Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 149 (ALL)

SHAFIULLAH. v. SPECIAL JUDGE (E. C. ACT)

2008-01-22

PRAKASH KRISHNA

body2008
JUDGMENT Honble Prakash Krishna, J.—This is an unfortunate litigation. 2. This matter has come up before this Court third time in the present writ petition and travelled to the Apex Court twice. 3. A simple suit for ejectment being SCC Suit No. 8 of 1978 was filed by the contesting respondents No. 3 and 4 alongwith their father against the petitioner after determination of tenancy, on the allegation that provisions of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act No. 13 of 1972) is not applicable to the shop in question being a new construction. 4. Respondents No. 3 and 4 alongwith their father Mohd. Isha Khan instituted SCC Suit No. 8 of 1978 against the present petitioner, who is admittedly a tenant, in the Court of Judge Small Causes for ejectment on the allegations that the petitioner who is a tenant on monthly rent of Rs.100/- of a newly constructed shop at Patel Nagar, District Gonda, has failed to pay the rent since November 1977 in spite of notice of demand and determination of tenancy. In the suit plaintiffs claimed a decree for eviction and possession as also Rs. 300/- towards arrears of rent alongwith usual relief of cost etc. 5. It was further pleaded that the building in question is a newly constructed building and was constructed about eight years before and as such the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable. The said shop originally belongs to Mohd. Isha (Plaintiff No. 3), the father of the plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 who by means of sale deed dated 20.7.1976 sold it to his sons plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and thus they have become its owner and landlord. It was let out to the defendant tenant with effect from 1.10.1973 with the clear stipulation that as an when the shop is needed by the landlord, the tenant would vacate it after the service of a months notice. The tenancy was determined under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by serving a notice dated 2.1.1978 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which was served on 4.1.1978. The tenancy has been determined after 30 days of the receipt of the notice. The tenancy was determined under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by serving a notice dated 2.1.1978 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which was served on 4.1.1978. The tenancy has been determined after 30 days of the receipt of the notice. The suit was contested mainly on the ground that there is no arrears of rent and that the shop in question is a old construction and was constructed about 20 years before and as such the provisions of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable. The relation of landlord and tenant between the parties and the rate of rent were, not disputed. 6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases by producing oral and documentary evidence. The Trial Court vide its judgement and decree dated 16.2.1980 decreed the suit after recording a finding that the shop in question is a "new construction" and was constructed in the year 1970 which is evident from the assessment list of the local authority being papers No. 128 and 129 as also admitted by the defendant-tenant through the rent note, being paper No. 124. It rejected the tenants contention that in view of the judgement of the Apex Court in Ratan Lal Singhal v. Smt. Maruti Devi, 1979 ARC 507 (SC), the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable on the ground that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970 and as such the provisions of the said Act are not applicable. This judgement and decree of the Trial Court was subject matter of Civil Revision No. 46 of 1980, at the instance of the tenant before the revisional Court. The revisional Court vide its judgement and order dated 31.7.1980 vacated the decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. This judgement and decree of the Trial Court was subject matter of Civil Revision No. 46 of 1980, at the instance of the tenant before the revisional Court. The revisional Court vide its judgement and order dated 31.7.1980 vacated the decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. It was of the view that in view of the fact that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970, i.e. before the commencement of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 a fact which was not disputed before it, the dicta as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ratan Lal Singhal (supra) would be attracted and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will be applicable to all such buildings, which were in existence on or before 15.7.1972, the day on which the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 commenced. It rejected the contention of the landlord that the ten years holiday period from the date of construction that is 1970 having not been expired since the suit was filed in the year 1978, the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 will not be applicable. First round of litigation : 7. Being dissatisfied with the judgement of the revisional Court, the landlords filed Writ Petition No. 3063 of 1980 in this Court which came up for decision on 8.2.1984. The aforestated writ petition was allowed and the order dated 31.7.1980 passed by the revisional Court in Civil Revision No. 46 of 1980 was quashed. It was found in the instant case that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970 and the suit was filed in year 1978, therefore the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 