Judgment : In a legal tussle between two Trusts staking conflicting claims over the right to construct a temple known as “Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan Jain Swethambar Temple”, the Trustees have successfully left Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan in the lurch, alter having displaced him from the sanctum sanctorum and after having performed “Baalalayam” more than about 16 months ago. The assertion of the right to construct the temple, has overtaken the desire and need to construct the temple, with the result that Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan is now left without a proper abode, either in the hearts of the warring groups or in the place where he had a temple. 2. “Shree Chandraprabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir Trust”, which is a registered Trust, has come up with C.S.No.440 of 2007 seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining another Trust by name “The Dadabadi Sri Jin-Kushalsuriji Jin-Chandrasuriji Trust” from interfering and involving in any manner in the plaintiffs administration, management, construction and any other work relating to “Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan Jain Swethambar temple. Pending suit, the plaintiff-Trust sought an interim order of injunction in O.A.No.629 of 2007 restraining the defendant-Trust from interfering and involving in any manner with the plaintiffs administration, management, construction and any other work relating to the aforesaid temple. 3. On 24. 2007, this Court granted an exparte interim order or injunction in favour of the plaintiff-Trust in O.A.No.629 of 2007. Therefore after service of notice, the defendant-Trust came up with an application in A.No.3810 of 2007 for vacating the interim order of injunction. 4. In the meantime, on coming to know of the suit filed by the claimant-Trust seven persons claiming to be the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust joined together and filed another suit in C.S.No.459 of 2007 against the plaintiff-Trust and the Secretary of the plaintiff-Trust seeking the following reliefs: (a) A declaration that he notice of the Extraordinary General Meeting dated 14. 2007 and all subsequent actions arising therefrom, including the meeting held on 24. 2007 and the resolution passed therein, are null and void and not binding on the Trust and (b) A permanent injunction restraining the Trustees (of the plaintiff-Trust) from acting contrary to the interests of the Trust. 5. Pending C.S.NO. 2007 and all subsequent actions arising therefrom, including the meeting held on 24. 2007 and the resolution passed therein, are null and void and not binding on the Trust and (b) A permanent injunction restraining the Trustees (of the plaintiff-Trust) from acting contrary to the interests of the Trust. 5. Pending C.S.NO. 459 of 200, the plaintiffs therein also sought an interim order of injunction in O.A.No.643 of 2007 restraining the Secretary and other Trustees (of the plaintiff-Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007 from acting adverse to the interests of the Trust. 6. On 5. 2007, when O.A.No.643 of 2007 in C.S.No.459 of 2007 came up along with A. No.3810 of 2007 and O.A.No.629 of 2007 in C.S.No.440 of 2007, this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo until further orders. Consequently, though the old temple structure is stated to have been pulled down as early as in January 2006 and a Bhoomi Pooja and the ceremony for stone laying was fixed for 5. 2007, a stalemate prevails for the past several months, with Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan watching the fun from a smaller make-shift temple and waiting perhaps, not only for the resolution of the dispute, but also for wisdom to dawn upon the rival claimants. 7. The application for injunction O.A.No.629 of 2007 and the application for vacating the injunction in A.No.3810 of 2007 in C.S. No.440 of 2007 and the application for injunction O.A.No.643 of 2007 in C.S.No.459 of 2007 were taken up together for hearing and I heard Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel for “Shree Chandraprabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir Trust”, which is the plaintiff in C.S. No.440 of 2007 and the first defendant in C.S. No.459 of 2007. I have also heard Mr. T.V. Ramanujun, learned senior counsel for “The Dadabadi Sri Jin-Kushalsuriji Jin-Chandrasuriji Trust” which is the defendant in C.S.No.440 of 2007 and Mr. N.R.Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs in C.S. No.459 of 2007. 8. Since there are only two Trusts involved in this litigation. “Shree Chandraprabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir Trust”, shall, here-inafter be referred to as the plaintiff-Trust and “The Dadabadi Sri Jin-Kushalsuriji Jin-Chandrasuriji trust shall, hereinafter be referred to as the defendant-Trust Since the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007 are the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust, they shall be referred to as the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust. 9. “Shree Chandraprabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir Trust”, shall, here-inafter be referred to as the plaintiff-Trust and “The Dadabadi Sri Jin-Kushalsuriji Jin-Chandrasuriji trust shall, hereinafter be referred to as the defendant-Trust Since the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007 are the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust, they shall be referred to as the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust. 9. The case of the plaintiff-Trust is as follows: (a) The plaintiff-Trust was established as a Public Religious Trust by a Deed of Declaration of Trust dated 18. 