JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner-original plaintiff has put to challenge order dated 1.10.2005, below Exh.22 for making reference of the dispute to the arbitrator in view of Clause -19 of the purchase order. FACTS : 2. The petitioner/plaintiff filed a summary suit for recovery of Rs.20,65,275.63 paise from respondent/defendant. It was the claim of the petitioner that the respondent used to issue purchase orders to the petitioner from time to time with a stipulation of payment of 100% bill amount against receipt of the goods supplied by the petitioner. But there was no clause for payment of interest on unpaid bills. The respondent however, failed to pay certain amounts during the course of transactions and ultimately there was accumulation of outstanding bills which led to filing of summary suit for recovery. 3. Respondent appeared in the suit and applied for grant of leave to defend the suit by filing written statement which was granted on 23.4.2004. No written statement was filed. The suit, thereafter, proceeded without written statement for evidence. At that stage an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 r/w Order 7 Rule 11and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved by the respondent for referring the dispute to the arbitrator. The application was opposed on various grounds. After hearing the Counsel for the parties the said application was allowed on 1.10.2005. The petitioner then filed a review application, which also stood dismissed by another order below Exh.35 on 19.4.2006. SUBMISSIONS : 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition made the following submissions : (1) Application for leave to defend and affidavit in support thereof that was filed by the respondent when perused shows that it is nothing but first statement and therefore, the respondent was estopped from filing application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. (2) There was no clause for payment of interest in the purchase orders and therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to claim interest by virtue of any agreement to pay interest and that was so because the agreement was on 100% payment basis. (2) There was no clause for payment of interest in the purchase orders and therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to claim interest by virtue of any agreement to pay interest and that was so because the agreement was on 100% payment basis. By now the entire principal amount having been paid to the petitioner and in the absence of agreement for payment of interest in default Clause - 19 of the agreement regarding arbitration will have no application and therefore, the application under Section 8 of the Act was liable to be dismissed. (3) The interest is being claimed by the petitioner in the suit not on the basis of any agreement as stated earlier but by virtue of the statutory provisions, namely, The Interest On Delayed Payments To Small Scale And Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, where under the respondent is required to pay interest on one and half time of the prime lending rate charged by State Bank of India and therefore, arbitration Clause - 19 will not be attracted. (4) Since the petitioner is claiming interest by virtue of statutory provisions and not in accordance with any agreement, the petitioner is entitled to avail of normal civil remedy particularly because the entire principal amount by now stands paid vide statements made in the Pursis St. No.9745/2008 to the petitioner and what remains is only the interest. (5) The legal principle that there cannot be bifurcation of claim while considering the provisions regarding reference by arbitration will have no application in the instant case because the claim for principal amount has been fully satisfied and the claim for interest is not the subject matter of arbitration clause as there was no agreement for payment of interest between the parties. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner cited following decisions : (i) 2000 (4) Supreme Court Cases 539 (P. Anand Gajapathi Raju and others Versus P.V.G. Raju (Dead) And Others). (ii) 2006 (6) Mh.L.J. 1 (Groupe Chemique Tunisien SA Versus outhern Petrochemicals Industries Corpn. Ltd.). (iii) 2006 (7) Supreme Court Cases 275 (Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. and another Versus Verma Transport Co.). (iv) AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2252 (Sukanya Holding Pvt. Ltd. Versus Jayesh H. Pandya and another). (v) 2003 (4) Civil L.J. 269 (Jashu M. Patel Versus Shivdatta R. Joshi). (vi) 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. 377 (Dr. Ltd.). (iii) 2006 (7) Supreme Court Cases 275 (Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. and another Versus Verma Transport Co.). (iv) AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2252 (Sukanya Holding Pvt. Ltd. Versus Jayesh H. Pandya and another). (v) 2003 (4) Civil L.J. 269 (Jashu M. Patel Versus Shivdatta R. Joshi). (vi) 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. 377 (Dr. Bais Surgical And Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd and another Versus Dhananjay s/o Digambar Pande). 6. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent made the following submissions : (1) Even if there was no contractual liability of payment of interest, the alleged liability of interest as even according to the petitioner accrued because there were purchase orders from the respondent and therefore, the amount of interest now claimed by the petitioner even assuming that the same is claimed not under any agreement but under a statutory provision is integral part of the claim flowing from the principal amount and therefore, there cannot be any bifurcation while considering the provision regarding arbitration. (2) Looking to the claim made in paragraph Nos.3, 4 and 5 of the suit, the principal amount due was of Rs.6,20,419/- of which Rs.3,00,000/- have been paid and still even according to the petitioner there is balance of Rs.3,00,419/- out of the principal amount and then in that case the claim cannot be bifurcated and therefore, the impugned orders are well justified. (3) Perusal of the application for leave to defend and the affidavit in support thereof do not anywhere at all reveal that it can be called as a first statement but then the issue regarding jurisdiction of the Court qua the arbitration clause has been substantially raised in the said application. Clause - 19 of the agreement leaves no doubt about existence of arbitration even in respect of the amount of interest. He therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on the following decision : (1) 2002 (1) Supreme Court Cases 319 (Ouseph Mathai And others...Versus...M. Abdul Khadir). 