JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Khare, the learned senior Counsel assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare for the petitioners and Sri Rajeev Gupta, the learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. In Writ Petition No. 29020 of 2007, Manoj Kumar Yadav was appointed on 18.10.2001 on a temporary basis, on the post of waterman, by the District Judge, Jalaun for a period of three months. Subsequently, by an order dated 2.1.2002, his services was regularised under the U.P. Subordinate Civil Courts Inferior Establishment Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). In Writ Petition No. 48213 of 2006, Shiv Pujan Yadav was appointed on a temporary post on 11.10.2001 as a Chaukidar, under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955 for a period of three months and thereafter his services was regularised. Similarly, Sujeet Kumar Yadav was appointed on a temporary post of Mali on 18.11.2001 and his services was also regularised after the expiry of three months. Sri Ram Bhajan Kushwaha was given an appointment on a temporary basis on the post of Waterman on 16.1.2002, for a period of three months and his services was also regularised after three months. In Writ Petition No. 63123 of 2006, one Sanjeev Kumar was appointed as a Chaukidar, on 1.11.2004, on a temporary basis and his services was subsequently regularised on 5.11.2001. In Writ Petition No. 56744 of 2006, Singh Mukesh Kumar was appointed on a temporary basis on the post of Farrash, on 8.1.2003, and his services was regularised after a period of three months. 3. It transpires that against the appointment of Sanjeev Kumar and Set Kamal Pandey, two complaints were lodged by Sri Saurabh Srivastava and Jagdeep Singh, which was referred by the Administrative Judge for necessary investigation, and eventually, upon an investigation, the Administrative Judge issued an order allowing the complaint of Jagdeep Singh. The Administrative Judge found that Sanjeev Kumar was wrongly offered an appointment and Jagdeep Singh was arbitrarily removed. The Administrative Judge found that Sanjeev Kumar was wrongly offered an appointment and Jagdeep Singh was arbitrarily removed. By another order, the Administrative Judge directed the District Judge : “In view of the aforesaid settled legal position vis-a-vis the powers of the District Judge under Rule 4(3) of the U.P. Subordinate Civil Courts Inferior Establishment Rules, 1955 a copy of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sachin Kumar and others (supra), is being enclosed herewith for ready reference, you are hereby required to take appropriate action against all such appointees, who had been offered appointments de hors the procedure known to law and in light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sachin Kumar and others (supra). Appropriate proceedings in accordance with law against such illegal appointees be initiated with all promptness and........” 4. Based on the aforesaid directions it transpires that the District Judge issued notices to the employees appointed in the judgeship of Jalaun since the year 2001 to show cause as to how their appointments were made without an advertisement in view of the decision in Sachin Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 ALJ 3100. The petitioners submitted their reply to the show cause notices. It transpires, that thereafter, a departmental inquiry was initiated and, an inquiry report was submitted, holding that the appointments of the petitioner’s were made without making an advertisement in a newspaper and, on this short ground, the services of the petitioner’s were terminated by various order, which are impugned in the writ petition. The District Judge, terminated the services of the petitioners on the ground that their appointments were made without any advertisement as contemplated under Rule 4 (3) of the Rules of 1955 in view of the mandate given in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sachin Kumar (supra). The petitioners, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, have filed various writ petitions which have been clubbed together. Since the issue is common in all these writ petition, the same is being decided together. 5. The short point which involves in the persent writ petition is, whether the Rules prescribes a procedure for selection of a person on a Class-IV post ? Since the issue is common in all these writ petition, the same is being decided together. 5. The short point which involves in the persent writ petition is, whether the Rules prescribes a procedure for selection of a person on a Class-IV post ? and, what is the power of the District Judge while making appointments on a Class-IV post under Rule 4 (3) of the Rules of 1955 ? and whether the Rules mandates the District Judge to issue an advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates before making an appointment on a Class-IV post ? 6. To answer the aforesaid questions, it would be appropriate, if various provisions in the Rules of 1955 are considered. Rule 4 prescribes the source of recruitment which is quoted herein under ? "4. Method of recruitment.—Recruitment to the following posts in the establishment shall be made : (1) Daftaries and bundle lifters—By promotion strictly on merits from amongst process-servers, orderlies, office peons, and farrashes who have put in at least five years service as such : Provided that no persons shall be promoted to these posts unless he is able to read and write Hindi in Devanagari script with correctness and fluency and can discharge the duties of the office satisfactorily and in the case of the post of daftari unless he also knows book binding. (2) Process servers, orderly peons, office peons and farrashes.—(a) by appointment of candidates on the waiting list prepared under Rule 12 or, (b) by transfer from one post to another according to suitability. (3) Chaukidars, malis, waterman and sweepers.—By direct recruitment on the discretion of District Judge." 