Arulmigu Chockanatha Swamy, rep. by its Executive Officer, Kamarajar District v. Aruppukottai Municipality, rep. by the Commissioner, Kamarajar District
2008-04-25
S.PALANIVELU
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S. PALANIVELU, J. 1. The Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Aruppukottai, in A. S. No. 90 of 2001, dated 27.3.2001 confirming the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Aruppukottai, in O.S. No. 172 of 1994, dated 6.11.1997. The plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal. The defendant is the respondent herein. 2. The case of the plaintiff is tersely as follows: The plaintiff’s temple is a Public Temple, which is being maintained and administered through the donations and hundial collections. Certain devotees have constructed some buildings and dedicated them to the plaintiff’s temple. A trust by name Sri Jayavilas Subbaraj Trust, constructed the suit marriage hall and dedicated the same to the plaintiff’s temple. They imposed a condition that the marriage hall should be utilised only for charitable purposes, particularly, pertaining to educational, spiritual discourses and ceremonies not connected to politics. Respecting the condition, the plaintiff’s temple is maintaining. The suit building is maintained and administered by the plaintiff’s temple. It does not charge any rent from the persons, who are using the said building for the charitable purposes. The expenses incurred for maintaining the building are defrayed from the donations and offerings received by the temple. Originally, in that place, five tiled houses were constructed, wherein the priests were residing. After construction of marriage hall, there are no residential houses and hence, there is no rent received from the said property. On 23.1.1992, the defendant issued a notice proposing to assess property tax for the suit building under premise that it was used for rent. The suit property is exempted from property tax. On 3.8.1993, the plaintiff received a special notice mentioning that the defendant has assessed the annual property tax at Rs. 9 306/-. On 5.4.1994, the Executive Officer of the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the defendant, but the same was rejected. The action on the part of the defendant is arbitrary, unlawful and not based on any legal principles. Hence, the suit. 3. The case of the defendant is as follows: The exemption of property tax would be applicable only to the temple and not for the other premises attached to the temple, which yield income to the temple. Since the plaintiff has been charging rent for the marriage hall, on the basis of the rental value, the property tax has been assessed.
The case of the defendant is as follows: The exemption of property tax would be applicable only to the temple and not for the other premises attached to the temple, which yield income to the temple. Since the plaintiff has been charging rent for the marriage hall, on the basis of the rental value, the property tax has been assessed. It is incorrect to state that the property is permitted to be utilised without preferring statutory objections before the appropriate authority, the plaintiff has come forward with this suit before the Court. The suit is not maintainable. Hence, the suit has to be dismissed. 4. After considering the contentions of both the parties, the learned District Munsif, Aruppukottai dismissed the suit. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned District Munsif, the plaintiff carried the matter in appeal in A.S. No. 90 of 2001 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Aruppukottai, who dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the District Munsif Court. 6. Challenging the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Judge, the plaintiff has filed the present second appeal. 7. At the time of admitting the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated by this Court: 1. Whether the Courts below are right in holding that general exemption under Section 83 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 will not be applicable to the appellant? 2. Whether the Courts below had not considered the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff on the proper prospective? 8. The plaintiff’s temple is situated in Aruppukottai, which is being maintained and administered through the donations and hundial collections. A trust known as Sri Jayavilas Subbaraj Trust constructed the marriage hall and dedicated the same to the plaintiff’s temple with the condition that the same should be utilised for charitable purposes alone. In the plaint, it is alleged that for utilising the property, no rent is charged. The respondent is aggrieved by the action of the plaintiff in the matter of assessing the suit building for property tax. 9.
In the plaint, it is alleged that for utilising the property, no rent is charged. The respondent is aggrieved by the action of the plaintiff in the matter of assessing the suit building for property tax. 9. It is the main contention of the appellant that the suit building is very much related to the temple and hence it is eligible to get exemption from the Provisions of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred as ‘Act’), Its contention that it is not at all earning any profit by letting it for performing certain celebrations nor getting any income, so as to make it as a commercial one. 10. Conversely, it is argued by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the temple alone is competent to get the exemption from the Provisions of the Act and the marriage hall constructed will not attract provisions for exemption and that the plaintiff is charging rent from the individuals, who are taking the building for celebrations and the element of charitable purposes, could not be inferred therein. 11. In order to have an analytical discussion in this matter, the relevant Provision has to be looked into. In the Tamil Nadu Municipalities Act 1920, Section 86, reads as follows: “86. General Exemption: The following buildings and lands shall be exempted from the property tax: (a) Places set apart for public worship and either actually so used or used for no other purpose; and (b) Choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and choultries the rent charged for the occupation of which is used exclusively for charitable purposes.” 12. In order to come within the purview of the Provision afore noted, two conditions have to be fulfilled. They are; (i) The building should be a Choultry. (ii) The rent charged for its occupation is used exclusively for charitable purposes. 13. If the two requirements are satisfied, then only, one can claim exemption under the Act. As far as the suit building is concerned, it has to be seen whether it will come under the purview of the term “Choultry.” 14.