8. Advocate Shri Pande for the petitioner thereafter filed a Pursis St.No.9745/2008 after supplying copy thereof to Counsel for respondent on record and submitted that what remains now is only the liability of interest since the entire liability of principal amount has been discharged. CONSIDERATIONS : 9. 8. Advocate Shri Pande for the petitioner thereafter filed a Pursis St.No.9745/2008 after supplying copy thereof to Counsel for respondent on record and submitted that what remains now is only the liability of interest since the entire liability of principal amount has been discharged. CONSIDERATIONS : 9. I have heard learned Counsel for the rival parties at sufficient length and also gone through the impugned order as well as the entire record and I find that the suit was filed for claiming the balance amount towards principal claim and the amount towards interest is claimed under the provisions of The Interest On Delayed Payments To Small Scale And Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993. It is not disputed that there was no agreement for payment of interest on delayed payments because the purchase orders were on 100% payment basis. Thus, there was no agreement for payment of interest in case of defaulted payment. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has now clarified that the entire principal amount has been paid and what remains to be recovered by the petitioner is only the interest vide Pursis St. No.9745/2008 which is not replied. And that is not claimed in accordance with the agreement between the parties but under statutory law. In view of this position, I find that what claim now remains to be adjudicated is only interest and that too not under any contractual liability but on the basis of statutory provisions of the said Act. That being so, various decisions cited before me by the Counsel for the parties on the question of bifurcation of claim etc. need not be discussed, as I hold that there was no agreement of interest between the parties and consequently Clause -19 of the agreement regarding arbitration is not attracted and therefore, there is no question of making any bifurcation of claim under any agreement. The claim for interest is under a statutory provision and for claiming such interest no provision has been shown to me that the matter shall be referred to the arbitrator. The provision in Clause - 19 about the reference to the arbitration cannot apply for making claim for statutory interest under the said Act. I further hold that since the principal amount has fully been paid and what remains to be paid is only the statutory interest under a statutory provision, the arbitration Clause - 19 is not attracted. 10. The provision in Clause - 19 about the reference to the arbitration cannot apply for making claim for statutory interest under the said Act. I further hold that since the principal amount has fully been paid and what remains to be paid is only the statutory interest under a statutory provision, the arbitration Clause - 19 is not attracted. 10. Considering the submission made by learned Counsel for the respondent that liability of interest even under the statutory Act has arisen because of the principal amount due and therefore, the said component of interest is integral part of the principal amount, I hold that the submission is not sound. It is an admitted position that there was no clause regarding payment of interest between the parties upon defaulted payment and the reason was that the agreement was for 100% payment on purchase order. It is thus clear that the petitioner was not entitled to claim any interest in case of default under the agreement. The arbitration Clause - 19 could be pressed into service only where dispute arises about term/terms of agreement which are then put to adjudication. That is not the case here. The petitioner is claiming interest under a statutory provision, which does not provide for making reference to arbitration for claiming interest under the said Act. In addition the agreement in question does not provide for arbitration clause for making a claim under the said statutory Act and therefore, in my opinion, even if it is taken that the suit was initially filed for balance amount for recovery of principal along with interest under the statutory law, the claim for interest under statutory law is clearly divisible from the claim for principal amount which was under agreement. The claim for interest under the statutory Act was never a part of agreement and therefore, it cannot be held that the amount of interest under statutory law is integral part of the principal amount. Therefore, even assuming that any balance amount of Rs.6,00,000/- was claimed in the suit, it was not necessary for the petitioner to make claim for interest by resorting to Clause - 19 of the arbitration clause under the agreement as the arbitration clause does not govern adjudication in relation to interest under the statutory provision of the said Act. 11. Therefore, even assuming that any balance amount of Rs.6,00,000/- was claimed in the suit, it was not necessary for the petitioner to make claim for interest by resorting to Clause - 19 of the arbitration clause under the agreement as the arbitration clause does not govern adjudication in relation to interest under the statutory provision of the said Act. 11. I have gone through the application for leave to defend as well as the affidavit in support thereof to examine the correctness of submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner regarding filing of first statement. I find in the first place that the application for leave to defend cannot at all be called a 'first statement'. On the contrary, affidavit in support of the said application in clear terms raises the issue of jurisdiction of the Court with reference to arbitration clause, and therefore, on the facts of the present case, I am inclined to reject the submission made by Advocate Shri Pande for the petitioner to that effect. 12. In view of the findings recorded by me above about separate existence of claim for interest under a statutory law other than the agreement on the facts of the present case, it is not necessary for me to refer to several decisions cited before me by the Counsel for the parties. In the result, I make the following order. 13. Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause - (i). The trial Court is directed to decide the civil suit pending before it in the present matter within a period of six months from today. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.