JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. On receiving a report submitted, under Section 173(2) of the Code, by the police, on completion of investigation of a case, disclosing commission of offence(s) by one or more persons, if a Chief Judicial Magistrate makes over the case for disposal to another Magistrate, subordinate to him, does such making over of the case necessarily denote that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence(s) and, having so taken cognizance, made over the case for enquiry or trial to the magistrate to whom the case was sent for disposal ? If a Judicial Magistrate issues process without condoning the delay, when taking cognizance stands barred by a period of limitation as prescribed in Section 468 of the Code, shall the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section482 of the Code, necessarily and invariably, set aside and quash not only the order taking cognizance, but also the first information report or the complaint, as the case may be, and/or the police report (i.e. charge-sheet) submitted under Section 173(2) ? These are two questions of paramount importance, which this criminal petition, made under Section 482 of the Code, have raised. How to compute the periods of limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), which imposes bar to the taking of cognizance by the Court beyond the prescribed periods of limitation and how to construe the commencement of such a period of limitation under Sections 469 read with Sections 471 and 472 of the Code are the two important questions, which have also arisen for determination in this Criminal Petition. Can a Court suo motu invoke the provisions of Section 473 of the Code for the purpose of extending a period of limitation and for taking of cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation or whether an application, request or prayer is required to be made, in this regard, by the prosecution or the complainant. 2. Can a Court suo motu invoke the provisions of Section 473 of the Code for the purpose of extending a period of limitation and for taking of cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation or whether an application, request or prayer is required to be made, in this regard, by the prosecution or the complainant. 2. Let me, first, take note of the facts and circumstances, which have led to the making of this criminal petition: (i) The Sub-Inspector of Police, Prafulla Bora, lodged an information, in writing, on 10.11.2000, with the Officer-in-Charge Dispur Police Station, alleging, inter alia, thus: on 10.11.2000, when the informant along with his team of police personnel was on duty, at Ganeshguri area, due to 'bandh' call given by a political party, namely, Assam Pradesh Youth Congress-I Party, a group of about 40/50 persons, led by Mrs. Rani Narah, a Member of Parliament, formed an unlawful assembly and forcibly started closing shops and also obstructing the normal flow of traffic. When the police party, led by the informant, raised their objection to such illegal activities of the members of the said political party, the said group of people became violent and started scuffling with the police personnel and obstructed them in discharging their official duties. The rioters damaged the shop causing injuries to the people working there. Treating this information as the First Information Report, Dispur Police Station Case No. 956/2000, under Sections147/325/353/427/448 IPC, was registered and, on completion of investigation, charge sheet was accordingly laid by the police, on 29.05.2004, against as many as 32 persons, including the present petitioner, as accused. (ii) By order, dated 11.10.2004, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, made over the said case, for disposal, to a Judicial Magistrate, at Guwahati, who, in turn, passed an order, dated 29.10.2004, directing issuance of summons to the accused persons. Without appearing in the case pursuant to the processes issued by the Court, a petition was filed, on 09.09.2005, by the accused-petitioner, Rani Norah, stating to the effect, inter alia, that since the charge-sheet had been filed, in the case aforementioned, upon expiry of the period of limitation, the taking of cognizance of the offences was barred by the provisions of Section 468 of the Code and, hence, the proceedings of the case, as a whole, be dropped. The learned Judicial Magistrate, then, passed an order, on 14.09.2005, indicating therein to the effect that the case had been made over to her, for the purpose of trial, in terms of Section 192 of the Code, and, hence, when the cognizance of the offences had already been taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, she (i.e., the learned Magistrate, who had come in seisin of the case), had no power to drop the proceeding as had been sought for. The prayer for dropping of the proceeding was accordingly rejected. It is this order, dated 14-09-2005, which stands impugned in the present application made under Section of the Code. 3. By making this application under Section 482 of the Code, one of the accused-petitioners, namely, Rani Narha, has sought to get set aside and quashed not merely the order taking cognizance, but the entire criminal proceeding including the charge-sheet. 4. I have heard Mr. H.L. Maurya, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. B.B. Gogoi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam, appearing on behalf of the opposite party. 5. Presenting the case on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Mr. Maurya, learned Counsel, has submitted to the effect, inter alia, that in the present case, the learned trial Court has taken cognizance of the offences aforementioned without application of mind inasmuch as the very filing of the charge-sheet against the accused-petitioner was beyond the period of limitation prescribed by law and, hence, the learned Court below could not have taken cognizance of the offences aforementioned without condoning the delay. As the delay was not condoned, the entire proceeding is, according to Mr. Maurya, without jurisdiction and, hence, the learned trial Court ought to have closed the proceeding in terms of the prayer made by the accused-petitioner. 6. While resisting the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Mr. B.B. Gogoi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, does not contend that at the time, when the Court took cognizance, taking of such cognizance stood barred by the period of limitation prescribed in this regard. 6. While resisting the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Mr. B.B. Gogoi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, does not contend that at the time, when the Court took cognizance, taking of such cognizance stood barred by the period of limitation prescribed in this regard. What has, however, been contended, on behalf of the prosecution, is that though there was no specific prayer made by the prosecution for condonation of delay, the very fact that a charge-sheet had been laid, in the learned Court below, seeking prosecution of the accused for offences committed by them, reflected that the prosecution of the accused had been sought by extending the period of limitation. 7. Before I deal with the relative merit of the rival submissions, made before me, it needs to be pointed out, at the very outset, that Section 468 of the Code bars the Courts from taking cognizance of offences beyond the periods of limitation prescribed therefor. 8. Though the accused-petitioner applied to the learned Court below praying for dropping the proceeding on the ground that the offence(s), alleged to have been committed, stand barred by the periods of limitation prescribed therefor, the learned Judicial Magistrate rejected this prayer by assigning reasons for not allowing the accused-petitioner's prayer. The reasons, assigned in the impugned order, dated 14.09.2005, are, in brief, thus: It is only Section 192 of the Code, which enables a Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over a case, for enquiry or trial, to a Judicial Magistrate subordinate to him and this power is exercisable by a Chief Judicial Magistrate only upon taking cognizance of the offence(s) and, in the present case, when the Chief Judicial Magistrate has made over the case for disposal, it necessarily implies that cognizance has already been taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before making over the case for disposal and, hence, when cognizance has already been taken, the criminal proceeding cannot be dropped on the ground that taking cognizance of the offence(s), in question, stood barred by the periods of limitation prescribed therefor. 9. 9. In the face of the reasons assigned by the learned Magistrate, in the impugned order, dated 14.09.2005, declining to drop the proceeding, it is, to my mind, of utmost importance to decide as to whether, in the present case, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate can be legally treated to have taken cognizance before making over of the case, on 11.10.2004, for disposal, to the learned Judicial Magistrate, who has passed the impugned order. However, in order to decide the question as to whether the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the present case, can be said to have taken cognizance, what needs to be, first, ascertained is as to what 'cognizance' means, when and how a Magistrate can take 'cognizance' of an offence or when can a Magistrate be said to have taken 'cognizance'. 