clearly is not applicable and the matter was covered by the exemption clause. This Court further recorded that in view of the finding recorded above, the findings of the learned Additional District Judge, Gonda holding that the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was applicable to this case, cannot be sustained, and remanded the matter to the Revisional Court to dispose of the revision on merits. This was the first round of the litigation. Second round of litigation : 8. This was the first round of the litigation. Second round of litigation : 8. After remand when the matter was restored back to the revisional Court, the revisional Court instead of deciding the matter passed an order of remand on 31.1.1991, sending back the case to the Trial Court to decide the genuineness of the sale deed executed by Hazi Mohd. Isha in favour of his sons, (who are respondents No. 3 and 4 herein) and other ancillary questions. This order was challenged by the petitioner-tenant by filing Writ Petition No. 62 of 1991 (R/C) as well as by the landlords by filing Writ Petition No. 135 of 1991 (R/C). Both these writ petitions were heard and decided together by a common judgement dated 4.4.2007 which has been filed as Annexure-16 to the writ petition. This Court found that the revisional Court unnecessarily remanded the matter to the Trial Court. The question of genuineness of the sale deed was not at all required to be gone into, as the tenant was not concerned with the said question. The main landlord i.e. Mohd. Isha was also one of the plaintiffs and the question of genuineness of the sale deed was foreign to the proceedings before the revisional Court. This Court observed that in view of the observation that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable, the sale deed executed by Mohd. Isha was also not required to be examined in the proceedings in question. Also, was of the opinion that the remaining question could be decided finally by the revisional Court in view of the evidence already on record. This was the second round of litigation. Third round of litigation : 9. The present round of litigation in the High Court has cropped up when the revisional Court finally decided the revision by the impugned order dated 12.9.2007 and held that the judgement and decree of the Trial Court is valid. Consequently, it dismissed the Civil Revision No. 46 of 1980 preferred by the tenant-petitioner. 10. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable and the Courts below have committed illegality in not scrutinising the said plea. Consequently, it dismissed the Civil Revision No. 46 of 1980 preferred by the tenant-petitioner. 10. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable and the Courts below have committed illegality in not scrutinising the said plea. Elaborating the arguments, he submits that earlier decisions holding that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the building in question will not operate as res judicata as those orders are illegal orders and illegal orders do not confer jurisdiction on Court. In this connection reliance has been placed on the following cases : (1) Smt. Isabella Johnson v. M.S. Susai, 1991 (9) LCD 1 (SC) (Para 6) (2) Sarwan Kumar v. Madan Lal Agarwal, 2004 (22) LCD 178 (SC) (3) Hope Plantation Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and another, (1999) 5 SCC 590 . 12. He submits that a Court which has no jurisdiction to try an eviction suit cannot be vested with jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. On the strength of the above, he further submits that admission of a party or of a counsel with regard to date of construction is no admission in the eyes of law as the date of construction is a jurisdictional fact and goes to the very route of a matter. In this regard reference was made to Smt.Vijay Lakshmi Jain v. Rameshwar Dayal Gupta, 2001 (19) LCD 856 as also Swami Krishnanand Govindanand v. M.D.Oswal Hosiery (Regd.), 2002 (20) LCD 567 (SC). He also submits that the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by a non speaking order does not amount a precedent vide State of Manipur v. Thingujam Brojen Meetei, (1996) 9 SCC 29 . 13. Shri Q.M. Haq, learned counsel for the respondents No. 3 and 4, on the other hand, submits that the Trial Court as a matter of fact on the basis of the relevant material on record has, categorically found that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970 and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable and the said finding was not challenged by the petitioner-tenant in the revision filed by him before the Revisional Court. He could have challenged it in revision No. 46 of 1980 and should have challenged if at all aggrieved by it. Therefore, the same has attained finality and cannot be re-opened at the subsequent stages of the proceedings. The petitioner-tenant fought the litigation on the footing that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970 and being unsuccessfully ultimately up to the High Court stage, cannot take U turn and urge a new point and urge a point which though available to him was given up earlier. In substance, the finding that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970 as was found by the Trial Judge was not challenged in the earlier round of litigation, has attained finality. Even otherwise also the said finding is based on relevant material on record and does not call for interference by this Court. The aim and object of the petitioner-tenant is to prolong the litigation to its optimum to which he has succeeded as by now about 30 years have gone. The tenant in order to prolong the litigation approached the Apex Court twice by filing successive Special Leave Petitions against the judgement of this Court passed in the first writ petition being writ petition No. 3063 of 1980 dated 8.2.1984. An application for review was filed which was dismissed on 8.2.1985. Thereafter an application for clarification was filed which was dismissed on 24.10.1988 against which Special Leave Petition No. 14541 of 1988 was filed which was dismissed on 3.2.1990. Another Special Leave Petition was filed by the petitioner-tenant being Special Leave Petition No. 85 of 2007 against the judgement and order dated 4.4.2007 passed in writ petition No. 62 of 1991 which was also dismissed on 16.5.2007. 