) factual foundation that disobedience is continuing; (3) actions/inactions contributing such factual foundation of disobedience. Besides the order of attachment, the Court is armed to pass an order of detention in civil prison against whom allegation of disobedience of injunction order is made. The order of detention of a person has a serious consequence under the anvil of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which as per our reading should be passed by the Court of law only on a positive and specific findings that there was a serious nature of disobedience existing. Even in a civil litigation, the concept of Article 21 of the Constitution of India could be brought as has been done by the Apex Court, when a judgment debtor upon being a pauper failed to satisfy the money decree had to suffer the civil imprisonment in the case Jolly George Varghese & Anr. Vs. The Bank of Cochin, reported in AIR 1980 SC 470 . While dealing with the case, though Order XXI Rule 32 of Civil Procedure Code prescribes arrest and detention in civil prison under contingency as stipulated, the Apex Court considered the application of Article 11 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, which reads “no one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation”. To remain free is a precious and valuable right of a human being and it is firmly protected by the constitutional mandate with a rider of different contingency, wherein such freedom could be curtailed. To remain free is a precious and valuable right of a human being and it is firmly protected by the constitutional mandate with a rider of different contingency, wherein such freedom could be curtailed. Such protective umbrella of Article 21 reads such: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” There is no doubt that under Order XXXIX Rule 2A when there will be presence of satisfactory foundational elements of disobedience, which requires implementation and/or execution of the order of injunction due to disobedience to comply with the order, the Court is empowered to pass such an order of detention depriving a person from his personal liberty so long protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India but when it is a question of personal liberty and deprivation of such liberty by bringing out it from the protective umbrella of constitutional provision under Article 21, naturally, it requires a high degree of subjective satisfaction of the Court for the purpose of passing such an order of detention in prison to implement and execute the order of injunction on being fully satisfied about the intramolecular components of each and every components of the factual foundation of disobedience and the condition precedent of applicability of the provision of Order XXXIX Rule 2A on such factual foundations with angle of its objectivity, namely, the continuance of such disobedience in its true sprit and letter. On considering distinguishing features of the Court’s power to exercise the jurisdiction under Contempt of Courts Act where elements of continuity of such disobedience are not at all the relevant consideration of the Court to impose punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act by taking away the personal liberty as per statutory provision of said Section, which is a procedure established by law in terms of Article 21, there is no cavil on the principle of law that the Order XXXIX Rule 2A is also a procedure established by law to bring someone outside of the constitutional umbrella of Article 21, but such procedure established by law requires strict fulfillment of all procedural ingredients, its material components and its molecular organic structure when there will be a question of depriving someone of his personal liberty under statutory rigour “a procedure established by law” being an exceptional clause empowering the Court of law to deprive someone from his personal liberty. Judging the matter in that angle, the Order XXXIX Rule 2A has a great impact of its applicability not only on the situational factum but also of substantive material ingredients availability and satisfaction thereof to apply the modes, either attachment of property and/or detention in the civil prison or both. It requires a strict and very strict consideration by the Court of law before applying the said rigourous provisions though being a “procedure of law” in terms of Article 21, to apply, for bringing out someone from the protective umbrella of the Constitution under Article 21. Litmus Test of said analysis on impugned judgment: On that score, the judgment under appeal before us will throw a light as to whether the learned Trial Judge in deciding the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was satisfied with the material molecular components of structural organ of disobedience weaved by factual fibres in terms of our finding and observation as already discussed to pass the order of detention in civil prison. Order of learned Trial Judge dated 27th July, 2006 reads such: “This application has been taken out by the plaintiff alleging breach of order of injunction passed by this Court on 3rd September, 2004 on the interlocutory application made by the plaintiffs being G.A. No. 3392 of 2004. The plaintiff and the first defendant are manufacturers of food products described to be the health drink. The plaintiff and the first defendant are manufacturers of food products described to be the health drink. Both the parties are in market of this product. According to the plaintiff they have been manufacturing and marketing their products for over centuries almost all over the world with extensive and high degree of reputation as to quality and efficacy of their product under the brand name “Horlicks”, whereas the defendant No. 1 has been in the market for some time and they are also manufacturing their products under the brand “Complan”. Both the manufacturers claimed that their products were based on milk with the ingredients, vitamins and minerals. It is the case of the plaintiff that there is no illegality to produce and market parallel food products and to remain in market on its own quality and efficacy, and healthy competition is always helpful as far as its product and the plaintiff is concerned. The plaintiff complains in this case that first defendant complicated the market situation by making disparaging advertisement with content aiming at to undermine and belittle the reputation and efficacy of their product “Horlicks” in the mind of the public at large. This advertisement has been made not only in the newspaper but also through television channels by making pictorial storyboard. The nature of the disparaging advertisement through television channels aired by the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 for and on behalf of the first defendant who had given instruction or engaged through the marketing agent to air and publish their products with reference to undermining and disparaging remarks. The pictorial story aired by the television channels is stated hereunder: (i) The advertisement started off by showing a school bus and kids rushing to get on to it. The TV advertisement first showed one school boy laughing, then showed two girls laughing and finally showed all the school children laughing at the attempts of one school boy hanging from the central bar in the bus apparently in a desperate bid to gain some height. (ii) The advertisement then showed a smart school boy walking upto the boy hanging from the central bar in the bus who is being laughed at and ridiculed by all other school children. He was advised by the smart boy to ask his mother to give him Complan which is necessary for growing up (growing tall). (ii) The advertisement then showed a smart school boy walking upto the boy hanging from the central bar in the bus who is being laughed at and ridiculed by all other school children. He was advised by the smart boy to ask his mother to give him Complan which is necessary for growing up (growing tall). (iii) Two cups were then projected – one murky brown cup with ‘Brand H’ written thereon and the other pre and extra white cup with ‘Complan’ written thereon in the background of the TV frame there was a scale shown behind the murky brown cup of Brand H. A white coloured liquid was shown being poured into the Brand H Cup while a brown coloured liquid was poured into the white coloured Complan Cup. There was a visual depiction of the Complan cup growing in height and becoming almost double the height of the Brand H cup, which registered Nil growth. (iv) While this visual depiction of extra growth was being shown for the Complan cup as compared to the Brand H cup, there was a voice-over which strongly and emphatically claimed that Complan had 100% more milk protein than Brand H…23 vital nutrients that give extra growing power. (v) The advertisement proceeded to show the same boy, who had been previously hanging on the central bar of the bus, laughing and waving his hand. He is asked by the same smart boy as to whether his mother has started giving him Complan. He replies in the affirmative and compares the increase in his height with his friend and finds that practically overnight he is as tall as his friend. He proudly declares that he too now was a Complan boy.” According to the plaintiff by reason of the said advertisement through television channels aired by the defendant No. 3, 4 respectively in their various programmes at the several time slots there has been tremendous prejudicial effect in the mind of the public consumer at large. The research study conducted by the expert body showed that almost in every sphere of the advertisement audience had the impression that the product of the plaintiff under the brand Horlicks is of inferior in quality as far as the efficacy and ability of growing power in comparison to the Complan is concerned. The research study conducted by the expert body showed that almost in every sphere of the advertisement audience had the impression that the product of the plaintiff under the brand Horlicks is of inferior in quality as far as the efficacy and ability of growing power in comparison to the Complan is concerned. It has become belief in mind of the consumer public that Complan is a superior quality of health drinks. According to the plaintiff this is absolutely and highly unfair trade practice and this is not permissible under the law to destroy and malign the good will and reputation which has been acquired over centuries in the market. So the plaintiff on the aforesaid background brought this civil action asking for decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and each of them and their servants, agents or assigns from publishing by telecast or otherwise the aforesaid advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 of the plaint or any advertisement similar thereto reflecting adversely on the plaintiff’s product “Horlicks” in any manner whatsoever; Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no. 1 and its servants, agents or assigns from publishing any advertisement similar or substantially similar to the advertisement published in Ananda Bazar Patrika being Annexure ‘E1’ to the plaint and from continuing to telecast or causing to be telecast further the advertisement/publicity similar to or substantially similar to the advertisement mentioned in paragraph 13 of the plaint, a copy whereof is annexure ‘E1’ thereto or containing any comparison with Brand ‘H’ or any brand referring to HORLICKS directly or indirectly. Special damages in the sum of Rupees 3 crores, enquiry into damage and Decree for damages for such sum and in respect of such periods