10. While considering the above aspects of law, it is necessary to bear in mind that 'cognizance' has not been defined under the Code. The word 'cognizance' really indicates the stage, when a Magistrate or a Judge, first, takes judicial notice of offence(s) and not of person(s) accused of such offence(s). In view of the fact that it is Section 190 of the Code, which deals with taking of cognizance of offences by a Magistrate, it is appropriate that the provisions of this Section are taken note of Section 190 runs as follows: 190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class especially empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2) may take cognizance of any offence- (a) Upon receipt of a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence, (b) Upon a police report of such facts; (c) Upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 11. A patient reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 clearly shows that a Magistrate can take 'cognizance' of an offence in three distinct circumstances, namely, (a) upon receipt of a 'complaint' of facts, which constitute such offence, (b) upon a 'police report' of such facts and (c) upon 'information' received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own 'knowledge' that such offence has been committed. Thus, Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190set out three distinct modes for taking of cognizance by Magistrates. 12. Let me, first, deal with the question as to when and how a Magistrate can take, or be said to have taken, 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'police report'. While considering this aspect of the matter, it needs to be pointed out that Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 provides that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced, in writing, by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed by the person giving it. Sub-section (1) of Section 156 vests, in the officer-in-charge of a police station, the power to investigate any cognizable case without the order of a magistrate and Sub-section (3) of that Section authorises the Magistrate, empowered under Section 190, to order an investigation as mentioned in Sub-section (I) of Section 156. What is, now, pertinent to note is that while Section 156(1) permits a police officer to investigate a cognizable case, Section 155(2) bars the police from investigating a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate, who has the power to try the case or commit the case for trial. When, however, a police officer receives, in terms of Section 156(3), from a Magistrate, an order to investigate a non-cognizable case, he will have, according to Section 155(3), same powers of investigation as he has in a cognizable case. What shall the Officer-in-Charge of a police station do on completion of investigation is set out in Section 173. Sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 provides that as soon as investigation is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station concerned shall forward to the Magistrate, empowered to take 'cognizance' of the offence on a 'police report', a report, in the form prescribed by the State Government, setting out various particulars including whether, in the opinion of the officer, any offence appears to have been committed and if so by whom. The report, so submitted, stands defined, under Section 2(r) of the Code, as the 'police report'. The report, so submitted, stands defined, under Section 2(r) of the Code, as the 'police report'. Thus, the police report, which Section 190(1)(b) speaks of, is, as defined in Section 2(r) of the Code, the report, which is forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Sub-section (2) of Section 173. When such a police report is received by a Magistrate, what option(s) the Magistrate has stands succinctly described in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Anr., reported in (1985) 2 SCC 531, wherein a three Judge Bench, speaking through Bhagwati, J, (as His Lordship then was), observed thus, "Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in-charge of a police station to the Magistrate under Sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things: (1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or (3) he may direct further investigation under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report. The report may, on the other hand, state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate, again, has an option to adopt one of three courses: (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under Sub-section (3) of Section 156." 13. In sum, when a Magistrate considers a police report submitted to him under Section 173(2), he has three options, namely, (i) that he may, upon finding that the investigation does not disclose commission of any offence(s), drop the proceeding or (ii) he may direct further investigation or (iii) he may take cognizance of offence(s) as may be disclosed by the police report and issue process(es) to the person(s) accused of having committed the offence(s). 14. 14. What emerges from the above discussion is that when a Magistrate considers the question as to whether a police report discloses commission of offence(s), which he is competent to try or competent to commit for trial, and, upon such consideration, when he forms the opinion that the investigation discloses commission of offence(s) and decides to issue process, the Magistrate shall be said to have taken 'cognizance' inasmuch as he could not have directed issuance of process without taking 'cognizance'. Though, ideally, an order, taking 'cognizance', must be a speaking order, yet even when an order, whereby process is issued, is not a speaking order, it will nevertheless be regarded as an order having been passed on taking cognizance, for, as already indicated hereinbefore, no process can be directed to be issued by a Magistrate on the basis of a police report without taking cognizance. 15. Let me, now, turn to the question as to when and how a Magistrate can take 'cognizance' or can be said to have taken 'cognizance' of offence under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, i.e., upon receipt of a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence. This aspect of law necessarily involves analysis of the provisions of Sections 200 202 203 and 204. Section 200 of the Code, if I may point out, reads as follows: 200. Examination of complainant.-A Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint, shall examine, upon oath, the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses - (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint, or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not: re-examine them. 16. Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not: re-examine them. 16. Whether a Magistrate has or has not taken, on the basis of a complaint, cognizance of an offence may, in a given case, be reflected by the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court, in R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in quoted with approval the observations made by Kulada Charan Das Gupta, J, in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerji, AIR 1950 Cal 437 , with regard to the question as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'complaint'. The relevant observations read thus, "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a) Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter - proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence." 17. From what has been observed above, it clearly transpires that when, on receiving a 'complaint', the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding Sections in Chapter XV of the Code, he is said to have taken 'cognizance' of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). From what has been observed above, it clearly transpires that when, on receiving a 'complaint', the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding Sections in Chapter XV of the Code, he is said to have taken 'cognizance' of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, the Magistrate has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as, issuing a search warrant or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. (See also Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors., reported in 1976 CriLJ 1361 ). 18. What surfaces from the above discussion is that the process of taking of 'cognizance' under Clause (a) of Section 190, (i.e., upon receipt of a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence) is distinct and different from the manner in which 'cognizance' is taken under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, i.e., upon a police report of such facts. Taking of cognizance, in the case of a complaint, implies application of mind by a Magistrate to the contents of a complaint in order to decide as to whether the complaint discloses commission of offence(s) and whether he shall proceed to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any, present and, upon such consideration, when he examines the complainant, he can be safely held to have taken cognizance, for, he could not have examined the complainant, under Section 200, without taking cognizance. On the other hand, taking of cognizance, on the basis of a police report submitted under Section 173(2), implies application of mind by a Magistrate to the contents of such a police report to determine if there are materials reflecting commission of offence(s), which he is competent to try or commit for trial, and, upon such consideration, when he decides to issue process, he can be safely held to have taken cognizance, for, he could not have issued process without taking cognizance. It is for this reason that in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, the Apex Court has held that when a Magistrate initially applies his mind to the contents of a complaint, becomes conscious and aware of the allegations made therein and decide to examine the validity of the said complaint by examining the complainant, he can be said to have taken cognizance. 