Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. M/s Cheran Roadways Corporation Limited, now named as Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 22. 2004 passed by the the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.12384 of 1996, where under the learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition filed by present respondent No.1, remanded the matter to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration. 2. The background facts may be noticed in brief. The present respondent No.1, which is a Transport Operator, had applied for renewal of permit and the same was allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “STAT”) by proceedings dated 11. 1980. This Court, in the revision filed by the appellant, remitted the matter to the STAT for fresh disposal and specifically directed that till the disposal of such appeal, the Transport Operator would be permitted to carry on the operation. However, the present respondent No.1 had filed the Special Leave Petition contending that there was no necessity to remit the matter for fresh disposal. Be that as it may, the said Special Leave Petition was withdrawn on 12. 1989. During the aforesaid period also, respondent No.1 was operating the vehicle in the route concerned. 3. Thereafter, after coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, where under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 had been repealed, the appeal was dismissed by the STAT solely on the ground that the new Act did not contain any provision for renewal of the old permit. Such order of the STAT was challenged by the present respondent No.1 by filing W.P. No.12384 of 1996. The decision taken in the said writ petition is now the subject matter of the present writ appeal. 4. Mr. R. Viduthalai, the then learned Advocate General, while appearing for the appellant, contended that there was no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for renewal of permit and no saving Clause was included in Section 217 of the M.V. Act, 1988 especially a saving clause regarding any pending proceeding relating to renewal of permit and therefore, the STAT had rightly rejected the appeal on the ground that no such relief could be granted. 5. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent has supported the decision of the learned Single Judge and submitted that whatever might have been the earlier controversy relating to consideration of pending applications for renewal, such controversy must be taken to have been concluded by introduction of amendment to Section 217 of M.V. Act in the shape of Section 217A of M.V. Act and therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge, directing the STAT to consider the pending appeal is justified. 6. Section 217 of the M.V. Act is as follows:- Repeal and savings:- (1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereafter in this section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed. 6. Section 217 of the M.V. Act is as follows:- Repeal and savings:- (1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereafter in this section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (1) of the repealed enactments,-- (a) any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice issued, or any appointment or declaration made, or exemption granted or any confiscation made, or any penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other thing done or any other action taken under the repealed enactments, and in force immediately before such commencement shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been issued, made granted, done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act: (b) any certificate of fitness or registration or licence or permit issued or granted under the repealed enactments shall continue to have effect after such commencement under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed; (c) any document referring to any of the repealed enactments or the provisions thereof, shall be construed as referring to this Act or to the corresponding provision of this Act; (d) the assignment of distinguishing marks by the registering authority and the manner of display on motor vehicles in accordance with the provision of the repealed enactments shall, after the commencement of this Act, continue to remain in force until a notification under sub-section (6) of section 41 of this Act is issued; (e) any scheme made under section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) or under the corresponding law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of section 100 of this Act (f) the permits issued under sub-section (1-A) of section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), or under the corresponding provisions, if any, in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to remain in force until the approved scheme under Chapter VI of this Act is published. (3) Any penalty payable under any of the repealed enactments may be recovered in the manner provided by or under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such penalty under the repealed enactments. (4) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1987) with regard to the effect repeals." 7. Section 217A of the M.V. Act , which was introduced by Act 27 of 2000 is extracted here under:- " 217-A. Renewal of permits, driving licences and registration granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939—Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (1) of Section 217 of the enactments referred to in that sub-section, any certificate of fitness or registration or licence or permit issued or granted under the said enactments may be renewed under this Act." 8. While considering the scope or ambit of Section 217 of M.V. Act vis-à-vis permissibility of continuation of proceedings, involving permit granted under Old Motor Vehicles Act, the Supreme Court in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1992 SCC 180 (M/s. GURCHARAN SINGH v. YASHWANT SINGH) had observed that an application for renewal or permit filed under the old M.V. Act, 1939 could not be dismissed only on the ground that new M.V. Act, 1988 had come into force. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in a decision reported in 1994 Supplementary (3) S.C.C. 210 (SECRETARY, QUILON DISTT. MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS’ COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS), without noticing the earlier decision of the Supreme Court, held otherwise. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of ANNA TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD., SALEM v. K. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU (1995 W.L.R. 432) had also held likewise, by relying upon the later decision of the Supreme Court. Since different legal interpretations relating to permissibility of continuance of an application for renewal, had been rendered, the Parliament stepped in and amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by introduction of Section 217A of the M.V. Act. 8. On the basis of such subsequent amendment, it has been held by the learned Single Judge under the impugned judgment that an application for renewal of permit granted under the M.V. Act, 1939 could be pursued even after M.V. Act, 1988 came into force. 8. On the basis of such subsequent amendment, it has been held by the learned Single Judge under the impugned judgment that an application for renewal of permit granted under the M.V. Act, 1939 could be pursued even after M.V. Act, 1988 came into force. For the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Single Judge has relied upon the unreported decision of an other learned Single Judge in W.P. No.14014 of 1995 dt. As a matter of fact, subsequent to aforesaid decisions of the learned Single Judges including the present impugned judgment, two Division Benches have specifically referred to and approved the ratio of the learned Single Judges in the decisions in W.P. Nos.9302 and 14014 of 1995 as apparent from the judgment dated 112. 2006 in W.A. No.463 of 2002 and decision reported in 2006 W.L.R. 858 (SUGANTHI, PROP. VEERAPPA TRANSPORT, TINDIVANAM v. M. PALANIVELU & ANOTHER). 9. In these two Division Bench decisions, it is indicated that if an application for renewal of permit granted under the M.V. Act, 1939 was pending at the time of M.V. Act of 1988 coming into force, the same shall be considered in accordance with the provisions contained in repeal Act notwithstanding the fact that there is no specific provision contained in repealed Act. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions, the consistent view expressed in several decisions including those of Division Benches is to the effect that if an application for renewal of permit was pending before the New Act came into force, the same can be continued more particularly in view of the provisions contained in Section 217A of M.V. Act. This being the consistent view we hardly see the scope for taking any contrary view in the matter. 10. From the narration of facts, it is apparent that the application for renewal of permit was in fact granted by the STAT initially on 11. 1980 and this Court had remitted the matter to the STAT for reconsideration. Ultimately when the Special Leave Petition was withdrawn on 12. 1989, the new M.V. Act, 1988 was yet to be in force. Therefore, during the relevant time, the present respondent No.1 had a vested right on his application (which was pending as an appeal before the STAT), which was to be decided in accordance with the existing law viz. M.V. Act, 1939. 1989, the new M.V. Act, 1988 was yet to be in force. Therefore, during the relevant time, the present respondent No.1 had a vested right on his application (which was pending as an appeal before the STAT), which was to be decided in accordance with the existing law viz. M.V. Act, 1939. Merely because such appeal remained pending for some reason or the other, the respondent No.1 should not have been washed off. It is of course true that when the appeal was dismissed by STAT in 1996, Section 217-A of the M.V. Act was yet to be inserted. However, Section 217A, more particularly in the background of two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, even though not ex facie made retrospective, can be considered as clarificatory or declaratory. 11. In the above view of the matter, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge, which is in line with the opinion expressed by several other learned Single Judges as well as subsequent opinion of the Division Benches, is justified. The legislative intervention in the introduction of Section 217A has in fact resolved the discordant view expressed by two coordinate Benches of equal strength of Supreme Court. It is also interesting to note that the later decision of the Supreme Court had been rendered without any reference to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court of the same strength. The parliamentary intervention in such matter has obviously relieved us from the onerous task of finding out whether earlier decision of the Supreme Court or the later decision of the Supreme Court is required to be followed. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any scope to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. STAT is now directed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Since respondent No.1 has been operating on the basis of interim order passed by this Court from time to time, it is obvious that till the matter is decided by the STAT, such order would continue to remain in force. No costs.