JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Dharam Pal Singh, Advocate for the review applicant and Sri A.B. Saran, Senior Advocate for the respondents at great length. It is contended by Sri Singh that on 23rd March, 2006 when this Court decided the appeal, one of the Counsel for the appellant, i.e., review applicant had sent adjournment on the ground of illness and, therefore, this Court ought not to have heard the matter on merits and instead, ought to have adjourned the case on the ground of illness. He further submitted that in case the Court was not inclined to adjourn the matter, treating the appellant as had not appeared, it was not open to the Court to decide the case on merit and instead the appeal ought to have been dismissed in default as provided in Order 41, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short ‘C.P.C.’). He has also placed reliance on Apex Court’s decision in Abdul Rahman and others v. Athifa Begum and others, (1996) 6 SCC 62 and Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and another, AIR 1981 SC 1400 . 2. From a perusal of record we find that the special appeal was initially filed by the review applicant (appellant) through Sri R.K. Awasthi, Advocate with the endorsement on Vakalatnama that Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, Senior Advocate, will appear. The appeal was presented in the Registry on 24.10.1997 and thereafter it was listed for admission on 26.4.2001 when nobody appeared for the appellant. The Court dismissed the appeal in default which order was recalled by the Court on 2.4.2002 on the application of the appellant. In the meantime, Sri G.N. Verma Advocate filed his Vakalatnama dated 8.2.2001 and Sri Hari Manish Bahadur Sinha, Advocate filed his Vakalatnama dated 11.2.2002 putting their appearance on behalf of the appellant. Thereafter another Vakalatnama dated 19.7.2004 was filed by Sri Bhagwati Prasad Srivastava, Advocate on behalf of the appellant. Though no Vakalatnama of Sri D.P. Singh, Advocate (Devendra Pratap Singh) is available on record, but the restoration application No. 50269 of 2001 was filed by him on 23.5.2001 and some listing applications were also filed by Sri D.P. Singh on behalf of the appellant. Though no Vakalatnama of Sri D.P. Singh, Advocate (Devendra Pratap Singh) is available on record, but the restoration application No. 50269 of 2001 was filed by him on 23.5.2001 and some listing applications were also filed by Sri D.P. Singh on behalf of the appellant. The appeal thereafter came up for admission before a Division Bench on 7.8.2003 when the Court required learned Counsel for the appellant to show as to how the appeal was maintainable and thereupon the learned Counsel for the appellant sought adjournment so as to prepare the matter further on the question of maintainability of appeal. This is evident from the order dated 7.8.2003 which is quoted below : “Learned Counsel for the appellant has prayed for a short adjournment in order to enable him to study further the question relating to the maintainability of this appeal. As prayed for, list in the next week.” 3. Thereafter it was listed before the Court from time to time but could not be heard. On 31.1.2006 Sri G.N. Verma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant sought adjournment which was accepted and the case was directed to be listed in the next cause list. On 23.3.2006 when the matter was listed before this Court, the names of S/Sri R.K. Awasthi, G.N. Verma, D.P. Singh, H.M.B. Sinha and Bhagwati Prasad Srivastava, Advocates were shown in the cause list as Counsels for the appellant. An illness slip was sent only on behalf of one of so many Counsels, namely, Sri D.P. Singh. As we have seen from the order sheet, Sri D.P. Singh had not appeared in the case to argue the matter at any point of time. Though restoration application was filed by him, but that too was argued by Sri H.M.B. Sinha, Advocate as is evident from the order dated 2.4.2002 and as late as on 31.1.2006 also when this matter was listed before this Court, Sri G.N. Verma Advocate has appeared for the appellant and sought adjournment. Even after filing this review application which is under consideration, initially on 30th March 2007 Sri G.N. Verma had appeared before the Court and requested for adjournment which was allowed but today ultimately, the matter has been argued by another Counsel Sri Dharam Pal Singh. Even after filing this review application which is under consideration, initially on 30th March 2007 Sri G.N. Verma had appeared before the Court and requested for adjournment which was allowed but today ultimately, the matter has been argued by another Counsel Sri Dharam Pal Singh. It is in these circumstances that we propose to consider the submissions of the learned Counsel for the review applicant, besides the question of law as to whether Order 41 Rule 17, CPC would have any application at all in an appeal arising out of an order passed by Hon’ble Single Judge in contempt proceedings. 4. It would be important to state at this stage that we, at the outset, required Sri Singh to show as to whether there is any error, legal or factual, in the view taken by this Court in our order dated 23.3.2006 whereby we have held that the special appeal preferred by the appellant against rejection of his contempt application is not maintainable to which he fairly conceded that probably he is not in a position to say that the view taken by this Court is exceptionable but then proceeded to submit that technically since this Court could not have decided the appeal when the appellant has not put in appearance or is absent in view of Order 41 Rule 17 C.P.C., the Court was bound to dismiss the appeal in default without entering into merits of the case and, therefore, the order dated 23.3.2006 is liable to be set aside. 