as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper. In connection with the said suit the plaintiff took out an interlocutory application as mentioned hereinabove. His Lordship Mr. Special damages in the sum of Rupees 3 crores, enquiry into damage and Decree for damages for such sum and in respect of such periods as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper. In connection with the said suit the plaintiff took out an interlocutory application as mentioned hereinabove. His Lordship Mr. Justice Subhro Kamal Mukherjee on 3rd September, 2004 being satisfied with the prima facie case and in presence of the learned Counsel for the respondents passed an interim order as follows: “Taking the allegation as contained in the plaint and in the application for injunction, I feel that unless an ad interim order is passed in terms of prayer (b) of this application the situation will become irreversible by the time the application is decided finally on merit, particularly when a case of loss of business has been made out in the application I am convinced that, at least for the purpose of the said interim order, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. However, this order will not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter H in the said advertisement.” His Lordship was also pleased to give direction for filing affidavit. I am told that said interim order is still valid and subsisting and operation of the same at no point of time had been stayed. The plaintiff says that there has been violation of the aforesaid order by each of the defendants, so two contempt applications have been taken out and the said contempt applications are still pending for hearing. These contempt applications have been taken out under the provision of contempt of Courts Act read with Order 39 Rule (2A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the plaintiff subject matter of the aforesaid two applications are absolutely different and separate and the same have noting to do with the present grievance. It is the grievance of the plaintiff in the application that during pendency of the aforesaid contempt application the defendant no. 1 again has started airing advertisement through television channels with the same very programme in a shorter version which is identical and categorical. In the advertising world it is called tag and this was done through the respondent No. 4 who aired through its television channel till sometimes in November 2005. 1 again has started airing advertisement through television channels with the same very programme in a shorter version which is identical and categorical. In the advertising world it is called tag and this was done through the respondent No. 4 who aired through its television channel till sometimes in November 2005. The plaintiff instead of taking out third contempt application for the subsequent breach, is to take out instant application for getting remedial measure under the provision of Order 39 Rule (2A) of Code of Civil Procedure. Although affidavits have been filed by the concerned respondents in support of their respective submission and averments. The plaintiff has got affidavit of third party which has made a research study while watching the said programme and supported the case of the plaintiff that after passing of the order of injunction the said version of the advertisement programme has been aired. The respondents Nos. 1 and 4 and each of them have explained in their affidavit in opposition their position. The first respondent says that after passing of the order of injunction, through its officials routine instruction was given to their various advertisement agents and also the aforesaid television channel company and asked its specifically not to air such advertisement in view of the order of injunction passed by this Court. In spite of such instruction the shorter version of the programme was aired through inadvertent mistake, and despite best effort being taken airing of advertisement of shorter version could not be avoided because there has been communication gap or ignorance on the part of the officials of the television channel company. Fourth respondent has explained in its affidavit that no specific instruction was given to them to stop airing the programme in shorter version as such through bona fide mistake and out of ignorance it was continued till some times in November, 2005 despite order of injunction. When it was detected it has stopped airing this programme. Upon reading of the pleadings of all the parties filed in the application it is quite clear that there has been subsequent airing of advertisement in spite of the order passed by this Court. Mr. When it was detected it has stopped airing this programme. Upon reading of the pleadings of all the parties filed in the application it is quite clear that there has been subsequent airing of advertisement in spite of the order passed by this Court. Mr. Sarkar learned senior advocate contends that when there has been breach of order of injunction the Court should take appropriate step under Order 39 Rule (2A) of Code of Civil Procedure, the respondents and each of them is in habit of committing breach. As such successive preventive action by way of contempt proceedings under the provision of Contempt of Court Act 1971 and Article 215 of the Constitution of India have to be taken. The said contempt applications are pending for hearing in this matter when there has been repeated breach, court should take stern view of the matter and take appropriately deterrent step not only against these two respondents but against their officers as well. The explanation given by the defendant No. 1 and 4th defendant are self-contradictory and inconsistent, but one thing is very clear that there has been breach undisputedly. Accordingly to him mere giving an instruction and/or writing a letter by the defendant No. 1 to the agent of the television channel companies is neither sincere nor adequate to respect to the order of the Court. Something more should have been done by taking positive action so that order of the Court would not have been breached on each and every occasion. Their mind-set is absolutely targeted to flout the order of the Court. They do not deserve any sympathy or soft treatment in this regard. Mr. Sudipto Sarkar the learned senior counsel for the defendant No. 1 contends that in substance the order has been carried out and the airing of the programme with storyboard of school bus has been stopped and there has been no reference to the product Horlicks either in broader sense or in shorter version. However, shorter version of the advertisement was published for some times because of the communication gap or for the reason beyond control of the advertising agent and/or his client. He has taken me through the various letters and documents wherefrom he submits, it will appear that all possible instruction was given to all agencies to stop airing programmes through television channels unfortunately for some times it continued. He has taken me through the various letters and documents wherefrom he submits, it will appear that all possible instruction was given to all agencies to stop airing programmes through television channels unfortunately for some times it continued. For this reason his client tenders unqualified apology to this Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the defendant No. 4 contends that no positive instruction was given to stop airing the programme of shorter version as such through inadvertent mistake shorter version in reference to the product Horlicks in violation of the order continued for some time. The moment it is detected this advertisement has been stopped. His client also tenders unqualified apology to this Court. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and read the respective pleadings and materials placed before me the following facts emerges. On the application of the petitioner Justice Subhro Kamal Mukherjee on 3rd September, 2004 was pleased to pass an order in terms of prayer (b). The petitioner alleging deliberate and wilful violation of the said order dated 3rd September, 2004 has filed two contempt applications, one was filed on 17th September, 2004 moved on 24th September, 2004. The petitioner made another contempt application complaining deliberate and wilful violation of the above order. Both the aforesaid two applications are pending for hearing. Interlocutory application on which the interim order was passed is also pending. By this order the respondents and each of them were restrained from publishing by telecast or otherwise the advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 of the plaint. However, it was made clear by the same very order that this will not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing advertisement of its products without showing the cup marked with the letter “H” in the said advertisement. By this application the petitioner has alleged that telecast of a abridged or truncated version of the main advertisement showing the cup with the letter H had again been resumed from 5th November, 2004 and had been continuing almost every day through the television channel owned by Akash Bangla. This information has been received by the Group M. Media India Pvt. Ltd. by letter dated 23rd November, 2004. In the affidavit in opposition the allegations made in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the petition have merely been denied. This information has been received by the Group M. Media India Pvt. Ltd. by letter dated 23rd November, 2004. In the affidavit in opposition the allegations made in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the petition have merely been denied. It has been stated therein opposition that immediately after passing of the order dated 3rd September, 2004, the respondent No. 1 by a communication addressed to the respondent No. 4 instructed to stop telecasting the advertisement relating to the product “Complan” as detailed in the said communication. It is true these letters were written to the other respondents who are owners of the television channels. But, the text of the order was not communicated with the letter of instruction, written by Sm. Seema Modi dated 3rd September, 2004 which is reproduced hereunder, the respondent No. 4 could not know the restraint order: “As per Calcutta High Court order, we have to withdraw advertisement which depicts ‘Mug with Branch H’. However, there is no restraint on airing the same advertisement which has ‘Mug with Brand X’. Request you to take immediate action on this and expedite.” The version of the defendant No. 1 is that in spite of such communication the truncated version depicting ‘Mug with brand H’ was advertised. It is the mistake on the part of the television channel company. The affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 4. It has denied that any instruction was ever given by the respondent No. 1 and/or its agent to withdraw advertisement of the abridged and/or truncated version depicting ‘Mug with the brand H’. Finally they withdrew advertisement from the weekly programme from 11th November, 2004 with such mistake was detected. The facts remain that truncated and abridged version of the advertisement in spite of the order, was published by the respondent No. 1 through the respondent No. 4. The explanation given by the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 are far from satisfactory. In my view giving instruction which is in my opinion vague and without any bonafide object, to the advertising company is not good enough to prove obedience to the order of the Court. The effort should have been effective, sincere and honest. The respondent