7. Sub-clause (3) of Rule 4 provides direct recruitment of malis, watermen and sweepers on the discretion of the District Judge. Rule 5 provides that the appointing authority is the District Judge. Rule 6 provides that the rules relating to reservation would be followed at the time of recruitment. Rule 7 provides that the candidate should be a citizen of India who alone could be given an appointment. Rule 8 provides that no person below 18 years or above 32 years of age could be appointed. Rule 9 provides that the candidate so appointed should be in a good and mental health and free from any physical defect which could interfere in the efficient discharge of his official duties. Rule 8 provides that no person below 18 years or above 32 years of age could be appointed. Rule 9 provides that the candidate so appointed should be in a good and mental health and free from any physical defect which could interfere in the efficient discharge of his official duties. Rule 10 provides that the appointing authority must satisfy himself with regard to the character and antecedents of the candidate before making an appointment. Rule 11 provides the requisite educational qualifications which the candidate must possess. 8. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that a selection process is provided under the Rules of 1955 which the District Judge is required to follow while making an appointment under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955. 9. In Sachin Kumar and others (supra) the Court held that under Rule 4(3) of the Rules, the appointments are made at the discretion of the District Judge. The Court observed that such discretion should not be exercised on the whims of the District Judge for oblique purposes and consequently, held that before making appointments, the District Judge was required to issue an advertisement under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955. The Court held : “There is no procedure prescribed under these rules for appointment of Chowkidars, Malies, Waterman and Sweepers. The appointments on posts under sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 are made by direct recruitment at the discretion of the District Judge. The other rules namely, Rule 6 provides for representation of Scheduled Castes : Rule 7 provides for nationality, domicile and residence : Rules 8 to 11 provide for physical fitness, character and antecedents and educational qualifications. The transfer from one Judgeship to another may be made by the High Court under Rule 17(a), and within the Judgeship by the District Judge under Rule 17(b). The pay, allowances, leaves and pension under Rules 16 and 18 are to the same as regulated by the rules made by the State Government under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The pay, allowances, leaves and pension under Rules 16 and 18 are to the same as regulated by the rules made by the State Government under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The seniority is to be determined in any class of posts under Rule 13 from the date of substantive appointment, or promotion to that class, Rule 14 provides for probation and confirmation.” and further held : “The discretion given by the District Judge under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955, for appointment of Chowkidar, Malies, Waterman and Sweepers is not to be exercised on his whims. The appointing authority exercising statutory powers of appointment in public service under statutory rules cannot use the discretion for oblique purposes. The submission that there are no guidelines provided in the rules for exercising the discretion is not correct. The appointment on a civil post, even if made at the sole discretion of the appointing authority, has to be made by giving wide publicity inviting all the eligible persons, and thereafter by following a selection procedure which should be fair, transparent, and reasonable and should conform to the tests of equality, non-arbitrariness guaranteed to all the citizens, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Rules of reservation under Rule 6 of the Rules of 1955 are required to be followed by the District Judge. He must ensure that the persons appointed are not below the minimum and above the maximum age and are in a good mental and bodily health, free from any physical defect and bear good character duly verified for public employment.” and finally held : “The District Judge must adhere to the settled norms of selections by the vacancies even if they fall on the posts mentioned in Rule 4(3), advertising hold selection in making such appointments, and follow the rules of reservation.” 10. In Ramesh and others v. State of U.P. and others, in Writ Petition No. 22942 of 2003, decided on 28.11.2006, the Court held that an appointment under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955 must be preceded by a valid advertisement and selection by a process known to law. In Ramesh and others v. State of U.P. and others, in Writ Petition No. 22942 of 2003, decided on 28.11.2006, the Court held that an appointment under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955 must be preceded by a valid advertisement and selection by a process known to law. In Shiv Murti Chandra Mishra and others v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 57323 of 2005, decided on 25.8.2005, the Court held : “In view of the aforesaid rules, appointment on the post of Chaukidar can be made by direct recruitment only. It is settled law that for direct recruitment being made in accordance with law and for the same being in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is but necessary that such appointment must be preceded by a valid advertisement and selection by a process known to law. 11. In Sushil Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (4) ESC 2638 : 2007 (7) ADJ 572 , the Court explained as to what is the discretionary power that has to be exercised by the District Judge. The Court held : “Learned Counsel have placed much emphasis on the discretionary power of the District Judge to make appointments under Rule 4(3) of the Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the scope of this power. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that even in a situation where an authority is vested with a discretionary power, such power can be exercised by adopting that mode which best serves the interest and even if the Statute is silent as to how the discretion should be exercised, then too the authority cannot act whimsically or arbitrarily and its action should be guided by reasonableness and fairness because the legislature can never intend that its authorities could abuse the laws or use it unfairly. Any action which results in unfairness and arbitrariness results in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been emphasised that an authority cannot assume to itself an absolute power to adopt any procedure and the discretion must always be exercised according to law. Any action which results in unfairness and arbitrariness results in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been emphasised that an authority cannot assume to itself an absolute power to adopt any procedure and the discretion must always be exercised according to law. In Websters’ Third New International Dictionary ‘discretion’ means “power of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds : ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right, or wise may be presupposed.” In Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, ‘discretion’ means : “As applied to public officers connotes action taken in light of reason as applied to all facts and with view to rights of all parties to action while having regard for what is right and equitable under all circumstances and law.” In this connection reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and others, (1991) 4 SCC 54 wherein the scope of discretionary power has been dealt with : “.........Discretion is an effective tool in administration. But wrong notions about it results in ill-conceived consequences. In law it provides an option to the authority concerned to adopt one or the other alternative. But a better, proper and legal exercise of discretion is one where the authority examines the fact, is aware of law and then decides objectively and rationally what serves the interest better. When a statute either provides guidance or rules or regulations are framed for exercise of discretion then the action should be in accordance with it. Even where statutes are silent and only power is conferred to act in one or the other manner, the Authority cannot act whimsically or arbitrarily. It should be guided by reasonableness and fairness. The legislature never intends its authorities to abuse the law or use it unfairly...............” (emphasis supplied). 12. In Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh, (2004) 2 SCC 590 the Supreme Court observed : “When anything is left to any person, judge or Magistrate to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with sound discretion, and according to law. 12. In Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh, (2004) 2 SCC 590 the Supreme Court observed : “When anything is left to any person, judge or Magistrate to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with sound discretion, and according to law. (See Tomlin’s Law Dictionary.) In its ordinary meaning, the word “discretion” signifies unrestrained exercise of choice or will; freedom to act according to one’s own judgment; unrestrained exercise of will; the liberty or power of acting without control other than one’s own judgment. But, when applied to public functionaries, it means a power or right conferred upon them bv law, of acting officially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Discretion is to discern between right and wrong; and therefore, whoever hath power to act at discretion, is bound by the rule of reason and law. (See Tomlin’s Law Dictionary.) Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, the discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution; nice soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the will and private affections of persons. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself (per Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Sharp v. Wakefield). (Also see S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India.) The word “discretion” standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly. unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. (Also see S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India.) The word “discretion” standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly. unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore, where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility.” (emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, no doubt that while exercising his ‘discretion’ under Rule 4(3) of the Rules in making appointments, the District Judge has to ensure that the procedure adopted by him is in conformity with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that he cannot act in an unfair or arbitrary manner.” 13. In the aforesaid decision of Sushil Kumar Sharma’s case (supra), the Court while placing reliance of the decision in Sachin Kumar and others (supra), further proceeded to hold that the District Judge was required to make an advertisement before making an appointment under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955. 14. From a perusal of Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955, it is clear that malies, watermen and sweepers are to be recruited on the discretion of the District Judge. The requirement of advertising the vacancy in a newspaper as a condition precedent for a direct appointment was not a requirement contemplated under the Rules of 1955 qua sub-clause (3) of Rule 4 of the said Rules. The requirement of an advertisement became an imperative condition of a valid appointment only as a result of a decision dated 22.8.2005 in Sachin Kumar’s case. Prior to this decision, an advertisement was not an imperative condition for an appointment under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955, and such appointment was made at the sole discretion of the District Judge. It has been stated at the Bar that prior to the date of the decision in Sachin Kumar’s case, the established procedure which was being followed in all the Judgeships in the State of U.P. was appointment under Rule 4(3) of the Rules without an advertisement and that an advertisement was not a mandatory condition while making an appointment. The issuance of an advertisement became a condition precedent and a mandatory requirement pursuant to the judgment in Sachin Kumar’s case. The issuance of an advertisement became a condition precedent and a mandatory requirement pursuant to the judgment in Sachin Kumar’s case. The said judgment was circulated by the Registrar General to all the District Judges for necessary action and compliance. 