1987 with the main object of administering and managing the affairs of two temples by name Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan Jain Swethamber Temple at 370, Konnur High Road, Chennai-600 023 and Shree Chandra Prabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir at No.345, Mint Street, Chennai-600079 and an institution by name Sri Sadharan Bhawan at Old No.108, New No. 346, Mint Street, Chennai-600 079. (b) Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan Temple was built in 1925 for the worship of one of the Jain Thirthankaras by name Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan and five other Thirthankaras. The temple, as seen from the preamble to the Deed of Trust of the plaintiff, was constructed by Swethamber Murti Poojak Marwari Jains of Madras. (c) Since the structure of the temple had become old, it was decided to pull down the old structure and construct a new one for Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan Temple Therefore, a Temple Renovation Committee by name “Jinodhar Samiti” was constituted, the idols of Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan and other five Thirthankaras were shitted to a temporary shrine, the old structure was pulled down and the land was cleared for performing Bhoomi Pooja after receiving the blessings and instructions of Gurus and Acharvas. (d) The defendant-Trust issued an advertisement in Rajasthan Patrika in its edition dated 14. 2007 proposing to perform Bhoomi Pooja and stone laying for the temple on 5. 2007. Upon seeing the same, the plaintiff-Trust issued a circular on 14. 2007 and called for an Extraordinary General Body Meeting on 24. 2007. In the said meeting, a resolution was passed protesting against the interference by the defendant-Trust into the management and administration of the aforesaid temple by the plaintiff-Trust. (e) However, the defendant-Trust issued a second notification in Rajasthan Patrika on 24. 2007 proposing to perform a ceremony preceding Bhoomi Pooja on 5. 2007 and to perform Bhoomi Pooja and Shilanyas on 5. 2007 and 5. 2007. (e) However, the defendant-Trust issued a second notification in Rajasthan Patrika on 24. 2007 proposing to perform a ceremony preceding Bhoomi Pooja on 5. 2007 and to perform Bhoomi Pooja and Shilanyas on 5. 2007 and 5. 2007. Therefore the plaintiff-Trust was compelled to file the present suit C.S.No.440 of 2007 for a permanent injunction restraining defendant-Trust from interfering with the plaintiff’s administration, management and construction of the aforesaid temple. 10. The defendant Trust in the affidavit in support of the vacate injunction application, has raised the following contentions: (a) The defendant-Trust was established in 1838 by Swethambar Murti Poojak Sect of Jains which consisted mainly of two sub-sects viz, Khartar Gach and Tapa Gach. A Dada Guru Jain Temple known as Dadawadi Mandir was established even in the year 1838 in the propeprty now bearing No.370, Konnur High Road, Ayanavaram. The defendant-Trust consists of members predominantly belonging to Khartar Gach sub-sects. The property at No.370, Kunnur High Road, Ayanavaram is of the extent of about 151 grounds and 1512 sq.ft, in T.S.No.307/2, Block No.18 of Perambur Village. (b) Though the defendant-Trust was established in 1838, no formal Deed of Trust was executed and registered. A Committee of Trustees and a Potedar (Managing Trustee) managed the temple and the Trust and the temple itself was constructed under the aegis of the defendant-Trust Since the Jain Shastras do not permit a temple fund being used for a Guru temple, the defendant Trust appointed a separate Committee of Trustees for managing and administering the temple. (c) On 30.12.1983, a Trust Deed was drawn up and registered with 7 Trustees, out of whom 5 belonged to Khartar Gach Sect and 2 belonged to Tapa Gach Sect. The Trustees and Potedar of the defendant-Trust were also managing the plaintiff-Trust as well as Sadharan Bhawan. Since it was found difficult administratively, the plaintiff-Trust was created in 1987 for the purpose of administration and management of (i) Shree Sumathinath Bhagawan Jain Temple (ii) Chandra Prabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir and (iii) Sadharan Bhawan. The ownership of the temple and Trust properties were not transferred to the plaintiff-Trust, but the administration and management were transferred. (d) Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Temple, constructed in 1925 became dilapidated and hence it was decided to demolish the old structure and construct a new one. The ownership of the temple and Trust properties were not transferred to the plaintiff-Trust, but the administration and management were transferred. (d) Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Temple, constructed in 1925 became dilapidated and hence it was decided to demolish the old structure and construct a new one. The defendant-Trust working in tandem with the plaintiff-Trust demolished the temple and moved the idols to a temporary shrine to perform the daily poojas. (e) Since the ownership of the properties always vested in the defendant-Trust, the defendant alone is competent to construct the temple and defendant-Trust alone is entitled even to apply to the statutory authorities for the sanction of the planning permission. 11. The plaintiffs in the second suit C.S.No.459 of 2007, are actually the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust. In the plaint in C.S.No.459 of 2007, the Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust have virtually endorsed the contentions raised by the defendant Trust in their application to vacate the injunction A.No.3810 of 2007. In other words, they have admitted that the defendant-Trust was established in 1838 and that the ownership of the property measuring about 151 grounds in No.370, Konnur High Road. Ayanavaram, vests with the defendant-Trust. The plaintiffs have also questioned the right of the Secretary of the plaintiff-Trust to call for an Extraordinary General Body Meeting and the manner in which the meeting was convened. According to the plaintiffs, the very act of the Secretary convening the Extraordinary General Body Meeting was illegal and consequently, the resolution passed at the meeting on 24. 2007 was also illegal. 12. Though the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007, seek an interim order, of injunction in A.No.643 of 2007 restraining the plaintiff-Trust (in C.S.No.440 of 2007) from acting adverse to the interests of the Trust and contrary to the Deed of Trust dated 20.8.1987. I do not wish to dwell in detail upon their application, for one simple reason. As is clear from their pleadings, the object of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007 appears to be to support the case of the defendant-Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007. Therefore, a decision on merits in the interlocutory applications in C.S.No.440 of 2007, would be sufficient to dispose of the application of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007. As is clear from their pleadings, the object of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007 appears to be to support the case of the defendant-Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007. Therefore, a decision on merits in the interlocutory applications in C.S.No.440 of 2007, would be sufficient to dispose of the application of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007. If the claim of the plaintiff-Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007 is found to be in accordance with the Deed of Trust, then they are entitled to an order of injunction and the prayer of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007 to injunct the Trust not to act contrary to the Deed of Trust would merge with the relief granted to the plaintiff-Trust. If the plaintiff Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007 is found to be not entitled to the relief prayed for, even then the interim prayer of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.459 of 2007 would merge with the decision taken thereon. Therefore, the answer to the question as to whether the plaintiff-Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007 alone is entitled to construct the temple, holds the key to the disposal of even the application of the plaintiffs in C.S. No.459 of 2007. 13. Even if the Extraordinary General Body Meeting convened by the Secretary of the plaintiff-Trust by the circular dated 14. 2007 and the resolution purportedly passed on 24. 2007, which are challenged in C.S.No.459 of 2007, are found to be illegal, it may not seal the fate of the claim of the plaintiff-Trust in C.S.No.440 of 2007, since C.S.No.440 o f2007 raises the fundamental issue as to whether it is the plaintiff-Trust or the defendant-Trust, which is entitled to demolish and construct the temple. If the Deeds of Trust of the plaintiff-Trust and the defendant-Trust as well as the other documents show that the plaintiff-Trust alone is entitled to construct the temple, the fact that the Extraordinary General Body Meeting was convened illegally, cannot defeat the rights of the plaintiff-Trust. On the other hand, if the plaintiff-Trust has no right to put up the construction of the temple, a validly convened Extraordinary General Body Meeting and a validly passed resolution, will not create any right in favour of the plaintiff-Trust. Therefore the question raised in the application in C.S.No.459 of 2007, can follow suit with the final outcome in the application in C.S.No.440 of 2007. 14. Therefore the question raised in the application in C.S.No.459 of 2007, can follow suit with the final outcome in the application in C.S.No.440 of 2007. 14. In view of the above, let me take up the applications in C.S.No.440 of 2007. The contention of the plaintiff-Trust is basically two fold viz., (a) that under the Deed of Trust by which the plaintiff was constituted, the plaintiff-Trust alone has the right to administer and manage the affairs of the temple in question and the right to manage and administer would include the right to construct and (b) that inasmuch as the temple in question was built for the worship of the Fifth Jain Thirthankara and Five other Thirthankaras, the entire property in which the temple is constructed, vest in the idol and that therefore no one including the defendant-Trust can claim ownership of the property. 