14. He also submits that undaunted by his successive failures, a deliberate attempt was made by the petitioner to mislead the Court in the present writ petition, vide paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit. With a view to mislead the Court, instead of filing of the judgement between the parties of Civil Revision No. 46 of 1980 passed by the revisional Court on 31.7.1980, judgement of another case i.e. Civil Revision No. 99 of 1980 (Abdul Jabbar v. Mohd. Zikriya and another) which was in respect of a different tenant of a different property, was filed as Annexure-11 to the writ petition. Zikriya and another) which was in respect of a different tenant of a different property, was filed as Annexure-11 to the writ petition. Reliance was placed on certain decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court to buttress his submission that the principles of res judicata are applicable and finality should be attached to binding decisions and a party should not be vexed twice over the same kind of litigation vide Shiv Shakti Contractors v. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, 1990 (16) ALR 963. He further, relied upon Jagdish Saran Gupta v. IInd Additional District Judge, Moradabad and others, 1993(1) ARC 417 for the proposition that the initial burden with regard to the date of construction with reference to Section 2(2) Explanation-I, lie on the landlord and if the said burden is discharged, the tenant has to prove his assertion by producing the relevant document, besides the various other cases on similar lines. 15. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The effect of the finding recorded in the earlier stages of the proceedings with regard to the date of construction as also what is the date of construction of the building in question with reference to the statutory provisions i.e. Section 2(2) Explanation-1 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are the questions mooted in the present petition. 16. The effect of the finding recorded in the earlier stages of the proceedings with regard to the date of construction as also what is the date of construction of the building in question with reference to the statutory provisions i.e. Section 2(2) Explanation-1 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are the questions mooted in the present petition. 16. For the sake of convenience the said explanation is reproduced below : Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section— (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time : Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building, which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants; (b) "Construction" includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished; (c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition." 17. The Explanation 1 to Section 2(2) of the Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Ratan Lal Singhal (supra) and subsequently, thereafter in Ram Swaroop Rai v. Smt. Lilawati, 1980 ALJ 651. The Explanation 1 to Section 2(2) of the Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Ratan Lal Singhal (supra) and subsequently, thereafter in Ram Swaroop Rai v. Smt. Lilawati, 1980 ALJ 651. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai (supra), on making an analysis of Explanation 1 to Section 2(2) of the Act found following : (1) Where a building has not been assessed, it is the date on which the completion was reported to, or otherwise recorded by, the local authority having jurisdiction. (2) Where a building has been assessed, it is the date on which the first assessment comes into effect : Provided that if the date on which the completion was reported to, or otherwise recorded by, the local authority is earlier than the date of the first assessment, the date of completion will be such earlier date. (3) Where there is no report, record or assessment, it is the date of actual occupation for the first time (not being an occupation for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction). 18. Subsequently, noticing the fact that the judgements delivered in the case of Ratan Lal Singhal (supra) as also in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai (supra) were at variance, the matter was referred to a Larger Bench by the Apex Court in Omprakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, 1982 ALJ 376. It was held therein that in the case of Ratan Lal Singhal (supra), there is no discussion except certain bald observation. On an interpretation of Section 2(2), in the absence of any ambiguity, without taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub-section, it was held in plain words that sub-section (2) of Section 2 contemplates that the Act shall not apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. It nowhere says that the building should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to interpret in that way it would be adding words to the sub-section, which is not permissible, vide paragraph 