JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been filed at the instance of transferee of defendant No.1 Mangilal. The suit of plaintiff has been decreed by learned trial Court and the appeal which was filed by defendant and transferee of defendant has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 2. One Laluram filed civil suit for declaration of Bhumiswami right in respect of certain agricultural land, description whereof has been mentioned in the plaint and for injunction against defendant Mangilal son of Tulsiram. In that suit, State of Madhya Pradesh through Collector, Mandsaur has been arrayed as defendant No.2 in view of Order 1 Rule 3-B (M.P. Amendment) CPC as formal defendant and no relief has been claimed against it. 3. According to the plaint averments plaintiff is the Bhumiswami having possession on the suit property. He never sold the suit property to defendant Mangilal, who is his nephew. In plaint para 6 it has been pleaded by plaintiff that he was keen enough to get the suit property bequeathed in favour of defendant Mangilal, but on 1.10.1982 defendant Mangilal brought plaintiff to Mandsaur and with the collusion of petition writer Irfan Ali pacified plaintiff that now-a-days there is ban of registration of Will and, therefore, plaintiff should execute sale deed in favour of defendant Mangilal and there shall be no difference between the two documents. On such assurance, defendant Mangilal obtained signatures of plaintiff on some stamp papers and got the sale-deed registered. The plaintiff did not receive any consideration from defendant Mangilal nor plaintiff made any promise to give the same in future. According to the plaintiff, defendant Mangilal is a shrewd and clever person and plaintiff is a rustic villager as such he was unaware of the vile idea of defendant Mangilal. Thereafter, on 18.10.1995 plaintiff came to Mandsaur and on inquiry found that defendant Mangilal got the sale-deed executed in his favour and on that date the fraudulent act of defendant Mangilal came to his knowledge. Further it has been pleaded by plaintiff on 27.10.1995 defendant Mangilal declared that his name has also been mutated on the suit property and now he will cut the crop which has been sown by plaintiff and will take possession of the suit property. Further it has been pleaded by plaintiff on 27.10.1995 defendant Mangilal declared that his name has also been mutated on the suit property and now he will cut the crop which has been sown by plaintiff and will take possession of the suit property. Hence present suit for cancellation of registered sale-deed dated 1.10.1982 being null and void; declaration of Bhumiswami rights on the suit property; and grant of decree of perpetual injunction that defendant Mangilal should not interfere in the possession of plaintiff, has been filed. 4. Defendant Mangilal filed written statement and refuted the plaint averments. According to him a valid sale-deed was executed by plaintiff in his favour and accordingly it was registered. The factum of not paying the consideration has been emphatically denied and it has been pleaded that after making payment of the entire consideration, sale-deed was got registered. In para 3 of the special plea, it has been pleaded by defendant Mangilal that after getting the sale-deed registered in his favour, possession was also delivered to him and since then he is possessing the suit property. On these premised pleadings it has been prayed by defendants that suit be dismissed. 5. Learned trial Court on the basis of averments made in the plaint and denial in the written statement framed necessary issues and after recording evidence of parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 6. Defendant Mangilal along with present appellant who is the transferee of defendant filed first appeal before learned lower appellate Court which has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 7. In this manner present second appeal has been filed by the appellant who is the transferee of defendant Mangilal. 8. This Court on 12.1.1998 admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law : "(1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Courts below have erred in not holding the suit as time barred?" (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Courts below have erred in holding the respondent No.(1) Lallu Ram has acquired rights of Bhumiswami over the suit land by adverse possession?" 9. During the pendency of this appeal plaintiff Laluram died and his name was deleted from the cause-title by the order of this Court dated 24.11.1999. On going through LA. During the pendency of this appeal plaintiff Laluram died and his name was deleted from the cause-title by the order of this Court dated 24.11.1999. On going through LA. No. 2794/99 which has been filed by the appellant it is revealed that plaintiff Laluram died without any issue. He was not married. His parents were already dead and defendant Mangilal is his only heir and it was prayed that respondent No.2 Mangilal be permitted to be brought on record who was already on record as respondent No.2. This application was allowed by, this Court on 24.11.1999 and eventually the name of respondent No.1 was deleted. 