5. We also confronted the learned Counsel with another proposition that though we are clearly of the view that the provision of Order 41 Rule 17 C.P.C. has no application in the present proceedings yet for the sake of argument, if we accept his submission and allow his recall application, and then pass the same order as we have passed on 23.3.2006 that the special appeal is not maintainable, would it make any difference in the matter, to which he could not give any reply and instead said that he is required to discharge his professional obligation by making his submission that in the absence of the appellant the Court cannot decide the appeal on merit and is bound to dismiss the appeal in default and this Court may consider the same and pass appropriate order. 6. 6. Now we proceed to consider whether this Court erred in law by deciding the question as to whether the appeal was maintainable or not instead of dismissing it in default following the procedure laid down under Order 41 Rule 17 of the C.P.C. 7. It is not in dispute that this intra-Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court was preferred by the review applicant against the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge whereby the contempt petition of the review applicant/appellant was dismissed. Against dismissal of the contempt petition no appeal is provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1971”). Section 19 provides for appeal only against such orders or decisions which imposes punishments. The Apex Court considering the question as to whether the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (in short “Cr.P.C”) would be applicable to contempt proceedings held in Sukhdev Singh v. Hon’ble C.J.S. Teja Singh, AIR 1954 SC 186 that the power of High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punishment, where necessary, is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all Courts of record and, therefore, Cr.P.C. is inapplicable to such proceedings. In para 24 of the judgment the Apex Court held : “We hold, therefore, that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court. The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself.” 8. In the same judgment referring to Section 1(2) of Cr.P.C., 1898 the Apex Court held that ‘special jurisdiction’ is excluded. What constitute ‘special jurisdiction’ has been dealt with in para 4 of the judgment as under : “4. The term “special jurisdiction” is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code but the words “special law” are defined in Section 41 of the Indian Penal Code to mean “a law applicable to a particular subject”. In the absence of any specific definition in the Criminal Procedure Code, we think that that brings out the ordinary and natural meaning of the words “special jurisdiction” and covers the present case. In the absence of any specific definition in the Criminal Procedure Code, we think that that brings out the ordinary and natural meaning of the words “special jurisdiction” and covers the present case. Contempt is a special subject and the jurisdiction is conferred by a special set of laws peculiar to Courts of Record.” 9. The view taken in Sukhdev Singh (supra) has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Mrs. V.G. Peterson v. O.V. Forbes and another, AIR 1963 SC 692 and R.L. Kapur v. State of T.N., AIR 1972 SC 858 . 10. A Full Bench of Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sher Singh v. Raghu Pati Kapur and another, AIR 1968 (P&H) 217 in para 26 has also expressed a similar view as under : “It is a peculiar type of an offence which is a class by itself and, therefore, it has a procedure for itself. The classification is intelligible as also the classification has rational relation to the object in that in the matter of contempt the punishment is awarded summarily for that is done not with the object of providing protection to individual Judges but in the interest of administration of justice so that the public confidence in the impartiality of the Judges be not shaken. It is this object with which the proceedings in contempt of Court have been classified as proceedings of a class by themselves with a procedure of their own.” 11. We find that the same reasoning would apply with the case in hand also. Application of C.P.C. to contempt proceedings would also excluded vide Section 4(1) thereof which provides that ‘special jurisdiction’ would not be affected either way by the provisions of C.P.C. and reads as under : “4. Savings.—(1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.” 12. Further, the power to initiate contempt is vested in the High Court being ‘Court of record’ as also expressly provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Presently the procedure and the manner of punishment etc. are governed by Act, 1971. Further, the power to initiate contempt is vested in the High Court being ‘Court of record’ as also expressly provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Presently the procedure and the manner of punishment etc. are governed by Act, 1971. Section 23 of the said Act confers power upon the High Court to make rules relating to its procedure and reads as under : “23. Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to make rules.