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2008 DIGILAW 1424 (RAJ)

Mohd. Harun v. Nissar Ahmed

2008-05-21

BHANWAROO KHAN, P.C.TATIA

body2008
Honble TATIA, J.–The present D.B. Special Appeal has been preferred to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 6.2.2008 by which the appellants application filed under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacating the interim order dated 10.1.2008 was dismissed and the interim order dated 6.2.2008 was confirmed in SBCWP No.243/2008. (2). Facts of the case in brief are that there is a Durgah Diwaneshah Sabab, at Kapsan (hereinafter referred to as Durgah) and it is stated that said Durgah is visited by thousands of Jaireen and for managing the said Durgah, a committee is constituted. The said committee is Tauliyat Wakf Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). According to the petitioners, the said committee is registered under the provisions of Wakf Act, 1954. Wakf Act, 1954 was repealed by the Section 112 of the Wakf Act, 1995. The petitioners were appointed as Tauliyat of Wakf Committee by the Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf, Jaipur vide order dated 17.1.2004. According to the petitioners, the term of the committee was not limited and as per Section 67 of the Act of 1995 term of the committee is until the expiry of its term if specified by the Wakf or until it is superseded by the Board under Section 67 for the reasons mentioned under Section 67 of the Act of 1995. The Mutwalies can be removed under Section 64 of the Act of 1995. Therefore, under the Wakf Act, 1995 the petitioners committee whose term is not limited by the Wakf or by order of any competent authority has right to work till it is superseded by lawful order. (3). Earlier under Wakf Act, 1954, Rajasthan Muslim Wakf Regulation, 1964 were framed. As per Regulation no.25, the term of the committee could have been for a period of one year and its period could have been extended for further six months only. Since old Wakf Act of 1954 and Regulations framed thereunder have been repealed by the Wakf Act, 1995, therefore, under the Act of 1995, it is not necessary that committee should be for limited period and it can continue till it is superseded because of the accrual of reasons as mentioned in Section 67 of the Wakf Act, 1995. According to the petitioners, the petitioners are independently called as Mutawalli and the entire committee is known as Tauliyat Committee. According to the petitioners, the petitioners are independently called as Mutawalli and the entire committee is known as Tauliyat Committee. The petitioner being Mutwalies also could have been removed only if they are removed by following procedure as provided by Section 64 of the Act of 1995. (4).According to the petitioners they are managing the affairs of the Durgah with full devotion and Durgah is well managed. No reason accrued for superseding the petitioners committee under Section 67 of the Wakf Act, 1995 or removal of petitioners under Section 64 of the Act of 1995. The respondent no.3 who is the member of the ruling party in the State wanted to oust the present petitioners from the management of the Durgah and he made false complaints with the connivance of the Board of Muslim Wakf, Jaipur and he obtained certain illegal orders from the Board. One of the said illegal order was order dated 18.12.2004 by which petitioners committee was superseded. The petitioners challenged the said order dated 18.12.2004. The said order dated 18.12.2004 was set aside by the Wakf Tribunal, Jaipur in appeal no.04/2005 by order dated 13.4.2005. The said order was set aside on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Section 67 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Copy of the order of the Wakf Tribunal, Jaipur dated 13.4.2005 has been placed on record as Annex.3 in the writ petition. The respondent no.3 annoyed with the order of the Wakf Tribunal (Annex.3) got his persons nominated as members of Wakf Board and started harassing the petitioners. It is alleged that to achieve removal of petitioners, the Wakf Boards meeting was called for which a notice was issued by one Usman Saddiqui as Chief Executive Officer of the Board, though he was not Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board and only Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board could have convened the meeting of the Board. Four elected members of the Board raised objection in respect of notice of the meeting and requested the Chief Executive officer for adjourning the meeting, but meeting was convened and without there being corum, resolution dated 18.12.2007 was passed. In consequence thereof, an order dated 6.11.2007 (Annex.7) was issued by the Wakf Board directing the petitioners committee to hand over charge of the committee to the newly constituted committee. In consequence thereof, an order dated 6.11.2007 (Annex.7) was issued by the Wakf Board directing the petitioners committee to hand over charge of the committee to the newly constituted committee. It is stated by the petitioners that neither there is any cause for removal of the petitioners committee nor any order has been passed for removal of the petitioners committee nor any proceedings was initiated under Section 64 for removal of Mutawalies, or under Section 67 for suspension of committee of Management was initiated by the Board and yet, it has been ordered that petitioners committee should hand over the charge to the newly constituted committee. (5). The petitioners being aggrieved from the order dated 6.11.2007 preferred appeal before the Rajasthan Wakf Tribunal under Section 64, 67 read with Section 83 of the Wakf Act. The petitioners said appeal was rejected by the Wakf Tribunal vide order dated 8.1.2008 after holding that the appeal against the order dated 6.11.2007 is not maintainable. The appeal of the petitioners was rejected on above ground because objection was raised against the maintainability of the appeal by non- petitioners in the writ petition. (6). The petitioners being aggrieved against the order of dismissal of their appeal dated 6.11.2007 by the Wakf