JUDGEMENT 1. Challenge in this appeal is to judgment rendered by learned District Judge, Jalna, in an appeal (R.C.A. No. 75/1981), confirming decree rendered by learned Civil Judge (J.D.), in Suit (R.C.S. No. 67/1975). 2. Deceased respondent No. 1 Syed Hussain was original plaintiff. Deceased appellant No. 1 was original defendant No. 1 and appellant No. 2 was original defendant No. 2, in the context of Suit (R.C.S. No. 67/1975). The Suit was for possession of agricultural fields bearing Gat No. 85, 86 and 87 which originally bore field Survey No. 41/2. The Suit was partly decreed to the extent of decree for recession of the contract of sale. The Suit was, however, dismissed to the extent of relief for recovery of possession. The first Appellate Court confirmed dismissal of the Suit for recovery of possession and also decree in respect of recession of the contract. 3. Briefly stated, the plaintiff’s case before the Trial Court was that he is owner of the field which originally bore Survey No. 41/2, admeasuring 7 acres 21 gunthas, situated at village Badnapur, under the then Tahsil Jalna. He agreed to alienate the suit field to deceased defendant No. 1 - Ramprasad for consideration of Rs. 4500/-. The parties entered into an agreement of sale dated 12th July, 1951. He paid Rs. 2000/- by way of earnest amount at the time of said agreement. The rest of the amount was to be paid by deceased defendant No. 1 Ramprasad, at the time of execution of the registered sale-deed. No time was fixed for execution of the sale-deed. Since the remaining amount was not paid within reasonable time, by notice dated 4th August, 1966, the deceased defendant No. 1 - Ramprasad was called upon to pay the balance amount. He did not comply. By another notice dated 06-06-1968, the contract was rescinded and the deceased defendant No. 1 - Ramprasad was called upon to restore possession of the suit field. The latter, however, gave a false reply alleging that he had paid full consideration amount. He also asserted that he was tenant of the suit field. The defendants No. 1 and 2 got divided the suit field amongst themselves into two (2) separate pieces bearing Gat Nos. 86 and 87. The Consolidation Officer has allotted Gat No. 85 to a small fragments of the field, comprising of two (2) gunthas, wherein a well is situated. He also asserted that he was tenant of the suit field. The defendants No. 1 and 2 got divided the suit field amongst themselves into two (2) separate pieces bearing Gat Nos. 86 and 87. The Consolidation Officer has allotted Gat No. 85 to a small fragments of the field, comprising of two (2) gunthas, wherein a well is situated. Consequently, the Suit for recession of contract and recovery of the possession was laid. 4. By their joint written statement (Exh-13), both the defendants resisted the Suit. They admitted previous ownership of the plaintiff. They submitted that the entire consideration amount was paid, but the plaintiff issued false notice regarding receipt of only part payment. They denied that the plaintiff was entitled to rescind the contract of sale. They also denied that in the year 1966, he had issued a demand notice. They contended further that they have acquired ownership of the suit field in as-much-as the transaction is validated as per provisions of Section 98 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "HT & AL Act", for sake of brevity). They relied upon validation certificate issued in their favour. They contended that they were tenants in possession of the field Survey No. 41/2 before they entered into an agreement of sale. They alleged that the validation certificate issued by the Tenancy Tribunal cannot be questioned in the Civil Court. They further asserted that the Suit was barred by limitation. They disputed jurisdiction of the Civil Court to the extent of competency to grant relief of possession. Hence, they urged for dismissal of the Suit alongwith regular as well as compensatory cost of Rs. 1000/-. 5. The parties went to trial over issues struck by learned Civil Judge on basis of such pleadings. They adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of the rival contentions. The learned Civil Judge held that the defendants failed to pay remaining part of consideration inspite of notice served by the plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge further came to conclusion that the contract was rightly rescinded by the plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge also held that the validation certificate issued under section 98-A of the HT & AL Act is of no avail. The learned Civil Judge further came to conclusion that the contract was rightly rescinded by the plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge also held that the validation certificate issued under section 98-A of the HT & AL Act is of no avail. The learned Civil Judge held that the tenancy certificate was issued in name of deceased defendant No. 1 and, therefore, the relief of possession could not be granted. Hence, the Suit was partly decreed to the extent of recession of the contract, but was dismissed to the extent of relief for possession. The first Appellate Court gave concurrent findings and dismissed the appeal, preferred by the original plaintiff Syed Hussain. 6. Mr. Bajaj, learned advocate, would submit that the payment of entire consideration amount is duly proved by the appellants/defendants. He would further submit that the Suit, as framed, was defective in as much as no declaration was sought in respect of inoperativeness of the validation certificate issued under section 98-A. He would submit that the deceased plaintiff did not remain owner due to validation of the transaction, rightly or wrongly, and the Civil Court ought not to have decided legality of the validation certificate. He disputed correctness of the decree for recession of the contract. He would further submit that the defendants were granted ownership certificate under provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act and hence, the plaintiff was no more entitled to claim any relief on basis of previous ownership. He urged, therefore, to set aside the part of the decree relating to recession of contract of sale. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Khader, would submit that the certificate under section 98-A could not have been issued when the transfer is not, admittedly, completed one. He would submit that the Suit for possession ought to have been decreed when the contract came to be rescinded. He submitted that the Cross-Objection filed by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff may be allowed in the interest of justice. 7. The second appeal was admitted on 16-10-1989. While admitting the second appeal, the then Hon’ble Judge considered grounds No. 6, 7 and 11 of the appeal memo as the substantial questions of law. He submitted that the Cross-Objection filed by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff may be allowed in the interest of justice. 7. The second appeal was admitted on 16-10-1989. While admitting the second appeal, the then Hon’ble Judge considered grounds No. 6, 7 and 11 of the appeal memo as the substantial questions of law. Instead of reproducing such grounds, I deem it proper to redraft the substantial questions of law in the following manner : (i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Courts below committed patent error while considering relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and wrongly exercised jurisdiction while giving finding to the effect that the validation certificate issued under section 98-A is of no avail ? (ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below committed patent error by omitting to frame appropriate issues which has resulted into patently erroneous findings ? 8. Before I proceed to consider merits, it may be mentioned that both the Courts rendered concurrent findings of facts, as regards only part payment of agreed amount of consideration. The appellants failed to prove the plea of full payment of consideration amount. These findings of facts cannot be interfered with in this second appeal. For, there appears no perversity committed by both the Courts below while reaching such conclusion. It appears that a validation certificate was issued in favour of defendant No. 1/appellant No. 1 by the Tribunal. The validation certificate is placed on record. 9. Mr. Bajaj, would submit that the Civil Court should have accepted the validation certificate as it is. He would submit that if at all, the validation certificate was to be considered, then the legality thereof could be examined only by the competent authority under the provisions of the HT & AL Act. He would submit that the issue ought to have been referred to the competent Tribunal. I find it difficult to countenance the argument. A Division Bench of this Court in "Mohiuddin Shaikh Chand v. Gulam Ghouse Gulam Jilani" (1962 Vol. LXIV Bom.L.R. 560 560, held : "Reference has already been made above to sub-s. (3) of S. 98A. He would submit that the issue ought to have been referred to the competent Tribunal. I find it difficult to countenance the argument. A Division Bench of this Court in "Mohiuddin Shaikh Chand v. Gulam Ghouse Gulam Jilani" (1962 Vol. LXIV Bom.L.R. 560 560, held : "Reference has already been made above to sub-s. (3) of S. 98A. That provision applies to permanent alienations or transfers which took place after the commencement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, and before December 1, 1957, which were invalid under the Act but were intended to be validated under s. 98A. Even in respect of such transactions, sub-s. (3) of s. 98A provides that, if the alienee or transferee fails to pay the penalty referred to in sub-s. (2) of that section "within such period as may be prescribed", the transfer shall be declared invalid by the Tahsildar, and thereupon the provisions of sub-ss. (3) to (5) of s. 98C shall apply." "......If the Legislature intended that transfers of possession under agreements of sale should be invalid in the absence of the Collector’s sanction, and that the failure of the transferee to pay the penalty under s. 98A within the prescribed time should have the consequence of forfeiting the lands to the State Government, it was essential that the intention of the Legislature should have been expressed clearly and unambiguously." 10. It is well settled that mere agreement of sale is neither a permanent alienation, nor it amounts to transfer of property. Section 98A would come into play only when a transfer is of permanent nature. The purport of section 98A is to validate the permanent alienations which were effected in contravention of certain provisions of the HT & AL Act. The provision does not apply, in any case, to those transfers which were in embryonic stage. Obviously, it does not stand to reason that mere validation certificate under section 98A would be of any avail to the appellants, though, admittedly, there was no permanent alienation effected in respect of the suit field. It would be futile to refer such a question to the Tenancy Tribunal in view of admitted facts. 11. The deceased plaintiff proved service of subsequent notice dated 6th June, 1968 (Exh-35) whereby the contract was rescinded. The contract of sale was admittedly entered into on 12th July, 1951. It would be futile to refer such a question to the Tenancy Tribunal in view of admitted facts. 