19. In short, in the light of the decision in Abani Kumar Banerji (supra) approved in R.R. Chari (supra) and in view of what Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) lays down, it is abundantly clear that when a Magistrate applies his mind to the contents of a complaint for the purpose of proceeding in accordance with the subsequent provisions of the Code, particularly, Section 200 thereof, he can be taken to have taken cognizance. When, however, the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XV of the Code, but for taking action of some other kind, such as, ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or directing issuance of search warrant, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 20. It is also wroth noticing that the proviso to Section 200 makes it abundantly clear that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not necessary, when the complaint is made, in writing, by a public servant or when a Magistrate makes over the case, for inquiry and trial, by another Magistrate under Section 192 of the Code. If a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, he must (i) examine, on oath, the complainant, though the complaint may be in writing and the witnesses present, if any, and (ii) reduce the substance of such examination to writing. By examining the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, what the Magistrate essentially does is to determine as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. If the Magistrate is of the opinion, on examining the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200, that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he can issue process in terms of Section 204 of the Code. If the Magistrate is of the opinion, on examining the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200, that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he can issue process in terms of Section 204 of the Code. When, after examining of the complainant and the witnesses, if present, in terms of Section 200, the Magistrate finds that there exists some materials against the accused, but the same are insufficient for issuance of process, the appropriate statutory mechanism is engrafted under Section 202, which empowers the Magistrate to either direct investigation or inquire into the cast; himself to decide if the process deserves to be issued against the accused. This inquiry or investigation is really for the purpose of determining as to whether there is sufficient grounds for proceeding. If the Magistrate chooses to hold the inquiry himself under Section 202 of the Code, this inquiry may result into either, as already mentioned above, issuance of processes against the accused under Section 204 or dismissal thereof under Section 203, for, Section 203 makes it clear that if, upon considering the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation, if any, under Section 202, the Magistrate is of the opinion that sufficient grounds do not exist for proceeding further, it is obligatory on him to dismiss the complaint, though, while dismissing the complaint, the Magistrate is duty bound to record reasons for so doing. 21. Let me, now, turn to the question as to how and when can a Magistrate be said to have taken cognizance under Clause (c) of Section 190(1)(c), i.e., upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. 22. In order to effectively understand as to when and how a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance under Clause (c) of Section 190, a careful reading of Section 191 too is imperative. Section 191 reads: 191. Transfer on application of the accused. 22. In order to effectively understand as to when and how a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance under Clause (c) of Section 190, a careful reading of Section 191 too is imperative. Section 191 reads: 191. Transfer on application of the accused. - When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, the accused shall, before any evidence is taken, be informed that he is entitled to have the case enquired into or tried by another Magistrate, and if the accused or any of the accused, if there be more than one, objects to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking cognizance, the case shall be transferred to such other Magistrate as may be specified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this behalf. 23. From a bare reading of Section 191, what becomes transparent is that in a case, where cognizance of offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Section 190(1)(c), it is obligatory for the Magistrate to inform the accused before the evidence is taken that he (accused) is entitled to have the case inquired into or tried by another Magistrate and if the accused or any of the accused, if there be more than one, objects to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(c), the case shall be transferred to such other Magistrate as may be specified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this behalf. These provisions, contained in Section 191, show that the obligation to inform the accused that he is entitled to have the case enquired into or tried by another Magistrate arises only when the stage of taking of evidence is reached meaning thereby that there is no impediment to the issuance of process by the Magistrate on the basis of the 'information' received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own 'knowledge' as contemplated by Clause (c) of Section 190. Thus, when the provisions, contained in Section 190(1)(c), are read in the light of the provisions contained in Section 191, it logically follows that when a Magistrate, upon receiving 'information' or upon his own 'knowledge', as envisaged by Section 190(1)(c), decides to issue process, he can be treated to have taken cognizance. Thus, when the provisions, contained in Section 190(1)(c), are read in the light of the provisions contained in Section 191, it logically follows that when a Magistrate, upon receiving 'information' or upon his own 'knowledge', as envisaged by Section 190(1)(c), decides to issue process, he can be treated to have taken cognizance. I may, however, hasten to point out that there is a difference between information, which indicates commission of offence, and a complaint, for, a complaint, as defined in Section 2(d), means any allegation made, orally or in writing, to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Thus, in order to be a complaint, the contents thereof must not only disclose that an offence has been committed, but it must also show that the person, who makes accusations, wants that action be taken by the Magistrate on his accusations. If, on the other hand, a mere information of commission of an offence is received by a Magistrate, it is not a 'complaint'; yet, on the basis of such 'information' too, a Magistrate is entitled, under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, to take cognizance of the offence(s), which such 'information' may disclose. 24. In the light of what has been discussed above, two important questions, which fall for determination, are: (i) when a Chief Judicial Magistrate, upon receiving a 'police report' under Section173(2), which may or may not reflect commission of offence, makes over a case to another Magistrate, subordinate to him, for disposal, does this act of the Chief Judicial Magistrate necessarily imply that the Chief Judicial magistrate has made over the case, for inquiry or trial, after having taken 'cognizance' ? and (ii) When a Chief Judicial Magistrate, upon receiving a complaint of facts, which may or may not constitute offence, makes over a case to another Magistrate, subordinate to him, for disposal, does this act of the Chief Judicial Magistrate necessarily denote that the Chief Judicial magistrate has made over the case, for inquiry or trial, after having taken cognizance ? Effective answers to these questions would not possible to reach without careful analysis of not only the provisions of Section 192 of this Code, but also of all other provisions, contained in the Code, relevant thereto. 25. Effective answers to these questions would not possible to reach without careful analysis of not only the provisions of Section 192 of this Code, but also of all other provisions, contained in the Code, relevant thereto. 25. Let me, first, take note of the provisions of Section 192. This Section reads: 192. Making over of cases to Magistrates.-(1) Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him. (2) Any Magistrate of the first class empowered in this behalf by the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry or trial to such other competent Magistrate as the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, by general or special order, specify, and thereupon such Magistrate may hold the inquiry or trial. 26. A minute reading of Section 192 shows that a Chief Judicial Magistrate is empowered to make over, after taking 'cognizance', the case, for enquiry or trial, to any competent magistrate subordinate to him. What is equally important to note is that under Section 192(2), even a Judicial Magistrate of 1st class, if empowered, in this behalf, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, may, after taking 'cognizance' of an offence, make over the case, for enquiry or trial, to any competent Magistrate. It is, therefore, not correct to take the view that it is only a Chief Judicial Magistrate, who can make over a case, after taking 'cognizance' of offence(s), to another Magistrate for enquiry or trial. 