JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—This is a civil revision filed under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 18.3.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mathura on an application under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC in Original Suit No. 834 of 2005, Rajeev Kumar Agarwal v. Nagar Palika Parishad, Mathura. 2. One Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC for being made a party in the suit. He stated that the Nagar Palika Parishad had settled an auction in his favour on 15.12.2005 regarding lease of the roof of the shop in question and possession of the same was given to him on 9.1.2006 on his payment of the entire auctioned amount. He also stated that pursuant to the said auction and possession he has made his construction on the roof of the shop in question and the status-quo order dated 19.1.2006 obtained by the plaintiff from the High Court was never served upon him. For the first time he came to know about the status-quo order of the High Court when contempt notice was received by him on 2.8.2006. According to him, there was no order of status-quo or restraint on the date when the roof of the shop was auctioned and possession was given to him. According to him, his interest is involved in the present suit because the plaintiff has brought the suit against Nagar Palika Parishad for a permanent injunction against holding of auction for granting lease of the roof of the shop in question. 3. The trial Court after considering the application under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC and objections filed thereto found that the suit was presented on 14.12.2005 and the trial Court had not granted any ex parte injunction order to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed Civil Revision Nos. 15 of 2006 and an order dated 19.1.2006 was issued by the revisional Court to maintain status quo as of that date relating to the property in suit. The trial Court found that the Nagar Palika Parishad had already settled the auction dated 15.12.2005 in favour of Ravi Krishna Agarwal and had made allotment in his favour by giving him possession on 9.1.2006 after the auctioned amount was deposited by the auction purchaser. The trial Court found that the Nagar Palika Parishad had already settled the auction dated 15.12.2005 in favour of Ravi Krishna Agarwal and had made allotment in his favour by giving him possession on 9.1.2006 after the auctioned amount was deposited by the auction purchaser. The trial Court recorded that there was no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff to show that he had any right over the roof of shop nor a right to be allotted the same. The trial Court relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur, 1999(2) AWC 1249 that when a third party is found to be a bonafide purchaser for value during the pendency of a suit his application under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC requires to be allowed since he was a necessary party. The trial Court also placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Saroj Goel v. Munshi Lal and others, 2003(5) AWC 3520 to state that in a suit for permanent injunction the transferee of the defendant is a necessary party and entitled to be impleaded as such. The trial Court also refer to a decision in the case of Smt. Shail Kumar v. Smt. Asha Srivastava, 2005(2) AWC 625 and in the case of Amit Kumar Shah v. Farida Khatoon and others, AIR 2005 SC 2209 and recorded that bonafide purchaser whose interest in the property is shown is a necessary party. The trial Court also considered a decision in the case of B.B. Jubeda and others v. Navi Husain, AIR 2004 SC 173 and recorded the fact and the circumstance of that case are distinguishable from those of the present case since the aforesaid decisions related to a property under mortgage in a suit for specific performance whereas the present suit related to permanent injunction. The trial Court therefore allowed the application of Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal and directed him to be made a necessary party in the suit. 4. The trial Court therefore allowed the application of Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal and directed him to be made a necessary party in the suit. 4. Sri Manish Goel, learned Counsel for the applicant has contended that a third party could not be impleaded in the suit since he was neither a necessary party nor a proper party and it changes the entire nature and complexion of suit which has the effect of compelling the plaintiff to carry out the amendment in his suit which is not permissible. He has also argued that no relief was claimed in the suit against the newly impleaded defendant nor any finding has been recorded by the trial Court that the presence of Ravi Krishna Agarwal is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in his suit. He further submits that in view of the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act there is no necessity to implead a third party and any transfer made during the pendency of suit is only subservient to the rights of party in suit. He submits that the alleged transfer by the defendant in favour of third party cannot invest any right in such party since the transfer was made during the pendency of suit. His further submission is that the Court below has failed to consider the necessary and relevant factors required while deciding the application under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC. His submission is that a plaintiff is the master of his own suit and in view of maxim ‘dominance litus’ the plaintiff cannot be compelled to alter his pleading due to intervention of a third party. It is also his case that the order dated 6.4.2007 (Annexure-8 to the affidavit supporting the stay vacation) passed by a Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal from Order No. 965 of 2007, Rajiv Kumar Agarwal v. Nagar Palika Parishad has been wrongly interpreted by the trial Court inasmuch as the Division Bench recorded that Ravi Krishna Agarwal can only be heard if his impleadment application pending before the Court below is allowed. According to him, there was no dirrection of the High Court to implead Ravi Krishna Agarwal. 5. Counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit have been filed on behalf of the opposite parties. According to him, there was no dirrection of the High Court to implead Ravi Krishna Agarwal. 5. Counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit have been filed on behalf of the opposite parties. The opposite parties have stated that earlier a resolution was passed by Nagar Palika Parishad relating to the roof of various shops to be allotted in favour of the sitting tenants. According to them the revisionist was one of such tenants and he made an application expressing his desire to be allotted the roof of the shop under his tenancy. He had also deposited Rs. 35,000/- with the Nagar Palika Parishad in view of resolution dated 27.5.2000. According to opposite parties the resolution dated 27.5.2000 was cancelled by the District Magistrate, Mathura on 18.7.2000 and such order of the District Magistrate has never been challenged nor set aside and after lapse of so many years it has attained finality. According to opposite parties the advertisement for open auction of the roof top was issued on 9.12.2005 and in pursuance thereto the auction was held on 15.12.2005. There was no restraint order of any Court to stop the auction and hence rights have flown to the auction purchaser. Filing a suit on 14.12.2005 for permanent injunction cannot debar an auction purchaser from being made a party in the suit since the rights of the plaintiff himself are not established nor the suit is a result of any established legal right, title or interest of the plaintiff. It has also been stated in the counter affidavit that the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff revisionist before the trial Court was rejected by the trial Court on 26.3.2007 finding that there was no prima facie case made out by the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction. Such order of rejection dated 26.3.2007 has been filed as Annexure-CA-1. Against the said order the plaintiff respondent filed FAFO No. 965 of 2007 which is pending and an order dated 6.4.2007 of status quo is operative. Such order of rejection dated 26.3.2007 has been filed as Annexure-CA-1. Against the said order the plaintiff respondent filed FAFO No. 965 of 2007 which is pending and an order dated 6.4.2007 of status quo is operative. The contention of learned Counsel for the opposite party is that the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 are discretionary in nature and when a third party being a bonafide purchaser for value without knowledge of the pendency of any suit relating to the property seeks impleadment in the suit which was only for an injunction to restrain the defendant from alienating the property the third party would be entitled to be impleaded not only because he would be a necessary and proper party but also because by not making him a party it would encourage multiplicity of suit which is to be avoided. He also states that the impleadment of the respondent in the present suit is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question as to whether the plaintiff revisionist had any right to restrain the Nagar Palika Parishad from auctioning the roof top of the shop in question particularly when it had been advertised for auction prior to the filing of the suit. He states that in case the respondent was not impleaded as a party in the suit, he having matured his right by virtue of being highest bidder in the auction and by virtue of the allotment made to him by the Nagar Palika Parishad, he will have to come up with a separate suit to enforce his right which would be giving encouragement of multiplicity of proceedings. Lastly it has been argued that a pendente lite purchaser of the property who claims to have purchased bonafide without knowledge of the suit is a proper and necessary party and is entitled to be impleaded as defendant therefore when the respondent or the Nagar Palika Parishad had no knowledge of the presentation of the suit on 14.12.2005 then the auction conducted by the Nagar Palika Parishad on 15.12.2005 and acceptance of the highest bid of the respondent on the same date was without any knowledge that the suit had been filed by the plaintiff revisionist one day earlier. He states that only lease rights have been given to the respondent by the Nagar Palika Parishad for a limited period and therefore, it cannot be said that the property has changed the ownership to attract the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. Various decisions have been cited by learned Counsels for the parties in support of their contentions. (i) In the case of Sunil Gupta v. Kiran Girhotra and others, (2007) 8 SCC 506 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case relating to impleadment of a purchaser of a property belonging to the deceased testator in probation proceedings held that the purchaser had taken a calculated risk and he was not a necessary party in a litigation regarding probate of a will. (ii) In the case of Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hasan Saheb and another, AIR 2004 SC 173 the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering two cross suits filed one for redemption of mortgage and the other for specific performance of contract. The transferee had purchased the property during pendency of the suits without leave of the Court and the action of alienation was not found bonafide since the suit was pending since long time and hence the rejection for impleadment and amendment of the pleadings was held to be proper. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly held that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the applicant except with the order of the Court. Therefore the alienation of such a property in such a suit would obviously be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52 of the Act. The purchaser was held not to be either a necessary or proper party to the aforesaid two cross suits. (iii) In the case of Savinder Singh v. Dilip Singh and others, (1996) 5 SCC 539 the appellant had filed a suit for exclusive right, title and interest in the land on the basis of will executed by his mother and by impleading his sisters. The suit was decreed and when the appellant sought possession it was resisted by the heirs of his sisters and he filed another suit for declaration of his ownership. The suit was decreed and when the appellant sought possession it was resisted by the heirs of his sisters and he filed another suit for declaration of his ownership. On the basis of will an interim injunction was granted in his favour and when the interim injunction was vacated the defendants alienated the land by registered sale deed in favour of the three persons. Such three persons filed application for being brought on record of the suit of declaration and it was held by the Supreme Court that these subsequent transferees were neither necessary nor proper parties to such a suit and hence were not entitled to brought on record. (iv) In the case of B. Somaiah v. Amina Begum, AIR 1976 AP 182 the High Court was considering the question of addition of parties to a pending suit and it was held that where a person applies to be made a party the Court has to see whether there is anything in the suit which cannot be determined owing to his absence or whether there will be prejudice by his not being added as a party. It was held that as a rule the Court could not add a person as a defendant in a suit when the plaintiff is opposing to such addition. The suit in question was with respect to recovery of possession of land against the Government of Andhra Pradesh and a Statutory Corporation on the basis that the plaintiff was claiming title through his mother who was absolute owner of the land and the persons seeking impleadment claimed that they had entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff’s mother during her life time and upon their probates. The Government after enquiry found that the property belonged to the mother of the plaintiff and the earlier agreement had been cancelled by a fresh agreement. The case of the plaintiff was that there was no longer any subsisting agreement of sale with regard to the land and therefore these persons claiming through the first agreement could not be impleaded in the suit. The case of the plaintiff was that there was no longer any subsisting agreement of sale with regard to the land and therefore these persons claiming through the first agreement could not be impleaded in the suit. (v) In the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524 it was held that a person claiming to be necessary or proper party in a suit relating to property which suit is not for declaration of status or legal character must show that he has direct or legal interest in the litigation. In this case a dealer was in possession of a service station under an agreement with the lessee. The dealer challenged a notice issued by the Municipal Corporation for demolition of certain structures raised on the premises. The lessee of the premises sought impleadment as a defendant. It was held that the lessee was not a necessary or proper party and the addition of the lessee would enlarge issue of the suit. (vi) In J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. and others v. M.R. Murali and another, AIR 2002 SC 1061 the case was under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the landlord was not allottee from the Municipal Corporation and had filed suit against the tenant on ground of default in payment of rent. The relationship of the Municipal Corporation who was the original owner of the premises with landlord was found to be not germane to such proceedings of eviction and even the question of title between the sister of the landlord and the landlord could not be decided in such proceedings. It was therefore held that impleadment of Municipal Corporation and sister of the landlord would change the complexion of the litigation and raise such controversies as are beyond the scope of this suit. Hence the presence of the Municipal Corporation or the sister of the landlord in the suit was neither necessary for decision in a dispute between the landlord and the tenant nor their presence was necessary to enable