15. The question now is, whether the judgment in Sachin Kumar’s case could operate retrospectively and would take in its fold such appointments which was made prior to the issuance of this judgment? In a similar situation, the requirement of advertising a vacancy in a newspaper as a condition precedent for a direct recruitment was not a requirement of law under the Second Removal of Difficulties Orders prior to the judgment in K.N. Dwivedi v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 461 as well as the decision of the Full Bench in Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, 1994 (2) ESC 345, wherein the Court in the said judgments held that the requirement of an advertisement was a necessary condition for direct appointment. The said judgments were explained by a Division Bench of this Court in Ashika Prasad Shukla v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and another, 1998 (3) ESC 2006, wherein the Court held that the said judgments could only be prospective and could not have a retrospective effect. In my opinion, the principle enunciated in the said judgment is squarely applicable to the present facts and circumstances of this case. As stated earlier, there was no requirement of issuance of an advertisement under Rule 4(3) of the Rules for making an appointment on a Class-IV post. The issuance of an advertisement became mandatory and a necessary requirement, rather an imperative condition of a valid appointment, pursuant to the decision of the Court in Sachin Kumar’s case. Consequently, in the light of the judgment in Ashika Prasad Shukla case (supra), this Court is of the firm opinion that the decision in Sachin Kumar’s case (supra), decided on 22.8.2005, can only operate prospectively and cannot invalidate an appointment made prior to this date on the sole ground that the said appointment was made without the issuance of an advertisement. 16. However, the judgments of the Court, as referred herein above have clearly held that the discretion exercised by the District Judge should be fair and reasonable and should not be on the whims and fancies of the District Judge for oblique motives or purposes. 16. However, the judgments of the Court, as referred herein above have clearly held that the discretion exercised by the District Judge should be fair and reasonable and should not be on the whims and fancies of the District Judge for oblique motives or purposes. The word ‘discretion’ has been explained in a decision of the Court in Sushil Kumar Sharma’s case (supra) holding that where an authority was vested with a discretionary power, such power should be exercised by adopting a mode which served the interest of the institution and where the statutes was silent on the issue as to how the discretion was to be exercised, even then, the authority could not act whimsically or arbitrarily, and that, the action of the authority had to be guided by reasonableness and fairness and that any action which resulted in unfairness and arbitrariness would automatically be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 17. In the present case, the Rules of 1955 provides safeguards which puts fetters upon the appointing authority in exercising its power arbitrarily. The Rules provides a procedure which, if followed would become fair and reasonable. For example, Rule 6 provides that, the Rules of Reservation are required to be followed. Rule 8 provides that, a candidate should not be less than 18 years nor should be more than 32 years. Rules 9 and 10 provides that, the appointing authority should appoint such persons who is mentally fit and free from any physical defect, and that, his character and antecedents are such which renders the candidate suitable for an employment in the establishment. In my opinion, these are various provisions which puts a fetter in the arbitrary exercise of powers of the District Judge, and if these Rules are followed in letters and in spirit, such arbitrary exercise of discretion would be curbed and fairness and reasonableness would be writ large in the selection and appointments of the candidates. 18. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion, that the power exercised by the District Judge under Rule 4(3) has to be read and worked out in the light of the provisions made in Rules, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Rules of 1955 and only then one can find out as to whether the appointing authority had validly exercised its discretion or not. This Court is also of the opinion that Rule 4(3) read with Rules 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Rules of 1955 provides a procedure for appointment of Class-IV employees as specified in Rule 4(3) of the Rules. 19. In the present case, the appointments of the petitioners has been set aside on the ground that an advertisement had not been issued. Since their appointments were made prior to the decision of Sachin Kumar’s case, this Court is of the opinion that the appointments of the petitioners on the ground of non-issuance of an advertisement cannot be invalidated. Other factors, as contemplated under Rules 6 to 11 of the Rules, are also required to be considered. 20. In Writ Petition No. 63123 of 2006, Sanjeev Kumar was appointed as a Chaukidar at the expense of one Jagdeep Singh, who was already working. The Administrative Judge found that the appointment of Sanjeev Kumar was made arbitrarily and that the District Judge had exercised his power malafidely in giving him an appointment at the expense of Jagdeep Singh who was already working. The Administrative Judge consequently directed the District Judge for appointment of Jagdeep Singh. The record on the Administrative side suggests that Jagdeep Singh was subsequently given an appointment. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that, even though the appointment of Sanjeev Kumar was cancelled on the ground that the advertisement was not issued, nonetheless, the Court is of the opinion, that his appointment was made arbitrarily and malafidely at the expense of one Jagdeep Singh who was already working in the Judgeship of Jalaun. Consequently, the petitioner Sanjeev Kumar is not entitled for any relief and his writ petition is dismissed. 21. In Writ Petition 56744 of 2006, the petitioner Singh Mukesh Kumar was appointed as a Farrash for a period of three months. A Farrash can only be appointed from a waiting list under Rule 4(2) of the Rules of 1955 which contemplates appointments by direct recruitment after due advertisement and a selection process. Further, a waiting list is required to be prepared under Rule 12 of the Rules. The counter affidavit as well as the record reveals that no selection procedure was adopted nor an advertisement was made nor any waiting list was prepared and that the District Judge had arbitrarily appointed the said petitioner without following the procedure. Further, a waiting list is required to be prepared under Rule 12 of the Rules. The counter affidavit as well as the record reveals that no selection procedure was adopted nor an advertisement was made nor any waiting list was prepared and that the District Judge had arbitrarily appointed the said petitioner without following the procedure. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion, that the discretion exercised by the District Judge in giving an appointment to the petitioner, Singh Mukesh Kumar, was in complete violation of Rule 4(2) of the Rules of 1955. Consequently, the said petitioner Singh Mukesh Kumar is not entitled for any relief and his writ petition is dismissed. 22. So far as the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 29020 of 2007 and Writ Petition No. 48213 of 2006 are concerned, the Court finds that their appointments were made in the year 2001 and, based on the directions of the Administrative Judge, old appointments were raked up and their services were terminated on the short ground that an advertisement was not issued before their appointments. The Administrative Judge had only directed to take appropriate action against all appointees who had been offered appointments dehors the procedure know to law and in the light of the judgment in Sachin Kumar’s case. As I have already held that the requirement of an advertisement was not a mandatory Rule as provided under Rule 4(3), and that, the provision of an advertisement became an imperative condition pursuant to the decision of the Court in Sachin Kumar’s case (supra) w.e.f. 27.8.2005. Consequently, any appointments made prior to the decision in Sachin Kumar’s case, could not be set aside on the ground of non-issuance of an advertisement. Further, I have already held that there is a procedure provided under the Rules of 1955 for making appointments. These provisions are required to be adhered. The authority can however investigate and see as to whether the appointing authority had validly and fairly exercised its discretion as per the Rules of 1955, as explained herein above, and if the exercise was not made fairly, in that event, action could be taken against the said employee. For example, this Court finds that one of the petitioners, Shiv Pujan Yadav has stated his age to be 39 years. For example, this Court finds that one of the petitioners, Shiv Pujan Yadav has stated his age to be 39 years. Consequently, it has to be seen by the authority as to whether he was within the permissible age limit as contemplated under Rule 8 of the Rules at the time of his appointment. The authority would be required to investigate as to whether the discretion was fairly exercised by the appointing authority or not. Similarly, the Rules of reservation is also required to be considered. It is also not clear from the record or from the affidavits as to whether the appointment was made against a vacancy or not. This aspect is also required to be seen. For example, if the appointing authority had appointed the petitioners under Rule 4(3) against a non-existing vacancy, in that case, the discretion exercised by the appointing authority would be totally arbitrary. 23. In view of the aforesaid, Writ Petition Nos. 63123 of 2006 and 56744 of 2006 are dismissed. Writ Petition No. 29020 of 2007 and 48213 of 2006 are allowed. The order of termination passed against the said petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 29020 of 2007 and 48213 of 2006 are set aside and the matter is remitted to the District Judge afresh to investigate and pass an order afresh as to whether their appointments were made validly under Rule 4(3) of the Rules of 1955, namely, whether the discretion exercised by the then appointing authority was validly made or not in the light of the observation made above. This exercise has to be done by the District Judge within six weeks from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order. In the event the District Judge finds that the appointment was validly made, in that event, the petitioners would be reinstated in service with continuity of service, but, the petitioners would not be paid their wages for the period from the date of their termination till the date of their reinstatement, on the principle of ‘No Work and No Pay’. In the event, no special appeal is filed within six weeks from today, this Court further directs the Registrar General of this Court to circulate this judgment to all the District Judges for necessary information and action after taking permission from the Hon’ble Chief Justice. In the event, no special appeal is filed within six weeks from today, this Court further directs the Registrar General of this Court to circulate this judgment to all the District Judges for necessary information and action after taking permission from the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The Registry is directed to place a certified copy of this judgment before the Registrar General within two weeks from today for necessary information and action. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own cost. ————