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2008 DIGILAW 1504 (PNJ)

Dara Singh v. State Of Haryana

2008-09-03

A.N.JINDAL

body2008
Judgment A.N.Jindal, J. 1. Assailed in this petition is the judgment dated 2.3.1993 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri dismissing the appeal of Dara Singh - accused/petitioner (herein referred as `petitioner) against the judgment dated 3.3.1992/5.3.1992 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jagadhri and maintaining the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three months, each, under Sections 279 and 337 and one year under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Briefly stated, the allegations as unfolded by Jagan Nath son of Krishan Lal - complainant (herein referred as complainant) are that on 1.4.1985 at about 4.00 p.m, when he reached in the area of Vishnu Nagar, then the accused while driving the truck No. HRA-904 in a rash and negligent manner came from the front side without blowing any horn and struck against his bicycle, as a result of which, he fell down. Krishan Lal (PW2) was also present at the spot. The complainant became unconscious and was shifted to the Hospital, where he succumbed to the injuries on 23.4.1995. 3. On the aforesaid allegations, the case was investigated and the petitioner was charged under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Ultimately, the trial ended into conviction. His appeal also failed. 4. The case of the prosecution banks upon the testimonies of Sham Lal mechanic (PW1), Krishan Lal (PW2), Buta Ram (PW3), Kalu Ram (PW4), ASI Mam Chand (PW5), Gopal Singh (PW6) and Dr. Ashok Kumar Baveja (PW7). 5. Though the complainant, who also was the first informant, was not alive to testify about the incident, yet Krishan Lal, stepped into the witness box as PW2 and stated that he was present at the spot at the time of occurrence along with Buta Ram (PW3). Both the aforesaid prosecution witnesses identified the petitioner in the Court and also gave full description of the occurrence. Besides, the complainant has also given description of the petitioner in the FIR. Krishan Lal and Buta Ram (PW2 & PW3, respectively) had no animosity or enmity of any type, whatsoever, so as to implicate the petitioner falsely in this case. 6. Both the courts below have taken the consistent view that it was the petitioner, who while driving the truck rashly and negligently struck against the bicycle of the complainant (since deceased). Krishan Lal and Buta Ram (PW2 & PW3, respectively) had no animosity or enmity of any type, whatsoever, so as to implicate the petitioner falsely in this case. 6. Both the courts below have taken the consistent view that it was the petitioner, who while driving the truck rashly and negligently struck against the bicycle of the complainant (since deceased). Nothing material could be argued, which may impel this court to differ with the findings of fact, returned by both the courts below. 7. The interference at the revisional stage could be made very sparingly and in cases where the judgment was palpably wrong, perverse or ignoring the relevant evidence or taking into consideration irrelevant evidence or the court while holding the trial misconducted the proceedings. It has also been observed by the Apex Court in case Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 1960 that the jurisdiction of the High Court in a criminal revision application is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. Further, on the issue, it held as under : "Now, it is obvious that the question whether the appellant was guilty of negligence in driving the bus and the death of the deceased was caused on account of his negligent driving is a question of fact which depends, for its determination, on an appreciation of the evidence. Both the learned Magistrate trying the case at the original stage and the learned Additional Sessions Judge hearing the appeal arrived, on an assessment of the evidence, at a concurrent finding of fact that the death of the deceased was caused by negligent driving of the bus by the appellant. The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have been justified in refusing to re-appreciate the evidence for the purposes of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact reached by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was correct." 8. The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have been justified in refusing to re-appreciate the evidence for the purposes of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact reached by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was correct." 8. Similarly, while discussing the scope of revision, the Apex Court in case State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, 1999(1) RCR(Criminal) 808 : AIR 1999 SC 981 held as under : "Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 9. The last resort has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner while contending that since the complainant died after 23 days due to the cardio respiratory failure, as a result of tetanus, which had no close nexus or proximity with the accident, as such, he cannot be said to have died as a result of the accident and, thus, no case under Section 304-A IPC is made out against the petitioner. In this regard, it may be observed that the accident in this case took place on 1.4.1985 and the injured complainant died on 23.4.1985. Evidence of Dr. Ashok Kumar (PW7) transpires that the complainant was previously admitted in Civil Hospital, Yamuna Nagar immediately after the accident, where, he developed tetanus. In this regard, it may be observed that the accident in this case took place on 1.4.1985 and the injured complainant died on 23.4.1985. Evidence of Dr. Ashok Kumar (PW7) transpires that the complainant was previously admitted in Civil Hospital, Yamuna Nagar immediately after the accident, where, he developed tetanus. Thereafter, he was referred to Civil Hospital, Ambala City, where he died on 23.4.1985 due to Cardio Respiratory failure, as a result of tetanus. The tetanus was directly on account of the injuries suffered the complainant in the accident, therefore, it could safely be concluded that there was direct nexus between the injuries suffered by the complainant and the Cardio Respiratory failure, on account of tetanus. It is not the case, where the injured was taken to house after being discharged from the Hospital or that no proper treatment was given to him. Consequently, the argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained. 10. As a sequel of the above discussion, the revision petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed.