JUDGMENT Rajive Bhalla, J.:- (Oral):- The petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the orders, dated 31.3.1999, 14.8.2001 and 22.11.2001, passed by the District Collector, Hoshiarpur, Commissioner Jalandhar Division, Jalandhar and the Financial Commissioner Appeals-I, Punjab Chandigarh respectively. 2. The petitioner, respondent no.4 and others applied for the post of Lambardar of village Pandori Mallian. The antecedents of the candidates were inquired and verified. The Circle Revenue Officer, Naib Tehsildar Gardhiwala, vide report, dated 18.9.1997, commended the name of the petitioner for the post of Lambardar. His recommendation was endorsed by the Tehsildar, Dasuya. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dasuya, however, did not agree with the report and recommended the name of respondent No.4. The District Collector, Hoshiarpur, vide order, dated 31.3.1999, held that Bikram Singh-respondent No.4 was the most suitable candidate and directed his appointment as a Lambardar. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division, Jalandhar on 14.8.2001. Still dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred a revision, which was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner Appeals-1, Punjab Chandigarh on 22.11.2001. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that as the petitioner’s father was the Lambardar, his hereditary claim to the office of Lambardar should have recived preference, in view of rule 15(a) of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1909 (for short herein after referred to as “the Rules”). It is submitted that the petitioner is better qualified than respondent No.4. Even otherwise, being a government servant, he is conversant with the government procedures and should, therefore, have been selected as the Lambardar. It is further argued that the District Collector rejected the petitioner’s candidature on the ground that he was a government employee. This error in the order, passed by the District Collector, should have been rectified by the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division or the Financial Commissioner Appeals-1. It is submitted that as the impugned orders are illegal and perverse, the writ petition be allowed and the impugned orders be set aside. 4. Counsel for the respondents is not present. 5. I have heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned orders. 6. It is submitted that as the impugned orders are illegal and perverse, the writ petition be allowed and the impugned orders be set aside. 4. Counsel for the respondents is not present. 5. I have heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned orders. 6. As regards hereditary claims for appointment to the post of Lambardar, rule 15(a) of the Rules reads as follows: “15.-Matter to be considered in first appointment-In all first appointments of headmen, regard shall be had among other matters to­- (a) his hereditary claims; xx xx xx xx 7. While considering the vires of a similar provision, namely, rule 17(ii) of the Rules, and as a consequence, the provisions of rule 15(a), a Division Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh vs The State of Haryana and others, 1973 PLJ 676, held as follows : “xx xx xx xx The main consideration that may appear to have prevailed is that the person selected was connected by ties of blood or heredity with the last incumbent. Shri Naubat Singh, the learned District Attorney for the State of Haryana, has argued that in actual practice other qualifications are also taken into consideration and the appointments are not made in all cases on the grounds only of heredity. Practice apart, rule 17(ii) may seem to attach too much importance to the claim of heredity and the selection of the successor is sought to be confined to a male lineal descendant or the nearest collateral. Rule 17(ii) may seem to make discrimination or distinction on the ground of heredity or family connections. This rule may, therefore, appear to be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Reference could in this connection be made to the Supreme Court rulings in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 564, and The State of Assam and others v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 884. Shri Naubat Singh has cited before us a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Rishikesavan Naidu v. S. Srinivasa Reddiar, A.I.R 1965 Madras 178, but the facts in that case were altogether different. The person who had been selected to the hereditary office in that case had no other rival in the field. Shri Naubat Singh has cited before us a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Rishikesavan Naidu v. S. Srinivasa Reddiar, A.I.R 1965 Madras 178, but the facts in that case were altogether different. The person who had been selected to the hereditary office in that case had no other rival in the field. He would have been unopposed selected independently of his family connections with the deceased. It was under these circumstances that it was held that heredity was no disqualification being selected to a particular post or appointment. 4. For reasons given above, we declare sub-rule (ii) of Land Revenue Rule 17 to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. The appointments under this sub-rule of respondent No.4 in Civil Writ No.1048 of 1967, respondent No.3 in Civil Writ No.696 of 1970 and respondent No.4 in Civil Writ No.666 of 1970 is quashed and the State Government is directed to make fresh appointments after considering, the claims of all the contesting candidates. The three writ petitions are allowed but we make no order as to costs.” 8. It is, therefore, apparent that rule 15(a), which is pari-materia to rule 17(ii) of the Rules, and provides for consideration of the hereditary claim of a candidate, would violate Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution and, an appointment to the post of Lambardar cannot be made on the basis of hereditary claims. 9. As regards the petitioner’s assertion that he was better qualified or that his claim was rejected on the ground that he was a government servant, suffice it to say that in matters of appointments of Lambardars, the choice of the Collector is final till such time as the aggrieved party establishes that the order, passed by the Collector, is perverse, violates any statutory provisions or is so arbitrary as to warrant interference. The District Collector, Hoshiarpur, in his wisdom, selected the best candidate available. In a process of selection, perceptions as to the comparative merits and suitability of a candidate, would vary from person to person and, therefore from court to court. It is an established principle that judicial review of such orders is confined to an appraisal of the impugned order so as to discern whether it is perverse, arbitrary or violates the provisions of any statutory enactment. It is an established principle that judicial review of such orders is confined to an appraisal of the impugned order so as to discern whether it is perverse, arbitrary or violates the provisions of any statutory enactment. Thus, till such time as the choice of the Collector does not suffer from any of the above disabilities, it shall be deemed to be final. The mere fact that there are minor errors in evaluating the respective merits, though in the instant case there are none, can not be a good ground to set aside the choice of the Collector. As the order, passed by the Collector, is neither perverse nor arbitrary and does not infringe any statutory provision, the choice of the Collector was rightly upheld by the learned Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. --------------------