10. Contention of Shri Saxena, learned senior counsel is that on plaintiff's own showing in para 5 of the plaint it can be inferred that it was in the knowledge of the plaintiff that document Ex. P-l is the sale-deed and the same is being executed because specifically it has been pleaded that on 1.10.1982 defendant Mangilal brought plaintiff to Mandsaur and told that now-a-days there is ban of registration of Will and, therefore, sale-deed be executed as there is no ·material difference between the two documents and if that is the position, according to learned senior counsel in view of Article 59 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short 'the Act of 1963') the prescribed period of limitation to cancel or set aside an instrument is three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument first become known to him and, therefore, the suit which was filed on 5.12.1995 is ex-facie time barred. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel has placed heavy reliance on decision of Supreme Court Noharlal Verma v. District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur. [ 2009 RN 42 = JT 2008 (11) SC 621]. 11. By putting deep dent on the finding of learned two Courts below holding the plaintiff to be the Bhumiswami by way of adverse possession it Las been argued by learned senior counsel that unless and until essential ingredients constituting the adverse possession are not pleaded in the plaint, the Court is not having any jurisdiction to hold that right of adverse possession has been accrued in a pa11y.ln support of his contention, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on Seshmani and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Dist. Basi, U.P. and others [ AIR 2000 SC 979 ]. 12. By placing reliance on two decisions of Supreme Court Kashmir Singh v. Hamam Singh and another [ AIR 2008 SC 1749 ] and State Bank of India and others v. S.N. Goyal [ AIR 2008 SC 2594 ], it has been submitted that if two Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence or Courts have drawn adverse inference by applying law erroneously, this Court can interfere in the findings of the two Courts below. Learned senior counsel has also placed reliance on another decision of Supreme Court Neelakantan and others v. Mallika Begum [JT 2002 (1) SC 433]. On these premised submissions, it has been argued by learned senior counsel that this appeal be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by learned two Courts below and the suit of plaintiff be dismissed. 13. After having heard learned senior counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed. Regarding Substantial Question of Law No. (1) : 14. In order to determine whether the suit is within time, para 6 of the plaint of the plaintiff is quite relevant. On going through para 6 of the plaint it is revealed that plaintiff's own case is that on 1.10.1982 defendant Mangilal took him to Mandsaur and pacified that now-a-days there is ban of registration of Will and, therefore, sale-deed be executed in his favour and thereafter a document was executed by him. Thus, the plaintiff was quite aware of the fact that document which he is executing is nothing but a sale-deed and if that is the position, in view of Article 59 of the Act of 1963, which prescribes the period of limitation of three years the suit should have been filed within three years from 1.10.1982. On going through para 6 of the plaint it cannot be said that it was not in the knowledge of plaintiff that the document which he is executing is not a sale-deed and, therefore, according to me, period of limitation of three years would commence from 1.10.1982 which is the date of execution of sale-deed and since admittedly the suit was filed on 5.10.1995, the same is ex facie barred by prescribed period of limitation. The substantial question of law is thus answered accordingly. The substantial question of law is thus answered accordingly. Regarding Substantial Question of Law No. (2) : 15. Learned two Courts below have also decreed the suit of plaintiff on the ground of adverse possession. On going through averments made in the plaint, it is revealed that an alternative plea of adverse possession has been taken by the plaintiff. To me, essential facts constituting plea of adverse possession have not been pleaded by the plaintiff. In order to derive right by way of adverse possession by the plaintiff, it was incumbent upon him to plead in the plaint that it was in the knowledge of the other party that he is possessing the suit property continuously without any interruption for last 12 years as owner. On going through the plaint this Court finds that simply it has been mentioned in para 11 that because plaintiff is possessing the suit property for more than 12 years from 1.10.1982, therefore, he has acquired Bhumiswami rights by way of adverse possession. To me, such type of pleading would not confer right of adverse possession in him. In this context I may profitably place reliance on Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.S. Alexander and others [ AIR 1968 SC 1165 ] as well as another decision of Supreme Court Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. and others [ (2002) 3 SCC 258 ]. To me, since essential ingredients constituting adverse possession have not been pleaded, it cannot be said that plaintiff has acquired Bhumiswami rights by way of adverse possession. The Supreme Court in Kashmir Singh (supra) and S.N. Goyal (supra) has held that where two Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence or the Courts below have drawn, wrong inferences from the proved facts by applying law erroneously, certainly this Court can interfere in the findings of the two Courts below even thought they are concurrent. The substantial question of law No.(2) is thus answered that the two Court below erred in holding that plaintiff has acquired Bhumiswami rights by way of adverse possession. 16. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. Judgment and decree passed by two Courts below is hereby set aside and the suit of plaintiff is dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.