JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The Petitioner Pradip Roy was appointed Constable in Tripura Armed Police, 1st Bn. on 9.10.1987. In 1992 he was posted in the special branch (SB) under the 3rd Respondent. He was placed under suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against him on 29.1.1994. On 7.4.1994 the disciplinary authority (Respondent No. 3) framed three charges against him which are: (i) The Petitioner, when attached with D.K. Reang, Ex. Minister as his personal guard remained absent from duty from 18.1.1994 to 28.1.1994 without any permission which is unbecoming of a police officer; (ii) While leaving his place of duty without permission on 18.1.1994 he did not deposit the revolver No. LLAMA 782342 with 24 rounds of ammunitions, which is unbecoming of a police officer; (iii) The said revolver with six rounds of ammunitions were seized by police on 26.1.1994 during investigation of BKR P.S. Case No. 6(1) 94 under Sections 393/307 IPC/27 Arms Act which indicates that he had handed over the fire arm to the accused person involved in the said case which is a grave misconduct. 2. After the charges aforementioned were framed an inquiry followed. The inquiry finally found the Petitioner guilty of the charges. Considering the gravity of the misconduct, the Petitioner who was a member of the disciplined armed forces, was dismissed from service by a provisional order dated 31.12.1994 followed by final order on 13.2.1995. The departmental appeal preferred therefrom was dismissed on 5.4.1995. The said dismissal is under challenge in the present writ petition. The grounds of challenge to the order of dismissal, as presented in the writ petition, are as follows: (i) Before the disciplinary proceeding in question, a preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Respondent concerned, but copies of the statements of witnesses examined in the said preliminary inquiry were not supplied to him, (ii) During the course of formal inquiry right from framing of charges, the Petitioner prayed for appointment of one Sachindra Ch. Das, Sub-Inspector of police of MTF Organisation as his defence assistant. But the Petitioner was informed that the said organisation (MTF) refused to spare services of Sri Das. He was, however, asked to name any other police officer to defend him. But he could not give any name as he had no knowledge about any other person who could defend him. But the Petitioner was informed that the said organisation (MTF) refused to spare services of Sri Das. He was, however, asked to name any other police officer to defend him. But he could not give any name as he had no knowledge about any other person who could defend him. He also expressed his inability to defend himself due to lack of knowledge about the procedure of a departmental inquiry. The inquiry thus was conducted without any defence assistant; (iii) The disciplinary authority passed a provisional order on 13.12.1994 proposing punishment of dismissal from service. Copy of the said order along with copy of the findings of the inquiry authority were supplied to him. In response he furnished his reply projecting several grounds for taking a soft and lenient view. He pleaded that he had left the place of his duty with permission from the Ex-Minister Sri D.K. Reang. The deposition of Sri Reang supporting him escaped consideration of the disciplinary authority. Thus he was not absent without authority. As regards the fire arms he made a clear statement that on 25.1.1994 at 7.45 p.m. when he was returning home from Jolaibari market, 5/6 miscreants suddenly attacked him and snatched away from him the fire arms. Though thereafter he was allowed to return home his house was guarded by the miscreants so that he could not come out and contact police station. On the following morning when he was proceeding towards police station, some miscreants had taken him prisoner in a near by jungle and tied his eyes and month. Only on 28.1.1994 after mid night he was freed by them. In the meantime the fire arm was recovered by police from one Himangshu Chakraborty who was the accused in aforementioned police case. This fact was totally ignored by the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority, (iv) During pendency of the writ petition the criminal case in which the Petitioner was one of the accused persons was finally disposed of. The Petitioner was convicted by the trial court on 10.2.1999. Aggrieved, he filed criminal appeal No. 9 of 1999. The appeal was allowed and the Petitioner was acquitted by judgment of this Court delivered on 13.9.2006. The Petitioner was convicted by the trial court on 10.2.1999. Aggrieved, he filed criminal appeal No. 9 of 1999. The appeal was allowed and the Petitioner was acquitted by judgment of this Court delivered on 13.9.2006. After the order of acquittal it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to revoke the order of dismissal and reinstate him in service, which has not been done prompting him to file the present writ petition. 