5 of the report. It nowhere says that the building should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to interpret in that way it would be adding words to the sub-section, which is not permissible, vide paragraph 5 of the report. Further in paragraph 6 it was held that on a perusal of Explanation 1 it is abundantly clear that the date of construction would be taken to be the date of completion of construction only when there is no prove or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment thereof. It divided the buildings basically into two major clauses. Buildings subject to assessment and the buildings which are not subject to assessment. If there is an assessment, it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction. This decision has been and is being consistently followed by the Apex Court as well as by other Courts as is evident from Vindhyachal Prasad Jaiswal v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others, 1995(1) ARC 318 (SC); Suresh Chandra Jain v. Shanti Swaroop Jain, 1997(1) ARC 640 (SC), etc. 19. Having clarified the statutory provisions, let us examine the facts of the present case. It is common case of the parties that the shop in question is subject to municipal assessment. The plaintiffs have come out with a case that building in question was constructed in the year 1970. The petitioner-tenant on the other hand pleaded in the written statement that the building was constructed 20 years before. It leads to the year 1950 as the written statement was filed in the year 1970. Now coming to the question of evidence, the plaintiffs-landlords have filed the documents to show that they applied for sanction of the proposed construction of the shop in question on 12.2.1969. Certain objection was raised before sanctioning the map which were clarified on 18.5.1969 and the map was subsequently sanctioned on 7.7.1969. A copy of the municipal assessment which according to the landlords is the first assessment after raising the new construction, has been filed which shows that the building was assessed for the first time in pursuance of the Boards resolution No. 298 dated 7.11.1970. A copy of the municipal assessment which according to the landlords is the first assessment after raising the new construction, has been filed which shows that the building was assessed for the first time in pursuance of the Boards resolution No. 298 dated 7.11.1970. The Trial Court, placed reliance upon these documents and in my view rightly so to come to the conclusion that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970. Copies of these documents have been annexed as Annexures 3, 4 and 5 to the counter affidavit. Vide Annexure 3 to the counter-affidavit Mohd. Isha Khan plaintiff No. 3 and father of Plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 applied for sanction of the map for the proposed construction and gave the information to the Municipal Board under Section 178(1) of U.P. Municipalities Act for the proposed construction with the stipulation that they would abide by the Section 178 to 186 of Municipal Act and its by-laws. The said application is dated 12.2.1969. Annexure-4 to the counter-affidavit is sanction order dated 7.7.1969 sanctioning the construction of the proposed construction vide Boards Resolution No. 108 dated 28.6.1969 subject to by-laws of the Board. Before granting the sanction some objection was raised by the office as per its report dated 16.4.1969, 28.4.1969 and 17.5.1969 to the effect that proposed construction is by the side of the PWD-Road. A reply was submitted on 18.5.1969. After raising the construction the building in question was assessed annually at Rs. 960/- vide the assessment list. These documents are of unimpeachable character and no attempt was made by the petitioner-tenant to show that either these documents do not exist or they in any manner are incorrect, fictitious or otherwise not genuine. No attempt was made by the petitioner-tenant to get the municipal record summoned to discredit these documents. From these documents it is evident that the landlord applied for raising constructions on 12.2.1969, the sanction to raise the construction was granted. The construction was raised thereafter and the building in question was assessed at Rs. 960/- per annum as out of two shop one shop was vacant vide Boards resolution dated 7.11.1970. By producing these documents the plaintiffs-landlords have discharged their burden to show that the building in question is exempted and beyond the purview of provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, for a period of 10 years i.e. till year 1980. 960/- per annum as out of two shop one shop was vacant vide Boards resolution dated 7.11.1970. By producing these documents the plaintiffs-landlords have discharged their burden to show that the building in question is exempted and beyond the purview of provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, for a period of 10 years i.e. till year 1980. The burden was shifted on the petitioner-tenant to prove otherwise. 