JUDGMENT 1. This is landlord's appeal against the reversing judgment and decree in an eviction suit. 2. Suit accommodation is situated in Narsinghgarh. Suit accommodation is residential situated on the ground floor. There is no dispute as regards the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Plaintiff claimed eviction on three grounds, viz., section 12 (1) (a) (e) and (m) of the Act. Defendant in the written statement denied the claim set up in the plaint. Based upon pleading of the parties, Trial Court framed issues and allowed the parties to adduce evidence. Learned Trials Judge, on appreciation of evidence, found in favour of the plaintiff and passed an eviction decree against the tenant vide judgment and decree dated 8.3.2000. Matter was carried in appeal by the tenant and plaintiff also filed cross-objection against the finding recorded by the Trial Judge on issue No.3 and also sought eviction under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. During the pendency of first appeal, original tenant died therefore, respondents herein, who are the legal representatives of the original tenant, were brought on record. Learned First Appellate Court allowed the tenant's appeal by reversing findings on grounds under section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (l) (m) of the Act. By the impugned judgment and decree, Lower Appellate Court partly allowed the cross-objection and directed tenants to monthly rent @ Rs. 350/- from 1.8.1992. Aggrieved by judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court, plaintiff has now preferred this second appeal. The appeal was admitted on 26.8.2003 for final hearing on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the Lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the decree passed by the trial Court holding that ground under section 12 (1) (e) is made out? Whether the reasoning assigned by the First Appellate Court for non-suiting the plaintiff on ground contained in section 12 (1) (e) of the Act can be regarded reasonable and correct and if so whether decree under section 12 (1) (e) can sustain on those reasoning. Whether on facts pleaded and found proved a case for defendant's eviction under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act is established?" 3. In view of the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission, learned counsel confined submission regarding eviction under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, therefore, we do not have tackle any other issue. Whether on facts pleaded and found proved a case for defendant's eviction under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act is established?" 3. In view of the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission, learned counsel confined submission regarding eviction under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, therefore, we do not have tackle any other issue. However, learned counsel for the appellant in the alternative submitted that he has already filed an application under section 100 (5) of the CPC (IA No. 6996/07) for formulating question of law relating to section 12 (1) (m) without precisely stating the substantial question of law. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the application is devoid of any substance and as such it stands rejected and closed. 4. Now coming to merit of the case, Shri M.G. Upadhyaya, learned counsel appearing for the appellant invited attention to the averments made in the plaint and the evidence adduced by the parties. He contended that Lower Appellate Court not only misread the pleading but also the evidence. According to him, impugned judgment and decree is unsustainable in law and this deserves to be allowed. 5. No doubt, ordinarily, conclusion of the First Appellate Court represent finding of fact and it could not be interfered with by this Court in second appeal. However, it is equally true that when there is no evidence at all or the finding of fact is based upon misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity or finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view. See Neelakantan v. Mallika Begum [ AIR 2002 SC 827 ]. 6. From the material available on record it is clearly established that besides appellant and his wife, there are two major sons and four major daughters. All of them are unmarried and residing together. Appellant's wife is a patient of hyper-tension. From the evidence, it is clear that the space available with the appellant on the first floor is insufficient, keeping in view the large number of members of the family. They have to share bed-room and there is hardly any privacy. After marriage, family will certainly grow and a lot more space and privacy would be required for decent living, if not luxurious. They have to share bed-room and there is hardly any privacy. After marriage, family will certainly grow and a lot more space and privacy would be required for decent living, if not luxurious. Thus, it is clear that entire approach of the learned Lower Appellate Court is unrealistic and as such is unsustainable in law and facts, and if allowed to stand, it would result in travesty of justice. Plaintiff set up and established the bonafide need of himself and his family members in respect of the suit accommodation and for that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation in city concerned. After going through record, we are clearly of the view that the First Appellate Court without assigning sufficient and cogent reasons interfered with the findings of facts recorded by the Trial Court on due and proper appreciation of evidence. These findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are based upon misreading of evidence. Having regard to evidence adduced before it, the Trial Judge came to conclusion that appellant had established his claim for eviction on the bonafide ground, the First Appellate Court could not have reversed the said finding without recording sufficient and cogent reasons therefor. If such reversal the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is allowed to stand then instead of landlord, the Courts would become the rationing authorities regarding the need and suit premises. This is impermissible' ill law and as such findings of the First Appellate Court are unsustainable in law. 7. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is hereby allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the, Trial Court is restored. Impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Narsinghgarh is hereby set aside with costs through out to be borne by the respondent. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000/- if certified.