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2008 DIGILAW 152 (DEL)

Suman Sodhi v. Yogender Sharma

2008-02-12

VIPIN SANGHI

body2008
VIPIN SANGHI, J. 1. On account of the ingenuity and, what appear to be the unscrupulous ways of the petitioner and her late husband, even after nearly 34 years of its passing, the eviction order passed in favour of the respondent on 7.5.1974 by the then Additional Rent Controller, Delhi (on the ground of, inter alia, bona fide requirement of the landlord) has not been fully executed till date, and the Petitioner continues to retain possession of a substantial portion of the tenanted premises till date. As would be presently seen, this has happened on account of complete abuse of the process of the Court by the petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest and husband, late Shri Saranjeet Singh, who was not even the tenant in the premises. 2. Late Pt. Bhim Singh had filed an eviction petition against the tenant, Inderjit Singh, the brother-in-law of the petitioner, (i.e., the brother of the husband of the petitioner) way back in the year 1968. After a trial, the petition was allowed, inter alia, on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord by the then Additional Rent Controller, Sh. Mohd. Shamim (as he then was), by a detailed order dated 7.5.1974. The appeal filed by the tenant was also dismissed. Time was sought by the tenant/judgment debtor to vacate the premises by 31.10.1977, which was granted. Thereafter Saranjit Singh, the late husband of the petitioner, sprung up and claimed interest in the property in question on the strength of an alleged agreement to sell. He filed a suit seeking specific performance of the alleged agreement dated 24.12.1974 with the landlord in respect of the premises situated in property No. C-1/155 on 17.7.1978. After a protracted trial this suit was dismissed by the learned ADJ, Sh. S. N. Dhingra (as he then was), holding that the agreement on which the suit was based was a forged and fabricated document and that the possession of no portion of the property bearing No.C-1/155 was ever delivered to Shri Saranjit Singh in pursuance of the so-called agreement. However, the said move of Shri Saranjeet Singh had paid of, since the execution of the eviction order dated 7.5.1974 remained stayed during the pendency of the suit and also in appeal in this court, which came to be vacated only on 4.8.1999. 3. However, the said move of Shri Saranjeet Singh had paid of, since the execution of the eviction order dated 7.5.1974 remained stayed during the pendency of the suit and also in appeal in this court, which came to be vacated only on 4.8.1999. 3. The Petitioner was not one to give up that easily, and she put her fertile and devious mind to work to once again drive a wedge in the execution proceedings before the Rent Controller. On 16.9.1999, the petitioner preferred objections in the execution proceedings before the learned Additional Rent Controller/Executing Court. For the first time in these objections, the petitioner sought to contend that she was in occupation of a hall measuring 20 x 70 besides WC and bathroom, claimed to be part of the premises bearing No.C-1/150 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi and adjoining to the tenanted property bearing No.C-1/155 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi. It was claimed that there is an access from the drawing-cum-dining room to the two bed rooms in the tenanted property. She contended that she is also in occupation of WC and bath room and staircase being part of the premises bearing No.C-1/150 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi. It was claimed that the said portion of property bearing No.C-1/150 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi is and was in her/her predecessors possession and occupation since 1960 and that they are not part of the premises subject matter of the eviction order obtained by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent. 4. The petitioner further claimed that she is in occupation and possession of one room measuring 25 X15 and one store measuring 10 x4-1/2 and an open space of 17 x17 on the back portion of the property bearing No.C-1/150 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi and the first floor of property bearing No.C-1/155 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi since 1986. She claimed an independent entry from the back portion of property bearing No.C-1/150 Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi without any obstruction or interference of the decree holder/respondents herein. It was stated that the tenanted premises has an access from the front side of the property i.e. the two rooms and a kitchen. It was claimed that the respondent could not dispossess the petitioner from the portions which are not the subject matter of the eviction order in execution proceedings under the garb of warrants of possession which may be issued in the execution proceedings. It was claimed that the respondent could not dispossess the petitioner from the portions which are not the subject matter of the eviction order in execution proceedings under the garb of warrants of possession which may be issued in the execution proceedings. The warrants of possession could not be issued or executed in respect of any area beyond the subject matter of adjudication in the eviction proceedings and no portion beyond the site plan can be forcibly be got evicted from the petitioner. So, the Petitioner projected that there are two distinct but adjoining and interconnected properties viz. bearing No.C-1/155 & C-1/150; what was leased out to Inderjit Singh was only a portion of property No.C-1/155, comprising of two rooms and kitchen; the interconnected portion which fell in property No. C-1/150 did not form part of the tenanted premises; even the bathroom, the WC and the staircase did not fall in property No.C-1/155, and it fell in property No.C-1/150 and it did not form part of the tenanted premises. She also claimed to be in possession of the First Floor of both C-1/150 and C-1/155. Pertinently, no such plea was ever raised by the tenant in his defense to the eviction petition, or even by Late Shri Saranjit Singh, the husband and predecessor in interest of the Petitioner. 