Tribunal preferred the writ petition and in the above writ petition the learned Single Judge granted ad-interim order in favour of the contesting respondents-petitioners of the writ petition no.243/2008. The interim order passed on 10.1.2008 in writ petition no.243/2008 is "In the meanwhile, effect and operation of the impugned order dated 8.1.2008 (Annex.9) and order dated 6.11.2007 (Annex.7) shall remain stayed till the next date of hearing." The case was ordered to be listed on 17.1.2008, but before that on 15.1.2008, an application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India was filed by the respondents. As per the facts mentioned in the impugned order itself, thereafter, on 17.1.2008 in the presence of both the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition was fixed for hearing on 27.1.2008 and interim order was extended till then. The writ petition was listed in court thereafter on number of occasions, but was adjourned and interim order was extended. Even the notice was issued to the learned Addl. The writ petition was listed in court thereafter on number of occasions, but was adjourned and interim order was extended. Even the notice was issued to the learned Addl. Advocate General of the State so as to find out why the regulations and rules are not framed under the Wakf Act, 1995 and a quarry was raised that how the State Government has allowed Wakf Board to follow the regulations (framed under Old Wakf Act) after coming into force the Act of 1995. (7). In the application filed under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, submitted for vacating the interim order, the applicants-respondents submitted that the Principal seat of the High Court had no territorial jurisdiction and the writ petition of the petitioners is not maintainable in view of Section 83(9) of the Act of 1995 as sub-section (9) of Section 83 provided that no appeal shall lie against any decision or order whether interim or otherwise, given or made by the tribunal. And the term of the petitioners committee had expired and the contesting respondents had taken over the charge of the committee on 7.11.2007. It is also submitted that newly constituted committee in last two months period has deposited more than Rs.4,08,000/- with the bank, obviously, the amount which was offered by the Jaireen in the Durgah. It is also submitted that the interim order passed in writ petition gave the ultimate relief to the petitioners which could have been granted only as final relief in the writ petition. (8).The writ petitioners contested all the issues raised by the applicants-respondents in reply to application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. It is pertinent to mention here that writ petitioners relied upon the Wakf Boards own reply filed in SBCWP No.449/2007 wherein Wakf Board took specific stand that as per Section 17, the meeting of the Board can be held as per regulations to be made under the Act of 1995 and that regulations have not been framed so far. In the said reply, it was specific stand of the Wakf Board that the regulations framed under the Wakf Act, 1964 stands repealed by the Wakf Act, 1995, yet the Wakf Board in the present case, wants to say that term of the committee cannot be beyond the period given in the repealed regulations. In the said reply, it was specific stand of the Wakf Board that the regulations framed under the Wakf Act, 1964 stands repealed by the Wakf Act, 1995, yet the Wakf Board in the present case, wants to say that term of the committee cannot be beyond the period given in the repealed regulations. According to writ petitioners when the term of the committee has not been fixed in the original order and power vest in the Wakf Board to take action against the erring committee under the Act of 1995 and a procedure has been given in the Wakf Act, 1995 then with the aid of repealed regulations and without following the procedure as prescribed under the Wakf Act, 1995, the petitioners committee could not have been dissolved by the Wakf Board. In fact, in the present case, the Wakf Committee of the petitioners had not been dissolved and yet the Board has ordered to petitioners committee to hand over the charge to newly constituted committee. (9). The learned Single Judge by impugned order dated 6.2.2008 rejected all objections raised by the contesting non-petitioners of the writ petition and rejected application of the non- petitioners filed under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India and confirmed the interim order dated 10.1.2008. Hence, this special appeal by the aggrieved parties. (10). Learned Sr. Advocate, Shri M. Mridul and learned counsel Shri MC Tailor, vehemently submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the recent judgment of this Honble Court delivered in the case of Chief Executive Officer, Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf, Jaleb Chowk, Jaipur & Ors Vs. Islamuddin & Anr. reported in 2007(3) WLC (Raj.) 278 = (2007(4) RLW 3341). The learned Single Judge of this Court held that expiry of term of committee not tantamount to supersession or removal of the committee. When committee is not constituted under Section 67 of the Act of 1995 then there cannot arise any question of applying remaining provisions of Section 67 and for same reason Section 64 would not also apply and order could well be passed without following procedure under Section 67(2) (4) and (5). In the said judgment, it also has been held that where by impugned order Mutawalli has not been removed and Section 64(1)(c)(i) has not been applied nor invoked then no inquiry is required to be held. In the said judgment, it also has been held that where by impugned order Mutawalli has not been removed and Section 64(1)(c)(i) has not been applied nor invoked then no inquiry is required to be held. In the said judgment, this Court directed to appoint new committee within four weeks. (11).In the case in hand, the term of the petitioners committee came to an end because of the reason that as per regulation 25 of the Rajasthan Muslim Wakf Regulations, 1964, term of a committee can be only one year and even the