No. 4 should have understood that all types of advertisement depicting Mug with the Brand H has been prohibited be it an abridged or truncated version. The effort should have been effective, sincere and honest. The respondent No. 4 should have understood that all types of advertisement depicting Mug with the Brand H has been prohibited be it an abridged or truncated version. The explanation of the respondent No. 4 that there was no instruction by the defendant No. 1 to stop airing the truncated and abridged version as such it was aired, is like lullaby. The words of the order were clear that it had prohibited advertising or airing in any manner, in spite of that it has been done, notwithstanding it is a party to the said application and suit. The question is whether the provision of Order 39 Rule 2A is applied in this case or not. The language of that order is as follows: “2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction. – (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, of any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.” It will appear from the aforesaid language unlike definition of civil contempt in the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 that the breach of order of injunction is not required to be deliberate or wilful rather mere proof of breach is good enough. It is true the Court has power to pass appropriate order but it must proceed with a restrained manner. It is true the Court has power to pass appropriate order but it must proceed with a restrained manner. Though the words “willful and deliberate” are not mentioned like corresponding provision in the Contempt of Court Act 1971, I think approach of the Court should be similar to that of proceedings for civil contempt. Two successive contempt applications have been taken out and the same are still pending and this is the third one. So I have no doubt in my mind that the defendants and each of them are absolutely careless and callous of obeying order of injunction, rather they are trying to defy the Court’s order willfully. The apparent version of the respondents No. 1 and 4 appears to be that it was a sheer mistake. This casual justification hardly establishes innocent violation. It is clear that they have not taken the Court’s order seriously though ultimately they have stopped airing such advertisement. Under such circumstances, in my view, the respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 4 are guilty of committing breach of the order under the aforesaid provisions. Now the question is what punishment should be awarded for the aforesaid breach. Since at present there has been no telecasting of the prohibited version of the advertisement and it has been stopped totally since November, 2004. I think passing order of attachment of their property is not required. In my opinion order of attachment is to be passed for continuous and repeated breach of injunction passed by the Court. Just because it has been stopped the Court cannot excuse the contemnors, therefore, I hold that both the respondents No. 1 and 4 are guilty of breach of order of injunction passed by this Court earlier. Accordingly, one of the Principal Officers viz. Ms. Seema Modi, the General Marketing Manager of the respondent no. 1, be committed to the civil prison for a period of seven days from the date of taking her to custody. I, therefore, direct the said Ms. Seema Modi to be personally present three weeks hence in the Court at 2 o’clock when the Sheriff of this Court will remain present and take her custody and/or make over her person to the Superintendent of the Presidency Jail for serving the terms. I, therefore, direct the said Ms. Seema Modi to be personally present three weeks hence in the Court at 2 o’clock when the Sheriff of this Court will remain present and take her custody and/or make over her person to the Superintendent of the Presidency Jail for serving the terms. Similarly, I direct to commit and to detain the Managing Director, Zee Telefilms Limited in the civil prison for a period of three days for violation of the order of injunction passed by this Court. Therefore, he shall appear personally before this at the same time. In addition thereto the aforesaid two defendants/respondents shall pay costs of this application assessed at Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 5000/- respectively to the petitioner. Stay of operation of the judgment and order has been prayed for on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4. Mr. Sarkar objects to such prayer. Since I have given three weeks time, there is an inbuilt stay and I do not think any formal stay is required to be granted. Parties concerned are to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of the judgment and order to be made available to the parties as early as possible.” From the aforesaid judgment of the learned Trial Judge under appeal before us it appears that the learned Trial Judge discussed the facts of initiation of civil suit, filing of injunction application, the order passed thereof and the subsequent events of the two contempt applications as filed earlier and thereby reached to the observation and finding as follows: “Two successive contempt applications have been taken out and the same are still pending and this is the third one. So I have no doubt in my mind that the defendants and each of them are absolutely careless and callous of obeying order of injunction, rather they are trying to defy the Court’s order willfully. The apparent version of the respondents No. 1 and 4 appears to be that it was a sheer mistake. This casual justification hardly establishes innocent violation. …………………………………… I hold that both the respondents No. 1 and 4 are guilty of breach of order of injunction passed by this Court earlier. Accordingly, one of the Principal Officers viz. Ms. Seema Modi, the General Marketing Manager of the respondent no. This casual justification hardly establishes innocent violation. …………………………………… I hold that both the respondents No. 1 and 4 are guilty of breach of order of injunction passed by this Court earlier. Accordingly, one of the Principal Officers viz. Ms. Seema Modi, the General Marketing Manager of the respondent no. 1, be committed to the civil prison for a period of seven days from the date of taking her to custody. I, therefore, direct the said Ms. Seema Modi to be personally present three weeks hence in the Court at 2 o’clock when the Sheriff of this Court will remain present and take her custody and/or make over her person to the Superintendent of the Presidency Jail for serving the terms. Similarly, I direct to commit and to detain the Managing Director, Zee Telefilms Limited in the civil prison for a period of three days for violation of the order of injunction passed by this Court. Therefore, he shall appear personally before this at the same time. In addition thereto the aforesaid two defendants/respondents shall pay costs of this application assessed at Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 5000/- respectively to the petitioner.” By reading the judgment under appeal it appears that learned Trial Judge while imposing the order of detention in civil prison to the respective parties, namely, Ms. Seema Modi and the Managing Director of Zee Telefilms Limited for the respective periods held “it is clear that they have not taken the Court’s order seriously though ultimately they have stopped airing such advertisement”. Learned Trial Judge further held “two successive contempt applications have been taken out and the same are still pending and this is the third one. So I have no doubt in my mind that the defendants and each of them are absolutely careless and callous of obeying order of injunction, rather they are trying to defy the Court’s order wilfully. The apparent version of the respondents Nos. 1 & 4 appears to be that it was a sheer mistake. This casual justification hardly establishes innocent violation”. Learned Trial Judge further held while passing the punishment order “I hold both the respondents No. 1 and 4 are guilty of breach of order of injunction passed by this Court earlier”. The apparent version of the respondents Nos. 1 & 4 appears to be that it was a sheer mistake. This casual justification hardly establishes innocent violation”. Learned Trial Judge further held while passing the punishment order “I hold both the respondents No. 1 and 4 are guilty of breach of order of injunction passed by this Court earlier”. On a bare reading of the said findings of the judgment under appeal it appears that learned Trial Judge while passing the impugned judgment under appeal was inspired more from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, rather the jurisprudential, conceptual and contextual concept of Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code. Under Contempt of Courts Act as already discussed that for breach of any order willfully and deliberately, if any, despite purging of such contemtuous act and conduct alleged and proved and tendering of apology, ipso facto, will not exempt the alleged contemnor found guilty to suffer punishment under Section 12 of the said Act. Reliance may be placed to the views of Apex Court on such issue to the case T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 1995 (4) SCC 1 . So far as tendering of apology is concerned to avail the benefits under proviso of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, where there is a scope to tender such apology seeking exemption of punishment in lieu thereof, it is a settled law that even mere tendering of apology will not exempt the accused of the contempt proceeding who has been found guilty of the charges to have exemption from suffering the punishment and/or remission of such punishment as awarded. It is the Court’s discretion to consider it. But on issue of imprisonment to jail arose out of criminal contempt and/or in a civil contempt, whatever it may be, the Court is empowered to exercise the discretion and may impose fine in lieu of imprisonment to jail. The punishment of imprisonment to jail is passed when there is a gross and outrageous contemptuous conduct, where acceptance of unconditional apology would not be sufficient to exempt punishment to jail and to satisfy the justice such punishment could be imposed. The punishment of imprisonment to jail is passed when there is a gross and outrageous contemptuous conduct, where acceptance of unconditional apology would not be sufficient to exempt punishment to jail and to satisfy the justice such punishment could be imposed. From the impugned judgment under appeal it appears that learned Trial Judge directed His Lordship’s mind to decide the issue in the angle of Contempt of Courts Act and for that reason held “though ultimately they have stopped airing such advertisement, under such circumstances, in my view, respondent no. 1 and 4 are guilty of committing breach of the order under the aforesaid provisions”. Further His Lordship while imposing the punishment also observed “Since at present there has been no telecasting of the prohibited version of the advertisement and it has been stopped totally since November, 2004, I think passing of the order of attachment of their property is not required. ………. Just because it has been stopped the Court cannot excuse the contemnors, therefore, I hold that both the respondents no. 1 and 4 are guilty of breach of order of injunction …………accordingly respondent no. 1 be committed to the civil prison for a period of 7 days from the date of taking her in custody. …… Similarly, I direct to commit and to detain the Managing Director of Zee Telefilms Limited in the civil prison for a period of three days for