15. In order to substantiate the plaintiff-Trusts claim that the property vested in the idol, Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Trust drew my attention to- (a) the fact that the Jains are also recognized only as Hindus; (b) the fact that in contra distinction to Buddhists, who have no belief in idol worship, Jains have belief in idol worship, which is why The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, enabled the Government under Section 2(1) to extent the provisions of the Act to Jain Public Religious Institutions and Endowments; and (c) the fact that an idol is always recognized as a juristic person entitled to sue. 16. It is the true that The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is made applicable even to Jains, as seen from Section 2 which reads as follows: “2. Application of Act. (1) This applies- (a) …….. (b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion.” Similarly, Section 2(1) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 enables the Government to extend the provisions of the said Act to Jain Public Religious Institutions and Endowments and Section 3(1) enables of the Government to extend the provisions of the Act, after enquiry, to Jain Public Charitable Endowments, if it has reason to believe that they are mismanaged. Section 2(1) reads as follows: “2. Section 2(1) reads as follows: “2. Power to extend Act to Jain Religious Institutions and Endowments.- (1) Where the Government may, by notification, extend to Jain public religious institutions and endowments, all or any of the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder and thereupon, the provisions so extended shall apply to such institutions and endowments:” Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 reads as follows: “3. Power to extend Act to Charitable Endowments.-(1) Where the Government have reason to believe that any Hindu or Jain public charitable endowment is being mismanaged, they may direct the Commissioner to inquire, or to cause an inquiry to be made by any Officer authorized by him in this behalf into the affairs of such charitable endowment and to report to them whether, in the interests of the administration of such charitable endowment, it is necessary to extend thereto all or any of the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder.” The word “Religious Institution” has been defined under Section 6(18) to include a math, temple or specific endowment and the word “Specific Endowment” has been defined under Section 6(19) to mean any property endowed for the performance of any specific service or charity in a math or temple or for the performance of any other religious charity. Therefore according to the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Trust, a Jain Public Religious Institution is akin to a Hindu Religious Institution or temple and that therefore the property dedicated to it, would vest in the idol. 17. Consequently, the idols of Thirthankaras, installed in the temple in question are juristic persons, according to the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Trust. In support of the said contention, the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Trust relied upon the decision in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Others AIR 1957 SC 133 where the Supreme Court held as follows: “Under the Hindu Law, an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. But it does not follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment. It is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties and it cannot have any beneficial interest in the endowment: 21nd App. But it does not follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment. It is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties and it cannot have any beneficial interest in the endowment: 21nd App. 145(P.C) and LLR 32 Cal. 129 (P.C.) and AIR 1925 PC 139; Ref.” In paragraph-7 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court further held as follows: “7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof in accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, if a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.” In Ram Jankijee Deities and Others v. State of Bihar and Others AIR 1999 SC 2131 : (1999) 5 SCC 5., it has been held as follows: “Hindu Law recognises Hindu idol as a juridical subject being capable in law of holding property by reason of the Hindu Shastras following the status of a legal person in the same way as that of a natural person. It is not a particular image which is a juridical person but it is a particular bent of mind which consecrate the image How one sees the Deity: how one feels the deity and recognises the deity and then establishes the same in the temple upon however performance of the consecration ceremony. It is not a particular image which is a juridical person but it is a particular bent of mind which consecrate the image How one sees the Deity: how one feels the deity and recognises the deity and then establishes the same in the temple upon however performance of the consecration ceremony. Shastras do provide as to how to consecrate and the usual ceremonies of Sankalpa and Utsarga shall have to be performed for proper, and effective dedication of the property to a Deity and in order to be termed as a juristic person. A simple piece of wood or stone may become the image or idol and divinity is attributed to the same. It is formless, shapeless but it is the human concept of a particular divine existence which gives it the shape, the size and the colour.” Therefore, it was contended by Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel that the property actually vested in the idol and the defendant Trust cannot claim ownership of the same. 18. Per contra, it was contended, by Mr. T.V. Ramanujun, learned senior counsel for the defendant-Trust that Jainism does not accept the concept of “Universal God” as propounded by Hinduism. Nevertheless Jainism acknowledges the existence of “Superior Beings” known as “Arhats” in heaven and “Gods” who are evolved souls, with greater freedom and higher degree of knowledge and intelligence. Therefore, according to the defendant-Trust the concepts of God, temple and idolatry, as prevailing in Hinduism, cannot be imported into Jainism. 