Board has power to extend the term of the committee for a further specified period not exceeding six months. In the case of Islamuddin (supra) in original order there was no mention of period of the committee, but yet this Court directed Wakf Board to appoint new committee. It is submitted by learned counsel Shri MC Tailor that by Section 112 of the Wakf Act, 1995 though the Wakf Act, 1954 and Wakf (amended) Act, 1984 have been repealed but as per sub-section (2) of Section 112, the action taken under the repealed Act have been saved and as per sub-section (3) where in any State any law was in force, which corresponds to the Act of 1995, that State law alone has been repealed and that repealed law also cannot effect anything done or any action taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under the corresponding law, which was taken under repealed State Act. With the help of Section 112 of the Wakf Act, learned counsel Shri MC Tailor tried to submit that the term of the petitioners committee still is governed by the regulation 25 of the Regulations of 1964. (12). Learned counsel Shri MC Tailor raised objection about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of lack territorial jurisdiction of Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur in entertaining the writ petition and according to him since the order was passed by the Board of Muslim Wakf at Jaipur and petitioners tried to approach the court at Jaipur on earlier occasion at the Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, therefore, the writ petition of the petitioners is not maintainable. It is also submitted that the petitioners could have preferred revision petition to challenge the impugned order and when effective remedy under the Act is provided then in that case, the writ petition cannot be entertained. Learned counsel Shri MC Tailor relied upon few judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in support of his contention in addition to the judgment of this court delivered in the case Islamuddin (supra), which have been considered by the learned Single Judge in detail in the impugned order. (13). Learned counsel for the writ petitioners-respondents supported the interim order and submitted that if a statutory authority has right to appoint then he may have right to remove also, but when statue itself provides how one appointee can be removed then without following the procedure, the appointee cannot be removed by the appointing authority. Admittedly, the petitioners committee was not constituted for any limited period. The appellants-non-petitioners relied upon the regulations of 1964 in support of their contention that period of committee can be on year or at the most for 1 1/2 years but said limit has no application after repeal of Wakf Act, 1954 and regulation framed thereunder. The petitioners committee was constituted and appointed after coming into force of the Act of 1995 when the regulations of 1964 were not in force and, therefore, no period was fixed by the appointing authority knowing it well that committee could have been removed for the reasons mentioned in the Section 67 of the Act of 1995 and only by following the procedure as provided under the Wakf Act, 1995. The respondents tried to dislodge the petitioners committee on earlier occasion and in that proceedings, the Wakf Tribunal clearly held that there was violation of the statutory provision in passing the order against the petitioners committed and that order attained finality. Therefore, apart from the fact that repeal of the regulation of 1964 is by statutory provisions of law there is binding order of the Wakf Tribunal against the Wakf Board that the petitioners committee could have been removed only by following the procedure as provided under the Act of 1995. (14). Therefore, apart from the fact that repeal of the regulation of 1964 is by statutory provisions of law there is binding order of the Wakf Tribunal against the Wakf Board that the petitioners committee could have been removed only by following the procedure as provided under the Act of 1995. (14). It is also submitted that admittedly, the property in question is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court and merely because of passing an order by the Board or Tribunal within territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, which can have effect without the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of the High Court, Jodhpur only then the cause of action arises only within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal seat of High Court at Jodhpur. The jurisdiction cannot be merely on the basis of fact that the order was passed by an authority at Jaipur, within territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of the High Court. If the Wakf Board wants to keep this order at Jaipur and does not want to give effect to it at the place where the property is managed by the petitioners then that order is no order in the eye of law as it would be an in executable order. (15). It is also submitted that appellants and the contesting respondents themselves raised objection about the maintainability of the appeal preferred before the tribunal then only remedy available to the petitioners is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for challenging the impugned order passed by the Wakf Board. Section 83(9) restricts further appeal against the order of the Tribunal then only remedy available to the petitioners is to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that even if it is assumed that revision petition is maintainable against the order passed by the Wakf Board even then it is not absolute bar against exercising of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that the action of the respondents is malafide in nature, which has been demonstrated by the petitioners. (16). It is also submitted that the action of the respondents is malafide in nature, which has been demonstrated by the petitioners. (16). It is also submitted that the interim order was passed by the learned Single Bench after considering the claim of the petitioners and if interim relief in the