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2008 DIGILAW 1456 (MP)

R. B. SHARMA v. STATE OF M. P.

2008-12-19

K.S.CHAUHAN, RAKESH SAKSENA

body2008
JUDGMENT : K. S. CHAUHAN J. 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment, finding and sentence dated 11-4-1997 passed by Special Judge, C.B.I., Jabalpur in Special Case No. 03/82, whereby the appellant has been convicted under section 161 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to R.I. for 6 months with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and also convicted under section 5(1)(d)/5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced to R.I. for 1 year with fine of Rs. 1,500/- in default of payment of total fine of Rs. 2500/- to further undergo R.I. for 3 months. Both the sentences were directed to run consecutively. 2. The prosecution case in short is that complainant Chhotelal (hereinafter for short 'the complainant') was employed on the post of Cabin Man in Central Railway, Karakbel, District Narsinghpur. Appellant R. B. Sharma was Sub Inspector Police in R.P.F., Jabalpur. On 14-9-1981 Tulsiram the son of complainant was arrested by appellant in a theft case. On the same day the complainant inquired about his son. At that time appellant said to him that if he gives Rs. 100/- as bribe then he will weak the case of his son thereby his son will be acquitted but the complainant does not intend to give bribe money instead he wanted to trap him red handed, therefore, he submitted a complaint (Ex.P-13) on 15-9-1981 in the office of S.P., C.B.I. Jabalpur who marked it to Manmohan Yadav (PW-6) Inspector of C.B.I, for necessary action. He verified from complainant and after being satisfied he recorded F.I.R. (Ex.P-14)., The Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Jabalpur ordered to summon G. L. Bhasin (PW-3) and R. S. Thakur (PW-5) as trap witnesses. They came there and introduced to complainant. The complaint (Ex.P-13) was given to them. They read the same and verified about its correctness. The complainant was asked to produce the currency notes to be given in bribe, therefore, he produced 5 notes of 20 denomination each. The details of which were mentioned in preliminary panchnama (Ex.P-7). The procedure of phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate test was applied in the office. The solution turned pink which was kept in a bottle. The phenolphthalein powder was applied in the currency notes and kept in the pocket of complainant. The details of which were mentioned in preliminary panchnama (Ex.P-7). The procedure of phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate test was applied in the office. The solution turned pink which was kept in a bottle. The phenolphthalein powder was applied in the currency notes and kept in the pocket of complainant. It was specified to the complainant that he should not come in contact with the treated currency notes till demand of bribe is made by the appellant. He was also directed that as soon as the transaction of giving and taking of bribe is complete he should give the signal by keeping the hand at his head, The trap witnesses were also directed to remain present nearby to the complainant and to overhear the conversation between complainant and appellant and also to see the transaction of giving and taking of bribe. The hands of members of trap party were washed. The preliminary panchnama (Ex.P-7) showing the entire proceedings done was prepared. On the same day at 3:00 p.m. the members of trap party reached at Railway Station, Jabalpur. The complainant was sent to meet with appellant R. B. Sharma. He returned therefrom and stated that appellant has gone to D.R.M. office. Thereafter the trap party also reached there. The appellant was found standing at the door of that office. The complainant met with him and talked. Appellant told him to meet at Malgodam, therefore, the members of the trap party reached there. At about 7:00 p.m. appellant R. B. Sharma and acquitted co-accused Phool Singh came there. The complainant accompanied them. The appellant asked him whether he has brought Rs. 100/-. The complainant replied positively. Thereafter the appellant asked him to provide the same to Phool Singh. He also directed Phool Singh to hand over the same to him later on. Appellant told complainant not to worry he would weak his case and thereafter he proceeded further. The complainant gave currency notes to Phool Singh who took it in his right hand. The complainant gave prearranged signal to the members of the trap party who rushed there. They caught hold the hands of Phool Singh. At that time he was having money in his right hand. His right hand was subjected to sodium carbonate powder test which was found to be positive because the colour of sodium carbonate turned to pink. The complainant gave prearranged signal to the members of the trap party who rushed there. They caught hold the hands of Phool Singh. At that time he was having money in his right hand. His right hand was subjected to sodium carbonate powder test which was found to be positive because the colour of sodium carbonate turned to pink. Hand wash of the Phool Singh was collected in a separate sealed bottle. Currency notes which were seized from Phool Singh were tallied and found correct. They were kept in a sealed envelope. Post trap panchnama (Ex.P-8) was prepared. Thereafter the appellant was caught and searched vide Ex.P-9. The statements, of the witnesses were recorded. The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to F.S.L., Delhi from where the report Ex.P-15 was received. Some other documents were also collected. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution the charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Special Judge, Jabalpur. 3. The accused persons were charged under section 120-B read with section 161 of Indian Penal Code and 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. They denied the guilt and claimed to be tried mainly contending that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. The appellant specifically stated that he has never demanded nor accepted any bribe from complainant Chhotelal. The complainant has not been examined, therefore, no offence is proved against him. Prosecution as well as accused persons each examined 7 witnesses. After appreciating the evidence trial Court acquitted Phool Singh from all the charges levelled against him whereas this appellant was found guilty for the offences charged against him and sentenced thereto as stated hereinabove in para No. 1 of this judgment. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, finding and sentenced the instant appeal has been preferred on the grounds mentioned in the memo of appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. There is no evidence regarding acceptance of bribe by appellant. No money has been recovered from the possession of the appellant. The complainant has not been examined. The independent witnesses have not supported the case of prosecution. It has not been proved as to how appellant was in position to help the complainant in the theft case of his son when the charge-sheet was already filed in the competent court. No money has been recovered from the possession of the appellant. The complainant has not been examined. The independent witnesses have not supported the case of prosecution. It has not been proved as to how appellant was in position to help the complainant in the theft case of his son when the charge-sheet was already filed in the competent court. The complaint was filed with the vexatious and malicious intention by the complainant as his son was arrested. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no valid sanction for launching the prosecution against the appellant. The finding of guilt is erroneous which deserves to be set aside and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 5. On the contrary, Shri Jayant Neekhra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent/C.B.I. supported the impugned judgment, finding and sentence mainly contending, that prosecution has proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. He has been rightly convicted and sentenced, therefore, it does not call for any interference. 6. The main point for consideration in this appeal is that whether the trial Court has committed any illegality in convicting and sentencing the appellant under section 161 of Indian Penal Code and 5(1)(d)/5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947? 7. An offence relating to theft of coal was registered against the son of complainant Chhotelal. According to prosecution appellant demanded Rs. 100/- to weaken his case but instead of giving bribe he filed the complaint (Ex.P-13) in the office of S.P., C.B.I. Jabalpur. Since complainant has expired during trial, therefore, his evidence is not available to the prosecution. However, other witnesses have adduced the evidence in this behalf. 8. Manmohan Yadav (PW-6) has stated that on 15-9-1981 he was called by S.P., C.B.I., Jabalpur and directed to take necessary action with regard to the complaint submitted by complainant. This witness interrogated to complainant and after being satisfied recorded F.I.R. (Ex. P-14). Two witnesses namely G. L. Bhasin (PW-3) and R. S. Thakur (PW-5) were called as trap witnesses. The complaint was read over to these witnesses and asked them to inquire from complainant. They inquired the same and thereafter complainant was directed to produce the currency notes of Rs. 100/- to be given in bribe to the appellant. He produced 5 currency notes of 20 denomination each. The numbers of these currency notes were taken down and they were treated by phenolphthalein powder. They inquired the same and thereafter complainant was directed to produce the currency notes of Rs. 100/- to be given in bribe to the appellant. He produced 5 currency notes of 20 denomination each. The numbers of these currency notes were taken down and they were treated by phenolphthalein powder. The hands of complainant were subjected to phenolphthalein powder test and on dipping the fingers of his hands, the colour of the solution turned to pink. The tainted hand wash of complainant was collected in separate sealed bottle. The tainted solution of sodium carbonate was also sealed. The treated currency notes were kept in the pocket of complainant and he was directed not to touch these treated currency notes till demand is made by the accused. It was also specified that he will give signal by keeping his hands over his head after giving and taking of the bribe. Panch witnesses were directed to hear the conversation in between the complainant and appellant. Thereafter Panchnama (Ex.P-7) was prepared. Manmohan Yadav (PW-6), and the trap witnesses G. S. Bhasin (PW-3) and R. S. Thakur (PW-5) have given evidence regarding the preparation of Panchnama (Ex.P-7). Rajkumar Shukla (PW-7) C.B.I. Inspector who was deputed to assist Manmohan Yadav (PW-6) has also given the evidence in this regard. 9. Thus, by this evidence prosecution has tried to establish that the complainant submitted complaint (Ex.P-13) on the basis of which F.I.R. (Ex.P-14) was recorded and the demonstration of phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate test was done at the office. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no substantive evidence regarding the demand of bribe by appellant in absence of the evidence of complainant Chhotelal. Learned counsel has placed the reliance on the following decisions: (i) Hasib vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 283 (ii) Sankaralinga Tevan vs. Emperor, AIR 1930 Madras 632 (iii) Kishan Chand Mangal vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1982 SC 1511 In Hasib (supra) it has been held that the report does not constitute substantive evidence though it is important as conveying the earliest information about the occurrence. It can be used only as a previous statement of the purpose contemplated under section 157 or section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is for corroborating or contradicting its maker and not of other witnesses. It can be used only as a previous statement of the purpose contemplated under section 157 or section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is for corroborating or contradicting its maker and not of other witnesses. In Sankaralinga (supra) it has been held that statements in first information report can be used for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting a witness but are inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the facts alleged therein are correct. In Kisan Chand (supra) it has been held that complainant Rajendra Dutt on whose complaint a trap was arranged was dead by the time the case came up for trial and his evidence was not available to the prosecution. However, the complaint Ex.P-12 filed by him was admitted in evidence because PW-7 Mahavir Prasad, the Dy.S.P. who recorded the same gave evidence about the same. The averments in the complaint even in the background of these facts would not provide substantive evidence and the only use to which it can be put is that a complaint of this nature was filed which tends to explain the subsequent actions taken by the Dy.S.P. 11. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid pronouncements it is apparent that F.I.R. can only be used for the contradiction or corroboration purposes of its maker and for no other purpose. 12. Since the evidence of complainant is wanting in this case, therefore, it cannot be used as a substantive evidence in favour of the prosecution. Under these circumstances, the initial demand of bribe is not proved from the evidence of the other witnesses. However, the second demand may be proved by the evidence of other witnesses who were present at the time of transaction of bribe money, therefore, the evidence in this regard requires to be scanned carefully. 13. It is borne out from the prosecution evidence that at about 3.00 p.m. the trap party proceeded to the Railway Station, Jabalpur. The complainant was sent to see appellant at the R.P.F. Post. He went there and returned back and told that appellant is not at the R.P.F. Post. He has gone to D.R.M. Office, Jabalpur, therefore, raiding party proceeded towards D.R.M. Office. They reached there and saw that appellant was standing at the door of D.R.M. Office. The complainant went there and talked with him. He went there and returned back and told that appellant is not at the R.P.F. Post. He has gone to D.R.M. Office, Jabalpur, therefore, raiding party proceeded towards D.R.M. Office. They reached there and saw that appellant was standing at the door of D.R.M. Office. The complainant went there and talked with him. Neither Manmohan Yadav (PW-6) nor G. L. Bhasin (PW-3) and R. S. Thakur (P\V-5) could listen the conversation in between the appellant and complainant. However, another Police Inspector Rajkumar Shukla (PW-7) has stated that he heard the talk. Appellant asked complainant whether he has brought the money to which he replied positively. This statement of Rajkumar Shukla (PW-7) is an exaggeration because if such conversation might have taken place in between the appellant and complainant at the door of D.R.M. Office then there was no reason that other C.B.I. Inspector (PW-6) and the trap witnesses would not have heard the same when they were also present there. If for the sake of argument the evidence of Rajkurnar Shukla (PW-7) is accepted then it emerged out that the appellant came to know that the complainant has brought the bribe money. He might have taken then and there, what was the hitch in taking the money at that time. It goes to show that he was trying to avoid the taking of money otherwise there was no reason to postpone it and direct him to come again. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant in this regard has placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) Sadashiv Mahadeo Yavaluje and Gajanan Shripatrao Salokhe vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 287 (ii) Shantilal Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1976 SC 739 . In Sadashiv Mahadeo (supra) the Supreme Court has held thus: "10. The learned Courts below so far as accused No. 1 is concerned have drawn an inference from the subsequent conduct of the accused after the trap was laid. Apparently such an inference could not be drawn because if the accused was really involved in the matter after the trap was laid and money was recovered from accused No. 2 it will be nothing but failure of the trap against accused No. 1. To take the application or the statement made by the complainant afterwards may be nothing but curiosity and the inference drawn could not be justified. To take the application or the statement made by the complainant afterwards may be nothing but curiosity and the inference drawn could not be justified. Admittedly there is no evidence at all against accused No. 1 except the story given out by complainant Pandurang on 29-11-1975. The evidence about the incident of 2-12-1975 only indicates that this accused avoided the complainant whenever he approached him. On this evidence the conviction of the appellant could not be sustained as this does not establish, any of the ingredients of the offence. 11. As regards accused No. 2 merely because he was entrusted with some money to be passed on, to accused No. 1 it could not be held that he was guilty of any one of these offences unless it is established that he was a party to the arrangement and the arrangement arrived at was that the money would be handed over to accused No. 2 to be given over to accused No. 1, Apparently accused No. 2 was not expected to help the complainant. The assurance to the complainant to settle the matter, according to the prosecution was given by accused No. 1 and according to the prosecution's own case and the evidence of complainant Pandurang this arrangement was finally settled on 29-11-1975 at the house of accused No. 1. Admittedly accused No. 2 was not there nor it is alleged that he had any knowledge about this settlement. The incident of 29-11-1975 is said to be between accused No. 1 and Pandurang alone and the only evidence is that of Pandurang. Under these circumstances it could not be held that accused No. 2 accepted this amount for any purpose. At best as the complainant told him to pass this money on to accused No. 1 he accepted it but on that basis it could not be held that he was sharing the intention with accused No. 1 or was acting on his behalf. 