violation of the order of injunction”. From the very nature of said findings and observation of learned Trial Judge, it is explicit that the learned Trial Judge practically decided the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A as an application under the Contempt of Courts Act and thereby despite the recording of the fact that the breach was not subsisting since November, 2004, i.e., prior to the date of filing the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which admittedly was moved on 6th December, 2004, proceeded to find the defendant-respondents guilty of the charge of disobedience of the injunction order and imposed the penalty. Had it been a proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, this Court is of the view that there was no doubt even to pass such an order, which under the legal parlance would have been considered as an order passed exercising jurisdiction vested under the Contempt of Courts Act. Had it been a proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, this Court is of the view that there was no doubt even to pass such an order, which under the legal parlance would have been considered as an order passed exercising jurisdiction vested under the Contempt of Courts Act. But since it is an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, in view of our earlier discussion as made at length and breadth, the angle of adjudicatory method applied by the learned Trial Judge, with due respect, was nothing but a misdirection to decide the issue under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code. From the impugned judgment under appeal it further appears that the learned Trial Judge himself was of the view that attachment of the property would not be appropriate as because telecasting of the prohibited version of the advertisement was stopped totally since November, 2004. This portion of the order of the Trial Judge is very much appreciable as it is within the field of an order under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which speaks that for implementation and/or execution of injunction order, coercive measures of attachment of property should be resorted to by the Court of law. From the very findings and observation of learned Trial Judge, namely, “Since at present there has been no telecasting of the prohibited version of the advertisement and it has been stopped totally since November, 2004, I think passing order of attachment of their property is not required” being an order under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, could be considered as a material foundation to test as to whether the subsequent findings and observation, namely, finding of guilty and imposition of order of detention in civil prison, was justified. Under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, now it is a settled proposition in view of the judgment of the Apex Court Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra) that it is nothing but in the nature of execution of a temporary injunction order having a parity with the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, it is clear from the statutory interpretation of Order XXXIX Rule 2A that as a coercive measures to compel the person who breached the order of injunction and/or caused disobedience of such, Civil Court is empowered to pass order of attachment or detention to civil prison, alternatively or both to rectify/remedy the breach. So far as order of attachment is concerned, there is a rider as already discussed that the same would continue for one year as per Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2A aforesaid and thereafter the attached property is liable to be sold so that the sale proceeds could be awarded as a compensation to the injured party. Similarly, when any order of detention in civil prison is passed, the object is to implement the order of injunction and as such, under the statute, time has been limited to three months with a rider that the Court during this period may release the person concerned, which pre-supposes the conceptual view similar to the attachment procedures that once the order of the Court is carried out and breach is rectified, the person concerned will be released from the civil prison. Under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, there is no doubt that the Court is empowered to take any coercive measures, namely, attachment or detention and both and further it is the discretion of the Court either to pass any order of attachment of property or detention in the civil prison in view of the settled law in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court in Samee Khan (supra), as both said two coercive measures have been placed in the statute under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. The jurisprudential concept and interpretation, accordingly, mandates that both the said two coercive measures, attachment of property and detention in civil prison, have the same object, namely, the implementation of the order of injunction. It is a settled legal position of statutory interpretation principle that when two measures are prescribed in a particular section for remedy of anything, the said two measures always should be considered and applied in the identical degree with identical shade and colour to satisfy the object of meaning and purpose of statute. It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. It is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. In the language of Viscount Simonds “it is an elementary rule” as per his decision A.G. vs. H.R.H. Prince Ernest Agustus, reported in (1957) 1 All. E.R. 49 at page 55 (HL). It has been termed by Lord Somervell of Harrow as it appears from the said report a “compelling rule”. As per views expressed by Lord Devy in the case Canada Sugar Refining Co. vs. R, reported in (1898) AC 735 at page 742 “every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter”, which has been followed recently in the case Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of T.N., reported in 2002 (3) SCC 533 . It is also spoken as construction “ex visceribus actus” as it appears from the report of the case Newspapers Limited vs. Industrial Tribunal, UP, reported in AIR 1957 SC 532 at page 536, Mohan Kumar Singhania & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 594. Views expressed by Sir John Nicholl in the case H.R.H. Prince Ernest Agustus (supra) that “the key to the opening of every law is the reason and sprit of the law – it is the animus imponents, the intention of the law maker, expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole”. As held by Hon’ble Justice B.K. Mukherjea in the case Poppatlal Shah vs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1953 SC 274 “it is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of the statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the act itself”. Same view expressed by His Lordship in the language “words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context, but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the act itself”, in the case Darshan Singh Balwant Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1953 SC 83 . It is the same view of Hon’ble Justice S.K. Das in the case Ram Narayan vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1957 SC 18 that “the meanings of words and expressions used in an act must take their colour from the context in which they appear”. “The words and sections like men do not have their full significance when standing alone, like men they are better understood by the company they keep” is the view expressed by the Apex Court in the case Kesar Singh vs. State, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1883 , which has been re-echoed again in the case Commission of Income Tax, Bangalore vs. Venkateswara Hatcheries, reported in 1999 (3) SCC 632 . It is also a settled position “when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of diverse meaning, a word is capable of according to lexicographers”, is the views expressed by the Apex Court in the case Mango Singh vs. Election Tribunal, reported in AIR 1957 SC 871 . It is the view expressed by the Apex Court in the case Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1029 that “words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. Therefore, it not be construed in isolation”. It is the view expressed by the Apex Court in the case Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1029 that “words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. Therefore, it not be construed in isolation”. Lord Herschell in the case Colguhoun vs. Brooks, reported in (1889) 14 AC 493 as quoted and relied in the case M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand & Anr., reported in (1978) 2 SCC 144 at para 5 that “it is beyond dispute, too, that we are entitled and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act”. Having regard to the aforesaid settled legal position on interpretation of a statutory provision and the different words and phrases therein, it is clear that words and clauses of a statute takes it colour and meaning from the contextual purpose of the statute itself. In that angle, we are of the view that the word “detention in civil prison” will takes the colour and meaning from the contextual aspect of the provision Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which is nothing but a provision to execute/implement the temporary injunction order by resorting the coercive modes in case of a continuing breach by attachment of the property or by “detention in civil prison” or both. The words “detention in civil prison” cannot be considered in its isolation but in the angle of contextual purpose of the statutory provision Order XXXIX Rule 2A and its purposive effect, only to execute/implement the injunction order similar to the mode as could be applied by resorting to “attachment to property and sale thereof”. The words “detention in civil prison” cannot be considered in its isolation but in the angle of contextual purpose of the statutory provision Order XXXIX Rule 2A and its purposive effect, only to execute/implement the injunction order similar to the mode as could be applied by resorting to “attachment to property and sale thereof”. As the learned Trial Judge as per His Lordship’s view considered that the punishment of detention in civil prison would be justified despite the finding “that the breach was not subsisting and it was stopped long back in November, 2004”, we have to consider the meaning of the said word, its width and amplitude and degree of acceptability and limit in the contextual contour of Order XXXIX Rule 2A. It is a settled legal position that a word changes its meaning like “chameleon changes its colour in a particular environment”. Every word has two meanings, one its ‘denotation’ and the other its ‘connotation’. ‘Denotation’ means one of its dictionary meanings, whereas ‘connotation’ means the meaning obtained by its association with other words. The words in an enactment have a society meaning or connotation themselves expressed by saying words are interpreted “Noscitur a sociis”. The word “Noscitur” means “to know” and the word “sociis” means “association”. The said Latin phrase “Noscitur a sociis” means “to know the meaning by association or accordingly to the context”. The views expressed to discuss the meaning as par Lord Macmillan’s observation, it reads “a word known by the company it keeps”. Applying the test under the said maxim “Noscitur a sociis”, we are of view that when the words “may also order such person to detain” as preceded by the word “may order the property of the person ………. to be attached” in Order XXXIX Rule 