form in which it has been granted would not have been granted then more harm and irreparable injury could have been caused to the petitioners and to Wakf as even after having the merit in the case of petitioners, the petitioners would have been deprived from managing the affairs. (17). In addition to the other grounds it is also submitted that, the order passed by the learned Single Judge, that too of interim nature, may not be interfered by the Division Bench in appellate jurisdiction because of the reason that it is an order passed in discretionary power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is, in accordance with law, equity and justice and is not perverse. It is also submitted that the writ petition itself was fixed for hearing and the parties and the contesting respondents favouring the appellants want to over reach the process of the court so that the issue raised by the petitioners may not be decided and the petitioners may be dislodged before judicial verdict. (18). It is also submitted that complete procedure has been given how the possession can be taken from the committee in case it is required to be handed over by the committee and committee fails to hand over charge of the committee. If the appellants and other respondents flouted the provisions of law to show that they took over charge of the committee then that cannot be recognized. It is also submitted that subsequent to that in the contempt petition more directions have been issued so that writ petitioners may continue to manage the affairs of the Durgah. (19). We considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case. At the outset we may observe that the alternate remedy is never considered as a bar against exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In appropriate cases, the High Court may refuse the entertain the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. At the outset we may observe that the alternate remedy is never considered as a bar against exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In appropriate cases, the High Court may refuse the entertain the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. The High Court is required to consider the question of adequacy and effectiveness of alternate remedy before denying the petitioners from their right to invoke jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Once, it has been held by the Court that it is not a fit case for rejection of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy and that too, while deciding the interim prayer of the petitioners, normally in the appellate jurisdiction, unless there are compelling reasons, such order should not be interfered. In the present case, the writ petitioners tried to avail the remedy under the Act of 1995 by preferring appeal against the order of Wakf Board dated 18.12.2004 and they in fact, succeeded on earlier occasion and they obtained an order in their favour on 13th April, 2005 wherein the order passed by the Wakf Board was set aside on the ground of non-compliance of the Section 67 of the Act of 1995 then the petitioners approached the Wakf Tribunal again when impugned order impugned in the said appeal dated 6th Nov., 2007 was passed by the Wakf Board. There, objection was raised by the present appellants and the contesting respondents favouring the appellants about the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal and the Wakf Tribunal held that appeal of the present writ petitioners is not maintainable. In that situation, it cannot be said that approaching of the petitioners to this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was with intention to bye pass the remedy under the Act of 1995. Be that as it may be, apart from the above reason in view of the findings given by the learned Single Judge on this issue we are not inclined to accept the appellants objection about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. (20). Be that as it may be, apart from the above reason in view of the findings given by the learned Single Judge on this issue we are not inclined to accept the appellants objection about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. (20). Challenge to jurisdiction of the Principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur is on the ground that order was passed by the Wakf Board at Jaipur and, therefore, could have been challenged only at Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. It appears that the argument has been advanced without noticing where the cause of action arose and without examining that what is cause of action. An order passed by the authority cannot be read or given effect to without noticing where the order will have its effect. This principle applies more when order is in relation to any immovable property or any benefit attached to it or where it is in relation to management of immovable property. The order passed at Jaipur by the Wakf Board or tribunal at Jaipur neither can be given effect to nor could have been enforced within the territorial jurisdiction of the bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The real cause and substantial cause accrues where order can be given effect to effecting the property or management of the property. The property in question is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court and order has been sought to be enforced only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. The cause, whatever it may be, accrued at Kapasan in the District of Nagaur which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur only. The order was passed at Jaipur but that was because of the reason that authority, in the opinion of the Government should sit at Jaipur irrespective of fact where the order of authority will have its effect in the entire area of Rajasthan State. The authority was asked to sit at particular place as per convenience and in present case, not to create any cause of action in the area where cause could not have accrued. The authority was asked to sit at particular place as per convenience and in present case, not to create any cause of action in the area where cause could not have