12. Under these circumstances the evidence as it stands does not establish the offences even against accused No. 2 beyond reasonable doubt. In the light of the discussions above therefore the conclusions reached by both the Courts below could not be sustained. The appeals are therefore allowed. The conviction and sentence passed against both the appellants are set aside. They are on bail. Their bail bonds are directed to be discharged. In the light of the discussions above therefore the conclusions reached by both the Courts below could not be sustained. The appeals are therefore allowed. The conviction and sentence passed against both the appellants are set aside. They are on bail. Their bail bonds are directed to be discharged. In the event of fine having been already paid, it shall be refunded." In Shantilal (supra) the Supreme Court has held thus:- "4. Now, there are some very salient features of this case which stand out prominently and cannot escape notice. They throw considerable light on the veracity of the prosecution case and cause grave doubt whether the appellant had anything at all to do with the demand of Rs. 10/- by way of bribe by Ram Narain. In the first place, it is significant to note that on both the days on which the demand for bribe was made by Ram Narain, namely 29th and 30th March, 1967, there was no direct talk between the appellant on the one hand and Dhanna Lal or Ram Nath on the other. Neither Dhanna Lal nor Ram Nath met the appellant, nor did the appellant make any demand for bribe from either of them. Even when Dhanna Lal submitted his application for certified copy of the appellant, no demand, not even a suggestion -for a bribe was made to him by the appellant. It was only Ram Narain, who represented to Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath that a sum of Rs. 10/- would have to be paid to the clerk in-charge of the preparation of certified copy, that is the appellant, if Dhanna Lal wanted certified copy early, or else he would have to wait for ten to fifteen days. Ram Narain, according to the evidence of Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath, did go inside the room apparently for the purpose of discussing with the appellant the question of the amount of the bribe and appeared to convey to Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath that it was the appellant who was demanding the amount of the bribe, but it is quite possible that Ram Narain merely made a pretence and did not have any discussion with the appellant and the appellant did not have the ghost of an idea that Ram Narain was trying to extract some money from Dhanna Lal in his name. It would be extremely unsafe to rely on what Ram Narain supposedly said to Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath in regard to the demand for bribe alleged to have been made by the appellant. If would indeed be hazardous to impute to the appellant complicity in the demand for bribe merely on the basis of statements supposed to have been made by Ram Narain who was, even on taking a most charitable view of the matter, an accomplice. It may also be noted that though Dhanna Lal stated is his examination-in-chief that he gave the application for certified copy to the appellant, he went back upon his statement in his cross-examination and confessed that he did not know the name of the clerk to whom he had given the application. Dhanna Lal added that the clerk to whom the application was given by him stated that the certified copy would be issued in seven days. That was quite a natural statement on the part of the clerk to make since the copying fee paid by Dhanna Lal was only Re. 1/- which was the fee for an ordinary certified copy and the normal time within which an ordinary certified copy would be issued is seven days. It is true that Dhanna Lal maintained in his evidence that he had affixed Court fee stamp of Rs. 2/- for urgent certified copy but that is belied by the certified copy of the entry in the Land Record Ex. P-4. where the copying fee shown to have been paid by the appellant is mentioned as Re. 1/- Perhaps Dhanna Lal came forward with the story of having paid copying fee for urgent certified copy in order to account for his going to the Land Record Office on the next day. If he had paid copying fee only for an ordinary certified copy, it is difficult to understand how he could have expected to receive the certified copy of the next day and gone to the Land Record Office for that purpose. 5. Secondly, the evidence given by Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath in regard to the demand for bribe made by Ram Narain is in conflict with the report made by Dhanna Lal to the Deputy Superintendent of Police for the purpose of entrapping the appellant and Ram Narain. 5. Secondly, the evidence given by Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath in regard to the demand for bribe made by Ram Narain is in conflict with the report made by Dhanna Lal to the Deputy Superintendent of Police for the purpose of entrapping the appellant and Ram Narain. The case, as unfolded in the evidence of Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath, was that the demand for bribe was made by Ram Narain on 29th and 30th March, 1967 and the amount of bribe was settled at Rs. 10/- on 30th March, 1967, while according to the report made by Dhanna Lal to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the talk about the bribe took place for the first time between Ram Narain and Dhanna Lal on 31st March, 1967 when he went to take the certified copy. This cannot be regarded as a trivial or insignificant discrepancy having no relevance to the veracity of the prosecution case, It is a significant departure made by Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath in their evidence and we do not think that their evidence can be regarded as reliable or trustworthy. It leaves an indelible infirmity or the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution so far as the demand for bribe made by Ram Narain is concerned. 6. The only incriminating circumstance on which reliance was placed on behalf of the prosecution for connecting the appellant with the taking of bribe by Ram Narain was that when, on 31st March, 1967, Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath along with the raiding party went to the Land Record Office for the purpose of giving the bribe, the appellant .came out of the room and on being told by Dhanna Lal that he had brought the monies, he asked Dhanna Lal to hand over the monies to Ram Narain and to take the certified copy and then Dhanna Lal went inside the room with the appellant and the appellant gave him the certified copy after obtaining his signature in the register. Now, there can be no doubt that if this part of the prosecution story is accepted, the participation of the appellant in taking of the bribe would be completely established. But we do not think that the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution is sufficient to establish this part of the prosecution version. Now, there can be no doubt that if this part of the prosecution story is accepted, the participation of the appellant in taking of the bribe would be completely established. But we do not think that the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution is sufficient to establish this part of the prosecution version. It is no doubt true that Dhanna Lal, Ram Nath and Pushp Kumar deposed to this incident which is supposed to have taken place in the first floor varandah outside the room of the copying clerks, but the evidence of Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath is that of interested witnesses because they were the persons responsible for laying the trap and so far as Pushp Kumar is concerned, we do not think it safe to act on his sole testimony. More so, when we find that though the Deputy Superintendent of Police was waiting in the compound under the tamarind tree from where he could see what was happening in the first floor varandah, he did not depose to having seen the appellant coming out of the room, talking to Dhanna Lal and then going back inside the room with him. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, of course, attempted to explain this in his cross-examination by saying that Dhanna Lal, Ram Nath, Pushp Kumar and Ram Narain were not visible to him from the place where he was waiting under the tamarind tree, because he was behind the tree, but this explanation runs counter to the first information report made by him immediately after the raid, where he stated that he, together with Head Constable Uma Shankar and other members of his staff, kept standing under the tamarind tree "from where varandah of the Land Record Office is clearly visible". Head Constable Uma Shankar undoubtedly stated that he saw that Ram Narain went inside the office and after a while came out with the appellant and the appellant had some talk with Dhanna Lal and then he went back inside the office and thereafter Dhanna Lal gave two five rupee currency notes to Ram Narain. But it is difficult to appreciate how Head Constable Uma Shankar could see this incident when the Deputy Superintendent of Police could not. But it is difficult to appreciate how Head Constable Uma Shankar could see this incident when the Deputy Superintendent of Police could not. The only explanation which the Deputy Superintendent of Police could offer for this difference in their versions was that he was standing behind the tamarind tree while Head Constable Uma Shankar was in the open compound. This explanation, however, cannot be accepted because in the first information report it was clearly stated by the Deputy Superintendent of Police that he "together with the staff and Head Constable Uma Shankar remained standing under the English Tamarind tree". Moreover, it is inexplicable as to why the Deputy Superintendent of Police should not have sent for the appellant from his room and arrested him or at least made inquiries from him. In fact the members of the raiding party saw the appellant coming out of the room and talking to Dhanna Lal and heard him asking Dhanna Lal and heard him asking Dhanna Lal to hand over the monies to Ram Narain and then found him taking Dhanna Lal inside the room for the purpose of giving him the certified copy. It is also significant to note that-when Ram Narain was arrested, he stated that he had taken the monies at the instance of the appellant, but even so, the Deputy Superintendent of Police did not think it fit to summon the appellant and to enquire from him because, as appearing from the recovery memo Ex. P-5, he believed, that the bribe was taken by Ram Narain, not for the appellant, but "in the name of the record clerk." The entire conduct of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the members of the raiding party was inconsistent with their having seen the appellant participating in the incident and taking the bribe or having anything to do with it. 7. We are, therefore, of the view that the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution is wholly insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant made a demand for bribe through Ram Narain or accepted any bribe from Dhanna Lal for giving early certified copy of the entries in the Land Record. We must, consequently, set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit him of the offences charged against him. The bail bonds executed by the appellant will stand cancelled." 15. We must, consequently, set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit him of the offences charged against him. The bail bonds executed by the appellant will stand cancelled." 15. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid decisions and in the facts and circumstances of this case, it can be said that appellant tried to avoid taking the bribe at the main gate of D.R.M. Office, Jabalpur. 16. Thereafter they proceeded towards the Malgodam. According to prosecution witnesses complainant talked with appellant. They heard the conversation and the currency notes were handed over to Phool Singh from whom the recovery was made. The evidence adduced by prosecution witnesses in this behalf requires to be critically examined. 17. R. S. Thakur (PW-5) has deposed that he did not listen any conversation in between them. Another trap witness G. L. Bhasin (PW-3) heard that appellant asked complainant whether he has brought the money. In cross examination he has stated that appellant said that he will weak the case of his son--but did not tell the way of doing it. There is discrepancy in between the evidence of these two trap witnesses. If G. L. Bhasin (PWr3) could hear such conversation why R. S. Thakur (PW-5) could not do so when he was also present there. Manmohan Yadav (PW-6), C.B.I. Inspector in-charge of trap has stated that the appellant said to complainant that he should not worry he would make his case weak. The other C.B.I. Inspector Rajkumar Shukla (PW-7) has stated that the appellant said the complainant that he will weak the case by changing the statement of the witnesses. So there is discrepancy in between the statements of these witnesses as to what they heard at the same point of time. R. S. Thakur (PW-5) did not listen any conversation, G. L. Bhasin (PW-3) listen the conversation that whether he has brought the money, Manmohan Yadav (PW-6) heard saying that he should not worry he will make the case weak and Rajkumar Shukla (PW-7) heard that he will make the case weak by changing the statement of the witnesses. Whereas originally in the complaint Ex.P/13 it was mentioned that the appellant said that he will make the case weak by changing the statement of accused persons. 