27. The question, now, is as to whether there is any other provision in the Code, which empowers a Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over, without taking 'cognizance' of a case, for enquiry or trial, to another magistrate ? This question brings me to Section 410 of the Code. In order to correctly appreciate the scope of Section 410, one has to keep in view the provisions of Sections 408 409410 and 411. These Sections are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: 408. Power of Sessions Judge to transfer cases and appeals - (1) Whenever it is made to appear to a Sessions Judge that an order under this sub-section is expedient for the ends of justice, he may order that any particular case be transferred from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in his sessions division. Power of Sessions Judge to transfer cases and appeals - (1) Whenever it is made to appear to a Sessions Judge that an order under this sub-section is expedient for the ends of justice, he may order that any particular case be transferred from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in his sessions division. (2) The Sessions Judge may act either on the report of the lower Court, or on the application of a party interested or on his own initiative. (3) The provisions of Sub-sections (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) of Section407 shall apply in relation to an application to the Sessions Judge for an order under Sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to an application to the High Court for an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 407, except that Sub-section (7) of that section shall so apply as if for the words "one thousand rupees" occurring therein, the words "two hundred and fifty rupees" were substituted. 409. Withdrawal of cases and appeals by Sessions Judges.-(1) A Sessions Judge may withdraw any case or appeal from, or recall any case or appeal which he has made over to/any Assistant Sessions Judge or Chief Judicial Magistrate subordinate to him. (2) At any time before the trial of the case or the hearing of the appeal has commenced before the Additional Sessions Judge, as Sessions Judge may recall any case or appeal which he has made over to any Additional Sessions Judge. (3) Where a Sessions Judge withdraws or recalls a case or appeal under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) he may either try the case in his own Court or hear the appeal himself, or make it over in accordance with the provisions of this Code to another Court for trial or hearing, as the case may be. 410. Withdrawal of cases by Judicial Magistrates.-(1) Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may withdraw any case from, or recall any case which he has made over to/any Magistrate subordinate to him, and may inquire into or try such case himself, or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other such Magistrate competent to inquire into or try the same. (2) Any Judicial Magistrate may recall any case made over by him under Sub-section (2) of Section 192 to any other Magistrate and may require into or try such cases himself. 411. (2) Any Judicial Magistrate may recall any case made over by him under Sub-section (2) of Section 192 to any other Magistrate and may require into or try such cases himself. 411. Making over or withdrawal of cases by Executive Magistrates.-Any District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may- (a) make over, for disposal, any proceeding which has been started before him, to any Magistrate subordinate to him; (b) withdraw any case from, or recall any case which he has made over to/any Magistrate subordinate to him, and dispose of such proceeding himself or refer it for disposal to any other Magistrate. 28. A careful reading of the provisions, contained in Sections 408 to 411, clearly shows that Section408 empowers a Sessions Judge to transfer cases and appeals from one criminal Court to another criminal Court in his sessions division; whereas Section 409 empowers the Sessions Judge to withdraw, subject to certain conditions, any case or appeal, within his sessions division, or recall any case or appeal, which he might have himself made over, and, then, either try the case in his own Court or hear the appeal himself, or make it over, in accordance with the provisions of the Code, to another Court for trial or hearing, as the case may be. Thus, the power to transfer a case from one Court to another is quite different from withdrawing a case or recalling a case and, thereafter, making over the same, for trial, to another judicial officer. Had the 'transfer' of a case from one Court to another, on the one hand, and 'withdrawal' or 're-call' of a case and, then, making over the case to another Court, on the other hand, been one and the same thing, the Code would have incorporated two distinct provisions in the form of Sections 408 and 409. 29. Turning to Section 410, it needs to be pointed out that a microscopic reading of Section 410shows that this Section empowers a Chief Judicial Magistrate to withdraw a case or re-call a case and, upon such withdrawal or re-call, to make over the case to any Magistrate for inquiry or trial. Thus, Section 410 does not conceive of initial making over of the case by the Chief Judicial Magistrate to another Magistrate for inquiry or trial. Thus, Section 410 does not conceive of initial making over of the case by the Chief Judicial Magistrate to another Magistrate for inquiry or trial. Hence, on receiving a 'police report', in terms of Section173(2), or on receiving a complaint, as defined in Section 2(d), when a Chief Judicial Magistrate makes over the case, for disposal, to another Judicial Magistrate subordinate to him, the Chief Judicial Magistrate does not really exercise powers vested in him under Section 410, for, Section 410can be taken recourse to only after a case, which the Chief Judicial Magistrate had already made over to a Judicial Magistrate, is, first, withdrawn or recalled and, then, made over, for inquiry or trial, to yet another Magistrate. That Section 410 does not empower a Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over a complaint or a police report, on receiving the same, to a Judicial magistrate without having withdrawn or recalled from another Magistrate becomes crystal clear, when one carefully analyses the provisions of Section 411, for, Section 411 not only empowers a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate to withdraw a case or recall a case and, then, make over the same, for disposal, to another Magistrate, but also enables the District Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, as the case may be, to make over a case, for disposal, at the very initial stage, when the case is instituted or which has been started before them. In short, thus, Section 410 is not the Section, which a Chief Judicial Magistrate resorts to, while making over a case to a Magistrate subordinate to him on receipt of a complaint or a police report; rather, Section 410 is resorted to only when a Chief Judicial Magistrate, having already made over a case, for enquiry or trial, to another Magistrate, withdraws the same or recalls the same and, then, makes over the case to a Magistrate other than the one to whom the case was earlier made over. 30. 30. A combined reading of Section 410 and 411 clearly reveals that under Section 411, while a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate has the power to make over a case to any Magistrate for disposal and also to make over such case upon withdrawing or recalling the same from another Magistrate, a Chief Judicial Magistrate's power, under Section 410, is confined to withdrawing or recalling of a case and, then, making over the case for enquiry or trial. One has to, therefore, necessarily lay his hands on some provisions of the Code, other than Sections 192 and410, which enable a Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over, without taking cognizance, a case, arising out of a police report or a complaint, to another Magistrate subordinate to him. 31. From what has been discussed above, what becomes clear is that had Section 192 been the only Section, which enables a Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over a case, for enquiry or trial, to another Magistrate, there could not have been an escape from the conclusion that whenever a Chief Judicial Magistrate makes over a case, for enquiry or trial, to another Magistrate, he shall be deemed to have taken cognizance, be the case one, which is instituted on the basis of a police report or a complaint. The fall-out of the limitation imposed by Section 192 would have been that whenever a case, arising out of a police report or complaint, was required to be made over by a Chief Judicial Magistrate to another Magistrate, such making over of the case would not have been possible without taking cognizance. The logical consequence of such a position of law would have been that a Judicial Magistrate, on receiving the case, could not have, if the case was instituted on the basis of a police report, dropped the proceeding or directed further investigation as laid down in Bhagwant Singh (supra) nor could a Judicial Magistrate have, if the case was instituted on the basis of a 'complaint', sent the 'complaint' to police for 'investigation' in terms of Section 156(3), for, the Chief Judicial Magistrate would have, in all such cases, be deemed to have already taken 'cognizance' and, then, made over the case for enquiry or trial. 32. At a given station, filing of complaint and police reports may run into thousands. 