JUDGMENT Hon’ble Bharati Sapru, J.—Heard Sri Manish Goyal learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Anil Kumar Aditya, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking writ of certiorari calling for the records of the case and quashing the judgment and order dated 2.7.2008 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Allahabad in MCA No. 39 of 2008 (Satyendra Chaturvedi v. Small Scale Industries Research and Development Organisation). The second prayer is also for a writ of certiorari to quash the judgment and order dated 30.1.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad on the application paper No. 6-C in the Original Suit No. 1300 of 2007. The third prayer is for a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent from causing interference in the running of the unit of the petitioner on shed No. 3 Plot No. B-4, SIRDO Campus, Industrial Area P.O. T.S.L. Naini, Allahabad and the last is the residuary prayer seeking appropriate direction which the Court may deem fit and proper according to the circumstances of the case. 3. The facts of the case are that the petitioner had entered into an agreement of lease with the respondent with regard to Nursery shed No. 3, plot No. B-4, SIRDO Campus, Industrial Area P.O. T.S.L. Naini, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the premises). The shed belongs to the respondent, which has several sheds and which it gives out to entrepreneurs to set up research projects. A copy of the lease deed dated 16.1.1993 has been filed by way of a supplementary affidavit. 4. The lease with regard to the premises is admitted to both sides. The lease was made between the two parties, initially for a period of 11 months started from 16.10.1993 for a sum of Rs. 600/- per month along with taxes and other charges. Under the terms of the lease as stated earlier, the lease was for a period of 11 months initially, which could be extended but not in any case for more than 33 months from its commencement i.e. 16.10.1993. Clause 5 of the lease is reproduced below : “5. 600/- per month along with taxes and other charges. Under the terms of the lease as stated earlier, the lease was for a period of 11 months initially, which could be extended but not in any case for more than 33 months from its commencement i.e. 16.10.1993. Clause 5 of the lease is reproduced below : “5. That with the mutual consent in writing, the period of the agreement can be extended by the parties, on the same terms and conditions or on such modified terms as may be determined by the first party. But in any case, the total period of occupations shall not be for more than thirty three months.” Amongst other conditions, clauses 9 and 10 of the lease deed also indicate the conditions for termination of lease. The clauses 9 and 10 of the lease agreement are reproduced below : “9. That the second party shall be permitted to use the shed/building on month-to-month basis. The lease shall be terminable by the first party by one month’s notice in writing. Likewise if the second party intends to vacate the shed/building earlier, he will also have to give one month’s notice or one month’s service charges in advance. 10. That this lease deed is for fixed term of eleven months. After the expiry of the fixed period, if one month before the fixed period is not extended, the second party shall have no right to continue as lessee and first party will have right to take possession of the shed/building at the expiry of the said period.” 5. The petitioner, who had established the manufacturing unit of the sale of protein food, minerals, vitamins products etc. under the name and style of M/s. G.S. Formulations, continued to occupy the plot leased out to it beyond the period of 11 months and thereafter even 33 months. 6. The aims and objects of the Small Industries Research & Development Organization (SIRDO) are to encourage the entrepreneurs engaged in the research projects and to allot them sheds for their research projects for specified period and thereafter the said sheds are to be allotted to new entrepreneurs engaged in the similar research work. 7. 6. The aims and objects of the Small Industries Research & Development Organization (SIRDO) are to encourage the entrepreneurs engaged in the research projects and to allot them sheds for their research projects for specified period and thereafter the said sheds are to be allotted to new entrepreneurs engaged in the similar research work. 7. Since the premises in dispute i.e. Nursery shed No. 3, Plot No. 4 was required to be allotted to a new entrepreneur by the respondent, it filed suit No. 93 of 2004 (Small Industries Research and Development Organisation v. Satyendra Chaturvedi) in the Court of J.S.C.C., Allahabad, seeking the petitioner’s ejectment from the disputed premises. The said suit was later on withdrawn by the order dated 9.10.2007. 8. After the suit was withdrawn by the respondent SIRDO, it issued to the petitioner a notice dated 31.10.2007 to vacate the premises. It is this notice, which is starting point of the present lis. 9. Under the notice dated 31.10.2007, the respondent asked the petitioner to vacate the premises within a period of 30 days. 10. Before 30 days could expire, the petitioner filed a suit for injunction being O.S. No. 1300 of 2007 on 22.11.2007 and also filed an application for an ad interim injunction under Order 39 Rule 1, C.P.C. The said application filed by the petitioner was rejected by the trial Court on 30.1.2008 holding that the petitioner could not fulfil the requirement for the grant of a temporary injunction i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. 11. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.1.2008 passed by then trial Court, the plaintiff petitioner filed MCA No. 39 of 2008 and the said appeal of the petitioner has also been rejected by the order dated 2.7.2008. It is these two orders, against which the petitioner has filed present writ petition. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued at length that the appellate order is bad because the appellate order does not contain any reason for dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner. It merely notices certain case laws and has recorded conclusions without going into the depth of the matter. He has further argued that the trial Court while refusing to grant a temporary injunction has acted upon irrelevant consideration. It merely notices certain case laws and has recorded conclusions without going into the depth of the matter. He has further argued that the trial Court while refusing to grant a temporary injunction has acted upon irrelevant consideration. His first argument is that the trial Court has wrongly passed its findings upon initial agreement, which was only for 33 months and the date of that agreement was dated 16.10.1993. 13. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the so-called agreement dated 16.10.1993 had already lapsed by efflux of time and therefore the agreement was of no consequence for consideration of the grant of injunction because even after expiry of agreement, the petitioner had continued to pay rent and the same was being accepted by the defendant-respondent. 14. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, notice dated 31.10.2007 fully establishes that the authority under which the petitioner was occupying the premises and the non-renewal of the agreement of lease was of no consequence as it did not wipe out the right of the petitioner to continue in the premises as a tenant by holding over. 15. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was in possession by virtue of holding over as a tenant and therefore only way, by which he could be dispossessed, was by the institution of suit for eviction filed by the respondent landlord on the basis of a decree which would have to be passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that in any case his lease had not been terminated by the issuance of the notice dated 31.10.2007 as it did not amount to a valid order of termination but simply it asked the petitioner to vacate the premises. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that in so far as the balance of convenience was concerned, the Court below had failed to properly assess as to in whose favour balance of convenience lay. According to him, because no injury was being caused the respondent who had several sheds in its possession and as the petitioner was a manufacturing unit, if it shuts down, the grievous prejudice would be caused to the petitioner. 18. Other than this, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the trial Court ignored material which was placed by the petitioner before it. 18. Other than this, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the trial Court ignored material which was placed by the petitioner before it. He argued that the trial Court ignored the notice dated 31.10.2007 which was a notice demanding possession and was not a notice terminating the tenancy. 19. Secondly learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the earlier suit for eviction being O.S. No. 93 of 2004 had been withdrawn by the respondent on 9.10.2007 without taking any liberty to file a fresh suit. 20. Thirdly he argued that the trial Court ignored the facts that the petitioner had continuous possession of the premises in question and since 1993 had continued to pay rent, which was accepted by the respondent. He further argued that the trial Court had ignored the facts brought to its notice that the entry of the petitioner was being obstructed from 20.11.2007 onwards. The trial Court also ignored the rent receipts showing the regular deposit of the rent by the petitioner as lessee, which had continued right from 1993 and the legal right of the petitioner as tenant by holding over particularly when the notice dated 31.10.2007 was confined to a demand for possession and did not terminate the lease. Most of all the trial Court ignored the status, which the petitioner has secured as tenancy on month-to-month basis and secondly the legal right vested in it. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that balance of convenience lies in his favour because the petitioner has been running a factory since 1993 and was utilizing the premises for the purpose for which he was let out to the petitioner and if the running of the factory was stopped, it would result grievous prejudice to the petitioner and it is sufficient to establish that the balance of convenience was in favour of the petitioner. 22. On the point of irreparable injury, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in case the factory of the petitioner shuts down, it would result unemployment of several persons and loss of capital invested. It would further result in loss of revenue to the State Government and this will be detrimental to the public exchequer. On the other hand, he argued that by grant of injunction, no loss would be caused to the respondent. It would further result in loss of revenue to the State Government and this will be detrimental to the public exchequer. On the other hand, he argued that by grant of injunction, no loss would be caused to the respondent. He had several sheds vacant, which could be allotted to other entrepreneurs who are willing to undertake research projects. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued at length that inference could be drawn from conduct of the respondent who has taken the recourse of filing of the suit for vacation in the year 2004 but subsequently withdrawn the suit without seeking liberty to file a fresh suit and therefore such conduct on their part amount to acquiesce and also accepts the petitioner as tenant by holding over. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited several decisions to establish his point of settled possession and sought to establish that once a person is in possession then he cannot be ousted except in accordance with law. In support of this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following decisions : (1) Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769 ; (2) Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others, (2004) 3 SCC 137 ; (3) M. Guridas and others v. Rasaranjan and others, (2006) 8 SCC 367 ; (4) Anupam Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. Additional District Judge and another, 2006 (63) ALR 161; (5) Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 ; (6) Lallu Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others, AIR 1968 SC 620 ; (7) Bhola Nath and others v. Maharao Raja Saheb Bundi State, AIR 1984 All 60 . 25. The other than the settled possession, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued at length on the point that notice dated 31.10.2007 was not a proper notice as it was only a notice demanding possession and did not actually terminate the tenancy. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following decisions with regard to this point : (i) Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin, AIR 1963 All 581 (DB); (ii) Bradley v. Atkinson, 1885 ILR 7 All 900 (FB); (iii) Farooq Ahmad v. Muneshwar Bux Singh, AIR 1972 All 155 . 27. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following decisions with regard to this point : (i) Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin, AIR 1963 All 581 (DB); (ii) Bradley v. Atkinson, 1885 ILR 7 All 900 (FB); (iii) Farooq Ahmad v. Muneshwar Bux Singh, AIR 1972 All 155 . 27. In reply to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri R.N. Singh Senior Advocate has argued that the petitioner is seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the present writ petition against refusal to grant ad interim injunction by both the Courts below. He has argued that after both the Courts below have recorded clear findings that in his favour, the petitioner has neither prima facie case nor irreparable injury nor balance of convenience, which are the necessary ingredients for the grant of an ad interim injunction. He has also argued that the admitted position is that the plaintiff-petitioner had continued in possession of the premises after the expiry of the terms of lease. The Original lease was made on 16.10.1993 for a period of 11 months and thereafter under its terms lease could have been extended for another period of 33 months and after this extension, the lease automatically came to an end. He has also argued that after the expiry of period of 33 months, the possession of the premises by the petitioner is illegal and he is a trespasser and the other admitted position is that the respondent organization is the true owner. He has next argued that it is not open to a trespasser to obtain injunction against the true owner. In support of this argument, he has placed complete reliance on a decision of Delhi High Court rendered in the case of D.T.T.D.C. v. M/s. D.R. Mehara & Sons, AIR 1996 Del 351 and has relied on para 16, 17 and 18 of the said judgment, which are quoted hereinbelow : “16. It is argued for the appellant that this may be anomalous. It is said that the trespasser has a “right” to an injunction against the true owner, and this is complementary to the duty of the owner not to evict the trespasser outside the judicial process. In our view, there is no anomaly. Each of these is based on a different legal principle. It is said that the trespasser has a “right” to an injunction against the true owner, and this is complementary to the duty of the owner not to evict the trespasser outside the judicial process. In our view, there is no anomaly. Each of these is based on a different legal principle. If the plaintiff wants the defendant to act in accordance with law he must first abide by the law himself and vacate the property as one would expect a law abiding citizen to behave. 17. It is then argued that this may lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Should the plaintiff be allowed to be forcibly evicted so as to compel him again to seek restoration of possession under Section 6, Specific Relief Act, or otherwise? The danger could be prevented? This argument based on multiplicity of proceedings, in fact, goes against the trespasser in possession. The plaintiff can,—on the same parity on reasoning—behave in such a manner as to make it unnecessary for the owner to sue for possession separately. The duty to be a lawful citizen is not one sided. It does not apply only to the owner but applies to the trespasser as well. 18. For the above reasons, we are of the clear view that the appellant plaintiff—whose licence has expired and which had itself pleaded in 1992 for a short period to vacate from the shop and which had been given a large number of notices to vacate and where the owners have even show alternative premises, which appellant could have, occupied, cannot be granted the helping hands of the Court for temporary injunction. The appeal is therefore dismissed in limine.” 28. Learned counsel for the respondent also drew the attention of the Court to the decision in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, 2004 (55) ALR 260 SC, in which the Apex Court has approved the judgment of Delhi High Court rendered in the case of D.T.T.D.C. v. M/s. D.R. Mehara & Sons (supra) in para 22, 23 and 24. 29. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondents has argued that anybody who seeks justice must abide by the law himself as would be expected of law abiding citizens. 30. He has argued that duty of the lawful abiding citizen is not one sided. 29. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondents has argued that anybody who seeks justice must abide by the law himself as would be expected of law abiding citizens. 30. He has argued that duty of the lawful abiding citizen is not one sided. It does not apply to true owner alone but also applies to a trespasser on the principle that “he who seeks equity must do equity”. He has further argued that judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court. He has also argued that the petitioner had entered into a lease agreement with the respondent and was bound by the terms of agreement and even after the agreement came to an end, he should have respected terms of the agreement rather than seeking to take advantage of his own wrong. He has argued that by way of a lease agreement, the petitioner has entered into a contract with the respondent SIRDO and he cannot seek the protection of the Court to wriggle out of the contract. For this purpose, he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Narain Prasad and others, JT 1996 (8) SC 50 and has also relied on State of Rajasthan & Ors. V. Anil Kumar Sunil Kumar & Party and another, JT 2000 (4) SC 186. 31. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused both the orders of trial Court as well as the order of the appellate Court. 32. The admitted position, which emerges is that there was a lease agreement between two parties, which was initially for a period of 11 months and thereafter could have been extended under the terms of the agreement for a maximum period of 33 months. The lease deed was dated 16.10.1993. Therefore the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was found on the lease agreement. There is no dispute about the fact that the lease agreement came to an end on 16.7.1996. After that the possession of the petitioner would be at the most of a tenant who stayed by holding over month by month or at the most for six months under the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 33. There is no dispute about the fact that the lease agreement came to an end on 16.7.1996. After that the possession of the petitioner would be at the most of a tenant who stayed by holding over month by month or at the most for six months under the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 33. In the instant case, the petitioner continued to hold over uptil 31.10.2007 when the petitioner was given a notice to give vacant possession after a period of one month. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the notice to terminate was not a valid notice terminating the tenancy and has cited decisions to the effect that unless the language of the notice clearly explicits that the tenancy itself be terminated, it would not amount to notice of the termination. However such a plea could be taken only when there was a valid tenancy not in a case where the petitioner was continued by way of holding over. 35. Moreover under clause 9 of the agreement, a notice was to be given by the respondent. Even if the notice was not happily worded, the intention of the notice was to give to the petitioner a month’s notice to vacate the premises. The clumsy drafting of the notice would not render the notice either illegal or invalid. 36. In so far as the question of settled possession is concerned, I am not inclined to agree with the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case, because here the petitioner was seeking to take advantage of by holding over. The true owner had resorted to give a legal notice to terminate the holding over thereby bringing a legal end to the holding over. The so-called settled possession as claimed by the petitioner was brought to an end by the issuance of a valid notice to terminate the so-called tenancy. It could not have been claimed thereafter against a true owner. 37. Reference may be had to the contents of para 27 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. It could not have been claimed thereafter against a true owner. 37. Reference may be had to the contents of para 27 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia, (2008) 3 SCC 279 “The occupant may have been a trespasser or may have breached the conditions of the tenancy or may have been occupying the premises as a condition of service but in any of these cases continued to occupy the premises despite cession of contract but the fact remains that no matter what the relationship was, it was brought to an end and after that it ceased to exist. 38. The law is well settled that no judicial proceedings can be initiated to protect or to perpetuate wrongs. 39. The Court below while examining three ingredients that are required for the grant of ad interim injunction also came to the conclusion after examining the facts and circumstances of the case that the petitioner was not able to make out any ground for the grant of ad interim injunction. 40. I am not in agreement with the arguments as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court or the appellate Court has failed to examine the basic ingredients for the grant of ad interim injunction. In so far as the prima facie case is concerned, it is abundantly clear that the lease on the strength of which the petitioner had entered as a tenant, had expired. The petitioner was continuing simply by holding over. In so far as the balance of convenience is concerned, the balance was in favour of the respondents who is the organization which encourages the entrepreneurs to set up more and more new research projects. Their intention by leasing out the premises to the petitioner was not to aid to set up his commercial and manufacturing unit. Moreover the public at large which is desirous to set up the research projects is prevented from getting the new units established if the petitioner is allowed to hold over the premises in dispute his commercial entrepreneurs. The very purpose of giving the shed was not to set up a manufacturing unit for commercial use by the petitioner but to encourage the new entrepreneur such the petitioner for research projects for development of scientific pursuits. 41. The very purpose of giving the shed was not to set up a manufacturing unit for commercial use by the petitioner but to encourage the new entrepreneur such the petitioner for research projects for development of scientific pursuits. 41. Lastly in so far as the irreparable injury is concerned, the petitioner is simply a manufacturing unit and is individual, whereas the public at large benefits if new research projects are set up. No doubt the petitioner was having a manufacturing unit, which employed a few people but when the entire purpose of respondent SIRDO is to encourage research and development work by the new entrepreneurs, it would be in the larger interest and that is much greater than the individual’s interest like the petitioner. 42. Thus in my opinion that both the Courts below have committed no error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to make out a case for grant of injunction. 43. This writ petition is dismissed as above. The observation made by this Court is only with regard to the grant of an ad interim injunction and shall not prejudice the case of the petitioner arising out of the suit to be decided by the Court below. ———