19. In order to substantiate their contention that the defendant-Trust, always treated the property in which the temple in question is located, as their own property, the defendant Trust has filed the following documents as additional documents: (1) Plan submitted on 26. 1918 as document No.1 (2) Demand notices under Section 4 of Madras Act 6 of 1867 as document Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 12. (3) Quit Rent Receipts as document Nos.3, 5 and 11 (4) Planning Permit issued by the Corporation on 13. 1924 as document No.9. (5) Property Tax Receipts as document Nos. 13, 14 and 25. (6) Notice received from the Urban Land lax Authorities and the provisional assessment order passed in pursuance thereof as document Nos. 16 and 17. (7) The order passed in the writ petition tiled by the defendant-Trust challenging the ULT proceedings as document No.20. 1924 as document No.9. (5) Property Tax Receipts as document Nos. 13, 14 and 25. (6) Notice received from the Urban Land lax Authorities and the provisional assessment order passed in pursuance thereof as document Nos. 16 and 17. (7) The order passed in the writ petition tiled by the defendant-Trust challenging the ULT proceedings as document No.20. (8) The order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, ULT, dated 7. 2002 as document No.23. 20. Drawing my attention to the above documents, the learned senior counsel for the defendant-Trust contended that the property was always treated as owned by the defendant-Trust and that there was no question of the property vesting in the idol. According to the learned senior counsel for the defendant-Trust, the Revenue Authorities as well as the Municipal Corporation have, recognized only the defendant-Trust as the owner of the property and that therefore, it was only the defendant-Trust, which will be entitled to apply even for demolition and reconstruction. 21. From the rival contentions extracted above, two fundamental questions arise for consideration, viz. (a) as to whether the property on which the temple in question is constructed, vests in the idol or in the defendant-Trust and (b) as to whether the plaintiff-Trust or the defendant-Trust is entitled to construct the temple. 22. The plaintiff-Trust as well as the defendant-Trust agree at least on one issue viz., that after the construction of the temple is completed, the plaintiff-Trust alone will be entitled to manage and administer the temple in question. In paragraphs-5 and 6 of the affidavit in support of their vacate injunction application, the defendant Trust has admitted that the management and administration of the affairs of the temple in question vested in the plaintiff-Trust. In para-7 of the same affidavit, the defendant-Trust has admitted that the old structure was demolished, by the defendant-Trust “working in tandem with the plaintiff-Trust. “ In view of such a categorical stand, the learned senior counsel for the defendant-Trust submitted that the defendant-Trust will concede the power of management and administration of the temple to the plaintiff-Trust, after completion of construction.’ 23. Therefore, the only question on which there is serious dispute, is as to who should be permitted to construct the temple. “ In view of such a categorical stand, the learned senior counsel for the defendant-Trust submitted that the defendant-Trust will concede the power of management and administration of the temple to the plaintiff-Trust, after completion of construction.’ 23. Therefore, the only question on which there is serious dispute, is as to who should be permitted to construct the temple. The plaintiff-Trust’s claim that they have the right to construct, is based upon two factors viz., (a) that the property vested in the idol and (b) that by virtue of the power of management and administration conferred on them, the plaintiff-Trust alone is entitled to construct. This is refuted by the defendant-Trust on the ground that the property vested not in the idol but in the defendant Trust and that therefore the mere power to administer and manage the temple conferred on the plaintiff’, would not include a right to construct the temple on the defendant’s property. 