2A, the meaning of the words “to be detained in the civil prison” applying the connotation meaning as discussed and the said principle will assume its meaning by association with the word “attachment of property” and in the context of the Order XXXIX Rule 2A, whose pervasive context and the objective mandate is nothing but execution of the temporary order of injunction in the language of the Apex Court views expressed in Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra) on parity with the object of Order XXI Rule 32. Learned Trial Judge, accordingly, failed to address the real test of identifying the meaning of the word “detention in civil prison” in its contextual perspective of Order XXXIX Rule 2A, by its objective contour as limited by the legislatures as par their wisdom, by holding otherwise that “though there was no necessity to pass any order of attachment but in view of the breach as committed penalty of detention in prison order should be passed”. The very finding of the learned Trial Judge to pass the order of detention in civil prison is against the basic contextual purpose, objective outlook and the subjective determination of Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Order XXXIX Rule 2A never has a simile and/or identity with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Taking the risk of repetition, we are of the view that the entire tenor of the judgment under appeal, the mind track of the learned Trial Judge and the spirit of the order impugned, all were channelized to decide the issue as if it was a case under the Contempt of Courts Act by exercising the jurisdiction under the said Act, though in fact in a civil litigation it was only an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, when already there was no existence and/or subsistence of the breach of injunction order, if any. As already discussed, applying the principle of “Noscitur a sociis” and “ex visceribus actus”, the two measures/modes under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is required to be considered in the identical angle and edge of appreciation and its meaning thereof, with avowed object of implementation of the order of injunction, except that nothing more and nothingless. As already discussed, applying the principle of “Noscitur a sociis” and “ex visceribus actus”, the two measures/modes under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is required to be considered in the identical angle and edge of appreciation and its meaning thereof, with avowed object of implementation of the order of injunction, except that nothing more and nothingless. The foundational facts under Order XXXIX Rule 2A when was absent even in the pleading of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A in view of the contention made in the said application by the respondent-plaintiff in paragraph 16 that “Group-M Media India Private Limited who was engaged by them to identify the fact as to whether truncated portion of the advertisement was being aired in the TV channel or not, informed that the telecast of abridge and/or truncated version of the main advertisement showing the cup with letter “H” was aired till 11th November, 2004” and when a supporting document to that effect being the letter dated 23rd November, 2004 with the detail particulars of the airing of the said advertisement was annexed and when the learned Trial Judge also was satisfied that there was no airing of said truncated version of advertisement and it was stopped in November, 2004 and when in the pleading in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, there was no such averment that the defendants were even continuing with the act of airing the truncated version of main advertisement even when the application was affirmed on 2nd December, 2004, we are of the view that it goes to the root of the jurisdictional arena to entertain the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A and to pass the impugned judgment and order under appeal. Learned Trial Judge once was satisfied that there was no breach continuing and it ceased long back in November, 2004, learned Trial Judge ought to have disposed of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A by directing that there was no necessity to pass any order similar to the observation as passed that there was no necessity to attach the property and thereby ought to have disposed of the application since nothing remained to be executed on the date of passing of the judgment and/or on the date of filing the application to execute the temporary injunction order, which is the main purpose and object of Order XXXIX Rule 2A following the dictum of the Apex Court judgment passed in the case Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra). Hence, we are of the considered view that there was no material facts pleaded and/or there was no molecular ingredients of disobedience factors of the order of injunction alleged in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which is the basic foundation of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A for execution of the temporary injunction order and as such, the learned Trial Judge erred in law by passing the impugned judgment under appeal when admittedly the jurisdictional fact to exercise the power vested under the statute under Order XXXIX Rule 2A were absent not only on the date of passing the judgment but also on the date when the application was affirmed and thereafter moved in December, 2004. It is a settled legal position that until and unless there is a pleading on factual matrix to invite the jurisdiction by a Court of law, which in the legal parlance is called as “jurisdictional fact”, being sine qua non of exercising the jurisdiction, no Court of law can exercise such jurisdiction to impose the order of detention, which is impugned in this appeal. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case Director, Food And Supplies, Punjab & Anr. Vs. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case Director, Food And Supplies, Punjab & Anr. Vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in 2007 (5) SCC 727 , where the Apex Court while dealing with the case under the Industrial Dispute Act held that the question whether the appellant was an industry or not under Section 2(j) of the said Act when was not decided by the learned Court below, it goes to the root of the matter as “jurisdictional factor, namely, existence of industrial dispute, which is essence of exercising the jurisdiction and in absence of such the same invalidate the reference”. The consideration of the jurisdictional fact was dealt with by the Privy Council in the case Nusserwanjee Pestinjee vs. Meer Mynoodeen Khan, reported in (1855) 6 MIA 134 (PC), there the Court held “whenever a jurisdiction is given to a Court by an act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that act, it is an universal principle that these terms must be complied with in order to create and raise the jurisdiction and if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise”. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case Mohammed Hasnuddin vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1979 (2) SCC 572 and Kothamasu Kanakarathamma & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 304 . While dealing with the applicability of the said principle upon the statutory authority, the Apex Court considered the matter by holding that “facts if jurisdictional that is when any jurisdiction of any authority to decide a matter raised on certain facts presence, the absence of such facts, will lead an illegality of exercise of such jurisdiction” in the case Arun Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2007 (1) SCC 732 . While dealing with the matter about applicability of section 17 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of identity of any waste arable land, the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction of the authority is depending upon a preliminary finding of fact that land was waste land to exercise the jurisdiction in the case Raja Anand Brahma Shah vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 1081 , similar view in the case The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Sardar D.K. Jadav, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1186 . Learned Trial Judge in the judgment under appeal considered some factual points, namely, that two successive contempt applications were taken out and those were pending, which became ground to pass the impugned judgment and order under appeal. From the records it appears that factually the same was not correct. It is a fact that two contempt applications earlier were filed by the plaintiff of the suit being C.C. No. 203 of 2004 and C.C. No. 210 of 2004. The contempt application registered as C.C. No. 203 of 2004, was disposed of by Subhro Kamal Mukherjee, J. by the order dated 15th June, 2005, which reads such: “This is an application for contempt alleging violation of my order dated September 3, 2004. In this case, violation is almost admitted. However, it is explained that the order was passed on September 3, 2004 and it took some time for the defendants to circulate the order to the parties concerned in the matter and in the process, the offending advertisements have been shown upto September 9, 2004. I am satisfied with the explanations offered by the contemnors. However, they should have been more careful in this matter. As the learned Advocates for the contemnors, tender apology on behalf of the contemnors and I accept such apology. Considering the facts and circumstances, I am not willing to proceed with the contempt matter any further. The application for contempt is, thus, disposed of as dropped. There will be no order as to costs. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking.” No appeal was laid against such order by the defendant. Hence, there was no pendency of the said contempt application. The application for contempt is, thus, disposed of as dropped. There will be no order as to costs. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking.” No appeal was laid against such order by the defendant. Hence, there was no pendency of the said contempt application. In the contempt application registered as C.C. No. 210 of 2004 for alleged violation of the injunction order dated 3rd September, 2004 passed in the suit, the present appellant suffered an order, whereby Subhro Kamal Mukherjee, J. directed to purge the contempt, failing which to face appropriate order, finding the alleged contemnors guilty of the contempt by the judgment and order dated 27th July, 2005, which reads such: “This is an application alleging contempt of court on account of violation of the order dated September 3, 2004 passed in G.A. No. 3392 of 2004 filed in connection with Suit No. 235 of 2004. In G.A. No. 3392 of 2004, on September 3, 2004, this Court passed an injunction order in terms of prayer (b) of the said application. However it was claimed that the said order would not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the disputed advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter “H” in the said advertisement. The said prayer (b) runs as under: “(b) An order of injunction restraining the Respondents and each of them and their servants, agents or assigns from publishing by telecast or otherwise the aforesaid advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 herein or any advertisement or publicity similar thereto and in any from reflecting adversely on the plaintiff’s petitioner’s product “Horlicks” in any manner whatsoever.” This application is filed alleging that the contemnors, with full knowledge and understanding of the purport of the said order dated September 3, 2004, has, in contumacious disregard of the same, willfully and deliberately telecast and are telecasting continuously, through various channels, the same advertisement with slight modification by substituting the letter “X” for the letter “H”. Milind Lele, the Branch Manager, Eastern Region of Heinz India Private Limited files an affidavit-in-opposition. He states that the respondent no. 1 withdrew the disputed advertisement, which depicted mug cup with brand “H”, but he submits that there is no restrain on airing the same advertisement, which has mug with brand “X”. Mr. Milind Lele, the Branch Manager, Eastern Region of Heinz India Private Limited files an affidavit-in-opposition. He states that the respondent no. 1 withdrew the disputed advertisement, which depicted mug cup with brand “H”, but he submits that there is no restrain on airing the same advertisement, which has mug with brand “X”. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the contemnors deliberately and willfully violated the order of injunction passed by this Court. He submits that the order was clear and by telecasting the said modified version of the original advertisement the contemnors have shown contumacious disregard of the said order. He submits that since there is clear violation of the order of injunction dated September 3, 2004, it is necessary to pass appropriate directions on the contemnors to close the breach in addition to punishment them for contempt of court. Mr. Mitra, in support of his contentions, refers to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohammad Idris and another Versus Rustam Jahangir Bapuji and others, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1826 . Mr. Pratap Chatterjee and Mr. Soumendra Nath Mukherjee learned senior advocates appearing for the contemnor nos. 1 and 4, submit that the contemnors have not violated the order of this Court dated September 3, 2004 and that they were within their rights in publishing the said advertisement of their product with the mug cup with brand “X”. The learned senior advocates submit that the contemnors acted under bona fide impressions that they are entitled to air the modified version of the advertisement showing the mug cup with brand “X” in stead and in place of the mug cup with brand “H”. Mr. Mukherjee cites the decisions in the cases of Chhotu Ram Versus Urvashi Gulati and another reported in (2001) 7 SCC 530 , Mrityunjoy Das and another versus Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and others reported in (2001) 3 SCC 739 and Calcutta Corporation Teachers Association and another versus Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others reported in 1993 (2) CHN 444 to submit that when two interpretations of the order are possible and as the contemnors bona fide interpreted the order in one manner, the contemnors are not liable to be punished for contempt of court. As there is no contempt of court, it is not necessary for this Court to pass any further order to close the alleged breach. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. The contemnors were airing an advertisement and in the advertisement two mugs were projected one brown cup with alphabet “H” written thereon and a white cup with ‘Complan’ written thereon. In both the said cups liquids were poured and there was a manual depiction of the white cup growing in height and becoming almost the double in height of the brown cup which registered nil growth. This Court on September 3, 2004 passed an ad interim order of injunction in terms of said prayer (b). The order was passed after hearing of the contesting parties. It was clarified, however, that the said order would not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter “H” in the said advertisement. The contemnors maintain that there is no restrain order on airing the same advertisement with the cup/mug marked with letter “X” in the said advertisement. The contemnors are airing the same advertisement replacing the letter “H” by letter “X”. They have not replaced the mug/cup same brown cup is shown same colour of liquid is poured in the brown cup, but instead of marking the brown cup with letter “H” they have marked the cup with letter “X”. On September 3, 2004, I have passed an order in terms of prayer (b) of the application with the clarification that the said order would not prevent the defendant no. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter “H” in the said advertisement. It is not open to the contemnors to give a wrong interpretation to the order and then justify their conducts on the basis of such wrong interpretations. In the ultimate analysis, the view so taken by the contemnors is nor found to be legally sustainable. In my view, the interpretation is not bona fide one. It is not a case of bona fide wrong interpretation of the order. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit case for taking action for contempt. I hold the contemnors guilty of contempt. In my view, the interpretation is not bona fide one. It is not a case of bona fide wrong interpretation of the order. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit case for taking action for contempt. I hold the contemnors guilty of contempt. However, in order to give contemnors an opportunity to purge the contempt before I pass the sentence. I adjourn the matter for three weeks to enable the contemnor nos. 2, 3 and 4, namely, the Managing Director of the contemnor no. 1, the Vice President (Marketing) of the contemnor no. 1 and the Company Secretary of the Contemnor no. 1 to delete the said brown cup/mug from the disputed advertisement and to report compliance before August 17, 2005 failing which this Court will proceed to pass appropriate orders in respect of the contempt. The contemnor nos. 2, 3 and 4 shall remain present at the next hearing on August 17, 2005 to inform this Court whether or not the order has been complied with. If nor the contemnors will run the risk of being sentenced. The office is directed to put up this matter on August 17, 2005 under the heading ‘For Orders’. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on usual undertaking.” Against that order, an appeal was laid by the contemnors, namely, the officers of the present appellants being APOT No. 523 of 2005 and the impugned order dated 27th July, 2005 passed by Subhro Kamal Mukherjee, J. was stayed by the Division Bench (Coram: D.K. Seth, J. as His Lordship then was and Maharaj Sinha, J.) by the order dated 12th August, 2005 to decide the maintainability question and subsequently by the order dated 17th August and 18th August, 2005, the said Division Bench held that appeal was maintainable and directed to place the matter in the hearing list, which is pending now. Hence, factually also, learned Trial Judge was not correct to observe “two successive contempt applications have been taken out and the same are still pending and this is the third one. So I have no doubt in my mind that the defendants and each of them are absolutely careless and callous of obeying order of injunction, rather they are trying to defy the Court’s order willfully”. So I have no doubt in my mind that the defendants and each of them are absolutely careless and callous of obeying order of injunction, rather they are trying to defy the Court’s order willfully”. As already discussed earlier that learned Trial Judge did not pass any order of injunction restraining the defendants from doing something and/or from acting in a particular manner, save and except, the order that “the said order would not prevent the defendants from airing their advertisement by changing the order “H” from the cup”. As there was no order of injunction at all passed, having regard to our earlier findings, we are of the view that the matter goes to the root of the issue to the question whether any application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A at all was maintainable. Unless there is any order of injunction restraining someone to do something and/or directing someone not to do something, there is no question of implementation and/or execution of the said order at all, by statutory device under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Having regard to such, we are of the considered view that an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A also was not maintainable at all as there was no injunction order passed by the learned Trial Judge on 3rd September, 2004, restricting airing of main advertisement and/or truncated version of advertisement in terms of the prayer (b) of the interlocutory application. As already discussed that since the injunction order as passed against a person invites a serious consequence of attachment of property and/or detention in the civil prison, for breach of such, it requires to be in the strict sense and no injunction order could be considered as an order of injunction, which requires an interpretation and/or clarification and by any understanding of the parties assuming such as an injunction. The order of injunction must be specific and must be a clear order and there should not be any ambiguity to understand, even if the parties understood that there was an order of injunction, still then, for applicability of Order XXXIX Rule 2A it requires the existence of an injunction order specific and breach thereof. The material foundations of Order XXXIX Rule 2A, namely, the existence of an order of injunction is absent herein, which was not at all considered by the learned Trial Judge. The material foundations of Order XXXIX Rule 2A, namely, the existence of an order of injunction is absent herein, which was not at all considered by the learned Trial Judge. As such, the application itself was not maintainable under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Learned senior advocate Mr. Sarkar of the plaintiff-respondent, however, has urged relying upon the judgments passed in the case Topanmal Chhotamal vs. M/s. Kundomal Gangaram & Ors., reported in AIR 1960 SC 388 , that the judgment to be interpreted in the context of pleadings, Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra) that conduct of parties is relevant in the interpretation of the order and Kesoram Industries Ltd. (supra) that the order to be viewed in its totality. There is no doubt in legal principles applied therein. But so far as the statutory requirements under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is concerned, on the risk of repetition, we are of the view that it requires a positive satisfaction of two ingredients, namely, (1) existence of an injunction order specific; (2) breach or disobedience of such injunction order continuing. From the order dated 3rd September, 2004, nowhere it appears that there was any specific injunction order passed by the learned Trial Judge in the interlocutory application. No order of restrain or no order of injunction was passed by the learned Trial Judge. The reading of the order of injunction on analysis and interpretation of legal principle is one thing but filing of the application for breach of such under Order XXXIX Rule 2A requires a positive and specific injunction order and not on basis of interpretation of any order to give it a shape of an injunction order. Learned senior advocate for the respondents further has urged the judgments, namely, Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 421 , T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Ashok Khot & Anr., reported in AIR 2006 SC 2007 , In Re Dr. D.C. Saxena and Dr. D.C. Saxena vs. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2481 and In Re, Arundhati Roy, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1375 . All those cases are under Contempt of Courts Act. As already discussed that Contempt of Courts Act and its adjudicative field is completely different than the adjudicative field by analyzing subjective identity of cause of action and its impact thereof under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. All those cases are under Contempt of Courts Act. As already discussed that Contempt of Courts Act and its adjudicative field is completely different than the adjudicative field by analyzing subjective identity of cause of action and its impact thereof under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Accordingly, the judgments as referred to by the learned advocate for the respondent has no relevancy in this matter. As already discussed that Contempt of Courts Act and its adjudicative field is completely different than the adjudicative field by analyzing subjective identity of cause of action and its impact thereof under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Accordingly, the judgments as referred to by the learned advocate for the respondent has no relevancy in this matter. Having regard to our aforesaid findings and observation, accordingly, we summarize our views; (1) the proceeding under Contempt of Courts Act being a quasi criminal proceeding is of completely different nature and character than a proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2A in a civil litigation; (2) under the Contempt of Courts Act, the prime object is to upright the dignity and majesty of the Court for due administration of justice when any contemtuous conduct is brought to the notice of the Court and where the status of the alleged contemnors become the status of the accused when he is found guilty of the charge to suffer the imprisonment to jail and/or fine, whereas in Order XXXIX Rule 2A proceeding is a civil proceeding for alleged disobedience of the order of injunction whose object and purpose is to implement and/or execute the temporary injunction order having a parity with the object and purpose of execution of permanent injunction decree under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code; (3) in the Contempt of Courts Act it requires satisfaction of Section 2(b) for a civil contempt, namely, willful disobedience, but in a proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, simply the continuity of disobedience of the order would attract the provision; (4) in a Contempt of Courts Act, there is a scope for tendering apology, a statutorily recognized provision, but it is the discretion of the Court to exempt the punishment and/or remission thereof, considering such apology as tendered, whereas under Order XXXIX Rule 2A apology has no factor unless the order of injunction is obeyed and/or executed and following coercive measures, Court is empowered to pass the order of attachment of property or detention of the person in the civil prison with a rider of exemption as and when the breach would be re-mediated; (5) the words “detention in civil prison” and “attachment of property” as are appearing under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, applying the maxim “Noscitur a sociis” and “ex visceribus actus” will takes its colour and its purpose alike ‘attachment of property’ and order of detention accordingly has its limitation only for implementing the order of injunction and not for the purpose of passing any penalty for past breach of injunction order, which, however, is looked into under the Contempt of Courts Act; (6) the jurisdictional fact is the sine qua non of exercising the jurisdiction by a Court of law and in absence of such, the application is not maintainable; (7) Under Order XXXIX Rule 2A the jurisdictional facts are (i) existence of an specific order of injunction, (ii) disobedience and/or breach of such injunction order and (iii) continuation of such breach and/or injunction order even on the date of filing of the application as well as on the date of judgment, so that injunction order could be implemented. In absence of any material facts and the molecular ingredients and components as are weaving materials of organic structure of disobedience in the pleading as well as in the supporting documents, no order of attachment of the property and/or detention in civil prison could be passed exercising jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code; (8) sine qua non of filing any application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is existence of the order of injunction specific and explicit; (9) Order XXXIX Rule 2A, when invites rigours of attachment of property, whereas property is within the “human rights concept” as well as a constitutional right under Article 300A and to detain someone in civil prison depriving his personal liberty is nothing but bringing him out from the protective umbrella of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, so passing of any order of attachment and/or order of detention exercising the jurisdiction and power under Order XXXIX Rule 2A requires a very strict subjective satisfaction with higher degree of such and it requires fulfillment of all material and molecular ingredients of such disobedience of injunction order in minute details with positive pleadings thereof; (10) the word “imprisonment to jail” and “detention in civil prison” as appearing in the statutes, namely, Contempt of Courts Act and Order XXXIX Rule 2A of Civil Procedure Code respectively, are not synonymous and there is a variation of degree of its applicability in its width and amplitude; (11) having regard to the object and purpose of the statutory provision Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which is nothing but to execute and/or implement the temporary injunction order when any allegation of disobedience is made, the purposive object and the mode of execution by detention in civil prison will also takes its colour in the contextual meaning and purposive field of enacting the said statutory provision and thereby its effect is toned down only with the object of executing the temporary injunction order applying the test of statutory interpretation following the doctrine of “Noscitur a sociis” and “ex visceribus actus”. Before parting with the matter, the argument advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties are required to be discussed to complete the adjudicative process in this appeal. On behalf of the appellants of A.P.O.T. No. 388 of 2006, learned senior advocate Mr. Before parting with the matter, the argument advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties are required to be discussed to complete the adjudicative process in this appeal. On behalf of the appellants of A.P.O.T. No. 388 of 2006, learned senior advocate Mr. Kapoor has submitted that the tags were inadvertently telecasted due to genuine bona fide mistake of the junior officer of the Zee, for which repeatedly and remotefully unqualified apology was tendered at the first available opportunity before the trial Court and also before the Appeal Court. It has been further contended that the tags continued telecasting till 11th November, 2004 has been admitted by Sri Goutam Banerjee of Zee in the affidavit affirmed on 13th July, 2005 in response to application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A and at para 14 of the stay application filed by Zee and also in the affidavit-in-opposition of Sri Goutam Banerjee filed before the trial Court on 27th January, 2006 in response to the affidavit filed by Arka Duttagupta of Heinz. Fact of tendering unconditional apology, has been admitted by the Glaxo in their affidavit-in-opposition of stay petition of Zee in para 2(o) of the affidavit affirmed by Sri Surinder Kumar of Glaxo before Appeal Court on 25th August, 2006. Mr. Kapoor, learned senior advocate has urged that having regard to the judgment passed in the case Rani Sonabati Kumari (supra) and Samee Khan (supra) that the detention in civil prison and attachment both are the coercive measures to enforce the order of injunction. It has been further urged that there was non-existence of the jurisdictional fact before the learned trial Court to exercise the power due to reason that the alleged breach was no more existing when the application was filed and thereafter when judgment was delivered. It has been further pointed out that the Contempt of Courts Act to anchor someone in the contempt proceeding and the initiation of a proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of Civil Procedure Code are completely of two different roots. The concept of Article 21 of the Constitution of India also has been canvassed relying upon the decision passed in the case Samee Khan (supra) and Jolly George Varghese & Anr. vs. The Bank of Cochin , reported in AIR 1980 SC 470 . The contention of respondent Glaxo as urged by the learned senior advocate Mr. The concept of Article 21 of the Constitution of India also has been canvassed relying upon the decision passed in the case Samee Khan (supra) and Jolly George Varghese & Anr. vs. The Bank of Cochin , reported in AIR 1980 SC 470 . The contention of respondent Glaxo as urged by the learned senior advocate Mr. Sarkar relying upon the judgments as already discussed has been countered by contending that those are related to contempt proceeding under Contempt of Courts Act in quasi criminal proceeding. Relying upon the views expressed by the Apex Court in the case The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. (supra) by referring the decision of the English Court in the case Charles Osenton And Company (supra), it is submitted that Appeal Court will exercise the power to test the judgment under appeal following the tests mentioned in the said The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. (supra) and Charles Osenton And Company (supra) cases. Learned senior advocate Mr. Bimal Chatterjee appearing for the appellants Heinz India Private Limited and Ms. Seema Modi in appeal A.P.O.T. No. 245 of 2004, submitted on facts before this Court about the compliance of the Court’s order promptly giving the details of the particulars thereof, which reads as follows on chronological order: “3 September, 2004 – On the very day of the making of the order [which was a Friday] by a letter signed by Ms. Seema Modi (the second appellant) written instructions were given to Starcom to have the advertisement withdrawn in toto. (Page 163 of the paper book). 6 September, 2004 – 4 September and 5 September, 2004 being Saturday and Sunday respectively, on the first working day next following, that is i.e. on 6 September, 2004, Starcom who was the advertising agent, through whom the contract for telecasting the advertisement had been negotiated, issued a letter to the concerned TV channel, namely Alfa Bangla, to cancel further relays of the advertisement. (Page 173 of the paper book) 7 September, 2004 – Zee confirmed by its letter in writing to Starcom that the instructions for cancellation of the impugned advertisement had been received by Zee and that with effect from 10 p.m. of 6 September, 2004 the telecast of the advertisement had been withdrawn. (Page 173 of the paper book) 7 September, 2004 – Zee confirmed by its letter in writing to Starcom that the instructions for cancellation of the impugned advertisement had been received by Zee and that with effect from 10 p.m. of 6 September, 2004 the telecast of the advertisement had been withdrawn. (Page 185 of the paper book) 7 September, 2004 – On the very same day, Starcom wrote to Heinz confirming that further telecast of the impugned advertisement had been cancelled (Pg. 181 of the paper book) 8 September, 2004 – A revised advertisement was sent to the advertising agency and thereafter relays of the impugned advertisement was completely discontinued. 