JUDGMENT Hemant Gupta J. - This judgment shall dispose of Civil Writ Petition No. 2456 and 3304 of 2008. In C.W.P. No. 2456 of 2008, the petitioner claims benefit of policy granting concession to the Co-operative Labour and Constructions Societies (for short the Societies) in the State of Haryana, whereas in C.W.P. No. 3304 of 2008 the challenge is to the action of the Punjab Government in not giving concession to the petitioner, a Society. Since the issues raised in these petition is common, the said petitions are taken up together for hearing. 2. The State of Punjab published a notification on 10.09.1999 in continuation of earlier notification dated 16.8.1994 to grant concession to the societies for a further period of five years. The said policy contemplated that all unskilled works upto any value and skilled works upto the limit of Rs. 10,00,000/- should be allotted to the Societies by way of tenders within common schedule of rates fixed by Public Works Department, Punjab .Vide subsequent notification dated 22.12.2004, the Punjab Government extended the similar benefits but increased the limit of Rs. 10,00,000/- to Rs. 15,00,000/- in respect of skilled works. The relevant extract from the notification reads as under : - "In continuation of Punjab Government Notification No. 76/52/79- CI(V)/11209, dated 10.9.1999, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to grant the following concessions to the Co-operative Labour and Construction Societies in the State for a further period of 5 years i.e. upto 14th August, 2009. 1. All unskilled works upto any value and skilled works upto the limit of Rs. 15,00,000/- for each work should be allotted to these Societies only by way of tenders within common schedule of rates fixed by Public Works Department, Punjab. In case these societies fail to tender or do not accept the work within the celling rates to fixed, the work may be executed by inviting open tenders from both the contractors and the societies. 2. If more than one labour and Construction Society have offered tenders for a work, the lowest rate accepted will be made applicable to the other Societies as well for doing that work upto their capacity, the work left over be got executed by inviting open tenders from contractors as well as the Societies." 3. 2. If more than one labour and Construction Society have offered tenders for a work, the lowest rate accepted will be made applicable to the other Societies as well for doing that work upto their capacity, the work left over be got executed by inviting open tenders from contractors as well as the Societies." 3. On the other hand, in the State of Haryana, Similar notification was issued on 29.03.2007 extending the earlier notification dated 1.12.2004 granting concession to the Societies in the State of Haryana upto 31.03.2012. The said policy contemplated that all unskilled works upto any value will be reserved for the societies upto the rates approved for the concerned circle of Public works Department ; whereas all skilled works costing upto Rs. 30,00,000/- were reserved of such Societies. The relevant extract from the notification reads as under:- "No. 2293-C-7-2007/7941 - In supersession of Haryana Government Cooperation Department notification No. 3587-C-7/04/14579, dated 16th December, 2004, the Governor of Haryana hereby extends the following concession to Cooperative Labour and Construction Societies in the State of Haryana upto 31st March, 2012. (1)(a) All unskilled works upto any value will be reserved for Co- operative Labour Construction Societies upto the rates approved for concerned circle of the PWD in the immediate past for similar works after inviting tenders. (b) All skilled works costing upto Rupees thirty lacs each will be reserved for Co-operative Labour and Construction Societies upto the rates approved for the construction of the PWD in the immediate past for similar works after inviting tenders. (c) Skilled works include buildings, bridges and roads involving the use of heavy machinery. (d) In case Co-operative Labour and Construction Societies fail to tender or do not accept the works upto the approved rate then open tenders may be invited both from the contractors and Co-operative Labour and construction Societies." 4. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that since the concession has been announced to be granted to the societies by necessary implication, there is prohibition of giving contract to any another person without giving an option to the societies to give their option for unskilled work upto unlimited value and skilled works upto the value of Rs. 30,00,000/- in the State of Haryana and upto Rs. 15,00,000/- in the State of Punjab. Reliance is placed upon decision of Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain etc. 30,00,000/- in the State of Haryana and upto Rs. 15,00,000/- in the State of Punjab. Reliance is placed upon decision of Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain etc. v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 714, wherein it was held that if the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory ; the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory. Thus, it is argued that since there is prohibition in the circular of the State Government that an offer is required to be given for all works of unskilled works upto unlimited value to the Societies, by necessary implication, it makes ineligible all other persons to complete for the tender. It is also argued that a Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Maya Construction Company and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 2004 Punjab and Haryana 35 has held that exclusion of private contractor in the process of award of contract is not unreasonable classification and, therefore, there is no violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It was found that such notification does not create monopoly in favour of the societies. It confers certain concession on them. That was a writ petition filed by a contractor challenging the action of the State Government in framing the similar policy. In the aforesaid judgment, a Division Bench of this Court affirmed the view taken by a Single Bench of this Court in Surender Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1986 Punjab and Haryana 222. In the aforesaid case, it was held to the following effect :- "Where the Public Works Department of the State issued a direction by way of a notification stipulating that all unskilled works upto any value and skilled works upto the limit of Rs. 3 lacs for each work should be allotted to the Co-opertive Labour and Construction Societies by way of tenders within the ceiling rates fixed by the competent authority, the notification could not be said to be violative of Article 14 on ground of discrimination or on the ground that it created monopoly in favour of such societies to the exclusion of individual private contractors. If the Government, in the light of their experience of dealing with the private contractors, took a policy decision to prefer to co-operative societies for execution of their works, it cannot be held that there was any discrimination. Also, the impugned notification does not create any monopoly in favour of the Societies. It confers certain concessions on them. If the Societies fail to tender or do accept the work within the ceiling rates, option is left with the authorities concerned to get them executed by inviting open tenders from both the contractors and the societies. All that the impugned notification provides is that the societies are given an opportunity to execute the work within the ceiling rates fixed by the authorities, but if they do not agree to do so, then the matter become open to all and the work can be got executed by inviting open tenders from both the contractors and the societies. It is not that the private contractors are altogether excluded from consideration. Thus, the notification does not affect the right to carry on the trade by private contractors. The classification between the co-operative societies and the private contractors is reasonable one and has a direct nexus with the object intended to be achieved." 5. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment would show that this Court found that the policy framed by the Government to extend certain concessions to the Societies is valid. Thus, the only question which is required to be examined in these writ petitions "whether the State Government having framed policy to grant concession to such Societies is bound to grant concession to all the societies or such policy is only directory." 6. The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or mandatory has very frequently arisen before the courts in India. There is no general rule but in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. When the provisions of the statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been a practice to hold such provisions to be directory only. The use of word "shall" in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. The Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912, has quoted the following quotation from Crawford on Statutory Construction :- "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other...." 7. It was held that consultation of the Public Service Commission affecting a person serving the Government of India or a state Government are not mandatory in spite of the use of words "shall" therein. 8. In Banwarilal Agarwala v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 849, Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only directory i.e. a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case, the Court has to decide the legislative intent. The Courts have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same. 9. In State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2190, Supreme Court held that in determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, one must look into the subject-matter and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. 9. In State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2190, Supreme Court held that in determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, one must look into the subject-matter and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. It was held that, no doubt, all laws are mandatory in the sense they impose the duty to obey on those who come within its purview but it does not follow that every departure from it shall taint the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination of the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law-maker. The said intention has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it in one way or the other. 10. In Administrator, Municipal Committee Charkhi Dadri v. Ramji Lal Bagla, AIR 1995 SC 2329, Supreme Court ruled that absence of provision for consequence in case of non-compliance with the requirements prescribed would indicate directory nature despite use of word shall. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, (2005)1 SCC 368, it was ruled that whenever the State prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement would lead to severe consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. 11. In P.T. Rajans case (supra), Supreme Court held that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory. It was held to the following effect :- "45. A statute as is well known must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be depend on the on the user of words "shall" and "may". Such a question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. 46. What is mandatory is the requirement of sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the 1950 Act and not the ministerial action of actual publication of From 16. 47. The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object for which the same had been used. 46. What is mandatory is the requirement of sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the 1950 Act and not the ministerial action of actual publication of From 16. 47. The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object for which the same had been used. In the instant case the 1960 Rules do not fix any time for publication of the electoral rolls. On the other hand, Section 23(3) of the 1950 Act categorically mandates that direction can be issued for revision in the electoral roll by way of amendment in inclusion and deletion from the electoral roll till date specified for filing nomination. The electoral roll as revised by reason of such directions can, therefore, be amended only thereafter. On the basis of direction issued by the competent authority in relation to an application filed for inclusion of a voters name, a nomination can be filed. The person concerned, therefore, would not be inconvenienced or in any way be prejudiced only because the revised electoral roll in Form 16 is published a few hours later. The result of filing of such nomination would become known to the parties concerned also after 3.00 P.M. 48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would directory and not mandatory. (See Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate of Monghyr, A.I.R. 1996 Patna 44 Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B., (1999)2 Cal. L.J. 21; and Garbari Union Co-op. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana, (1997)1 C.H.N. 189). 49. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature although employs the word shall may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. (See Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996)3 SCC 364; Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy. Commr. (Revenue), (1997)9 SCC 128 and Rai Vimalkrishna v. State of Bihar, (2003)6 S.C.C. 401." 12. Sh. (See Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996)3 SCC 364; Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy. Commr. (Revenue), (1997)9 SCC 128 and Rai Vimalkrishna v. State of Bihar, (2003)6 S.C.C. 401." 12. Sh. Mohan Jain, learned Senior Advocate, strongly relied upon the judgment in Lachmi Narains case (supra) to contend that where a policy provision is couched in prohibitive or negative it can rarely the directory. The said question does not arise in the present case. In the aforesaid case, Supreme Court was considering the provision of Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (for short the Bengal Act) as extended to Delhi Section 6 of the Bengal Act as applicable to Delhi provided that the State Government should amend the Schedule by giving not less than three months notice by notification. It was found that not less than three months notice, as originally stood in the Act, was mandatory as it was couched in prohibitive or negative language. 13. In the present case, the policy is to grant concession. Such policy is not absolute inasmuch as if such societies fail to tender or do nor accept the tender of work, then tender can be invited from other contracts as well. Such policy grants preference in award of contracts to such Societies. Such preference could be circumscribed by the executing department, keeping in view the requirements of the work. 14. The public interest is to get work executed at minimum of the cost without compromising quality of work. Therefore, if tenders are invited from all eligible Societies, such tender process does not violate the mandate of Article 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It only enables all eligible contractors to compete and to provide a level playing field to all competitors, Misuse of such concession by forming bogus societies or by excluding a section of eligible contractors is in public interest. Thus we hold that such policy is only directory in nature and it is always open to the State Government to take appropriate decision in each case whether the works are required to be executed through the Societies or by open advertisement. 15. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in both the writ petitiones. The same are dismissed with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.