24. The first question as to whether the concept of idol and its capacity to hold property, as applicable to Hinduism, is applicable to Jainism or not, poses some difficulty. It appears that essentially Jainism differs from Hinduism on all four basic tenets viz., (i) God (ii) Soul (iii) Karma and (iv) Salvation or Mukthi. The distinctions are as follows: (l) While Hinduism believes in the existence of a “Universal God as the creator, protector and destroyer, Jainism does not believe in the existence of such an “Universal God.” But Jainism believes in “superior or perfect beings” worthy of devotion to live in heaven. Jainism does not believe in God as the Ruler or as one who helps people or as one who is pleased by worship and confers material benefits upon people. The idea of god in Jainism is different from the conventional idea of God. But Jainism could not also be termed as atheistic in the strict sense of the term. Therefore, Heinrich Zimmer called Jainism, “a transtheistic religion” meaning thereby that it is “ inaccessible by arguments as to whether or not a God exists.” Though “Liberated Souls”, according to Jainism, possess infinite knowledge, infinite vision, infinite power and infinite bliss, Jains do not worship those liberated souls, for any reward, but they worship them, with a view to set before themselves, the example of perfection that they want to follow in their own lives. (ii) While the inherent nature of the soul (called “Jeevathma”) according to Hinduism, is pure and unaffected, the soul (called “Jeeva”) according to Jainism, become polluted and weighed down through contact with matter (“Ajiva”) (iii) According to Hinduism, the word “Karma” encompasses within itself both cause and consequence, but is not tangible. But Jainism, conceives of “Karma” as the atomic particles, which cling to the soul. (iv) Mukthi or Salvation, according to Hinduism, is the union of Jeevathma with Paramathma. But according to Jainism, Salvation or Nirvana is a state of perfect peace and purity which can be attained by pursuing “three jewels” (Rathna thraya) viz., Right Faith (Samyak Darshana), Right Knowledge (Samyak gnana) and Right Conduct (Samyak Charitra), the absence of which, on the part of the Trustees of both the plaintiff-Trust and defendant-Trust, has, perhaps, led to the present litigation. Man is expected to achieve Salvation or freedom from the cycle of birth and death, by adopting 5 abstinences or vows namely ahimsa, satya, asteya, aparigraha and brahmacharya. 25. Thus, Jainism appears to have a different outlook and philosophy than Hinduism. Therefore, I am not able to come to a conclusion at the interlocutory stage as to whether the consecrated images or idols of the “Thirthankaras”, have the same status as idols in Hindu temples, which are juridical persons capable of holding property. Hindu Law recognizes a Hindu idol as a juridical subject being capable in law of holding property by reason of the Hindu Shastras following the status of a legal person in the same way as that of a natural person. The Privy Council in the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) 521A 245 observed: “One of the questions emerging at this point, is as to the nature of such an idol, and the services due thereto. A Hindu idol is, according to long-established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of law, a juristic entity. It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in Jaw its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir.” 26. It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in Jaw its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir.” 26. In Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows: “The Shastras do provide as to how to consecrate and the usual ceremonies of Sankalpa and Utsarga shall have to be performed for proper and effective dedication of the property to a deity and in order to be termed as a juristic person. In the conception of Debutter, two essential ideas are required to be performed: in the first place the property which is dedicated to the deity vests in an ideal sense in the deity itself as a juristic person and in the second place, the personality of the idol being linked up with the natural personality of the shebait, being the manager or being the Dharamkarla and who is entrusted with the custody of the idol and who is responsible otherwise for preservation of the property of the idol.” 27. Therefore, it is clear that every image or statue may not be placed and treated on the same pedestal as an idol in a temple, even if such an image or statue is shown the highest regard and reverence. Even the statues of the greatest leaders of the world, howsoever reverential they are, may not become juridical persons, as idols in a temple would be. The idols have a special place, as they are deemed to be infused with life by the performance of certain ceremonies and rituals and people come to believe in the deity’s religious efficacy, after the performance of those ceremonies. In such circumstances, the question as to whether the idols of Thirthankaras in a Jain temple can be equated to the deities in Hindu temples, especially when Jainism differs conceptually about God, Self, Karma and Liberation, has to be tested only at the time of trial, alter a more elaborate consideration. 28. In such circumstances, the question as to whether the idols of Thirthankaras in a Jain temple can be equated to the deities in Hindu temples, especially when Jainism differs conceptually about God, Self, Karma and Liberation, has to be tested only at the time of trial, alter a more elaborate consideration. 