20. The petitioner-tenant, as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner has produced six documents which Ext. A-1 to Ext. A-6. These are house tax assessment for the years 1951-1952 to 1955-1956, 1956 to 1960-1961, 1961-1965, 1965 to 1967, 1967-1970 and 1970-1971 (Ext. A1 to Ext. A-4) and extract of Khata No. 439 Ext. 5 and extract of Khata No. 4370, Ext. 6. Out of these six documents, the petitioner has referred only four documents Ext. A1 to Ex. A4 before me. Except these four documents no other document was referred to or relied upon during the course of the argument. Ext. A-1 is the copy of the assessment register for the year 1951-1952 to 1955-1956 which shows the annual assessment of the building at Rs. 60. Similarly the annual assessment in Ext. 2 is shown at Rs. 144. In Ext. A3 and A-4 assessment has been shown at Rs. 48 only. Thus the building was assessed at Rs. 48 annually only for the assessment years commencing from 1961 to 1971. These documents do show that the landlord Mohd. Isha Khan was in occupation of some property but it is not established that these documents do relate to the shop i.e. the disputed shop. Before proceeding further at the cost of the repetition, it may be noted that as per pleadings of the petitioner-tenant, the shop in question was constructed in the year 1958. The pleadings do not find corroboration from these documents. No attempt was made by the petitioner-tenant to show that these documents do relate to the shop in question in any manner. On a perusal of the evidence, it is evident that the shop in question was raised for the first time after obtaining permission as per the sanctioned map in the year 1970 and was assessed separately. In this view of the matter, the date of disputed shop is of the year 1970 and not earlier to it. 21. On a perusal of the evidence, it is evident that the shop in question was raised for the first time after obtaining permission as per the sanctioned map in the year 1970 and was assessed separately. In this view of the matter, the date of disputed shop is of the year 1970 and not earlier to it. 21. In addition to above, yet there is one more aspect of the case. The shop in question was taken on rent and for this purpose an oral agreement of tenancy was arrived at on 20.9.1973 which was followed by a rent note executed by the petitioner on 26.9.1997 wherein he agreed that tenancy will commenced with effect from 1.10.1973 vide Annexure-1 to the writ petition. He admits his signature while he was in the witness box and thus the execution of the agreement is beyond pale of doubt. In the said agreement it is mentioned that the shop in question was recently constructed. It is also stated in clause 6 of the said agreement that the shop in question was a new construction and was constructed about three years before which leads us to the year 1970. The Trial Judge has come to the conclusion that the building in question was constructed in the year 1970. The reply of the learned counsel for the petitioner is only this much that admission in the rent has no evidentiary value. 22. In the absence of any explanation the admission in the rent note dated 1.10.1973 that the shop was three years old construction on the date of the execution of the rent note, which also finds corroboration from the other public documentary evidence, is binding and the said admission has got evidentiary value and cannot be brushed away totally. 23. In view of the above discussion, the date of construction of the disputed shop at the earliest is 7.11.1970 when vide resolution of the Board it was assessed at Rs. 960/- per annum and not earlier to it. The finding recorded by the Trial Judge on this issue is therefore, correct, and does not call for any interference by this Court. It was thought necessary to discuss the matter in great detail as the learned counsel for the petitioner urged to send the matter back for re-consideration to the Trial Court. The finding recorded by the Trial Judge on this issue is therefore, correct, and does not call for any interference by this Court. It was thought necessary to discuss the matter in great detail as the learned counsel for the petitioner urged to send the matter back for re-consideration to the Trial Court. Considered that on two occasions remand orders were passed and period of 30 years have expired. To draw a final curtain to the litigation which is otherwise a simple suit for eviction, it was thought appropriate and expedient to hear and examine the matter in detail in the writ petition itself. Although strictly speaking in view of the finding recorded earlier by revisional Court and by this Court as well, which is going to be noticed shortly, the said plea of the tenant with regard to the date of construction is not open now. 24. Against the judgement of the Trial Court holding that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970, a revision No. 46 of 1980 was preferred before the Court below by the petitioner-tenant. Before the revisional Court the finding with regard to the date of construction as is evident from the portion extracted below was accepted and was not challenged : "The finding of the learned court on the point that the shop was constructed in near about 1970 has not been challenged by any party. I, therefore, proceed with the assumption that the shop was constructed in 1970." 25. The said judgement was subject matter of writ petition in this Court being writ petition No. 3036 of 1980. Before the writ Court also the stand of the petitioner-tenant herein was the same. This Court has noticed the fact that the shop in question was admittedly constructed in the year 1970. The relevant portion is extracted below : "The shop in question was admittedly constructed sometime in 1970 and when the landlords filed the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the tenant-opposite party No. 2 in 1978, it had not completed ten years after construction. The relevant portion is extracted below : "The shop in question was admittedly constructed sometime in 1970 and when the landlords filed the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the tenant-opposite party No. 2 in 1978, it had not completed ten years after construction. One of the contentions was that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 did not apply to the building as it had not completed 10 years of age after construction and consequently the tenant-opposite party No. 2 could be evicted under the normal provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and that the protection of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not available to the tenant-opposite party No. 2". 