32. At a given station, filing of complaint and police reports may run into thousands. Even in the district of Kamrup, the filing of complaint and the police report is, on an average, more than 20,000 in number. In such circumstances, at a heavier station, the Chief Judicial Magistrate would have only been taking cognizance and making over cases, for inquiry or trial, to the Magistrates, subordinate to him, for, at a heavier station, the Chief Judicial Magistrate would have had no time to try any case. Such an unworkable scheme of administration of criminal justice could not have been conceived by the legislature, while enacting the Code. The answer has to be, therefore, discernible from the scheme of the Code itself. 33. A search for an answer to the question as to whether there is any provision in the Code, other than Section 192 and/or Section 410, empowering a Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over, without taking 'cognizance', a case, on receiving a complaint or a police report, to another Magistrate, for disposal, brings me to Section 15 of the Code. This Section reads as follows: 15. Subordination of Judicial Magistrates.-(1) Every Chief Judicial Magistrate shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge; and every other Judicial Magistrate shall, subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge, be subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules or give special orders, consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of business among the Judicial Magistrates subordinate to him. 34. A minute reading of Section 15(2) shows that a Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules, consistent with the Code, as to the distribution of business among the judicial magistrates subordinate to him. Section 15(2) also empowers the Chief Judicial Magistrate to give special orders, consistent with the Code, as to the distribution of business among the judicial magistrates subordinate to him. The power, so vested in a Chief Judicial Magistrate, under Section15, is an administrative power. Thus, a Chief Judicial Magistrate can either frame rules or give special orders as to the distribution of business among the judicial magistrates subordinate to him. The special order can be in respect of a class of cases or in respect of a specific or a particular case. Thus, a Chief Judicial Magistrate can either frame rules or give special orders as to the distribution of business among the judicial magistrates subordinate to him. The special order can be in respect of a class of cases or in respect of a specific or a particular case. When a Chief Judicial Magistrate makes over a case, for disposal, to a magistrate subordinate to him, it is a special order within the administrative competence of the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 15(2) and, in such a case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate cannot be treated to have taken 'cognizance', for, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, in such a case, does nothing more than passes an administrative order making over the case, for disposal, to a magistrate subordinate to him. 35. It is only when a Chief Judicial Magistrate, upon receiving a complaint, applies his mind to the contents of the complaint and decide to examine the complainant under Section 200, can he be said to have taken the cognizance of the offence(s) on the basis of the complaint. If, however, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, instead of examining the complainant or directing that the complainant be examined under Section 200, orders issuance of search warrant or orders investigation by the police in terms of Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken 'cognizance'. Similarly, when a Chief Judicial Magistrate, on receipt of a police report under Section 173(2), decides to issue process against the accused, he can be said to have taken cognizance, for, he could not have issued process without taking cognizance; but if a Chief Judicial Magistrate, for the purpose of distribution of cases, sends or makes over the police report to another Magistrate for disposal, the Chief Judicial Magistrate cannot be treated to have already taken cognizance. 36. In short, when, for the purpose of distribution of cases, a Chief Judicial Magistrate merely makes over a case, on receiving a police report, for disposal, to another Magistrate subordinate to him, such an order is really an administrative order within the ambit of Section 15(2) and in such a case, as the Chief Judicial Magistrate has not taken cognizance, provisions of Section 192 would not be applicable. Similarly, when a Chief Judicial Magistrate, on receiving a complaint, merely sends or makes over the same, for disposal, to another Magistrate subordinate to him, such sending or making over of the case is in exercise of the administrative powers under Section 15(2) and, in such a case, the Magistrate, to whom the case is sent or made over, will remain free to either send the complaint to the police in exercise of his powers, under Section 156(3), for investigation or he may take cognizance and proceed to examine the complainant under Section 200. 37. In the backdrop of the law, as discussed above, let me, now, revert to the order, dated 11.10.2004, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guwahati. This order shows that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate did not take cognizance on the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the police, for, by order, dated 11.10.2004, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate merely made over the case, for disposal, to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, who has passed the impugned order, dated 14.09.2005. In the face of the fact that the order, dated 11.10.2004, aforementioned does not reflect that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance, it logically follows that the view expressed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, in the order dated 14.09.2005, to the effect that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had made over the case after taking cognizance is palpably incorrect. It logically follows that the case has proceeded not on the basis of the order, dated 11.10.2004, but by the order, dated 14.09.2005, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate directing issuance of process to the accused. Strictly speaking, therefore, there has been no application of mind by the learned Court below to the question of condonation of delay, which the present accused-petitioner has raised or to the question of granting of extension of the period of limitation. It is appropriate, at this stage, to take note of the relevant provisions contained in Chapter XXXVI of the Code, which impose bar to the taking of cognizance upon lapse of the prescribed periods of limitation. The relevant provisions, contained in this Chapter, are, therefore, reproduced herein-below: 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. It is appropriate, at this stage, to take note of the relevant provisions contained in Chapter XXXVI of the Code, which impose bar to the taking of cognizance upon lapse of the prescribed periods of limitation. The relevant provisions, contained in this Chapter, are, therefore, reproduced herein-below: 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. - (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be - (a) Six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) One year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) Three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. 469. Commencement of the period of limitation. - (1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offence, shall commence, (a) On the date of the offence; or (b) Where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) Where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded. 470. Exclusion of time in certain cases. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded. 470. Exclusion of time in certain cases. - (1) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded: Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which suffers from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) Where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been stayed by an injunction or order, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded. (3) Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender - (a) Has been absent from India or from any territory outside India which is under the administration of the Central Government, or (b) Has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded. 471. Exclusion of date on which Court is closed. - Where the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed, the Court may take cognizance on the day on which the Court reopens. 473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. - Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitations, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. 38. 38. A conjoint reading of Sections 468 and 473 of the Code shows that while Section 468 bars Courts from taking cognizance of the offences of the categories specified in Section 468(2), whereunder time frames have been prescribed as the periods of limitation, Section 473 permits the Court to take cognizance of an offence even after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation provided that the Court is satisfied, in the context of the facts and circumstances of a given case, that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. 