28. Unfortunately, none of the documents tiled by the plaintiff-Trust and the defendant-Trust throw any light upon the manner in which the property at No.370, Konnur High Road, Ayanavaram, Chennai-23 was dedicated and the person to whom it was dedicated. It is the property on which Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Swethamber Temple is situate. There is no document by which the property was dedicated. If such a document is in existence, there would have been no difficulty in finding outline person on whom the property vested and how the dedication was made. 29. The plaintiff-Trust has filed the Deed of Declaration of the plaintiff-Trust dated 18. 1987 as plaint document No.1 in C.S.No.440 of 2007. In the preamble portion of the Deed of Declaration of Trust, it is stated that Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Swethamber Mandir was constructed in 1925 and that Swethamber Murti Poojak Marwari Jains at Madras are having two temples by name “Shree Chandra prabhu Maharaj Juna Jain Mandir” and “Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Swethamber Mandir” and a Trust by name “Shree Sadharan Bhawan Trust. It is further stated in the preamble that the temples and Sadharan Bhawan have been in existence for a long time and the same were being managed by a Trustees. But it is not stated in the Deed of Trust as to who dedicated the property, when it was dedicated and to whom it was dedicated. Clause 3(b) of the Deed of Declaration of Trust shows that one of the objects of the plaintiff-Trust is to administer and manage the affairs of Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Temple, Clause 3(g) of the Deed of Declaration of Trust reads as follows- “To work of the construction of new Jain Temple, protection of existing Jain Temples and renovation of old Jain Temples as and when necessary according to the Tenets of Jain Religion.” Clause 3(h) of the Deed of Trust enables the Trustees to arrange for installation, maintenance and worship of Jain idols as per Jain rites, rituals, principles sashtras and prevailing customs and practices. Clause 3(j) enables the Trustees to give and contribute donations to other Jain Temples for purchase of land, construction and/or renovation, repairs or maintenance of Jain Temples. Clause 4(c) of the Deed of Declaration of Trust empowers the Trustees to purchase, acquire, exchange take on lease or invest in mortgage and sell land and immovable properties and to construct buildings, repairs, renovate and develop any immovable property. 30. It is relevant to note that the Deed of Declaration of the plaintiff-Trust was signed by six persons by name (1) Jeevanchand Samdaria (2) Motichand Daga (3) Shantimull Naher (4) Ratanchand Savansukha and (5) Motichand Guleche and (6) Himmatmal Mardia. The preamble to the Deed of Trust at page No.3 states that the temples and Sadharan Bhawan have been in existence for a long time and the same were being managed by a group of five Trustees. The five Trustees, who were already in management of both the temples and Sadharan Bhavan were (1) A. Manekchand Bethaia (2) Motichand Daga (3) Jeevanchand Samdaria (4) Ratanchand Savansukha and (5) Mohanchand Dadha. Out of these 5 Trustees who were earlier in management of the temple, three Trustees became signatories to the Deed of Trust of plaintiff-Trust. 31. The defendant-Trust has filed its Deed of Declaration of Trust dated 30.12.1983 as defendant’s document No.2. The said Deed of Trust was executed by seven persons by name (1) Motichand Daga, (2) Mohanchand Dadha (3) Manekchand Bethaia (4) C. Ratanchand Savansukha (5) Jeewanchand Samdaria (6) kesarichand Sethia and (7) Moolchand Gulache out of whom three persons were also signatories to the Deed of Trust of the plaintiff-Trust. In the preamble to the said Deed of Trust, it is stated that a Dada Badi Trust was established in 1838 at Ayanavaram on a vast campus of about 100 grounds. Clause 3 of the Deed of Trust containing the objects of the Trust includes under sub clause (d), the object of taking over the administration and management of any other Swethamber Jain Temples etc. 32. As stated above, on a comparison of the plaintiffs Deed of Trust executed on 18. 1987 and the defendant’s Deed of Trust executed on 30.12.1988 it is seen that three out of seven Founder Trustees of the defendant-Trust were also the Founder Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust. 32. As stated above, on a comparison of the plaintiffs Deed of Trust executed on 18. 1987 and the defendant’s Deed of Trust executed on 30.12.1988 it is seen that three out of seven Founder Trustees of the defendant-Trust were also the Founder Trustees of the plaintiff-Trust. The defendant’s Deed of Trust records the existence of the defendant-Trust from 1838 on a vast campus of about 100 grounds in Ayanavaram. Admittedly, shree sumathinath Bhagwan Jain Swethamber Temple was constructed only in 1925. Therefore, it appears that the dedication of the land over which the temple stands, took place much earlier than the construction of the temple in question. There is no indication in the Trust Deeds of both the Trusts as to whether the property was dedicated to the idol of Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan after the construction of the temple in 1925. As per the contents of the defendant’s Deed of Trust, the defendant-Trust, as a Public Religious Institution, was in existence even before the construction of the temple in question. But as per the plaintiffs Deed of Trust, to which the defendant’s Trustees were signatories, even the power to construct and renovate temples had been conferred upon the plaintiff-Trust. For a fairly long time, both Trusts appear to have had nearly 50% of the Trustees, in common. Therefore, it appears prima facie that the power to renovate temples has been conceded by the defendant-Trust to the plaintiff-Trust, with eyes wide open when both Trusts had common Trustees. 