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2008 DIGILAW 1428 (PAT)

S. M. Naiyer Imam v. Chancellor, Lalit Narayan Mithila University

2008-09-15

RAMESH KUMAR DATTA

body2008
Judgment 1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 2.6.2008 issued under the signature of the Registrar, Lalit Narayan Mithila University (respondent No.3) on the orders of the Vice-Chancellor of the University, by which he has recognized respondent No.6 Dr. S.M. Naqui Imam as President of the Rauf Muslim Jamia Society and the Chairman/Director of the Institutions established under it and Dr. S.M. Naqui Imam Dental College and Hospital, Bahera and S.M. Zaheer Alam Teachers Training College, Bahera till the dispute is finally settled by a competent Court of Law. 2. The facts relevant for consideration of the present matter are that the said Rauf Muslim Jamia Society, which is being managed by a Governing Body, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act in the year 1985 and since its inception, Respondent No.6, Dr. S.M. Naqui was continuing as the President. The said society was running several institutions including the two mentioned aforesaid which are affiliated to the Lalit Narayan Mithila University. The petitioner is the Secretary of the said society and all of its institutions. On 14.2.2006, admittedly Respondent No.6 submitted his resignation as the President of the said society. The petitioner and his men claimed that the said resignation was accepted at a subsequent meeting of the Governing body, whereas the claim of Respondent No.6 is that before the acceptance of his resignation on 21.2.2006, he withdrew his resignation. The petitioner claims that thereafter the Vice-President of the society started acting as the President and the petitioner and other such officebearers continued to run the society and its institutions until the respondent No.6 again in the month of December, 2006 sought to interfere with the functioning of the society as President. It is the further claim of the petitioner that after the completion of three years term, a new Governing Body was constituted in terms of the bye-laws of the socieity on 14.1.2007 in which the petitioner continued to be the Secretary and the other office-bearers were also elected. The petitioner claims on the basis of a report submitted by the S.D.O., Benipur, Darbhanga on the direction of the District Magistrate for onward submission of the matter to the Indian Dental Council, that the Governing Body headed by S.M. Jaffar Imam after the resignation of Respondent No.6, including this petitioner had been representing the said institution in all the matters. During the course of inspection by the Dental Council of India as also various correspondences with the Minister of Family Welfare, Government of India, National Council for Teachers Education, State Government as well as Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga all the required papers were signed by the said S.M. Jaffar Imam as the Chairman after 14.2.2006. However, on accound of subsequent claims being made by Respondent No.6, the Bank, in which the accounts of the society were kept, had refused to permit operation of accounts until the issues were clarified. 3. In the said circumstances, a title suit being T.S. No. 42 of 2006 was filed by the members of the Governing Body headed by S.M. Jaffar Imam which is pending in the court below. It is stated that in the said title suit status quo was ordered on 9.5.2007, which was again extended on 13.6.2007 in which the learned Subordinate Judge had taken note of the fact that Respondent No.6 had resigned on 14.2.2006 and accordingly, he had again extended the order of status quo and finally upon the transfer of the said case from the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Benipur to that of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga by order passed on 28.5.2008 the status quo was continuing. It is submitted that continuation of the said status quo order was lastly passed on 28.8.2008 and therefore the action of the Vice-Chancellor through the impugned order dated 2.6.2008 also amounts to contempt of Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Vice-Chancellor has no jurisdiction under any provisions of the Bihar State Universities Act, to pass the impugned order dated 2.6.2008 recognising one or the other person as the President of the Rauf Muslim Jamia Society and the Chairman/Director of its institution, more so, in view of the various orders of status quo passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. It is submitted by learned counsel that the same has been done merely to help Respondent No.6 violating the established norms and provisions of the Universities Act. In this regard, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioners institution is a minority institution and the University authorities have no jurisdiction to interfere in the internal managment of the same. 5. In this regard, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioners institution is a minority institution and the University authorities have no jurisdiction to interfere in the internal managment of the same. 5. Learned counsel for the University sought to argue that the petitioner had an alternative remedy to move the Hon ble Chancellor by filing an appeal under Section 9(4) of the Universities Act and thus the writ petition is not maintainable. 6. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the University that various disputed questions of fact arise in this case as to whether the resignation of respondent No.6 had been withdrawn before its acceptance by the Governing Body, which cannot be properly adjudicated upon in a writ petition. It is further argued that the Vice- Chancellor had not interfered with the right to administration of the minority institution. It is submitted that it is an established proposition as laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court that the right to administration does not include the right to maladministration and in such circumstances, the Vice-Chancellor has only acted in the matter in the interest of the institution and the University considering the fact that Respondent No.6 had been the President of the institution from its inception since 1985 continuously. It is submitted that if the petitioner had a grievance in the matter, he should have, in fact, approached the Hon ble Chancellor and filed an appeal before him. 7. Learned counsel for Respondent No.6 has also sought to support the impugned order on the line of arguments advanced by learned counsel for the University. He has further sought to rely upon a letter dated 12.6.2008 issued by the office of the I.G. of Registration, by which he has refused to recognize either of the two contending Governing Bodies stating that he has no jurisdiction in the matter and the same can only be resolved by a competent Civil Court. 8. On the basis of the above, it is submitted by learned counsel for Respondent No.6 that there should be no interference with the impugned order dated 2.6.2008, which is only an interim arrangement in order to ensure that the society continues to function and co-ordinate with the University. 9. 8. On the basis of the above, it is submitted by learned counsel for Respondent No.6 that there should be no interference with the impugned order dated 2.6.2008, which is only an interim arrangement in order to ensure that the society continues to function and co-ordinate with the University. 9. On the question of alternative remedy, this Court is of the view that since the challenge is to the very jurisdiction of the Vice-Chancellor to pass an order of the nature that he has passed hence the plea of alternative remedy can be of no assistance to the respondents. It is evident that Section 10(11) and (16) of the Universities Act does not give any such power to the Vice-Chancellor as has been argued by learned counsel for the University and Respondent No.6. The said powers relate to the matters of arrangement of the University and it is provided that the Vice-Chancellor shall be responsible for the discipline of the University. It is further laid down that it shall be lawful for the Vice-Chancellor to take all steps for maintaining the academic standard and administrative discipline of the University. The aforesaid two provisions cannot justify the interference by the Vice-Chancellor in the internal affairs of the Governing Body of the society or those of its institutions which are affiliated to the University when such Institutions are minority Institutions. 10. This Court is of the view that the validity of the claim of one or the other side to be the real Governing Body of the society can only be considered by the competent Civil Court as has been rightly pointed out in the letter dated 12.6.2008 issued by the office of the I.G. of Registration. In the said circumstances, it was not open to the Vice-Chancellor to have interfered in the matter. More so, it is admitted that the Vice-Chancellor was aware of the fact of pendency of the Civil Suit between the parties and the earlier orders of stay dated 9.5.2007 and 13.6.2007. Since there is nothing on the record to show that the order dated 28.5.2008 extending the stay was brought to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor before he had passed the impugned order, therefore, this Court would not go to the extent of holding that the Vice-Chancellor has committed a contempt of Court; otherwise he would have been probably guilty of the same also. In any case, the Vice Chancellor being aware of the pendency of the suit in the matter ought not to have interfered and should have directed the parties to avail of their remedy before the Court. If at all the University was so much concerned as to which of the parties should be allowed in the matter of running of the two institutions, it could have directed them to obtain necessary interim order in this regard from the Court. 11. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, the writ application is allowed and the impugned order dated 2.6.2008 is quashed. However, in view of the question of the career of the students engaged in the two institutions affiliated to the University and in the other various institutions run by the society, it is directed that the parties may approach the Civil Court for passing appropriate orders in this regard. It is further directed that the matter be taken up by the learned Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga on a day to day basis and disposed of expeditiously. It is made clear that anything stated in this regard in this order shall not affect the merits of the issues before the Civil Court.