JUDGMENT This appeal, under Section 30 of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, has been preferred against the judgment and award dated 31.05.2005, passed by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner/Assistant Labour Commissioner, Haldwani, Nainital in Workmen Claim Case No. 15/2005, Smt. Suman Devi versus Manger, Polyplux Lohiya Head Road & another, thereby awarding a sum of Rs. 3,79,180/- to the claimants, against the National Insurance Company Limited (appellant before this Court), along with an interest of 8% per annum, from the date of filing the claim petition till the date of judgment. 2. The claimant – Suman Devi filed a claim petition under the provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act, for grant of compensation on account of death of her husband – Munna Lal. According to the claimant, her husband – Munna Lal was employed as Operator in Polyplux Corporation Limited, Khatima. On 1.6.2004, when her husband – Munna Lal was returning to his house after finishing his duty to first shift, he met with an accident on account of storm on his way near Jhankat Chauraha as a tree fell on him and he succumbed to his injuries on the way while being carried to Khatima Hospital. The claimant has pleaded that her husband – Munna Lal was getting Rs. 4500/- per month as salary, along with bonus and other allowances, at the time of his death. The claimant has also pleaded that her husband – Munna Lal died during the course of his employment while he was returning to his house after finishing his duty hours. Therefore, the claimant claimed for a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- as compensation, along with interest @ 12% per annum and penalty. 3. The appellant, who was the respondent before the Workmen Compensation Commissioner, filed the written statement stating therein that death of the deceased-workman did not take place during the course of his employment. It has further pleaded that neither the death took place within the campus of the factory nor during the course of actual employment or during the period of his duty. 4. Respondent no. It has further pleaded that neither the death took place within the campus of the factory nor during the course of actual employment or during the period of his duty. 4. Respondent no. 2 – Manager Polyplux Corporation, filed the written statement stating therein that the deceased was working as an Operator in the factory and on the date of accident the factory and on the date of accident when he was returning to his house after his duty hours, he met with an accident on account of storm on the way as a tree fell on him and he succumbed to injuries. He has further pleaded that the deceased-work man of the factory was insured by the National Insurance Company Limited on the date of accident, therefore, the legal liability to pay the amount of compensation rests upon the Insurance Company. 5. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner after having considered the entire evidence adduced by the parties and perusing the material available on the record, came to the conclusion that the workman died while he was going to his house after discharging his official duty, therefore, the workman died on account of the accident during the course of the employment. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner having considered the age of the deceased as well as his monthly salary awarded the compensation for a sum of Rs. 4,09,514/- (including the interest from the date of filing the petition till the date of judgment). 6. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned judgment and award, the Insurance Company has preferred the appeal, under Section 30 of Workmen’s Compensation Act, before this Court. 7. Heard Sri Manish Dalakoti, holding brief of Sri D.S. Patni, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri B.D. Pande, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 and perused the record. None has appeared for respondent no. 1. 8. On the basis of pleadings adduced by the parties the relevant issue for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the death of the deceased was caused during the course of employment or out of employment? And as to whether the Commissioner is right in holding that the alleged injury caused to the deceased due to which he succumbed to injuries comes within the course of his employment or it falls outside the scope of employment? 9. And as to whether the Commissioner is right in holding that the alleged injury caused to the deceased due to which he succumbed to injuries comes within the course of his employment or it falls outside the scope of employment? 9. It is the specific case of the claimant that the deceased, who was working as an Operator in the factory of respondent no. 2, was returning to his house after discharging his official duty. The witness produced by the factory-respondent no. 2, has stated in his deposition that deceased-Munna Lal was working as an Operator in the factory on 1.6.2004 i.e. the date of accident he was returning to his house after finishing his duty and on account of storm a tree fell on him and he died. This witness was cross-examined by the Insurance Company and he has deposed that death of Munna Lal – workman did not take place in the factory campus or during period of actual duty performed by him, but he died on the way while returning to his residence from work place after finishing his duty. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner has recorded a categorical finding that when the deceased was taken to Hospital from the place of accident, he was wearing his uniform provided by the factory. The evidence on record further reveals that the witness produced by the employer has deposed in his deposition that the time of occurrence which has been mentioned as 8.30 p.m. in the First Information Report was indicated therein due to inadvertence as the workman died on 8.30 p.m. and this time of 8.30 p.m. is the time of death of the workman. This witness has also stated in his deposition that he does not have remembered the exact time of the accident. He has further deposed that the information with regard to the accident was given to him on telephone. Further, statement of Smt. Suman Devi, who is wife of deceased-Munna Lal, reveals that she has deposed in a cross-examination that she visited the spot of accident at about 5 p.m. and she thereafter intimated the factum of the accident to the factory in the evening, thereafter, the factory officials came to her. The evidence therefore clearly makes out a case that the deceased died when he was returning to his house after finishing his duty hours from the factory. The evidence therefore clearly makes out a case that the deceased died when he was returning to his house after finishing his duty hours from the factory. Under these circumstances, the case is covered that the accident took place during the period of notional extension of employment and the workman died during the aforesaid period, hence, it is a clear-cut case that the workman died during the period of discharging his official duty. 10. In order to reach to a definite conclusion in the instant case, it would be relevant to reproduce the provisions of Section 3(1) of Workmen’s Compensation Act, which read as under : “3. Employer’s liability for compensation.- (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable – (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding (three) days; (b) in respect of any (injury, not resulting in death (or permanent total disablement) caused by) an accident which is directly attributable to – (i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the willful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or (iii) the willful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workman.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, 1958-65 A.C.J. 473 (S.C.), has held as follows : “Under Section 3(1) of the Act the injury must be caused to the workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The question, when does an employment begin and when does it cease, depends upon the facts of each case. ‘But, the Courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily end when the ‘down tool’ signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time and space. ‘But, the Courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily end when the ‘down tool’ signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time and space. The scope of such extension must necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case. As employment may end or may begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his tools but also when he used the means of access and egress to and from the place of employment.” 12. I do not find any infirmity in the conclusion drawn by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner that workman- Munna Lal died on his way to his residence from work place hence the accident took place the course of employment. 13. The expression “employment” in Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is wider than the actual work or duty which the workman had to do. It is enough that at the time of accident the workman was in actual employment although he might not be actually turning out the work which was his duty to carry out. It is for this reason that even when a workman is resting, or having his food, or taking his tea (in the factory premises) or proceeding from the place of employment to his residence and an accident occurs, the accident is regarded as arising out of and in the course of the employment. Therefore, even if any injury or death takes place during the course of journey from the residence to the place of employment and so also, from the place of his employment to his place of resident, it has to be construed in law as the accident has taken place during the course of employment. 14. Applying the principle of notional extension of time of employment and in view of the evidence available on record as well as the observations recorded by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner in the impugned judgment, I am of the considered view that deceased-Munna Lal, who was the workman in the factory of respondent no. 2, died while on his way to his residence from work place and met with an accident during the course of employment. The compensation has been rightly awarded by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner and the same does not require any interference. 15. 2, died while on his way to his residence from work place and met with an accident during the course of employment. The compensation has been rightly awarded by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner and the same does not require any interference. 15. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 16. The appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment and award passed by Workmen Compensation Commissioner, is confirmed.