—The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, any High Court, may make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure.” 13. In exercise of the said power, Contempt of Courts (Allahabad High Court) Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the “1977 Rules”) were framed and published in the U.P. Gazette on 12th February, 1977. In certain aspects the provisions of C.P.C. have been made applicable as is evident from Section 17(4) of 1977 Rules which is in respect to attachment of property and for the said purpose it is provided that the manner provided in C.P.C. shall be followed. Similarly, under Rules 11, 12 and 13 of 1977 Rules certain provisions applicable to criminal matters have been applied. Except as provided therein no other provision of C.P.C. or Cr.P.C. would be applicable in contempt proceedings initiated or pending before this Court. That being so, appeal in the present case, being continuation of contempt proceeding the provisions of C.P.C. and Cr.P.C. cannot be relied on so as to restrict the power of the Court to consider or decide the matter. 14. Moreover, Rule 10 of 1977 Rules is also of importance and may be referred to as under : “10. After giving information about the commission of Contempt of Court by any person or persons, the informant shall not have any right to appear or plead or argue before the Court unless he is called upon by the Court specially to do so.” 15. After giving information about the commission of Contempt of Court by any person or persons, the informant shall not have any right to appear or plead or argue before the Court unless he is called upon by the Court specially to do so.” 15. In view of Rule 10 of 1977 Rules, once an informant who has brought to notice of the Court about the commission of a contempt by any person or persons, he ceases thereafter any right to appear or plead or argue before the Court unless he is called upon by the Court specially to do so and this makes it clear that an informant or complainant in contempt proceedings has a very limited role and cannot insist upon his right to appear and argue a case in the same manner as the right available to a plaintiff or respondent in civil proceedings or to a petitioner or respondents in writ jurisdiction before this Court and alike. 16. Besides, in our view, even otherwise the reference and reliance on Order 41 Rule 17, C.P.C. in the case in hand is thoroughly misconceived and ill-advised. Order 41 deals with appeals arising from original decree. A decree is defined in Section 2(2) of C.P.C, and reads as under : “(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144 but shall not include— (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.—A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” 17. It is thus evident that the matter arising out of the suit where appeal is preferred, Order 41, C.P.C. would apply and thus Order 41 Rule 17 would also apply only to such appeals. Further, Order 41 Rule 17, C.P.C. applies at the stage of hearing when the appeal is fixed for hearing. It is thus evident that the matter arising out of the suit where appeal is preferred, Order 41, C.P.C. would apply and thus Order 41 Rule 17 would also apply only to such appeals. Further, Order 41 Rule 17, C.P.C. applies at the stage of hearing when the appeal is fixed for hearing. When an appeal is listed for admission, the procedure to be followed is given in Order 41 Rule 11, C.P.C. which reads as under : “11. Power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to lower Court.—(1) The Appellate Court after fixing a day for hearing the appellant or his pleader and hearing him accordingly if he appears on that day may dismiss the appeal. (2) If on the day fixed or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. (3) The dismissal of an appeal under this rule shall be notified to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. (4) Where an Appellate Court, not being the High Court, dismisses an appeal under sub-rule (1), it shall deliver a judgment, recording in brief its grounds for doing so, and a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment.” 18. Sub-rules (2) and (4) of Rule 11, Order 41 clearly show that in the absence of the Counsel, appeal can be dismissed by the Court and there is no bar that such dismissal shall not be on merits but only for non-prosecution of the appeal. There is a clear distinction between Order 41 Rule 11 and 17, C.P.C. The present special appeal was never admitted. On the first date when it was sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant, it is evident from the order sheet that this Court raised an objection about its maintainability wherefor the learned Counsel for the appellant sought adjournment to study the matter further and to see as to whether the appeal is maintainable or not. The entire order sheet makes it clear that at no point of time, this appeal was admitted and, therefore, on 22.3.2006 when it was listed, this Court considered the matter on admission and found it not maintainable, hence, dismissed the same. The entire order sheet makes it clear that at no point of time, this appeal was admitted and, therefore, on 22.3.2006 when it was listed, this Court considered the matter on admission and found it not maintainable, hence, dismissed the same. We held that this intra Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court was not maintainable. 