11. The deceased plaintiff proved service of subsequent notice dated 6th June, 1968 (Exh-35) whereby the contract was rescinded. The contract of sale was admittedly entered into on 12th July, 1951. The terms of the contract would show that the remaining consideration amount of Rs. 2500/- was to be made at the time of execution of the sale-deed. Though time was not the essence of the contract, yet, the defendants could not have postponed the payment of remaining consideration for indefinite period. It appears that they raised false plea regarding payment of full amount of consideration. Mr. Bajaj would submit that the Suit for specific performance of the contract or for declaration that the contract stood rescinded, should have been filed. I do not agree. The recession of the contract could be unilateral in view of section 27 of the Specific Relief Act. It is well settled that a contract may be rescinded without consent of parties on grounds laid down in section 27 (1) (a) and (b) and no aid of the Court is necessary. By grant of a declaration that a contract has been validly rescinded, the Court does not create a right in favour of a party. It only decides the validity of the recession made by the party. The contract could be unilaterally rescinded by the deceased plaintiff when the amount of remaining consideration was not paid within the reasonable time. The Courts below did not commit any error while reaching conclusion that the contract stood rescinded due to service of notice dated 6th June, 1968 (Exh-35). The recitals of the said notice purport to show that the deceased plaintiff rescinded the contract due to non-payment of the remaining consideration amount. The service of notice (Exh-35) is an admitted fact. The deceased defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 2 utterly failed to get the sale-deed executed within reasonable time. Nor they filed any Suit for specific performance of the contract. 12. Mr. Khader, would submit that the Cross-Objection filed by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff may be considered. He seeks to rely on "Namdeo s/o Ukhardu Patil (Bhombe) vs. Bharat s/o Janardhan Patil and another" 2006 (1) Mah. L.R. 857 857. Nor they filed any Suit for specific performance of the contract. 12. Mr. Khader, would submit that the Cross-Objection filed by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff may be considered. He seeks to rely on "Namdeo s/o Ukhardu Patil (Bhombe) vs. Bharat s/o Janardhan Patil and another" 2006 (1) Mah. L.R. 857 857. It is held by Single Bench of this Court that the claimant was entitled for interest even without filing cross objection, in exercise of powers contemplated under Order-XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no difficulty in accepting the proposition that the Appellate Court has powers to pass any decree which ought to have been rendered. The provisions of Order-XLI Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code are wide enough to bestow such power in the Appellate Court. The Apex Court in "Koksingh 634) v. Smt. Deokabai" ( AIR 1976 S.C. 634 ), held that the Appellate Court may pass a decree which ought, in law, to have been passed. It was held that even though the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the Trial Court, that was not bar to the High Court in passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge. The fact situation in the present case is quite different. No cross-objection or cross-appeal was preferred by the respondents before the first Appellate Court. While considering the second appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, the questions which were not agitated before the first Appellate Court cannot be raised for the first time in this Court. Obviously, there appears no merit in the cross-objection filed by the respondents. The questions so raised in the Cross Objection stamp No. 4577/1990 are not the substantial questions of law, nor are available for re-agitation thereof. 13. As stated before, the Trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court came to conclusion that the defendants would continue their possession as tenants and, therefore, relief of decree for possession cannot be granted. A Single Bench of this Court in "Shaikh Usman s/o Shaikh Burahan & others v. Shaikh Badruddin s/o 362 Shaikh Bhagan & another" 1994 (1) Bom.C.R. 362 , held that the tenant can fall back on tenancy rights even though the transaction of sale or contract of sale is invalid or proved to be unavailable. A Single Bench of this Court in "Shaikh Usman s/o Shaikh Burahan & others v. Shaikh Badruddin s/o 362 Shaikh Bhagan & another" 1994 (1) Bom.C.R. 362 , held that the tenant can fall back on tenancy rights even though the transaction of sale or contract of sale is invalid or proved to be unavailable. It is observed : "The opening words of section 19 clearly provide that the termination tenancy shall only be on the specified grounds. Provisions of the Tenancy Act protect the possession of the tenant and unless an application is presented within time to the Tahsildar by the landlord who has accrued right to gain possession, the tenant cannot be dispossessed. Looking to this protection given to the agricultural tenancy by this Act, it cannot be interpreted that the provisions of section 111 (d) would be available for the landlord to say that once the sale deed is executed in favour of the tenant and he becomes the landlord, he cannot fall back upon his rights as tenant if the sale fails." 14. Considering the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that both the Courts have rightly held that the deceased defendant No. 1/appellant No. 1 could fall back on tenancy rights which pre-existed before the contract of sale. The Suit for recovery of possession was, therefore, rightly dismissed. 15. For the reasons aforestated, there appears no substance in the second appeal. Hence, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. The Cross-Objection Stamp No. 4577/1990 is also dismissed. No order as to costs.