17 September, 2004 – The first contempt application was filed complaining of breach for a period of two days only (that is on 4 September and 5 September, 2004). An apology was tendered and this apology was accepted by this Hon’ble Court. 22/23 Sept. 2004 – The second contempt application was filed. The dispute in the second contempt application concerns the revised advertisement and a stay has been granted in this matter by the Hon’ble Appeal Court. This appeal as mentioned earlier is still pending. 13/14 Oct, 2004 – The impugned advertisement appeared in the form of Tags [the expression Tags is a technical term, which is used to describe short/truncated/adridged versions of advertisement], which are telecast without charge and as complimentaries by the concerned TV channel. 15 October, 2004 – Immediately on detection of the Tags the advertising agent of Heinz i.e., Starcom wrote to Zee about the reappearance of the tags; and Zee confirmed in writing that the telecast of the tags, had been discontinued (Page 333 of the paper book) 6 December, 2004 – Zee confirmed yet again that the relay of Tags has happened “purely due to human error in the scheduling department at our end …..” and apologized for the error; and also confirmed that the telecast of the tags had been discontinued. (Pages 334 of the paper book) December, 2004 – Order 39 Rule 2(A) application was filed. (Pages 334 of the paper book) December, 2004 – Order 39 Rule 2(A) application was filed. 27 July, 2006 – Sengupta, J., disposed of the order 39 Rule 2(A) application by the order impugned in this appeal.” It has been further submitted that tags were not part of the original text for which there was a contractual agreement to telecast it, which, however, was stopped immediately and promptly soon after the order of the Court was passed as par understanding of the parties that there was an injunction order. The truncated version were telecasted without any charge by the Zee TV and no bills were raised or paid by the respective parties. It is submitted that unfortunately due to mistake of a junior executive of the Zee, the airing of tags resumed and immediately when the attention of the Zee was drawn, relay of the tags were discontinued long before the filing of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A and far long before when judgment was delivered by the learned Trial Judge. It is contended that Ms. Modi was not a party in the suit in the first contempt application as well as in the second contempt application as allegedly moved by the plaintiff and even as a co-nominee in the present application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, wherefrom this appeal has been led. There was even no whisper of alleged disobedience in the injunction order against Ms. Modi in the said petition, save and except, the prayer in the said petition that respondent no. 1 and 4, namely, Heinz and Zee, both should be directed to disclose the names of their respective officers responsible for violation as complained of. Against Ms. Modi, only allegation has been made that she had given a false instruction but such false instruction was never argued or urged before the learned Trial judge or in this Court of appeal and there is no finding by the learned Trial Judge against Ms. Modi to that effect and there was no adjudication of the said issue. Ms. Modi got no chance to meet the allegation as there was no allegation. It is submitted that the learned Trial Judge was more influenced about pendency of the two successive contempt applications and learned Trial Judge further failed to appreciate that telecasting of tags occurred due to human error at the departmental level through inadvertence and bona fide. Ms. Modi got no chance to meet the allegation as there was no allegation. It is submitted that the learned Trial Judge was more influenced about pendency of the two successive contempt applications and learned Trial Judge further failed to appreciate that telecasting of tags occurred due to human error at the departmental level through inadvertence and bona fide. It has been further argued that long before 18 months when the judgment was delivered, the tags discontinued to have telecasting and the requirements of Order XXXIX Rule 2A accordingly were not fulfilled to pass a judgment under appeal. It has been contended further that learned Trial Judge opined that there should be willful and deliberate disobedience to fix the liability under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, but did not consider that opinion even when the judgment was delivered. The following judgments has been referred to contend that the punishment was not justified: firstly on the proportionality doctrine in terms of the judgment passed in the case Krishna Mochi & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2002 (6) SCC 81 , secondly on point that mere breach, unless it is willful, will not attract any punishment clause, relying the judgment passed in the case Indian Airports Employees’ Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee & Anr., reported in 1999 (2) SCC 537 and thirdly, that casual or accidental or unintentional act resulting the noncompliance cannot be treated as willful disobedience by referring the case Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 1999 (7) SCC 76 . Having regard to the rival contentions of the parties as urged to avoid the repetition in terms of our findings and observation and on the risk of repetition, we are of the view that a contempt proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, being a quasi criminal proceeding is on different angular spectrum, whereas the proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of Civil Procedure Code, which is neither a suit nor a quasi criminal proceeding similar to Contempt of Courts Act, but a civil proceeding has different angular spectrum to identify the issue. There was no allegation made against Ms. Modi, save and except, the false instruction and she was not made as a party of the proceeding. From the records it appears that Ms. Modi being an officer of the appellant Heinz took prompt action immediately to stop airing the said telecast. There was no allegation made against Ms. Modi, save and except, the false instruction and she was not made as a party of the proceeding. From the records it appears that Ms. Modi being an officer of the appellant Heinz took prompt action immediately to stop airing the said telecast. The telecasting of truncated version of main advertisement, which admittedly is not chargeable by the Zee TV, from the records it appears was a technical mistake of processing the matter and same was even stopped before 6th December, 2004 when application under order XXXIX Rule 2A was moved and even before the date when affidavit was affirmed on 2nd December, 2004, far to say, the date of judgment, which was delivered 18 months after the telecasting was stopped. We have already answered those points dealing with the object and purpose of Order XXXIX Rule 2A. Relying upon those, we are of the considered view that the submission advanced by the learned Advocate for the respondent has no merit. Considering the aforesaid findings and observation including the summary thereof as detailed above and having regard to the impugned judgment under appeal and considering the rival arguments advanced by parties, we have applied the principle to interfere with any order passed by the Court below exercising the discretionary jurisdiction, as reflected in the judgments passed in the case The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. vs. Pothan Joseph, reported in AIR 1960 SC 1156 and Charles Osenton & Co. vs. Johnson, reported in (1942) Appeal Cases 130 as relied upon by the learned senior advocate appearing for the appellants. For our own appreciation of the matter to exercise our jurisdiction to interfere with an order passed by the learned Trial Judge exercising the discretionary jurisdiction, we are referring the principles as detailed by Lord Wright in the case Evans vs. Bartlam, reported in (1937) Appeal Cases 473, which reads such: “It is clear that the Court of Appeal should not interfere with the discretion of a judge acting within his jurisdiction unless the court is clearly satisfied that he was wrong. But the court is not entitled simply to say that if the judge had jurisdiction and had all the facts before him, the Court of Appeal cannot review his order unless he is shown to have applied a wrong principle. But the court is not entitled simply to say that if the judge had jurisdiction and had all the facts before him, the Court of Appeal cannot review his order unless he is shown to have applied a wrong principle. The court must if necessary examine anew the relevant facts and circumstances in order to exercise a discretion by way of review which may reverse or vary the order. Otherwise in interlocutory matters the judge might be regarded as independent of supervision. Yet an interlocutory order of the judge may often be of decisive importance on the final issue of the case, and one which requires a careful examination by the Court of Appeal. Thus in Gardner vs. Jay (I), Bowen L.J. in discussing the discretion of the judge as regards mode of trial says: ‘That discretion, like other judicial discretions, must be exercised according to common sense and according to justice, and if there is a miscarriage in the exercise of it will be reviewed’.” Having regard to the aforesaid principle of law to interfere with an order passed in the discretionary jurisdiction, we are of the view that learned Trial Judge failed to consider the material facts despite findings and observation that the breach of injunction order and/or disobedience thereof, was stopped long before filing of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, i.e. November, 2004, that though learned Trial Judge did not incline to pass order of attachment of the property on the logic as mentioned but passed the impugned order of detention in civil prison, a contra, to said logic, that the learned Trial Judge misdirected his approach by proceeding with the application as if the same is an application under Contempt of Courts Act and thereby imposed the penalty of detention in civil prison for the past breach, which is not permissible under Order XXXIX Rule 2A and that the learned Trial Judge did not consider the material relevant fact that there was no existence of jurisdictional fact to exercise the jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A in its conceptual and objective angle and the facts as would be sufficient to deny protective umbrella under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, impugned judgment under appeal is not legally sustainable, accordingly, it stands set aside and quashed. Hence, impugned judgment under appeal is not legally sustainable, accordingly, it stands set aside and quashed. The application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A is also stand dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable at all as there was no order of injunction passed by the learned Trial Judge and there was no continuance of disobedience when such application was filed. Cross Appeal filed being A.P.O. No. 290 of 2006 also, accordingly, fails with the aforesaid findings and reasoning. Both the appeals being nos. A.P.O.T. 408 of 2006 and A.P.O.T. 388 of 2006 and connected application stand allowed and the cross appeal being no. A.P.O. No. 290 of 2006 stand dismissed. No order as to costs on the facts and circumstances of this case.