Research › Browse › Judgment

Supreme Court of India · body

2008 DIGILAW 1447 (SC)

State of U. P. v. Munshi

2008-08-28

ARIJIT PASAYAT, MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA

body2008
JUDGMENT: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is by the State of U.P. questioning the correctness of the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoiin Sessions Trial No.455 of 1985 convicted the two respondents for offence punishable under Sections 363, 366and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC). The High Court by the impugned judgment set aside the conviction and directed acquittal. 2. The factual position need not be narrated in view of the fact that the High Courts order, to say the least, is not only cryptic but also non-reasoned. The High Court for thepurpose of directing acquittal only observed as follows: "I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and I have gone through the record. My attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellants to the medical evidence on record, which shows that the girl in question was aged about 17 years. She might be thus of 19 years as well. No injury internal or external was found on her body and she was used to sexual intercourse. The girl in question thus appears to be major and was thus a consenting party and there is no reliable evidence on record to show that she was kidnapped by the accused persons or was raped. The girl in question was returned home safely on the same day. The learned Court below was not thus justified in believing the prosecution theory and convicting the appellants." 3. Learned counsel for the appellant-State highlighted the desirability of recording reasons, particularly, when the analysis of the evidence made and the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court in detailed manner are sought to be upsetby the High Court. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent on other handsubmitted that though elaborate reasons have not been given,the High Court has found the conclusions of the trial Court tobe erroneous. 5. 11. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set for this reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Courts judgment not sustainable. 12. 11. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set for this reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Courts judgment not sustainable. 12. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union (1971) 1 All ER1148, observed: "The giving of reasons is one of thefundamentalsof good administration." In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) itwas observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial ofjustice." "Reasons are live links between the mind of thedecision-taker to the controversy in question and the decisionor conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity byobjectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if thedecision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, byits silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts toperform their appellate function or exercise the power ofjudicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Rightto reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system;reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind tothe matter before court. Another rationale is that the affectedparty can know why the decision has gone against him. One ofthe salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling outreasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking-out.The "inscrutable face of the sphinx" is ordinarily incongruouswith a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. 6. In the instant case, let alone any discussion of theevidence, the High Court has not even indicated any basis fordeparting from the conclusions of the trial Court. 7.”13… Even assumingthat the victim waspreviouslyaccustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not a determinativequestion. On the contrary, the question which was requiredto be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on thevictim on the occasion complained of. Evenif it ishypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginityearlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any personto rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not thevictim. Even if the victim in a given case has beenpromiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a rightto refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyoneand everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or preyfor being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. 14. It is the accused who was on trial and not thevictim. Even if the victim in a given case has beenpromiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a rightto refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyoneand everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or preyfor being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. 14. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of havingbeen a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice afterthe crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. Shestands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In thelatter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in theformer it is both physical as well as psychological andemotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult toaccept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it maysearch for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which wouldlend assurance to hertestimony. Assurance, short ofcorroboration as understood in the context of an accomplicewould do. 8. In our view, the High Court should re-hear the matterand dispose of the appeal by a reasoned judgment.We,therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and remand thematter to the High Court for fresh disposal. We make it clearthat we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 9. The appeal is allowed.