39. A closer look into the provisions of Section 473 of the Code clearly shows that this Section starts with anon-obstente clause, which reads, "notwithstanding to anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter". This, in turn, means that notwithstanding the bar, which stands imposed by Section 468 of the Code, on the Court's power to take cognizance of an offence beyond the prescribed period of limitation, a Court, may, in a given case, if satisfied, that 'the delay has been properly explained' or 'that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice', take cognizance of an offence even after the period of limitation stands expired. The granting of such extension or taking of such cognizance beyond the period of limitation would obviously mean that the Court has invoked its powers under Section 473 and has condoned the delay provided, of course, that the order, taking such cognizance, reflects judicial application of mind by the court to the question of delay, for, no exercise of judicial power can be mechanical or without application of mind. 40. What is, now, of utmost importance to note is that a microscopic reading of Section 473indicates that it is permissible for a Court to take cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation under two different conditions. One condition is that before such cognizance is taken, the Court must be satisfied that the delay has been explained ; whereas the other condition is that the Court shall be satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to condone the delay. One condition is that before such cognizance is taken, the Court must be satisfied that the delay has been explained ; whereas the other condition is that the Court shall be satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to condone the delay. Unless a different intent can be attributed to the provisions of Section 473, one has no option, but to construe the two expressions, 'the delay has been properly explained' and 'it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice', disjunctively and not conjunctively. When construed in this light, it logically follows that though ordinarily, a Court can take cognizance of an offence only when the police or the complainant has explained the delay in not presenting the police report or complaint, as the case may be, within the period of limitation, the fact remains that in a given case, even if there is no formal application or prayer made for condonation of delay, the Court is not powerless in condoning the delay and taking cognizance of the offence if it is satisfied that the condonation of such delay is necessary in the interest of justice. 41. Coupled with the above, what is also imperative to note is that when a State launches prosecution against a person as an accused, the State also represents the interest of the person, who is aggrieved by the commission of such offence. Victomology has developed into a recognized aspect of criminal jurisprudence. Every provision of penal as well as procedural law has to take into account the interest of the victim, while construing or interpreting such a provision. The expression, 'it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice' reflects the legislative concern for the unseen victim or for the unseen aggrieved party, the protection of whose interest becomes, undoubtedly, the duty of the Court too. 42. What surfaces from the above discussion is that though it is true that the prosecution or the complainant should be the one to seek condonation of delay in a case, where taking of the cognizance is barred by a prescribed period of limitation, the fact remains that it the duty of the Court too to appreciate that when a charge-sheet or a complaint is filed after expiry of the period of limitation, there is an implied prayer for condonation of delay. This apart, before the Court refuses to take cognizance of an offence on the basis of a belatedly filed police report (i.e., charge-sheet) or complaint, it is in the interest of the real victim, who may not be before the Court, that the Court looks into such materials, which may be available on record or collect such materials as may be warranted in a given case, and, then, determine for itself if the materials on record explain the reason(s) for the delay or if the interest of justice necessitates condoning of the delay in laying belatedly such police report or complaint. 43. While considering the above aspects of the case, it is pertinent to note that though Section 469describes the point of time from when the period of limitation commences, the fact remains that in a given case, the police may not have been able to submit charge-sheet, because of the reason that forensic report has not been made available or some material articles could not be seized or effective interrogation of the accused had not been possible due to the fact that the accused had been evading police or absconding. In such circumstances, the perusal of the case diary may itself reflect the cause(s) of delay. In such a situation, it would be, contrary to the legislative intent expressed in Section 473, to contend that the Court is powerless to look into the causes of delay on its own motion and condone, suo moto, in a given case, the delay if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant in the interest of justice. 44. It is worth pointing out that Chapter XXXVI of the Code, which prescribes various periods of limitation, was introduced, for the first time, in 1973. Before the provisions, prescribing various periods of limitation, were incorporated in the Code, the delayed launching of prosecution was a relevant factor, while adjudging the truth or veracity of the prosecution's version of the occurrence. The need to prescribe a period of limitation was considered advisable for several reasons. Lapse of time has the effect of weakening and, at times, obliterating the memory of the witnesses and, sometimes, the evidence itself may disappear. Larger interest of peace in the society too requires that even an offender be left to rest after a reasonable lapse of time. Lapse of time has the effect of weakening and, at times, obliterating the memory of the witnesses and, sometimes, the evidence itself may disappear. Larger interest of peace in the society too requires that even an offender be left to rest after a reasonable lapse of time. Deterrent and retributory punishments get denuded of their effect after a reasonable period of time. This apart, introduction of the period of imitation was considered necessary to put pressure on the prosecutors and/or complainants to expedite bringing of their grievances to the Court at the earliest. With these objects in view, Section 468 of the Code prescribes, six months, one year and three years limitation for offences punishable with fine, punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years respectively. 45. However, while making the special provisions as regards limitation, the Parliament has enacted Section 473 giving overriding effect over all earlier Sections and vesting a discretionary jurisdiction in the criminal court empowering it to take cognizance of an offence despite expiry of the period of limitation if the court is satisfied, in the facts and circumstances of a given case, that the delay has been properly explained or if it is satisfied that the interests of justice warrant taking of cognizance of the offence(s) even if the period of limitation stands expired. The legislature, in their wisdom, chose not to enumerate any circumstances or lay down concrete guidelines, which would enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 473. The Parliament appears to have, even after prescribing various periods of limitation, considered it necessary that wider interest of the society or the citizens may, in a given case, justify taking of cognizance beyond expiry of a prescribed period of limitation. It is in this perspective that the provisions of Section 473 need to be considered. 46. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that under the Limitation Act, which applies to civil proceedings, extension of the period of limitation or condonation of delay is possible only when the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court, as embodied in Section 5, that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period of limitation. As against this, Section 473 gives absolutely no indication that a formal application has to be made by the police or the complainant, as the case may be, for the purpose of enabling the Court to take cognizance of an offence by extending the period of limitation. Far from this, Section 473 merely requires that the Court shall be satisfied, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. 47. Noticing the underlying difference between the provisions of Sections 468 and 473 of the Code, on the one hand, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on the other, the Apex Court, in Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt) v. Vanka Venkata Reddy and Ors., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 4 , observed: 6. At times it has come to our notice that many courts are treating the provisions of Section 468 and Section 473 of the Code as provisions parallel to the periods of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the requirement of satisfying the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of that Act. There is a basic difference between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code. For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas Section 473 enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such, whenever the bar of Section468 is applicable, the court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. If the power under Section 473 of the Code is to be exercised in the interests of justice, then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture, cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a deeper examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim : vigilantibus, et non, dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences relating to cruelty against women. 