19. So long as an appeal is not admitted and if it is not maintainable, we do not find any reason to accept the contention of Sri Singh that such an order after considering entire matter could not have been passed by us since one of the several Counsels appearing for the appellant has not attended the Court, may be for a justified reason. An appeal is not a matter of right but is a creature of the statute. Unless the statute provides no one can assert a right of appeal against an order passed by the Court or any authority in exercise of, its jurisdiction under some statute etc. This Court, in the absence of any provision applicable and providing otherwise, could always consider and decide as to whether the appeal itself is maintainable or not. We are, thus, clearly of the view that submission of Sri Singh that the appeal ought to have been dismissed in default under Order 41 Rule 17 of C.P.C. and could not have been dismissed by considering that it was not maintainable is not tenable in law and is rejected. 20. As we have discussed above, Order 41, Rule 17, C.P.C. has no application to the present appeal. The judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant also have no application to the facts of this case. Learned Counsel for the review applicant also could not place any authority to show that in an appeal arising out of contempt proceedings the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Moreover, where a large number of Advocates had filed their vakalatnama on behalf of the appellant, an illness slip sent by one of them by itself would not entitle anyone to get the case adjourned. Moreover, where a large number of Advocates had filed their vakalatnama on behalf of the appellant, an illness slip sent by one of them by itself would not entitle anyone to get the case adjourned. Be that as it may, as we have already noticed, we also afforded full opportunity to the applicant to show as to whether the special appeal would have been maintainable or not to which learned Counsel for the appellant conceded that he could not find any error in the view taken by this Court vide judgment dated 23.3.2006 and hence we do not find any substance in the submission warranting indulgence. 21. Before parting, we find it appropriate to express our anguish and pain to see the manner in which this case has been dealt with by the appellant/applicant. This is an illustration to show that the litigants and sometimes their Counsels create all kinds of obstructions or situations so that a matter may not be decided finally by the Court but should linger on for years together. As is evident, the appeal, though not maintainable, and ought to have been dismissed in 1997, yet has remain pending before this Court for almost a decade due to reasons mainly attributable to the appellant/applicant. We find it our duty to place on record that this Court when already flooded with lacs of cases, pending for years together and the number of cases pending in this Court being the highest in the country, it should be the genuine efforts of the Bar and Bench, both, that frivolous litigation must come to an end at the earliest. Learned Counsels should assist the Court for getting a decision and not to prolong litigation. The effort should be to get the cases decided on merits instead of going by technicalities like dismissed in default etc. as that would not end litigation in the Court but the cases would continue to remain pending in one or the other form, namely, restoration application etc. 22. Very fairly Sri Dharam Pal Singh, learned Counsel, though could not contest the decision that the appeal was not maintainable yet his request was that the matter may continue to remain pending since the appellant/applicant is trying to negotiate with the respondents and for that purpose pendency of the appeal was necessary. 22. Very fairly Sri Dharam Pal Singh, learned Counsel, though could not contest the decision that the appeal was not maintainable yet his request was that the matter may continue to remain pending since the appellant/applicant is trying to negotiate with the respondents and for that purpose pendency of the appeal was necessary. This approach and attitude on the part of a litigant is not only highly objectionable and condemnable but should be deprecated in the strongest words. Learned Advocates being officers of the Court owe a duty not only to the Court but to their clients also in getting the cases decided expeditiously so as to achieve the objective of dispensation of justice. The time of the Court is precious for the reason that it is public’s time and must be utilised for adjudicating matters which have substance and need to be decided at the earliest. The arm of justice must reach the aggrieved person dispensing justice speedily. If time of the Court is consumed, and that too, a lion’s share, by frivolous and bogus litigation, it is bound to take away the time which could have been utilised for really needy litigants. The time has come when the learned members of the Bar should rise to the occasion and discourage frivolous and bogus litigation by telling their clients that they would not be a party to such kind of litigation. Frivolous litigation only adds burden on the Court and deprives real litigants from the shower of justice at a time when he really needs it. Needless to say, it would be healthier for institution in particular and public at large and this pious institution would be able to achieve its constitutional obligation of dispensation of justice in deserving cases with greater pace. 23. In the result, we do not find any merit in this application and it is accordingly rejected. No order as to costs. ————