3. In the counter affidavit the Respondents contended, inter alia, that Rule 1015(a) of Police Regulation of Bengal (for short PRB) which is in force in the State provides: (a) Inspectors, Sergeants and Sub-Inspector proceeding on leave shall, if they possess any small arms, deposit their revolvers and ammunitions in the Police Armoury at the Head Quarters of their District, unless the Supdt. in his discretion permits the officer to take their arms with them. This provision applies to all members of the force by virtue of the standing instruction dated 28.3.1993. Even the Petitioner himself on earlier occasions had deposited the fire arms during his temporary absence from duties. By not depositing the fire arms before proceeding on unauthorized leave in the present case the Petitioner committed serious misconduct. 4. As regards the preliminary inquiry it is contended that the same was considered necessary to find out whether there existed a prima-facie case for a formal inquiry. Law does not require that copies of the statements of witnesses examined during such inquiry are to be furnished to the delinquent. In a formal departmental inquiry the delinquent is at liberty to defend himself or to engage a defence assistant of his choice. His prayer for appointment of Sachindra Ch. Das of MTF Organisation was duly forwarded. But the said organisation refused to spare his service. Petitioner was duly informed about the position with liberty to engage any other defence assistant which he failed to do. The inquiry officer cannot compel any one to act as defence assistant. The inquiry officer asked him by letter dated 2.9.94 to reply to the earlier communication about engagement of another defence assistant. On 6.9.1994 the Petitioner himself in formed the inquiry officer that he would personally defend his case. As such the question of not affording opportunity to engage a defence assistant does not arise. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 6. On 6.9.1994 the Petitioner himself in formed the inquiry officer that he would personally defend his case. As such the question of not affording opportunity to engage a defence assistant does not arise. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 6. From the factual position noticed above it would appear that there is no allegation of irregularity in the procedure followed by the inquiry officer. The Petitioner was given all opportunity to defend himself. When the defence assistant of his choice was not available he himself decided to defend the case which he had actually done. I entirely agree that law does not require that if there is any preliminary inquiry proceeding a formal departmental proceeding, copies of the statements of witnesses examined during such preliminary inquiry are required to be furnished to the delinquent. Admittedly, copy of the regular inquiry report was furnished to the Petitioner with copy of the provisional order of punishment. He had accordingly given his reply to the same. The punishment of dismissal from service has been in consideration of the gravity of misconduct. The Petitioner filed an appeal in which the punishment has been confirmed. 7. The question which has been advanced with considerable force by Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. counsel for the Petitioner is that after acquittal of the Petitioner from the criminal charge by this Court the order of dismissal from service cannot be sustained. He seeks to derive support for his submission from a decision of the Apex Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Anr. reported in AIR 2006 SC 2129 . In that case departmental inquiry and criminal proceeding were based on identical set of facts and evidence. In the criminal proceeding the accused was honourably acquitted. The same set of witnesses were examined in the departmental inquiry leading to order of dismissal from service. The Apex Court held that such order of dismissal was unfair and oppressive and liable to be set aside. Thus, three essential conditions must exist to knock down an order of punishment in a disciplinary proceeding by an order of acquittal in a criminal proceeding which are: (i) the facts and charges in both the proceeding must be same; (ii) same set of witnesses were examined in both the proceeding; (iii) the result of the criminal proceeding is honourably acquittal. 8. 