18. Whereas originally in the complaint Ex.P/13 it was mentioned that the appellant said that he will make the case weak by changing the statement of accused persons. 18. On the other hand, it is manifestly clear from the evidence of Matloob Ali (DW-5) that challan of the son of complainant has already been filed in the competent court on 14-9-1981 and hence nothing was left in the hands of appellant to weak the case of the son of complainant. Appellant was a Senior Inspector at R.P.F. Post, Jabalpur. He was knowing that he cannot do anything in that case in which the challan has already been filed in the Court. In such situation, it cannot be said that he might have said that he will weak the case or change the statement of witnesses or the accused persons. The fact that challan was produced in the competent Court was also in the knowledge of complainant because he himself had gone to that Court and got his son released on bail on 14-9-1981. He was also the employee of Central Railway Karakbel, District Narsinghpur and was knowing that after filing the charge-sheet nothing was remained with appellant to help him in any manner. It appears that his son was arrested by appellant and produced in the competent Court, therefore, the complainant become annoyed and he was behind him to teach the lesson. Matloob Ali (DW-5) has given the evidence in this regard that after obtaining bail from the Court the complainant said to him that appellant not did well and he will see him. 19. On perusal of the entire prosecution evidence it is evident that there is discrepancy regarding demand of money by appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant in this regard has placed reliance on the following decisions :- (i) State vs. K. Narasimhachary, 2006 Cri.L.J. 518 (ii) State of M. P. vs. J. B. Singh, AIR 2000 SC 3562 (iii) State of H. P. vs. Sukhdev Singh Rana, 2005 Cri.L.J. 1136 (iv) G. D. Mariswamy vs. State of Karnataka, 2004 Cri.L.J. 3584. In K. Narasimhachary (supra) it has been held thus : "21. It is really curious that when PW 1 handed over the application to PW 4 on 2-3-1994, on the same day his statement as also the statement of his grandmother were recorded and all the documents, namely, Exts. In K. Narasimhachary (supra) it has been held thus : "21. It is really curious that when PW 1 handed over the application to PW 4 on 2-3-1994, on the same day his statement as also the statement of his grandmother were recorded and all the documents, namely, Exts. P-2 and P-6 were handed over by him to PW 1 who in turn handed them over to the respondent. It was at this stage the purported demand was said to have been made. Strangely enough he met the respondent in the evening of 3-3-1994, although a demand was said to have been made by the respondent on 2-3-1994 in the office, presumably after office hours and then the amount of gratification was reduced from Rs. 1000 to Rs. 600. PW 1 did not make any complaint to PW 3 on the said date i.e. 3-3-1994 and even on 4-3-1994, although from the conduct of PW 1 and PW 3, it is evident that they were very close to each other, PW 3 apparently intended to help him out of way. The valuation certificate was sent to PW 3 by the respondent on 4-3-1994 which was signed by PW3 on the same day. It was also certified by PW 4. It is wholly unlikely that although his demand was not met, the respondent would forward his certificate to PW 3. The natural conduct of the respondent, if he had in fact demanded any amount by way of gratification, would have been to wait for PW 1 to meet his demand. 22. It is not in dispute that it was PW 4 who was to evaluate the property and it was PW 3 who was to grant the certificate. The respondent was merely a recommending authority. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court has arrived at the following findings : "... The evidence on record in this case discloses that Ext, P-1 was submitted by PW 1 directly to PW 3 and it has moved with almost jet speed. The local verification, recording of statements, furnishing of certified copies of revenue record, etc., had taken place within one day. The file reached PW 3, in all probability on 3-3-1994 and he signed on the next day. PW 3 was very much accessible to PW 1. The local verification, recording of statements, furnishing of certified copies of revenue record, etc., had taken place within one day. The file reached PW 3, in all probability on 3-3-1994 and he signed on the next day. PW 3 was very much accessible to PW 1. If he sensed any delay or if there were any hindrances, he could have brought the same to the notice of PW 3 himself. When PW 3 received Ext. P-l directly from PW 1 without any objection, there should not have been any impediment in handing over Ext. P-8 to PW 1 directly. The accused was neither the issuing authority nor was the outward clerk. He figured somewhere in between. The handing over of Ext. P- 8 by PW 3 to the accused appears to be deliberate and planned. Suggestions to PW 3 that he was suspended for certain irregularities on earlier occasion, he bore grudge, against the accused and wanted to implicate him gains credence in this regard." 25. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that two views are possible and the view of the High Court cannot be said to be wholly improbable; it cannot be said, in view of the discussions made hereinbefore, that the materials brought on record would lead to only one conclusion i.e. the guilt of the accused. The impugned judgment, therefore, is sustained." In J. B. Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held thus :- "4. We have been taken through the evidence of said Badri Prasad (PW-1) and his evidence, by no stretch of imagination, can be held to have established the fact that the accused made any demand from Mithailal. The only statement made by Badri Prasad is that the Sub-Inspector had told him that the accused should pay some money for being released. This statement cannot be held to be a statement to establish that the accused made the demand to Mithailal. So far as the payment is concerned, once Mithailal himself did not support the prosecution case, there is no material also to establish the alleged payment said to have been made by Mithailal to the accused pursuant to the alleged demand. This statement cannot be held to be a statement to establish that the accused made the demand to Mithailal. So far as the payment is concerned, once Mithailal himself did not support the prosecution case, there is no material also to establish the alleged payment said to have been made by Mithailal to the accused pursuant to the alleged demand. Therefore, all the necessary ingredients of the offence under section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as under section 161, Indian Penal Code not having been established, the order of acquittal is wholly justified and cannot be interfered with." In Sukhdev Singh Rana (supra) it has been held that in absence of evidence regarding demand of bribe money by accused conviction is improper. In G. D. Mariswamy (supra) it has been held thus: "29. Analysing the testimony of P.Ws. 1 and 2 being full of inconsistencies, they being not trustworthy and credible cannot be relied upon so as to come to the conclusion that the accused demanded any bribe or accepted it. The testimony of P.Ws. 1 and 2 being unsatisfactory regarding the manner in which the Investigating Officer tried to lay the trap does not inspire confidence. 30. For the above reasons, the case of the prosecution being full of doubts, the benefit of doubt has to be extended in favour of the accused. The reasoning of the learned Special Judge holding that the accused is guilty of the offence charged is not sustainable and the conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside". 20. In the light of the aforesaid pronouncements and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, it is apparent that there is discrepancy in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the demand of bribe by appellant which creates serious doubt on the prosecution case. 21. It is apparent from the record that even at the Malgodam this appellant did not accept the bribe but tried to avoid because he did not stay there even for a moment and proceeded towards R.P.F. Post so again he tried to avoid taking the bribe. 22. On the contrary, the evidence has been adduced on behalf of the appellant that he was present at R.P.F. Post at that time. Matloob Ali (DW-5), Tulsiram (DW-6) and Dineshwar Choube (DW-7) have given the evidence in this regard. 22. On the contrary, the evidence has been adduced on behalf of the appellant that he was present at R.P.F. Post at that time. Matloob Ali (DW-5), Tulsiram (DW-6) and Dineshwar Choube (DW-7) have given the evidence in this regard. From their evidence it transpires that C.B.I. Officers tried to carry appellant from R.P.F. Post forcibly and on the information of Dineshwar Choube (DW-7) another Inspector K. N. Singh came there. Thereafter the C.B.I. Officers carried appellant, took his search and his house was also searched but nothing incriminating was found. 23. On critical appraisal of the evidence of both the sides adduced in this behalf it transpires that if the appellant might have been there at Malgodam and said to Phool Singh to take the money then there was no reason to catch him then and there by the C.B.I. Officers when they saw that the money has been handed over to Phool Singh and who was also caught hold by them why this appellant was not caught there. It is not the prosecution case that the appellant ran away from the spot and at least half an hour took there at Malgodam in conducting the post trap proceedings and recording the statement of Phool Singh and thereafter they went to R.P.F. Post to arrest the appellant. It creates serious doubt regarding the presence of this appellant at Malgodam. 24. There is the prosecution evidence that the tainted currency notes were recovered from co-accused Phool Singh and the case of the prosecution is that co-accused Phool Singh received the money at the instance or direction of this appellant. However, the appellant has denied that no such direction was given to Phool Singh to accept the bribe money. 25. There is no evidence that complainant Chhotelal ever met with these accused persons together before this incident. Perhaps he was not knowing the accused Phool Singh. Though Phool Singh was constable in R.P.F. Post but he was working in the different unit i.e. in Cloths Store and neither he was subordinate to this appellant nor there was any connection in their work as is reflected from the evidence of Dineshwar Choube (DW-7). It goes to show that though they were in the same department but working in the different units, therefore, in absence of dependable evidence conspiracy in between them cannot be established. 26. It goes to show that though they were in the same department but working in the different units, therefore, in absence of dependable evidence conspiracy in between them cannot be established. 26. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance or the decision rendered in the case of T. Shankar Prasad vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 1242 in this regard. But the cited case is quite distinguishable from the present case because in that case the defence was that the amount of commercial tax was due which was received whereas it was found that the tax was not due. On the contrary the complainant was entitled for sum refund, therefore, the defence plea was not accepted and the conviction of accused persons was held proper. But so far as the present case is concerned, the present appellant is totally denying the receiving of any bribe money and has also taken defence that he has not directed Phool Singh to receive such money on his behalf, therefore the cited case is of no help to the respondent. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Phool Singh has stated that he received the money at the instance of this appellant, therefore, it should be accepted. On perusal of evidence it reveals that Phool Singh stated so in the statement recorded under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code which cannot be used in evidence against the co-accused without giving opportunity to cross-examine him by appellant on this point. 28. The law regarding the conviction on the basis of the evidence of accomplice is well settled. In Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra etc. vs. K. S. Dalipsinghji and another etc, AIR 1970 SC 45 it has been held that the combined effect of sections 133 and 114 illustration (b) is that though a conviction based accomplice evidence is legal the court will not accept such evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration must connect the accused with the crime. It may be direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary that the corroboration should confirm all the circumstances of the crime. It is sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars. The corroboration must be from an independent source. Once accomplice cannot corroborate another. 