Judgment 1. This second appeal is directed against concurrent judgements of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in Suit (R.C.S. No. 129/1977) and appeal (R.C.A. No. 36/1982), respectively. 2. The respondents filed Suit (R.C.S. No.129/1977) for possession. Subject matter of the Suit is an agricultural field bearing Survey No. 74-A, admeasuring 12 acres situated at Sultanpur, under Georai Tahsil. 3. Briefly stated, the plaintiff’s case before the Trial Court was that originally, the suit field was owned by defendant No. 1. The suit field was in his actual possession as a tenant as on the tiller’s day i.e. 1st February, 1957. He was a protected tenant of the suit field. He was dispossessed by the defendants on 20th April, 1967. He became statutory owner of the suit field under provisions of Section 38(6) of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "HT & AL Act" for sake of brevity). He, therefore, sought restoration of possession on basis of statutory ownership. 4. The defendants resisted the Suit. They admitted that originally the suit field was owned by defendant No.1. They denied, however, that the plaintiff was tenant of the suit field. They asserted that the defendants No. 2 and 3 purchased half eastern portion of the suit field by virtue of sale-deed dated 6th May, 1971 whereas the defendant for has purchased remaining half western side portion of the suit field by virtue of sale-deed dated 8th October, 1973 and thus became owner to the extent of such purchased lands. They asserted that since date of purchases, they were in cultivating possession of the respective half portions without any disturbance. They denied that the plaintiff acquired statutory ownership as a protected tenant. They also submitted that the plaintiff could seek remedy under provisions of the HT & AL Act and that the Suit for recovery of possession was not maintainable. 5. The learned Civil Judge framed certain issues below Exh-3. The learned Civil Judge held that the plaintiff proved statutory ownership in respect of the suit field and was entitled to recover possession of the same. The learned Civil Judge further held that the defendants No. 2 and 3 failed to prove their ownership in respect of eastern half portion and so also defendant failed to prove his ownership in respect of remaining western half portion of the suit field. The learned Civil Judge further held that the defendants No. 2 and 3 failed to prove their ownership in respect of eastern half portion and so also defendant failed to prove his ownership in respect of remaining western half portion of the suit field. Consequently, the Suit came to be decreed. The contesting defendant preferred an appeal. The first Appellate Court confirmed the decree and dismissed the appeal. 6. The Second Appeal came to be admitted on a single substantial question of law which is stated as ground No. 6A in the appeal memo. The same is articulated in the following way : "Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the purchases made by the defendants No. 2 and 3 to the extent of eastern half portion of the suit field and by the defendant No. 4 to the extent of western half portion of the suit field, are saved because the certificate of statutory ownership was granted in favour of the plaintiff at a later point of time ? And hence, the latter is not entitled to claim possession of the suit field ? 7. Before I proceed to consider merits, it would be appropriate to refer to certain documents placed on record. The entries in the 7/12 extracts (Exh.5 Exh.49 and Exh.50) would show that name of plaintiff Gena was recorded in other right’s column as protected tenant. He was shown as a tenant in possession since 1964-65. However, the revenue entries do not show the period since when he became tenant of defendant No.1 Rama. The certificate (Exh.6) issued U/s 38(6) of the HT & AL Act reveals that plaintiff Gena deposited the price determined U/s 38(5) of the HT & AL Act and, therefore, was deemed as purchaser of the suit field. The contesting defendants filed copy of sale deed dated 6.5.1971 and original sale deed dated 8th October 1973 at Exh.41 and Exh.44 respectively. The internal sale transactions between the defendant No.1 and the contesting defendants are duly proved. 8. Clinching question is whether the private sale transactions referred to above are legal and valid. The defendant Nos.2 and 3 would submit that they are owners in respect of eastern half portion of the suit field on account of purchase thereof from defendant No.1 by virtue of sale deed dated 6.5.1971 (Exh.41). 8. Clinching question is whether the private sale transactions referred to above are legal and valid. The defendant Nos.2 and 3 would submit that they are owners in respect of eastern half portion of the suit field on account of purchase thereof from defendant No.1 by virtue of sale deed dated 6.5.1971 (Exh.41). It is the case of defendant No.4 that he became owner of the western half portion of the suit field by virtue of sale deed dated 8th October 1973 (Exh.44). The plaintiff, on the other hand, claims statutory ownership on strength of the certificate issued U/s 38(6) of the HT & AL Act. The said certificate is admittedly issued on 23.9.1976 i.e. at latter point of time after the sale deeds executed by the land owner - defendant No.1. In other words, the question to be addressed is whether the subsequent statutory sale in favour of the plaintiff would prevail over the private sale transactions. 9. Mr.Choudhari, would submit that the sale transactions in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to could not be brushed aside. He would submit that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover possession of the suit field only on strength of the certificate issued U/s 38(6) of the HT & AL Act. He would submit that the defendant Nos.2 to 4 became landlords and ought to have been joined as parties in the proceedings of any inquiry which preceded the issuance of such certificate. He contended that the certificate will not be binding on the rights of those purchasers. Hence, he urged to allow the appeal. Mr. Vaishnav, learned advocate, on the other hand, supports the impugned judgment. 10. The scheme of Section 38 may be briefly stated. It is worthy to be noted that Section 38 of the HT & AL Act gives an umbrella of protection to tenants so as to facilitate acquisition of statutory ownership. Subclause (5) of Section 38 reveals that the protected tenant or, as the case may be, ordinary tenant will be required to deposit the amount of price determined under subsection (4). Thereupon under subsection (6), the Tribunal shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to the protected tenant, or the ordinary tenant, declaring him to be the purchaser of the land. Thereupon under subsection (6), the Tribunal shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to the protected tenant, or the ordinary tenant, declaring him to be the purchaser of the land. The language of subclause (6) (a) would show that such sale certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the sale as against land holder and all persons interested therein. Thus, where certificate under Subsection 6(a) of Section 38 is issued, no further proof is required to infer transfer of statutory ownership. It is also manifest that the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of such sale not only against the land holder but also against all persons interested in the land. Needless to say the certificate of statutory ownership U/s 38(6)(a) would be conclusive proof of sale not only against defendant No.1 but also against the present appellants who are interested in the land. 11. A Single Bench of this Court in “Sahebrao Anna Ripture Vs. Dattatraya Krishnajee Patel” 1965 Bombay Law Reporter (Vol.LXVII) 744, held that certificate issued U/s. 38(6)(a) of the HT & AL Act, does not require registration and would be per se admissible in evidence. The relevant observations may be usefully quoted as follows : . "The position of the tenant under Section 38(6) is inferior to that of the protected tenant under S.38E, but once the tenant has gone through the procedures of making the offer and getting the price determined and depositing the said amount, I fail to understand why there should be any difference in his position and that of protected tenant. Section 38(6) clearly says that the certificate shall declare the tenant to be the purchaser of the land. This declaration will have the same effect as a regular deed of sale or gift as the case may be. But the section does not stop at this declaration. It goes further and says that the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the sale as against the landholder and all persons interested therein. Similar effect is given to a statutory transfer under S. 38-E, sub-s. (2). Subsection (2) also says that the certificate shall declare the protected tenant to be owner and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the protected tenant having become the owner of the land. Similar effect is given to a statutory transfer under S. 38-E, sub-s. (2). Subsection (2) also says that the certificate shall declare the protected tenant to be owner and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the protected tenant having become the owner of the land. The difference between the two is only of a terminological character." (Emphasis supplied) I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the above referred case. It goes without saying that the statutory sale certificate will be binding on the appellants though they were not parties to the proceedings U/s 38 of the HT & AL Act. The relevant provision enumerated U/s 19 of the HT & AL Act, would make it manifest that tenancy rights of a tenant cannot be abrogated in any other manner than provided under the provisions of the said Act. The surrender of tenancy ought to be in particular manner which is prescribed under the law. It is nobody’s case that plaintiff Gena had surrendered the tenancy rights. It appears that his rights as a tenant were dormant for certain period due to his dispossession. In the absence of determination of the tenancy rights, he was entitled to fall back on the pre-existing tenancy rights when the proceedings U/s 38 of the HT & AL Act, were drawn. There is presumption about official acts. Obviously, it will have to be said that the Tenancy Tribunal followed due procedure as contemplated U/s 38 before issuance of the sale certificate U/s 38(6)(a). 12. In “Waman Nagorao Despande and others Vs. Dayanand Babu Mitkari and others” 1983 Mh.L.J. 298, this Court held that a protected tenant, in whose favour certificate of ownership is granted U/s 38-E, is entitled to maintain a suit for possession. It has been held that for such a tenant it is not necessarily to apply for summary eviction U/s 98 of the HT & AL Act. Needless to say, the suit for recovery of possession by such a tenant is quite maintainable. Thus, there was no impediment in granting decree for recovery of possession when the tenant sued for possession on strength of statutory sale certificate issued U/s 38(6)(a) of the HT & AL Act. Needless to say, the suit for recovery of possession by such a tenant is quite maintainable. Thus, there was no impediment in granting decree for recovery of possession when the tenant sued for possession on strength of statutory sale certificate issued U/s 38(6)(a) of the HT & AL Act. As stated before, the said certificate would be binding even on the appellants in view of the language used in subclause (a) of subsection (6) of Section 38. The first appellate Court duly considered the relevant aspects of the matter. I am of the opinion that when the defendant Nos.2 to 4 made the purchases of the respective parcels of the lands in the suit field then they also took the risk of the tenancy claim which was likely to be set up by deceased plaintiff Gena. Though their sale deeds are prior in time, yet, their rights were eclipsed due to existence of the tenancy rights of deceased plaintiff Gena. They cannot claim any better rights only for the reason that their sale deeds are prior in time to the issuance of the certificate U/s 38(6)(a) of the HT & AL Act in favour of the tenant - Gena. The statutory purchase made by the deceased plaintiff - Gena brought about end to the landlord - tenant relationship between the defendant No.1 and himself. The appellants claimed their rights through the original defendant No.1. They cannot have better rights than that of their vendor. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the concurrent findings of both the Courts below are legal and proper. The substantial question of law will have to be, therefore, answered against the appellants. 13. For the reasons aforestated, the Second Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.