33. Even it the defendant-Trust’s contention that the property did not vest in the idol but it is owned by the defendant is accepted, the defendant has conceded the power to renovate temples, to the plaintiff-Trust. The Deed of Declaration of the defendant-Trust is dated 30.12.1983. The plaintiffs Deed of Trust is dated 13.08.1983. The plaintiffs Deed of Trust is dated 18. 1987. Three out of 7 Trustees of defendant-Trust were signatories to the Deed of Declaration of plaintiff-Trust. Therefore, they are deemed to have conceded the power of renovation of temples, to the plaintiff-Trust. Hence they cannot now go back on the commitment and I find a prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiff-Trust. 34. 1987. Three out of 7 Trustees of defendant-Trust were signatories to the Deed of Declaration of plaintiff-Trust. Therefore, they are deemed to have conceded the power of renovation of temples, to the plaintiff-Trust. Hence they cannot now go back on the commitment and I find a prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiff-Trust. 34. But unfortunately, I am not able to grant an order in favour of the plaintiff-Trust for the simple reason that their house is not in order, Seven trustees of the plaintiff have taken sides with the defendant. Therefore, any attempt on the part of the plaintiff to complete the construction may be scuttled by these persons, leading eventually to a stalemate. 35. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered view that the construction of the temple at an early date is more important than recognizing the right of the plaintiff and granting a relief in their favour. In the given situation, I consider that a Committee of five persons could be appointed for the construction of the temple, under the Chairmanship of an independent person of good reputation in society, professing Jainism with two members from the plaintiff-Trust and two members from the defendant-Trust. 36. In view of the above, all the application are disposed of with the following directions: (i) A five member committee is hereby appointed as the “Temple Renovation Committee”, for the purpose of construction of “Shree Sumathinath Bhagwan Temple” in the property in question. (ii) The Committee shall consist of the following persons: 1. Mr. Naresh Kumar, J., Advocate, 90, Santhome High Road, Chennai-28. 2. The President of the plaintiff-Trust 3. The Secretary of the plaintiff-Trust 4. The Managing Trustee of the defendant-Trust 5. A Trustee of the defendant-Trust nominated by the Board of Trustees. (iii) The Committee shall formulate its own procedure for convening meetings and taking decisions. However all decisions shall be by a simple majority of persons present and voting. The Chairman of the Committee shall have a casting vote, if the members present and voting are equally divided. Three members shall form the quorum for the meeting. (iii) The Committee shall formulate its own procedure for convening meetings and taking decisions. However all decisions shall be by a simple majority of persons present and voting. The Chairman of the Committee shall have a casting vote, if the members present and voting are equally divided. Three members shall form the quorum for the meeting. (iv) The Committee is vested with the power to apply for building plan approval, to engage architects and contractors, to buy materials of construction, to engage the services of men and machinery, to sanction payments and approve all expenditure and do whatever is necessary to complete the construction of the temple and also its consecration according to Jain Shastras. (v) All donations for the construction of the temple and all funds allocated for the purpose, be collected only in the name of the plaintiff-Trust. Periodically, the plaintiff-Trust shall make all payments which are sanctioned or approved or authorized by the Committee. The plaintiff-Trust shall also place before the Committee, periodically, the statement of all receipts (in the form of donations) and expenditure for the scrutiny of the Committee. (vi) After the completion of the construction and the consecration of the temple, the Committee shall hand over the management and administration of the temple to the plaintiff-Trust, as there is no dispute about their right to do so. (vii) The Committees shall maintain a complete record of all the meetings held and the minutes and resolutions passed at the meeting. If the Committee deems it necessary, the Committee will be free to engage the services of others, either on voluntary basis or on payment of honorarium, to assist the Committee in performing its functions effectively and for carrying out the directions of the Committee. (viii) The plaintiff as well as the defendant-Trust shall render all assistance and cooperation to the Committee, to enable the Committee to carryout the task assigned hereunder, keeping in mind the tact that the rights of thousands of devotees who await the completion of construction of the temple, for offering worship, are far greater than the rights of the Trustees. 37. The applications are disposed of accordingly. No costs.