JUDGMENT : Challenge in this writ application is to the order dated 28.02.2004 (Annexure-6) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum (East) in M.J. Case No. 15 of 1996, whereby the Respondent, Ramdeo Sharma has been awarded one month notice pay and retrenchment compensation for the period from 1989-1994. 2. The petitioner’s case in brief is that the petitioner is an Establishment carrying on Trade and Business of manufacturing, repairing and testing of body/machines of vehicles. Under an agreement dated 07.11.1998, the Respondent, Ramdeo Sharma was appointed as a Production Manager in the Petitioner’s Establishment for a period of one year commencing from 01.01.1989. The period was subject to further renewal by way of fresh agreements between the parties. After the expiry of the stipulated period in the Agreement, the Respondent no. 2 left the services of the petitioner and did not opt for renewal of the Agreement. However, subsequently the Respondent no. 2 approached the petitioner, offering his services as Technical Advisor. On his proposal being accepted, an Agreement dated 21.04.1991 was entered into by and between the petitioner and the sole Respondent under which the services of the Respondent as a Technical Advisor as required from time to time on Piece Meal Basis, was to be taken. The relations between the petitioner and the sole Respondent was thus, conditioned under the terms of the Agreement dated 21.04.1991 as a Technical Advisor on Piece Meal Basis. However, notwithstanding the above Agreement, the sole Respondent filed an application under Section 33 (C) Clause 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, claiming himself to be a workman under the petitioner on a monthly wage of Rs. 4,000/-, besides a production incentive of Rs. 4,000/-per annum with annual increments of 10 per cent as monthly wages and further, claiming that the petitioner had illegally and wrongfully terminated his services with effect from 08.04.1995 without giving one month’s notice and without paying him one month’s wages in lieu of such notice and also without paying the Retrenchment benefits as per the law. The petitioner had denied the entire claim of the Respondent taking a definite stand that the Respondent, Ramdeo Sharma was not a workman under the petitioner and also taking an objection to the maintainability of the proceeding on the ground that the provisions of Section 33 (C) (2) are not applicable to the facts of the case. The petitioner had denied the entire claim of the Respondent taking a definite stand that the Respondent, Ramdeo Sharma was not a workman under the petitioner and also taking an objection to the maintainability of the proceeding on the ground that the provisions of Section 33 (C) (2) are not applicable to the facts of the case. By the impugned order, the learned court below allowed the claim of the Respondent directing the petitioner to pay a total sum of Rs. 37,000/-to the Respondent. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Respondent, wherein he has reiterated the same stand as taken by him before the court below claiming that the was a workman employed under the petitioner’s establishment on a monthly wages of Rs. 4,000/-together with production incentive @ Rs.32,000/-each year with annual increment of 10 per cent on monthly basis and further alleging that the petitioner had terminated the services of the petitioner with effect from 08.10.1995 without giving one month’s notice in advance or one month’s wages in lieu of such notice and without paying the Retrenchment benefits as per law. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the sole Respondent. 5. Mr. K. P. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order has been passed by the learned court below without application of judicial mind and exceeding its jurisdiction by going beyond the ambit and scope of Section 33 (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel explains that the impugned order has been passed without appreciating the evidences adduced by the petitioner, which would otherwise have established that the engagement of the services of the Respondent No. 2 by the petitioner was not as a workman but on a Managerial/Supervisory capacity as Production Manager and that too for stipulated period of one year only, which had expired in December, 1989. Referring to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tara and Others-versus-Director, Social Welfare and Others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 671 , learned counsel argues that since the status and nature of employment of the Respondent No. 2 was seriously disputed, unless there was a prior adjudication on merit of the status, which is the foundation for making the claim of wages at the specified rates, the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the I.D. Act for computation of wages did not arise. 6. Learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand would argue that the Respondent was in the services of the petitioner, is an admitted fact as appearing even in the evidence of the petitioner’s witnesses, examined by the learned court below in the enquiry and as such, the status of the Respondent vis-a-vis, the petitioner having been admitted the claim of the Respondent was only for wages and therefore, the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the I.D. Act was applicable to the facts of the case. 7. It appears from the pleadings of the petitioner as taken before the learned court below that the claim of the Respondent of his being a workman in the Establishment of the petitioner, was consistently denied and disputed by the petitioner. Admittedly, the services of the Respondent was engaged by the petitioner by virtue of an Agreement dated 07.11.1988, under which the Respondent was appointed in the Establishment of the petitioner as a Production Manager in his supervisory capacity and on a monthly remuneration of Rs. 4,000/-together with production incentive of Rs. 32,000/-per annum on actual assessment of quality report and delivery schedules. Such engagement as per the terms of Agreement was only for a period of one year, unless extended for a further period by way of renewal. 4,000/-together with production incentive of Rs. 32,000/-per annum on actual assessment of quality report and delivery schedules. Such engagement as per the terms of Agreement was only for a period of one year, unless extended for a further period by way of renewal. Though the petitioner had adduced in his evidence, a copy of a second Agreement executed by and between the petitioner and the sole Respondent in 1991, under which the services of the Respondent was in the capacity of a Technical Advisor by way of consultancy services, but on a dispute raised by the Respondent regarding the execution of such Agreement, the learned court below refused to accept the genuineness of the document merely on the ground that the petitioner did not get the signature appearing on the Agreement, which was claimed by the petitioner to be that of the Respondent, Ramdeo Sharma examined by the Expert. In the light of the specific assertion by the petitioner and in the light of a document being adduced in evidence, the learned court below could itself have examined the disputed signature of the Respondent with his admitted signature on the earlier Agreement, which was also adduced in evidence and was available to the court below. Be that as it may, it appears that despite the admitted fact that the petitioner’s engagement as per the original Agreement of 1988 was in the Supervisory Capacity as the Production Manager, the learned court below appears to have ignored this aspect and accepted the contention of the Respondent that he was engaged as a workman under the petitioner’s Establishment. 8. As it appears, the dispute as raised by the petitioner before the court below was essentially regarding the status and nature of employment of the Respondent in the petitioner’s establishment. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that unless there is a prior adjudication on merits of the status, which is the foundation for making the claim for wages at the specified rates, the question of entertaining an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of the wages does not arise. Such adjudication could be made only on a reference under Section 10 (1) of the I.D. Act, which in the instant case, appears not to have been made at all. 9. Such adjudication could be made only on a reference under Section 10 (1) of the I.D. Act, which in the instant case, appears not to have been made at all. 9. The learned court below having not considered this aspect of the case, the entertainment of the application of the sole Respondent under Section 33-C (2) of the I.D. Act by the learned court below was in itself improper and beyond its jurisdiction. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. I find merit in this writ application. Accordingly, this writ application is allowed. The impugned order dated 28.02.2004 (Annexure-6) of the learned court below is hereby quashed.