S. U. KHAN, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) LANDLORD-RESPONDENT after purchasing the property in dispute in 2005 instituted a suit for eviction against tenant-petitioner in the form of S. C. C. Suit no. 45 of 2006. Property in dispute is a shop, the rent of which is Rs. 150/- per month. Ground of eviction mentioned in the plaint was default in payment of rent and material alteration. In respect of default, the Trial Court held that as on the first date of hearing of the suit, i. e. 29. 3. 2006, tenant had deposited rs. 7000/-, which included entire rent along with interest and cost of the suit, hence he was entitled to benefit of section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In respect of material alteration, the Trial Court held that defendant-tenant had lowered the level of the land in front of the shop in dispute and replaced the door with iron shutter and these changes were covered by section 20 (2) (b) of the Act. Accordingly, eviction was ordered by J. S. C. C. , Kanpur Nagar in the suit through judgment and decree dated 8. 2. 2007. Against the said judgment and decree, tenant-petitioner filed S. C. C. Revision No. 31 of 2007, Sri Kalideen Gupta v. Nathuram gupta. Revision was dismissed by 16th A. D. J. , Kanpur Nagar on 29. 5. 2007, hence this writ petition. Section 20 (2) (b) of the Act is quoted below :-"20 (2) (b) that the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building;" ( 3 ) SUPREME Court in "g. Reghunathan v. K. V. Varghese, 1988 2 ARC (SC) 243" has held that closing door and window by bricks, lowering level of wall, cutting the rafters, erecting the pillars and fixing the rolling shutters does not amount to material alteration. ( 4 ) THE Lower Revisional Court, before whom also the said authority of the Supreme Court was cited, distinguished the same on the ground that in the said authority, tenant was carrying on the business of jewellery hence shutters were necessary for the purposes of safety of the goods kept in the shop, however, in the instant case, tenant was carrying on business of scooter repairs hence shutters were not necessary. ( 5 ) IN my opinion, the distinction is not tenable at all. For a petty shop keeper, his cheap goods kept in the shop are as valuable as valuable goods of a big shop for the wealthy occupant of the said shop. Moreover, question of material alteration does not depend upon the status of the tenant, or the exact business carried out from the tenanted occupation. ( 6 ) IN my opinion, the aforesaid authority of the Supreme Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. ( 7 ) MOREOVER in the instant case, the allegation was that level of the land in front of the shop was lowered. Tenancy is of the shop. Landlord is owner of the shop and not of the land in front of the shop. ( 8 ) SOME photographs were shown to the Court at the time of arguments. Those photographs only show a shutter in a shop and wooden doors in another shop. ( 9 ) ADMITTEDLY, the changes were made in the shop before it was purchased by the respondent. The tenant pleaded that changes were made in 1983-84. As respondent purchased the property in 2005, hence he could not say that when the changes were made. Previous landlord was not examined. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the landlord cited several authorities of this Court and the authority of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal v. Ram Prakash, 2005 61 ALR (SC) 138. In the said case, big platform had been raised along with the other constructions, hence Supreme Court held that it amounted to material alteration. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, in my opinion, alleged changes made in the shop did not amount to material alteration as provided under section 20 (2) (b) of the Act. Writ petition is therefore allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree and order ware set aside. Suit of the landlord for eviction is dismissed. Rent deposited by the tenant may be withdrawn by the landlord. ( 12 ) I have held in Khursheeda v. A. D. J. , 2004 54 ALR 177 and H. M. Kichlu v. A. DJ. Writ petition is therefore allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree and order ware set aside. Suit of the landlord for eviction is dismissed. Rent deposited by the tenant may be withdrawn by the landlord. ( 12 ) I have held in Khursheeda v. A. D. J. , 2004 54 ALR 177 and H. M. Kichlu v. A. DJ. , 2004 57 ALR 485, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, Writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. ( 13 ) IN the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and another, 2008 71 ALR 499, part of Para-29 and Para-34 of which are quoted below :- "29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of maharashtra and another (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1. 9. 1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31. 3. 1998. 9. 1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31. 3. 1998. " ( 14 ) UNDER U. P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (section 9-A) or Government is tenant (section 21 (8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in "shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance corporation of India, AIR 1996 SC 2410 ", paragraph-11 of which is quoted below :- "it is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priory, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. " thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under ;-"rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bonafide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S. F. P. v. L. I. C. , AIR 1996 SC 2410 . has laid down that while granting relief to a party the Writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S. F. P. v. L. I. C. , AIR 1996 SC 2410 . has laid down that while granting relief to a party the Writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the un-reasoanble arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent control Act. The Writ Court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the un-reasoanble benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act. " ( 15 ) THEREAFTER in H. M. Kitchlu v. A. D. J. , 2004 57 ALR 485. I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. ( 16 ) EXISTING rent is Rs. 150/- per month, which is highly inadequate. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1200/- per month with effect from August, 2008. Unpaid rent @ Rs. 900/- per month as directed to be paid through interim order dated 26. 9. 2007 passed in this writ petition shall be paid to the landlord-respondent till July, 2007. Petition Allowed. .