8. A plain perusal of the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1999 and 9 of 1999 delivered on 13.9.2006 would bring to notice that on 26.1.1994 at about 8 p.m. one Himangshu Chakraborty (now dead) and another Premtosh Ghosh had demanded money from three persons followed by a tussle between them. Both the offender were finally nabbed and handed over to the police station. Himangshu was in possession of revolver bearing No. LLAMA 782342 which was with the Petitioner herein when he had left his place of duty without permission from his higher authority. The Petitioner was not involved in the said occurrence. The only charge against him was that he had give the fire arm to Himangshu Chakraborty from whose possession it was seized. The charges framed against Himangshu Chakraborty were under Sections 307, 309 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Against other accused Premtosh the charge was only under Section 393 IPC. But against the Petitioner the charge was framed under Section 29 of the Arms Act. During the trial prosecution examined 17 witnesses to bring home the charges. Though convicted by the trial court, this Court in appeal found that the prosecution did not put on record any evidence to show that the Petitioner Pradip Roy herein had willingly given the fire-arm to Himangshu Chakraborty for unauthorized use. As the only charge against the Petitioner was allowing Himangshu Chakraborty to use the fire arm and there was no evidence on record in support thereof this Court allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the Petitioner. But the charges in the departmental proceeding against the Petitioner are totally different. Firstly he was charged with leaving the station and remained absent without permission of the competent authority. Secondly, he did not deposit the fire-arm before leaving the place of duty and thirdly, the revolver was found in the possession of one Himangshu Chakraborty which was allegedly used in connection with the criminal offence. 9. The facts, charges and witnesses examined in the two proceeding are totally different. It cannot be said that the Petitioner was acquitted honourably. He was, as a matter of fact, acquitted because no evidence was brought on record to prove that the Petitioner had willingly given he revolver to Himangshu Chakraborty. 10. 9. The facts, charges and witnesses examined in the two proceeding are totally different. It cannot be said that the Petitioner was acquitted honourably. He was, as a matter of fact, acquitted because no evidence was brought on record to prove that the Petitioner had willingly given he revolver to Himangshu Chakraborty. 10. As regards the version of the Petitioner that the revolver was snatched away from him by some miscreants on 25.1.1994, his house was placed on guard by the miscreants during that night and on the following day he was abducted in the near by jungle where he was in confinement till 28.1.1994 seems to be a cock and bull story being based on no evidence. It is quite apparent that only after his revolver was recovered from Himangshu Chakraborty on 26.1.1994 he went to the near by police station to tell them the above story which nobody did believe. The ratio laid down in the G.M. Tank (supra) has, therefore, no manner of application in the present case. 11. What has now finally emerged is that the Petitioner though member of a disciplined force left his place of duty without permission from his controlling authority. Though he was deployed for duty with the Ex-Minister, he continued to be under the control of his higher authority. The Ex-Minister was not as per rules authorized to grant leave or permit him to remain absent, more so for the reason that it is the competent authority in the SB to provide for replacement. Thus, evidently the Petitioner left the place of duty and remained absent without authority. 12. The Petitioner himself has admitted that he did not deposit the revolver before he left the place of his duty. He also admitted that his revolver was found and seized from the possession of the Himangshu Chakraborty on 26.1.1994 in connection with the criminal case. The explanation he has advanced that it was snatched away from him by some miscreants has no basis at all. The only presumption from the above is that he himself had given the revolver to Himangshu Chakraborty for its use. The explanation he has advanced that it was snatched away from him by some miscreants has no basis at all. The only presumption from the above is that he himself had given the revolver to Himangshu Chakraborty for its use. Though for want of evidence in the criminal trial he was acquitted from the charge of handing over the same to Himangshu Chakraborty, that cannot come to his rescue for the reason that the standard of proof in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding is different. When accused cannot be convicted in a criminal proceeding for want of evidence to prove charge beyond reasonable shadow of doubt, he can be punished depart-mentally on the basis of preponderance of probability. It is very much probable in the present case that the revolver was given by the Petitioner to Himangshu Chakraborty for its unauthorized use. The misconduct is thus very much grave in nature. In the departmental proceeding every opportunity of defending himself was afforded to the Petitioner. 13. For the reasons and discussions aforementioned, this writ petition has no merit and, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do. No cost.