26. It is an acknowledged legal position that principles of res judicata are applicable at different stages of the same litigation. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred certain rulings such as Smt. Isabella Johnson v. M.S. Susai (supra); Sarwan Kumar v. Madan Lal Agarwal (supra). Hope Plantation Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and another (supra). These decisions are not applicable to the controversy involved in the present case even remotely. Neither it was pleaded anywhere nor it was urged before me that the judgement delivered by the revisional Court or by this Court in the writ petition were in any manner without jurisdiction or there is inherent lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner-tenant filed the revision and possibly it does not lie in his mouth to say that the revisional Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. It is also equally settled that statement of fact as contained in the judgement is taken on its face value and the burden lies upon the person who disputes the correctness, to contradict it by cogent evidence. If a wrong statement of fact has been incorporated in a judgement, as has been laid down by various pronouncement of Supreme Court, the remedy is to approach that very Court forthwith to correct the error by filing application. 27. In the present petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not refer any material to dispute the observations, already reproduced above, of the revisional Court or of the High Court. 27. In the present petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not refer any material to dispute the observations, already reproduced above, of the revisional Court or of the High Court. Necessarily it follows that having lost the case that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable even though the shop in question was constructed in the year 1970, the petitioner-tenant now is making an effort to dispute the date of construction which has otherwise attained finality. Such an objection is not permissible. 28. The other cases relied by the counsel for the petitioner need not be discussed in detail as they are beyond the points and do not advance the case of the petitioner further. Great emphasis was lead by the counsel for the respondent-landlord that intentionally with a view to mislead the Court, the petitioner alongwith the writ petition filed copy of judgement of revisional Court delivered in Civil Revision No. 99 of 1980 which has nothing to do with the present writ petition as Annexure-11. The relevant copy is the judgement delivered in Civil Revision No. 46 of 1990 which has been annexed alongwith the counter affidavit. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply accepts the mistake and submits that it was an accidental mistake. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to dwell upon this issue any further. 29. No other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 30. Viewed as above, there is no merit in the writ petition. The same is therefore, liable to be dismissed. 31. Before parting with the case, it may be noted that the petitioner is enjoying the disputed shop situate in Gonda on a very normal amount on a sum of Rs. 100/- per month. The said rent was agreed rent in the year 1973 when the tenancy commenced. The prices of immovable property have sky rocketed during the last 30 years and as such it is desirable that the petitioner who obtained the stay orders at various stages of litigation from the revisional Court as well as by this Court in writ petition should be asked to pay at least Rs. 200/- per month, in addition to the agreed rent of Rs. 100/- by way of damages to compensate the plaintiffs-respondents for depriving them to use the shop in question for their personal use. 200/- per month, in addition to the agreed rent of Rs. 100/- by way of damages to compensate the plaintiffs-respondents for depriving them to use the shop in question for their personal use. The additional sum of Rs. 200/- shall be payable for the period subsequent to the passing of the decree by the Trial Court i.e. after 16.2.1980. The petitioner shall be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 300/- (inclusive of Rs. 100/- per month as the agreed rent and Rs. 200/- as enhanced by this judgement), since 1.4.1980 up to January 2008 or up to the date of actual delivery of possession whichever is later, after adjusting the amount, if any, already paid. Time to vacate the disputed premises is granted up to 30.6.2008 subject to fulfilment of the following conditions : (1) The petitioner shall file an undertaking on affidavit within a period of one month before the Trial Court stating that he will vacate and handover the peaceful vacant possession to the contesting landlords on or before 30.6.2008. (2) Within the aforesaid period of one month, the petitioner shall deposit the amount as indicated above for the period upto 30.6.2008, after adjusting any amount if already deposited. 32. In case of default of compliance either of the conditions stipulated above, it will be open to the respondent landlords to apply for the execution of the decree, as also the cost of the present writ amounting to Rs. 5000. 33. In the result, the writ petition fails and is therefore dismissed with costs of Rs. 5000/-. ————