48. Thus, Section 473 does not contemplate making of any application by the prosecutor or a prayer being made to the Court. Section 473 is a discretionary jurisdiction, which the court can exercise suo motu and without, in a given case, being asked for. The legislative intent is that it is for the court, exercising criminal jurisdiction, to examine and ascertain if the delay has been properly explained or whether the interests of justice warrant extension of the period of limitation. Any other interpretation would defeat the legislative intents for incorporating the provisions of extension of the period of limitation in the Code with the help of Section 473. It must, however, be borne in mind that every order, whether extending the period of limitation or refusing to the extent the period of limitation, must assign cogent reasons thereof. 49. In the present case, it is, to my mind, necessary to clarify that Chapter XXXVI of the Code applies to the delay in instituting the prosecution and not to the delay in taking of cognizance. As a corollary, it becomes evident that when a complaint or a police report is filed within the period of limitation, the court will remain competent to take cognizance even after the period of limitation has expired, for, as already indicated hereinbefore, Chapter XXXVI of the Code applies to the making of the complaint or filing of the police report. As a corollary, it becomes evident that when a complaint or a police report is filed within the period of limitation, the court will remain competent to take cognizance even after the period of limitation has expired, for, as already indicated hereinbefore, Chapter XXXVI of the Code applies to the making of the complaint or filing of the police report. Though the language, appearing in Chapter XXXVI of the Code, reflects that taking of cognizance is barred by the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact as to whether the complaint or police report was filed within the period of limitation or upon expiry thereof, the Apex Court, in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. 2003 CriLJ 4543, while elaborately dealing with this aspect of law, observed thus: ...A cumulative reading of various provisions of the said Chapter clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed therein is only for the filing of the complaint or initiation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance. It of course prohibits the court from taking cognizance of an offence where the complaint is filed before the court after the expiry of the period mentioned in the said chapter. This is clear from Section 469 of the Code found in the said Chapter which specifically says that the period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence either from the date of the offence or from the date when the offence is detected. Section 471 indicates while computing the period of limitation, time taken during which the case was being diligently prosecuted in another court or in appeal or in revision against the offender should be excluded. The said section also provides in the explanation that in computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the government or any other authority should be excluded. Similarly, the period during which the court was closed will also have to be excluded. All these provisions indicate that the court taking cognizance can take cognizance of an offence, the complaint of which is filed before it within the period of limitation prescribed and if need be after excluding such time which is legally excludable. Similarly, the period during which the court was closed will also have to be excluded. All these provisions indicate that the court taking cognizance can take cognizance of an offence, the complaint of which is filed before it within the period of limitation prescribed and if need be after excluding such time which is legally excludable. This in our opinion clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the period of limitation, but for taking cognizance of an offence in regard to which a complaint is filed or prosecution is initiated beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Code. Apart from the statutory indication of this view of ours, we find support for this view from the fact that taking of cognizance is an act of the court over which the prosecuting agency or the complainant has no control. Therefore a complaint filed within the period of limitation under the Code cannot be made infructuous by an act of court. The legal phrase 'acfus curiae neminem gravabit' which means an act of the court shall prejudice no man, or by a delay on the part of the court neither party should suffer, also supports the view that the Legislature could not have intended to put a period of limitation on the act of the court of taking cognizance of an offence so as to defeat the case of the complainant. This view of ours is also in conformity with the early decision of this Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar (supra). 50. In the backdrop of the law discussed above, let me, now, consider the grievances of the petitioner in the present case. The present petitioner's prosecution, along with some others as accused, has been sought under Sections 147 352 353 448 and 427 IPC, which are punishable by imprisonment for a term of 2 years, 3 months, 2 years, 1 year and 2 years respectively. As the maximum term of imprisonment for the offences, which the accused persons have allegedly committed, is 2 years, it clearly follows, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 468(c) of the Code, that the maximum period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offences, in question, was 3 years. 51. As far as Section 469 is concerned, it embodies the provisions as regards the commencement of the period of limitation. 51. As far as Section 469 is concerned, it embodies the provisions as regards the commencement of the period of limitation. This Section (i.e., Section 469) shows that that the period of limitation commences, ordinarily, on the date of the offence or where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the commission of the offence or the police officer, then, on the first day on which such offence comes to the notice of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier, or where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender becomes known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. 52. In the present case, since the offenders were known on the very day of the alleged occurrence, it is clear that in the case at hand, the period of limitation commenced on the alleged date of the offence(s) itself, i.e., on 10.11.2000. Viewed thus, it is clear that cognizance, in the present case, could not have been, ordinarily, taken under Section 468(2)(c) beyond the period of three years commencing from 09.11.2003. Thus, the last date for taking of the cognizance was 09.11.2003. In the present case, the charge-sheet was submitted on 29.05.2004. This shows that when the charge-sheet was laid, the taking of the cognizance already stood barred by the prescribed period of limitation. The learned Court below could not have, therefore, taken cognizance of the offences without condoning the delay in terms of requirements of Section 473 of the Code. It appears to have escaped the attention of the learned trial Court that the taking of cognizance was barred by limitation. Oblivious of this primary necessity, the learned trial Court has allowed the case to proceed under a mistaken impression that the cognizance has already been taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Since the very taking of cognizance was without condoning the delay in terms of Section 473, the order, taking cognizance, cannot survive and must, therefore, be set aside. 53. Oblivious of this primary necessity, the learned trial Court has allowed the case to proceed under a mistaken impression that the cognizance has already been taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Since the very taking of cognizance was without condoning the delay in terms of Section 473, the order, taking cognizance, cannot survive and must, therefore, be set aside. 53. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that notwithstanding the fact that the order taking cognizance of the offences, in question, needs to be set aside, the fact remains that an opportunity needs to be given to the learned trial Court to apply its mind to the facts of the case and decide for itself as to whether the delay has been properly explained or whether the interest of justice necessitates condonation of delay. If the Court is so satisfied as indicated hereinabove, there shall be no impediment, on the part of the Court, to take cognizance of the offences, which may appear to have been committed by the accused-petitioner. I may, at this stage, pause to point out that no such condonation of delay is possible without an opportunity of hearing having been accorded to an accused, who is sought to be proceeded against, for, on expiry of the period of limitation, a valuable right accrues to such an accused of not being prosecuted for commission of the offence(s), which he is alleged to have committed. Such right cannot be set at naught by refusing to give to such an accused the right to have his say in the matter of condonation of delay. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has, therefore, laid down in State of Maharastra v. Sharat Chandra Vinayak Dongre AIR 1995 SC 231 , that when the taking of cognizance stands barred by a prescribed period of limitation, notice needs to be issued to the person, who is sought to be proceeded against, offering him an opportunity to have his say in the matter of extension of the period of limitation. The relevant observations, made in Sharat Chandra Vinayak Dongre (supra), read thus: (9) Since the Chief Judicial Magistrate condoned the delay for launching the prosecution, without notice to the respondents and without affording any opportunity to the respondents to have their say, the case deserves to be remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for deciding the application filed by the prosecution seeking condonation of delay, if any, afresh in accordance with law after hearing both the parties.... 54. I may also pause here to point out that in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Anr., reported in 1985 CriLJ 1521 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through PN Bhagwati, J, (as his Lordship then was), has held that upon investigation, on the basis of a first information report, when the police submits a report that no offence appears to have been committed or that against one or some of the person(s) out of those, who were named in the first information report, no incriminating material was found, the Magistrate must, before accepting such a report and dropping thereby the proceedings against all or some of the accused named by the informant, give notice to the informant enabling him to have his say as to why the police report shall not be accepted. In Bhagawant Singh (supra), the Court has further clarified that though a Magistrate is not bound, under the Code, to give notice to the injured or relative(s) of a person, who was killed in an occurrence, the injured or the relative(s) of the deceased may appear and if he objects to the acceptance of such a police report, his submission shall be considered. The Court has further pointed out, in Bhagwant Singh (supra), that though not bound by law, a Magistrate may, in exercise of his judicial discretion, give, if he thinks necessary, such notice to the injured or any particular relative(s) of the deceased, as may be warranted by the facts of a given case, to have his/their say in the matter of acceptance of a police report as indicated hereinbefore. The decision, in Bhagwant Singh (supra), thus, reflects, in effect, the principle that when an order, to be passed by a Court in a criminal proceeding, is likely to adversely affect the interests of an aggrieved person - who may be the informant, injured or relative(s) of the deceased - such an aggrieved person has the locus standi to appear in the criminal proceeding to object to the possibility of the Court not taking cognizance on the basis of a police report submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code. 55. What logically follows from the decision, in Bhagwant Singh (supra), is that if, in a given case, a question arises as to whether the period of limitation shall, in terms of Section 473 of the Code, be extended for the purpose of enabling the Court to take cognizance of the offence(s) or not, the informant must be given by the Court an opportunity of having his say in the matter and as far as the injured or relative(s) of the deceased is concerned, he has, in such a case, the locus standi to appear in the criminal proceeding and submit before the Court as to why it shall extend the period of limitation and take cognizance of the offence(s). This is more so, because there may be a case, where the aggrieved person has informed the police promptly and the evidence may be available against the offender, but the inaction of the police, on some aspect or the other, may have resulted into belated submission of the police report, (i.e., charge-sheet). In such circumstances, for the fault of the police, the informant, injured or the relative(s) of the deceased may not, in a given case, be made to suffer. In order, therefore, to avoid miscarriage of justice, it is necessary for a Magistrate to give notice to the informant to have his say on the question of condonation of delay. This apart, though not bound by law, it is, indeed, permissible, in the facts and circumstances of a given case, for a Magistrate to give notice to the injured or the relative(s) of the deceased, while considering the question of extension of a prescribed period of limitation under Section 473. 56. Referring to Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd and Ors. v. Mohd Sharaful Haque and Anr., reported in 2005 CriLJ 92, it has been contended by Mr. 56. Referring to Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd and Ors. v. Mohd Sharaful Haque and Anr., reported in 2005 CriLJ 92, it has been contended by Mr. Maurya, learned Counsel for the accused-petitioner, that not only taking of cognizance, but the proceeding, as a whole, including the charge-sheet, in the present case, needs to be set aside and quashed by taking resort to the provisions of Section 482 of the Code. 57. While considering the above aspect of the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, what needs to be pointed out is that in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd (supra), the Apex Court has not held that when the cognizance is taken by a Court without condoning the delay, not only the order taking cognizance shall be set aside and quashed, but even the first information report as well as the charge-sheet must be set aside and quashed. It is necessary to point out that in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (supra), the entire proceeding was quashed on the ground, as observed by the Apex Court, that the proceeding, which the Court, in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (supra), had considered, was nothing but sheer abuse of the process of law, for, the factual position, according to the Court, in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (supra), "goes to show that the complainant had not come to the Court with clean hands and that there was no explanation whatsoever for the inaction between 1995 and 2001." Hence, the proceeding, in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (supra), was quashed on merit and not merely because of the fact that cognizance was barred by the period of limitation. Had it been so, there was no purpose in empowering, with the help of Section 473, the Court to extend the period of limitation. Merely because of the fact that a Court has taken cognizance oblivious of the provisions of Section 468, whole criminal proceeding cannot be set at naught. The illegality committed by a Court cannot prejudice any aggrieved party's rights. Ordinarily, the superior court shall remove the illegality and place the parties to the same position as they would have stood, had the illegality not been committed. The illegality committed by a Court cannot prejudice any aggrieved party's rights. Ordinarily, the superior court shall remove the illegality and place the parties to the same position as they would have stood, had the illegality not been committed. Hence, in the present case, the impugned order, dated 14.09.2005, needs to be set aside leaving the learned Court below to decide, if, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the period of limitation shall or shall not be extended. For taking a decision on this question of paramount importance, opportunity of hearing must be accorded not to the accused-petitioner alone, but to all those, who are sought to be prosecuted in the present case. 58. Coupled with the above, when the law, as indicated above, is that it is the duty of the Court to extend the prescribed period of limitation if the delay has been properly explained or such extension is necessary in the interest of justice, it logically follows that in the case at hand, the matter needs to be examined by the learned Court below if, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, such extension of the period of limitation is warranted by law. No such enquiry can, however, be made, as already indicated above, and if I may reiterate, without giving an opportunity to the accused-petitioner and her other co-accused an opportunity to have their say in the matter. 59. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this criminal petition partly succeeds. The impugned order, dated 14-09-2005, aforementioned is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court to consider the question of condonation of delay in the light of the provisions of law as indicated hereinabove. 60. In order to avoid further delay in the disposal of the case, it is hereby directed that the learned trial Court shall take up, on 03.03.2008, the case for consideration of the question of extension of the period of limitation and on that day (i.e, on 03.03.2008), the accused-petitioner shall appear in the learned Court below and she shall have the right to have her say on the question of extension of the period of limitation. The learned Court below shall also give notices to the remaining co-accused enabling all of them opportunity to have their say on the question of the extension of the period of limitation. The learned Court below shall serve notice on the informant too enabling him to have his say on the question of extension of the period of limitation. 61. With the above observations and directions, this criminal petition is disposed of. Send forthwith a copy of this order to the learned Court below. Send back the LCR.