Honble SHARMA, J.—Both the criminal appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan arise out of the same set of facts and evidence, hence they are being decided by this common Judgment. (2). The State of Rajasthan has preferred these two appeals against the judgments of acquittal dated 30.5.1998 passed by learned Special Judge, Essential Commodities Act Cases, Jhunjhunu in criminal (Sessions) Case No. 3/1996 and 5/1996. Facts of Case of Appeal No. 1127/02: (3). On 19.2.1996 Mr. Shyam Sunder Sharma, District Supply Officer, Jhunjhunu along-with other officials went to enquire about supply of illegal kerosene oil to plant of M/s. Pahal Granite Industries, Chirawa situated at Industrial Region. After reaching there, these persons saw that two drums were lying there in which 420 ltr kerosene oil was there, which was of supply of general public. When he enquired about the owner of the firm, then one worker of the firm namely; Jai Kumar told that the owner of the factory is Virendra and he has gone to Delhi. When he asked the name of person who was working on Granite, then he stated his name as Jai Kumar. The aforesaid kerosene oil was seized and thereafter, necessary formalities were completed. Facts of Case of Appeal No. 583/2001: (4). On 19.2.1996, upon receiving information Mr. Shyam Sunder Sharma, District Supply Officer, Jhunjhunu, along-with other officials went to check M/s. Vikas Granite Chirawa Marble plot situated in Industrial Area. After reaching there, these persons found 2-3 persons doing police and they found 4 drums at the plot. After seeing they found that one drum was filled up and remaining drums were vacant. When these persons enquired about the name of owner of firm, then one person told his name as Mansa Ram and he is resident of Haryana State. These persons asked the names of persons who were working on the factory then these persons stated their names as Shambhu Singh, Sohan Singh and Shambhu Singh and these persons showed the drum by opening it, which was filled up from kerosene oil and for enquiring about the same, in three bottles kerosene oil was taken for sample and the aforesaid kerosene oil was of blue color. When these persons stated to show the bill of purchase of kerosene oil then these persons failed to produce the bills. Thereafter, they completed all the necessary formalities. (5).
When these persons stated to show the bill of purchase of kerosene oil then these persons failed to produce the bills. Thereafter, they completed all the necessary formalities. (5). After registering the complaint accused respondents were summoned. In substance the charge was read over to the accused respondents. (6). During trial the prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 4 witnesses and certain documents were got exhibited. (7). Thereafter the statements of the accused-respondents under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded. (8). After conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 30.5.1998 acquitted the accused-respondents by giving them benefit of doubt. (9). Aggrieved with the impugned judgments dated 30.5.1998 of acquittal passed by learned trial Court, the State of Rajasthan has preferred the instant appeals. (10). In this appeal it has been submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the learned trial Court has not gone through the statements of the prosecution witnesses properly. He submits that the learned trial Court has wrongly acquitted the accused respondents by giving them benefit of doubt. He submits that the learned trial Court has committed serious error in disbelieving the statements of PW.1 Sri Ram Verma, PW.2 Sohan Singh, PW. 3 Shyam Sunder Sharma and PW. 4 Jile Singh. He further submits that the learned trial Court has erred only by stating that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused respondents have legally purchased the kerosene oil. He further submits that the l trial Court has committed serious error by giving benefit of doubt to the accused respondents, though the prosecution tried to prove its case beyond any doubt. Thus, the impugned judgments of acquittal dated 30.5.1998 are erroneous one and should be quashed and set aside. (11). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the accused- respondents has submitted that the impugned judgments passed by the learned trial Court are based on the correct appreciation of evidence and after giving cogent reasons, the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused respondents by giving them benefit of doubt. He submits that the prosecution witnesses have made improvements and contradictions in their statements. He submits that the prosecution has failed to prove this fact that blue kerosene oil was illegally purchased by the accused respondents.
He submits that the prosecution witnesses have made improvements and contradictions in their statements. He submits that the prosecution has failed to prove this fact that blue kerosene oil was illegally purchased by the accused respondents. He submits that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove this fact that the said kerosene oil was illegally purchased and the accused respondents were not authorized to keep the kerosene oil in their possession but the prosecution has failed to prove the same as is clear in para 7 of the impugned Judgments. Thus, no interference is required to be called for in the impugned Judgments of acquittal dated 30.5.1998 passed by learned trial Court. (12). I have heard learned Public Prosecutor as well as the learned counsel for the accused-respondents and also gone through the record of the case. (13). Having gone through the impugned judgments 30.5.1998 passed by the learned trial Court, I find that the learned trial Court has given cogent reasons for not finding the case of the prosecution proved against accused respondents. The Court attention was drawn on the following judgment of the Honble Supreme Court:- Umrao vs. State of Harayana & Ors. SC 2006 Vol. 10 Page 136 in which the Lordships of the Supreme Court has observed in para 26 that "it is now well settled that if two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court below." (14). Looking to the evidence just discussed above, it can easily be said that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the accused respondents for the offence for which they have been convicted and the learned trial Court was right in acquitting the accused respondents by giving them benefit of doubt. I have no reason to dissent from the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court as the same appears to be reasonable and plausible in the facts and circumstances of the case. (15).
I have no reason to dissent from the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court as the same appears to be reasonable and plausible in the facts and circumstances of the case. (15). It may be stated that in appeal against acquittal though powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and to reach its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet as a rule of prudence, it should always give proper weightage and consideration to the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and thus, High Court should not ordinarily disturb the order of acquittal. Therefore, this Court does not want to interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court and this appeal is liable to be dismissed. (16). Accordingly, both the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan fail and the same are hereby dismissed, after confirming the judgments of acquittal dated 30.5.1998 passed by learned Special Judge, Essential Commodities Act Cases, Jhunjhunu in criminal (Sessions) Case No. 3/1996 and 5/1996.