the Court to adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in such proceedings. Hence the presence of the Municipal Corporation or the sister of the landlord in the suit was neither necessary for decision in a dispute between the landlord and the tenant nor their presence was necessary to enable the Court to adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in such proceedings. (vii) In the case of Anokhe Lal v. Radhamohan Bansal and others, (1996)6 SCC 730 a suit was filed by landlord for eviction of a tenant which was a partnership firm and it was contested by one of the partners of the firm. The legal representative of another deceased partner wanted to be impleaded in the suit at the appellate stage. The suit was decreed and confirmed in appeal. The application for impleadment had earlier been dismissed as infructuous. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the application for impleadment should normally have been disallowed since by allowing the same it would involve de novo trial of the suit. (viii) In the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and others, (2001) 6 SCC 534 it was a case where execution proceedings were pending against the governing body of a college and during the suit’s pendency the college became a constituent unit of a University and the plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to continue the suit against the University. It was held that such an omission, by the plaintiff did not result in making the decree void ab initio. The Supreme Court laid down the devolution of any interest during pendency of the suit would not make it obligatory to seek leave of the Court to continue the suit merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of the suit has devolved upon some other person or entity. (ix) In the case of Ram Charan Sharma and others v. Vidya Matri Mandir, Ghaziabad and others, 1995(1) ARC 130 this Court held that the persons who sought impleadment in a suit relating to prohibitory injunction in a joint family property, these persons cannot be added as a defendant merely because he would be affected by the decision or that he would be adversely affected in case the suit is decreed. The question was whether the defendant (Rajendra Nath) had any right in the disputed property after the family settlement and whether the said defendant could transfer a part of the land in favour of other defendants. It was held that mere fact that a fresh litigation can be avoided is not a ground to invoke the power under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. (x) In the case of Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, (1999) 2 SCC 577 the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a case of an application by a third party on the basis of a pendente ilite alliance in suit for injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the property and where the defendant who sold the property came up with a case that he was not aware of the suit. It was held that the questions raised by the party seeking impleadment has to be decided either on his application or in the suit or in a separate suit. It was held that such a right of impleadment claimed by the third party was necessarily to be decided since his rights were also involved in the suit between the plaintiff and the defendant relating to an injunction. The pendente lite transfer of and interest in an immovable property being bonafide and without knowledge of the suit the person seeking impleadment is a representative in interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest and has a right to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. While considering the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as also the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure it was found that if he does not apply to be impleaded he may suffer by default on account of any order passed in the proceedings. But if he applies to be impleaded as a party and to be heard he has got to be so impleaded and heard. 7. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as has been referred to above it has to be seen whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal was a necessary party in the present suit. The plaint of the suit has been filed along with the annexures of supplementary counter affidavit. The plaint of the suit has been filed along with the annexures of supplementary counter affidavit. A perusal of the plaint indicates that the plaintiff claimed to be a tenant of a shop of the Nagar Palika Parishad and has placed reliance upon a resolution of the Parishad to lease the roof of various shops to the tenants whereupon the plaintiff deposited Rs. 35,000 as premium for the said lease in the year 2000. He has claimed that the cause of action arose when he came to know that the Parishad is going to settle the lease of the roof top through a public auction and therefore he filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Parishad restraining them from auctioning the roof top to any person. Admittedly the suit was filed on 14.12.2005. From the plaint it is apparent that the plaintiff was claiming his rights by virtue of a resolution of the year 2000 passed by the Parishad to give the lease rights of the roof top to the tenants of various shops. Apart from the aforesaid resolution no other right to be given the roof top on lease has been pleaded by the plaintiff. No lease deed or concluded contract has been pleaded. Therefore when the suit was for a permanent