(ii) The rent charged for its occupation is used exclusively for charitable purposes. 13. If the two requirements are satisfied, then only, one can claim exemption under the Act. As far as the suit building is concerned, it has to be seen whether it will come under the purview of the term “Choultry.” 14. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that inasmuch as the suit premises is being utilised for the charitable purposes and for other activities connected to the affairs of the temple, it has be entreated as a Choultry and further in colloquial terms, the building has been called as Choultry (Chatram). Hence the suit property could be brought under the ambit of Section 86(b) of the said Act. 15. Repelling the arguments, the learned Additional Government Pleader would submit that it is not at all a Choultry because “Choultry” has been defined in the earlier texts that it is a shelter or resting place for the pilgrims or travellers and the suit building does not at all fulfill the required conditions aforestated. 16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the first place, neither there is pleading nor oral evidence on record to show that the suit building is known as a Choultry. No documents are forthcoming to establish that it is a Choultry. It transpires from the records that the building is revenue yielding in character and the activities conducted therein are not at all attracting the definition for the term “Choultry.” 17. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant garners support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council Tirupathi v. Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanam AIR 1974 SC 521 : (1974) 1 SCC 683 , in which, their Lordships have held as follows: “In the absence of a statutory definition in the Act, recourse has to be taken to the meaning attributed to the word in the dictionaries and the law lexicons as well as to the popular concept of the term. Choultry is indeed an ancient institution and is – principally meant for lodging of pilgrims and travellers.
Choultry is indeed an ancient institution and is – principally meant for lodging of pilgrims and travellers. It is conceivable that in 1884, when the first municipal legislation was passed in Madras, such institutions were some humble sheds and other structures to enable the pilgrims to stay for a short while when they came to visit temples and other religious places. This institution, like similar others elsewhere, has come to stay as a symbol of religious and charitable disposition of human mind translated into physical manifestation in the shape of safe shelter for the pilgrims. As man advances and ideas grow and expand, with his ever increasing desire for comfort and convenience, the shape of the choultry must also needs change. It is, therefore, only to be expected that with the growing funds of the Devasthanams, such choultries will be constructed in a modern way catering to the needs and requirements of the pilgrims and visitors of all classes in a self-contained unit or complex.” 18. The Supreme Court has clarified and defined the word “Choultry” on the basis of the meaning found in the law lexicon of British India compiled and edited by Ramanatha Aiyar, 1940 edition. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has extracted the definition for the word ‘Choultry’ as mentioned in the above said law lexicon as follows: “Choultry: Chatram. A choultry is a corruption of chavadi. It means a shelter or resting place for travellers. A chathram (corruption of the Sanskrit Sathram) is a house where pilgrims and travellers are fed.” In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, choultry is described as an Anglo-Indian word “being corruption of Telugu chawadi” and its meaning is given as “A caravanserai.” In Wilson’s Glossaryt Of Judicial And Revenue Terms, second edition,’ page 108, the word is given in different forms such as Chawati or Chauti, corruptly, Choltry or Choultry and the meaning is given as “A public lodging place, a shelter for travellers.” 19. When a building is called as ‘Choultry’, it should be utilised by the pilgrims or travellers, who are passing the said place, where the Choultry is situated to take rest and food. If the Choultry is situated in a larger extent, then it is expected that various facilities have to be provided for the pilgrims in large number, who are staying there.
If the Choultry is situated in a larger extent, then it is expected that various facilities have to be provided for the pilgrims in large number, who are staying there. If the structures formed for providing facilities to the visitors or pilgrims, who are on pilgrimage, those shall be included under the term ‘Choultry’ and they are also eligible to get exemption under the purview. It is in the words of Apex Court, the Choultry must in truth and reality bear the hallmark of a charitable institution and should not partake of the character of a hotel run for profit. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the permission to private individuals to conduct certain functions or ceremonies on payment of donation is not on any profit motive and the temple is not at all earning any profits out of the income, but it is only spending the income derived therefrom for charitable purposes alone and that there is no contra evidence on the side of the respondents showing that the profits are being utilised for commercial purposes. Tersely speaking, it is his submission that there is no profit motive on the part of the plaintiff’s temple and only for charitable purposes, the building is being used. Eventhough, the said contention is accepted, still it will not bring the building within the ambit of Section 86(b) of the Act.. There is no convincing evidence on record to show that what are the charitable purposes for which income from suit building is spent. 21. As adverted to supra, the suit building is not all a Choultry and hence the plaintiff is not eligible to get exemption under the Act. It is true that there is no suggestion emanating from the respondents before the plaintiff’s witness to the effect that the funds obtaining from the suit property are utilised for some other purpose than the charitable work. The suit building would not partake the character of a Choultry in view of the purpose for which it was constructed, and it is being utilised for different purpose. There are neither pleading nor evidence on record to show that the pilgrims or visitors are staying in the suit buildings. 22. In these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot get exemption from the Provisions of the Act. The substantial questions of law are answered as indicated above.
There are neither pleading nor evidence on record to show that the pilgrims or visitors are staying in the suit buildings. 22. In these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot get exemption from the Provisions of the Act. The substantial questions of law are answered as indicated above. The concurrent findings of the Courts below deserve to be confirmed. There is no ground to upset the upshots of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. There are no intimities in their judgments so as to interfere with then. The appellant is not entitled for the relief sought for in this appeal, which suffers dismissal. Resultantly, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Second appeal dismissed.