JUDGMENT 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15.1.1993 passed by the learned VIth Additional District Judge, Ujjain in Civil Appeal No. 25A/91 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned IVth Civil Judge Class-II, Ujjain in Civil Suit No. 38-A/90 decreeing the suit of plaintiff dated 30.4.1991 has been affirmed, defendant-appellant Sevaram has come up in this second appeal knocking the doors of this Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. In brief, the suit of plaintiff Sugan Bai is that defendant No.1 Ranchhod was Bhumiswami of the agricultural land survey No. 13 total area 7.577 hectare. Out of the total area 7.577 hectare, defendant No.1 Ranchhod sold an area 2.090 hectare to appellant-defendant No.2 Sevaram. Defendant No.1 Ranchhod further sold an area 1.098 towards southern side to plaintiff respondent No.1. Accordingly, the revenue record was also corrected by mutation. 3. Further it has been pleaded in para 3 of the plaint that Assistant Settlement Officer in Case No. 1/86-87 A-6 on 15.12.1987 passed an order mutating the name of the plaintiff as Bhumiswami of area 1.098 hectare but directed that the plaintiff shall be Bhumiswami of this land towards northern side of survey No. 13, although she bought the southern side of survey No.13. In this manner, it has been prayed by plaintiff that she be declared Bhumiswami of the suit property viz. survey No. 13 area 1.098 hectare situated on the southern side and, accordingly, she is entitled to get her name mutated in the revenue record. 4. Defendant-appellant by filing written statement refuted the plaint averments of the plaintiff, inter-alia, raised objection about jurisdiction of the civil Court. 5. Learned trial Court after framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties decreed the suit of the plaintiff against which an appeal was preferred by the defendant which has been dismissed. 6. In this manner this Second Appeal has been filed by the defendant assailing the judgment of the two Courts below. 7. This Court on 28.1 0.1993 admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law : "Whether the Courts below were right in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff without ascertaining proper boundaries-Survey No. 13 of Gram Gunia Tahsil Bhattiya? & Whether the suit is barred u/s 257 (g) and (f) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code?" 8. 7. This Court on 28.1 0.1993 admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law : "Whether the Courts below were right in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff without ascertaining proper boundaries-Survey No. 13 of Gram Gunia Tahsil Bhattiya? & Whether the suit is barred u/s 257 (g) and (f) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code?" 8. The contention of Shri Jain, lean1ed counsel for the appellant is that the two Courts below erred in substantial error of law in decreeing the suit without ascertaining the proper boundaries of Survey No.13 of Village Gunia Tahsil Bhattiya. By putting emphasis on second substantial question of law, it has been argued by learned counsel for the appellant that since the matter is in the domain of Revenue Court as there is dispute of demarcation of the boundaries, the civil Court has no jurisdiction and in this context, he has invited my attention to section 257 (g) and (t) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on State of M.P v. Shyam Kishore Agrawal, 1975 JLJ 557 . 9. In this appeal despite plaintiff-respondent No.1 Sugan Bai has been served but no one has put appearance on her behalf. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and after perusing the record, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed. Regarding substantial questions of law No. 1 & 2 : 11. On going through the plaint averments, it is revealed that as per the case of the plaintiff, she bought 1.098 hectare of agricultural land out of5.487 hectare of the land of defendant No.1 Ranchhod. Plaintiff also bought a part of land of defendant No.1 which is 2.09 hectare and his name has already been mutated. The sale deed of defendant is dated 23.1.1984 (Ex. P-l) in which it has been mentioned that the southern side of the land of Survey No.13 area 1.098 hectare has been sold to plaintiff Sugan Bai plaintiff, submitted an application before Assistant, Land Record, against her vendor Ranchhod which was registered as 1/A/6/86-87. The sale deed of defendant is dated 23.1.1984 (Ex. P-l) in which it has been mentioned that the southern side of the land of Survey No.13 area 1.098 hectare has been sold to plaintiff Sugan Bai plaintiff, submitted an application before Assistant, Land Record, against her vendor Ranchhod which was registered as 1/A/6/86-87. In these proceedings defendant-appellant submitted objections and after hearing the parties, it was held by Assistant, Land Record, that the four boundaries mentioned in the sale deed of plaintiff Sugan Bai is different though she has stated that she bought southern side of the land. The Assistant, Land Record, further came to hold that according to the map submitted by Patwari the four boundaries of plaintiff do not tally which are mentioned in her sale deed. The Assistant, Land Record further came to hold that defendant Sewaram is possessing southern side of the land and he had become occupancy tenant vide order dated 20.4.1983 (Ex. D-3) of southern side of land. The Assistant Land Record after considering the case of plaintiff's Sugan Bai, Ranchhod and defendant who was objector, carne to hold that the land area 1.098 hectare which is left is on the Northern side of Survey No. 13, hence the name of plaintiffs hall be mutated as Bhumiswami of the said land and, accordingly, demarcated that area to be 13/1 by dividing survey number 13 and made new survey number. The order of Assistant, Land Record dated 15.12.1987 was assailed by Sugan Bai in appeal and the appellate authority (settlement Officer) dismissed her appeal on 12.12.1988. On going through the order of Assistant, Land Record, dated 15.12.1987 (Ex. D-4) as well as the appellate order Ex. P-2 dated 12.12.1988 passed by Settlement Officer, it is revealed that since on the southern side of the land of Survey No. 13 defendant-appellant Sewaram became occupancy tenant vide order dated 20.4.1983 (Ex. D-3), therefore, it was directed that plaintiff's name be mutated as Bhumiswami on the northern side of area 1.098 hectare of Survey No. 13. Accordingly, it was directed that Survey No. 13 be divided and plaintiff's name as Bhumiswami on area 1.098 hectare on northern side be mutated by forming new survey No. 13/1. D-3), therefore, it was directed that plaintiff's name be mutated as Bhumiswami on the northern side of area 1.098 hectare of Survey No. 13. Accordingly, it was directed that Survey No. 13 be divided and plaintiff's name as Bhumiswami on area 1.098 hectare on northern side be mutated by forming new survey No. 13/1. On going through these two judgments and order of revenue Court, it is revealed that no land was left on the southern side after defendant Sewaram was declared occupancy tenant of the southern side of the land of survey No. 13, therefore, in order to safeguard the right of plaintiff, her name was directed to be mutated on the northern side by dividing Survey No.13 and making a new survey No. 13/1. Thus, I am of the view that there is no perversity in the order of Assistant, Land Record dated 15.12.1987 (Ex. D-3) which was affirmed in appeal by Settlement, Land Record, Ujjain dated 12.12.1988 (Ex. P-2) while dismissing the appeal of defendant. On the other hand it is gathered that in order to safeguard the interest of plaintiff her name was mutated on the northern side of survey No.13 and, therefore, since there is no perversity in the orders of Revenue Courts and the dispute pertains to demarcation of the land, I am of the view that exclusive jurisdiction vest in the Revenue Court in view of section 257 (g) of the Code. The Division Bench of this Court in Shyam KishoreAgrawal (supra) has categorically held that civil Court could not entertain the suit when the matter lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts and when the Revenue Courts has acted within their jurisdiction and also when their proceedings do not reveal any fraud, arbitrariness or perversity it should not have been interfered. It would be apposite to quote para-11 of the said judgment which reads thus: "11. With such evidence as this, we fail to see what prevailed over the Additional District Judge to hold that the Revenue Officer had acted on no legal evidence at all, or that they had acted on their imaginations and conjectures. We rather find perversity in the finding of the Additional District Judge instead. With such evidence as this, we fail to see what prevailed over the Additional District Judge to hold that the Revenue Officer had acted on no legal evidence at all, or that they had acted on their imaginations and conjectures. We rather find perversity in the finding of the Additional District Judge instead. In our view, therefore, civil Court could not entertain the suit when the matter lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court and when the Revenue Courts had acted within their jurisdiction. Their proceedings do not reveal any fraud, arbitrariness or perversity." 12. To me, the above said decision is fully applicable in the present case and it is help that civil Court is not having jurisdiction in the matter. Substantial questions of law No.1 and 2 are, thus, decided accordingly. Apart from what I have held herein above, on going through the averments made in the plaint as well as relief which has been claimed by the plaintiff, it is revealed that plaintiff has not sought cancellation of order dated 15.12.1987 (Ex. D-4) passed by Assistant, Land Record, which has been affirmed in appeal dated 12.12.1988 (Ex. P-2) and no declaration has been sought that these orders passed by the Revenue Courts be set aside. Thus, I am of the view that without asking any relief to set aside or to cancel these orders the present suit is not maintainable and the same is hit by section 34 of Specific Relief Act. In this Context, I may profitably place reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Jugraj Singh and another v. Jaswant Singh and others, AIR 1971 SC 761 in para 11, the Supreme Court has categorically held that if the order of SDO is not challenged and no declaration has been sought for, such suit would be hit by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963). 13. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgments passed by two Courts below are hereby set aside and the suit of plaintiff is hereby dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.z