29. The corroboration must connect the accused with the crime. It may be direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary that the corroboration should confirm all the circumstances of the crime. It is sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars. The corroboration must be from an independent source. Once accomplice cannot corroborate another. 29. So far as the present case is concerned, as stated earlier, the evidence of prosecution regarding demand of bribe and accepting the same at the instance of this appellant is discrepant, therefore, on the basis of the statement given by co-accused Phool Singh, it cannot be proved that he took the money at the instance of this appellant. 30. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the trap cases conviction may be based on the testimony of the trap officers. He has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Hazari Lal vs. State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 873 . In this case, it is held that where the evidence of the Police Officer who laid the trap is found entirely trustworthy, there is no need to seek any corroboration. There is no rule of prudence, which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there should be insistency on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case a Court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration, but, equally, in the fact and circumstances of another case the court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such an Officer, It is all a matter of appreciation of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast rule, nor can there be any precedential guidance. 31. The ratio of this case is that the conviction may be based on the testimony of the trap officers if found trustworthy. But, as stated earlier, the evidence of trap officers is discrepant and they are trying to exaggerate their statements. In these circumstances, their evidence cannot be said to be reliable. 32. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the presumption may be drawn against the appellant under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. But, as stated earlier, the evidence of trap officers is discrepant and they are trying to exaggerate their statements. In these circumstances, their evidence cannot be said to be reliable. 32. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the presumption may be drawn against the appellant under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. On the contrary, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that such presumption can only be drawn when the acceptance of bribe is proved. Since in this case neither the demand nor the acceptance of bribe on behalf of this appellant is proved, therefore, no presumption can be drawn against the appellant. Learned counsel has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Jagdish Chandra Makhija vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1990 MPLJ 239 (ii) State of H. P. vs. Sukhdev Singh Rana, 2005 Cri.L.J 1136 33. Thus in the absence of demand and acceptance of bribe money no presumption can be drawn against this appellant. 34. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the sanction of prosecution has not been validly proved by the prosecution. On the contrary learned counsel for the respondent submitted that such sanction has been proved by the evidence of Ramratan (PW-4). 35. On perusal of evidence of Ramratan (PW-4) it reveals that he has given the sanction of prosecution after seeing some documents vide Ex.P-5 but the details of the documents which he perused have not been mentioned in it. Inspector Saxena who produced such documents before him has not been examined by the prosecution. In absence of his evidence, it cannot be said that which of the documents were produced by him before sanctioning authority, 36. Learned counsel for the appellant has produced several authorities to demonstrate that the sanction was not valid. He has placed reliance on the following decisions :- (i) V. Venkatta Subbarao vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police, A.P., AIR 2007 SC 489 (ii) State of Karnataka vs. Ameer Jain, AIR 2008 SC 108 (iii) State of T. N. vs. M. M. Rajendran, 1998 (9) SCC 268 (iv) Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 (v) M. G. Thatte vs. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cri.L.J. 2878 37. No doubt the sanctioning authority should mention regarding the documents whereupon he became satisfied to grant sanction of prosecution. Iqbal Ahmed vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 (v) M. G. Thatte vs. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cri.L.J. 2878 37. No doubt the sanctioning authority should mention regarding the documents whereupon he became satisfied to grant sanction of prosecution. Since we have found that the prosecution evidence on the demand of bribe and acceptance of money by this appellant is discrepant which creates serious doubt on the prosecution case, therefore, there is no need to dwell upon in great detail regarding the validity of sanction or otherwise. 38. The trial Court has acquitted co-accused Phool Singh from the same set of evidence. There is no iota of evidence regarding criminal conspiracy in between them. Therefore, from the same set of evidence the conviction of this appellant is not justified. 39. For the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that prosecution has not established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. It is the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused hence in the facts and circumstances of this case the appellant deserves to be given same benefit. Hence the finding of guilt is erroneous which deserves to be set aside and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 40. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence passed by trial Court under section 161 of Indian Penal Code and section 5(1)(d)/5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 are hereby set aside. Fine amount, if deposited, be refunded to the appellant. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are discharged. He be directed to set at liberty.