injunction against the Parishad on the basis of the aforesaid pleadings it is quite clear that there was no settlement of the rights in favour of the plaintiff by the Parishad till the date of filing of the suit. The suit required the Parishad not to exercise rights of auctioning of its own property. The advertisement for auction had been issued prior to filing of the suit. The notice of the suit filed on 14.12.2005 was admittedly not served on the Parishad in view of the averments made in paragraph 13 of the plaint which is for waiver of notice to the Parishad before filing the suit. In these circumstances the record clearly indicates that the Parishad had no knowledge about the filing or pendency of the suit when it concluded the auction and settled the lease rights in favour of the opposite party. In these circumstances the record clearly indicates that the Parishad had no knowledge about the filing or pendency of the suit when it concluded the auction and settled the lease rights in favour of the opposite party. Since the auction notice was advertised on 9.12.2005, prior to filing of the suit, the auction was held on 15.12.2005, one day after the filing of the suit, and the lease rights were confirmed upon Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal being the highest bidder on 15.12.2005 it is quite clear that the Parishad had no notice of the suit and Ravi Krishna Agarwal was a bonafide auction purchaser for value deposited by him. 9. The decisions relied upon by the revisionist relate to either proceedings where there was established source of title of the parties in probate proceedings, in redemption of mortgage and specific performance suit, in proceedings for recovery of possession of land by the owner or in suits between the landlord and tenant where the original owner was not a necessary party or in execution proceedings of a decree. Clearly the aforesaid decisions relating to issues involved in those suits a third party would not be a necessary party by virtue of any right that he may claim through the parties to the suit. Therefore the decisions cited on behalf of the revisionist cannot be of any help to him for the reason that the present suit is not based upon an established right, title or interest in favour of the plaintiff whereas it is quite clear that the Nagar Palika Parishad was the owner of the property in question which it was putting for open public auction. The rights of the plaintiff for restraining the Nagar Palika Parishad from auctioning the property were at the maximum on the basis of a resolution of the year 2000 of the Parishad which according to the case set up by the opposite party had in any case been cancelled by the District Magistrate, Mathura in that year itself. Such cancellation by the District Magistrate is not a subject matter of the present revision and the plea taken on that basis is yet to be considered by the Trial Court. Such cancellation by the District Magistrate is not a subject matter of the present revision and the plea taken on that basis is yet to be considered by the Trial Court. On the other hand the opposite party had matured a legal right on 15.12.2005 when he was accepted as highest bidder and the lease rights were settled in his favour by being given possession on 9.1.2006 which was much prior to any order of status quo passed by the High Court. Therefore when status quo with respect to the property in question is still to be maintained from the date such order was issued by the High Court, but when the opposite party had matured his legal right prior to such date without knowledge of the pendency of the suit he was a bonafide purchaser for value. His rights would be affected in case any adverse order is passed in the suit against the Nagar Palika Parishad and in that event he would have to file as separate suit to establish his legal right against either the Nagar Palika Parishad or the plaintiff as the case may be. It is also noteworthy that the relief claimed in the suit for restraining the Nagar Palika Parishad from proceeding with the auction is subjudice and the proceedings of the auction have already conducted on 15.12.2005. Such circumstances clearly indicate that Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal the bonafide auction purchaser for value from the defendant without knowledge of the pendency of the suit would be a necessary party to the suit, particularly when even the defendant admittedly had no knowledge of the pendency of the suit which was filed one day prior to the auction held on 15.12.2005. 9. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as quoted hereunder : “The case really turns on the true construction of the rule in particular the meaning of the words “whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.” The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions.” 10. This Court find that Sri Ravi Krishna Agarwal has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the rights he has matured by settlement of the auction in his favour, allotment and possession which has the effect of a completed lease contract with the Parishad and his interest is directly involved in the suit wherein he has a cause of action against the plaintiff. 11. For the aforesaid reasons the judgment and order does not suffer from any material irregularity or illegality and requires no interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The revision has no force. It is accordingly dismissed. 12. No order is passed as to costs. ————