accrued. Simply because there can be one statutory authority in the State, who can pass appropriate order and that authority because of various reasons can sit only in the Capital of the State, the order passed by the said authority having direct effect on the rights and particularly, affecting the right in or relating to immovable property or its management then the substantial cause of action arises in the area where such property are situated. (21). When any court has been established to exercise jurisdiction over the cases arising in particular territories then that territorial jurisdiction is not effect nor it can be taken away by implication. The law prescribing territorial jurisdiction of a court is a law to govern the issue of territorial jurisdiction. The establishing authority having jurisdiction to administer, manage and deal with the properties in the entire State of Rajasthan gives limited jurisdiction to that authority to pass appropriate order irrespective of fact where the property is situated. That authority by virtue of power given by the statute can pass the order with respect to the property situated in entire State, but without affecting the courts territorial jurisdiction, which has been given to the court by statute. When such authority passes an order in relation to property situated within the jurisdiction given it, having effect on the properties situated in various places of the State then said authority is competent to pass order as per the law authorizing it to pass because of the order passed by such authorities, the consequence, effect and right of the parties may be effected where the properties are situated and being managed. Unless and until order has effect on the rights of the concerned party, the concerned party cannot have any grievance. Therefore, grievance arises and accrues only where the property is situated. Therefore, the cause of action in that situation arises at the place where property or properties or rights in the property or benefit of the property or its management is effected by the order passed by the authority, which may it be outside the area in which the property is situated. Therefore, the cause of action in that situation arises at the place where property or properties or rights in the property or benefit of the property or its management is effected by the order passed by the authority, which may it be outside the area in which the property is situated. The cause of action is the infringement of right of the party alongwith other bundle of facts, which are required to be proved by the party approaching the Court. Jurisdiction of the court is not determined from the defence. (22). The question of jurisdiction of principal seat of High Court at Jodhpur and Bench at Jaipur came up for consideration before the Honble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association Vs. UOI & Ors reported in (2001) 2 SCC 294 = (RLW 2001(1) SC 73). The Honble Apex Court held that territorial jurisdiction between Principal Seat at Jodhpur and Permanent Bench Seat at Jaipur is required to be found out by applying the test in which District the case arose i.e., in which District, the cause of action can be said to have arisen. In the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association (supra), the Honble Apex Court clearly held that no legislative power has been conferred on the Chief Justice to define the cause of action and, therefore, it has been held that when dispute arises whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It will be relevant to mention here that the Permanent Bench of High Court of Rajasthan has been established at Jaipur by order of His Excellency President of India dated 31.1.1977. The said order dated 31.1.1977 is as under : - "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of Section 51 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), the President, after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, is pleased to make the following Order, namely; 1. Short title and commencement . Short title and commencement . - (1) This order may be called the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976. (2) It shall come into force on 31.1.1977. 2. Establishment of a Permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. - There shall be established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, and such Judges of the High Court of Rajasthan, being not less than five in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretionary, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jodhpur. Sd/- F.A. AHMAD New Delhi. 8.12.1976 President" (23). While considering the clause (2) of the said order the Honble Apex Court held as under : - "........The purpose of the Presidential Order is to carve out and define territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat at Jodhpur and the permanent Bench seat at Jaipur. The cases are to be heard accordingly, unless the Chief Justice may exercise in his discretion the power vested n him by the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential Order. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court. Although the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying thereunder cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. In case of dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test - from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have been arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution." (24). From above decision of the Honble Apex Court as well as from the plain reading of clause (2) of Presidential order dated 31.1.1977 it is clear that in Presidential order words have been used "in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk". Over the cases arising in above districts alone jurisdiction has been given to the Jaipur Bench. (25). As noticed above the Honble Supreme Court held that it is the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. When the order passed under Constitution by the President of Indian has bifurcated and carved out the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court and permanent Bench seat of the Rajasthan High Court then by giving interpretation to any law creating an authority to decide a matter cannot be interpreted so as to nullify the said order and to take away the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of High Court for the territories, which are within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of High Court at Jodhpur. Otherwise also, it will be not in public interest that for dispute in their own places where the courts are established, the parties should go for redressal of their grievance in other territories. (26).So far as accrual of cause of action because of the order passed by the Board is concerned, that arose at Kapasan in the District of Nagaur within territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and by virtue of appellate order, the original jurisdiction and cause of action has not been and cannot be effected. (27). In view of the above, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents about the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court deserves to be rejected, hence, rejected. (28). The writ petitioners in their writ petition have placed on record the order by which the committee consisting of petitioners was constituted, which is dated 17.1.2004. In view of the above, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents about the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court deserves to be rejected, hence, rejected. (28). The writ petitioners in their writ petition have placed on record the order by which the committee consisting of petitioners was constituted, which is dated 17.1.2004. Admittedly, in this order, the period of committee has not been mentioned and, therefore, in view of the stand taken by the appellants and contesting writ petitioners, a debatable question requires consideration that whether appointing authority has unfettered right to remove the appointee and particularly, in a case where no period is fixed in the appointment order, and, in a matter of management of Wakf property, whether the term, which was not earlier fixed in order can be fixed in relation to the committee constituted by the Wakf Board, whether the petitioners could have been removed by taking action against them under Section 67 of the Act of 1995 provisions under Section 67 are made for supersession of committee of management and gave power to Board to supersede the committee and whether that excludes all other modes of removal of committee, whether the period prescribed by the regulations of 1964 enacted under the old Wakf Act limits the period of committee constituted under the Wakf Act, 1995 and other questions raised by the writ petitioners and by the non- petitioners-appellants and other respondents. Those above and other issues can be decided only after hearing parties and in final judgment, which may be passed by the Court ultimately in the writ jurisdiction. It is not a rule of law of general application that in no case court can grant relief by interim order, which may be final relief prayed by the petitioner. So far as judgment, which was heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant delivered in the case of Chief Executive Officer, Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf, Jaleb Chowk, Jaipur & Ors. Vs. Islamuddin & Anr reported in 2007(3) WLC (Raj.) 278 (supra) is concerned, the said judgment was delivered after examining the relevant orders passed and the term for which the persons could have worked and without detail inquiry on question of fact, the said judgment ipso facto cannot be applied in the present set of facts at this interim stage, that too, in appellate jurisdiction. (29). (29). In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned order making interim arrangement in a matter of management of Durgah in which there cannot arise personal interest of any person and it is settled law that appellate court should be slow in interfering in interim orders passed by the court below and court passes the interim orders on the basis of merit, prima facie case of the petitioner as well as after securing balance of convenience. If in writ jurisdiction interim order is passed then it is not necessary for the High Court to frame above issue and record finding issue-wise. The court may not even pass a very detailed order while deciding interim application . (30). Apart from above, it is apparent from the impugned order itself that the writ petition itself was listed for hearing in a very short period as interim order was passed on 10.1.2008 and it was ordered to be listed on 17.1.2008 in the period of seven days only. After moving application by the contesting non- petitioners under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India on 15.1.2008, on 17.1.2008, the learned Single Judge of this Court fixed the case for hearing on 22.1.2008. In this situation, instead of insisting for vacating the interim order, the respondents should have insisted for final decision of the writ petition and should have avoided the decision on few questions of law in interim order. It is no doubt true that interim order may give grievance to the aggrieved party and the aggrieved party may not be liable to suffer the consequence of interim order for single moment if the order is illegal and then the aggrieved party can request the court for vacating the interim order and the court on finding merit in the objection against the interim order may vacate the interim orders, but in the facts of this case, referred above, we do not find any reason for vacating the interim order by exercising appellate jurisdiction and further we do not find any just reason on the basis of which, the learned Single Judge should have vacated the interim order on application filed by the applicants, who moved application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India. (31). (31). In view of the above, the appeal of the appellants is dismissed, but looking to the facts of the case, we expect from the learned Single Judge that the writ petition of the petitioners be decided expeditiously so that in the matter of management of Wakf property, there may not be hindrances.