5. The petitioner, who is the appellant in the aforesaid R.F.A. (arising out of the judgment in the suit for specific performance) also filed two applications in those proceedings pending in this Court, one under Order VI Rule 17 CPC dated 27.10.1999 and another application under Section 151 CPC dated 17.11.1999. The application for amendment was moved to incorporate the plea that the petitioner herein was also in possession of back portion of property No.C-1/150 and first floor of property No.C-1/150 and C-1/155. In the application filed under Section 151 CPC, the petitioner herein sought clarification that the order dated 04.08.1999, dismissing the stay application of the Petitioner pertained to the tenanted portion of property No.C-1/155 and not to the other portions of which the appellant was in occupation. Both these applications were dismissed on 19.11.1999 as withdrawn and as not maintainable, respectively. In the application filed under Section 151 CPC, the petitioner herein sought clarification that the order dated 04.08.1999, dismissing the stay application of the Petitioner pertained to the tenanted portion of property No.C-1/155 and not to the other portions of which the appellant was in occupation. Both these applications were dismissed on 19.11.1999 as withdrawn and as not maintainable, respectively. Pertinently, in para 6 and 7 of the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, the petitioner set up the following case: “That the applicant states and submit that at the time of delivery of possession, there existed only two rooms on the Ground Floor and two rooms, kitchen and bathroom were the subject matter of the eviction proceedings, and the said accommodation was since short to meet the requirements of the Appellants and his family members, the Appellants husband had also been let out the back portion of the adjoining property i.e. C-150, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi since 1969-70, which consisted of a hall and a toilet/bathroom which had an absolute independent entrance and access from the back lane and for both the properties i.e. C-150, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi and C-155, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi (Back Portions) are in possession of the Appellant and thus have an independent access from the back portion i.e. through property No. C-150, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi and incidentally the respondents are the landlords of the property bearing No.C-150, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi also. That due to the growing children there was need for more accommodation, the Appellants with the consent of the Respondents constructed a hall on the First Floor of property bearing No.C-155, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi i.e. above the existing 2 rooms of the suit property and the terrace was also partitioned with a para feet wall of 3-1/2 feet approximately.” 6. From the aforesaid, it is seen that the case now set up by the petitioner herein was that (i) the husband of the petitioner herein was let out the back portion of property No.C-1/150, Lajpat Nagar-1, New Delhi since 1969-1970 consisting of a hall and a toilet/bathroom with an independent access from the back lane; (ii) the appellant, that is the petitioner herein with the consent of the respondent constructed a hall on the first floor of property bearing No.C-1/155, Lajpat Nagar-1, New Delhi above the existing two rooms of which the tenancy was admitted even by the petitioner. 7. While the aforesaid objections of the petitioner were pending consideration before the additional Rent Controller, some relevant developments took place in another related proceeding. It appears that before preferring the execution Petition before the Additional Rent Controller the landlord filed an execution application No.174/1999 in the dismissed suit of the petitioners Late husband in the Court of Sh. S.N. Dhingra, ADJ, as he then was. Notice of this application was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred CR No.1169/1999, before this Court to challenge the entertainment of the execution application by the Civil Court in respect of an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller and this Court stayed the execution proceedings before the learned ADJ, Delhi. In the said Civil Revision, the following order was passed by the Court on 08.09.2000: - “08.9.2000 Present: Mr. V.K. Malik for the petitioners. Ms Vandana Bhatnagar for the respondents. C.R. 1169/99 & C.M.56/1999 Petitioners case is that the deceased husbands brother Inder jeet Singh was a tenant of property C-155, Lajpat Nagar, Part I consisting of two rooms, kitchen and a bath room. Respondents father (Landlord) initiated eviction proceedings against him and obtained an eviction decree. It is claimed that during eviction proceedings he executed an agreement to sell with her husband and symbolic possession of the premises was delivered to him on 15.10.1970 and her husband also constructed a hall and a store on the first floor of the back portion of the adjacent property No.C-1/155, Lajpat Nagar of respondents. Petitioners were later given tenancy rights of the property also which was never the subject matter of eviction proceedings launched against Inder jeet Singh. Meanwhile petitioners husband filed a suit no.222/97 for specific performance against respondents father which was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 26.7.1997. Petitioners were later given tenancy rights of the property also which was never the subject matter of eviction proceedings launched against Inder jeet Singh. Meanwhile petitioners husband filed a suit no.222/97 for specific performance against respondents father which was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 26.7.1997. an appeal (RFA No.75/98) was taken against it which was admitted and wherein stay was declined and respondents were allowed to execute the eviction decree against Inder jeet Singh. It is further submitted that respondents took execution proceedings before Rent Controller to which petitioners filed objections. But they were surprised to receive notice of another execution application No.174/99 from the court of Additional District Judge, Shri S.N. Dhingra to which they also filed objections which were over ruled by impugned order dated 12.11.1999. It is this order which is under challenge in this petition. Petitioners case is that ADJ entertained this execution application in contravention of provisions of Order 21 Rule 10 CPC because eviction decree was passed by Rent Controller where execution was pending and not by the Court of ADJ. Respondents, on the other hand, submit that petitioners had frustrated the eviction decree obtained by them 25 years ago by resort to one stratagem or the other. While this matter was under consideration parties agreed for disposal of this petition by the following consent order, consent whereof was accorded by rival counsel on the instructions of parties. Petitioners shall vacate two rooms, one kitchen and one bath room in C-155 within three months from today and deliver the possession to respondents. As regards the other premises C-1/155, it shall be open to respondents to take any appropriate remedy to seek and claim its possession, “if so advised”. This shall have no bearing in the pending execution proceedings before Rent Controller”. B.A. Khan,J. September 08, 2000.” 8. This order was corrected on 08.12.2000 and the said order reads as follows: - “08.12.2000 Present: Mr. Girdhar Govind for petitioners. Ms Vandana Bhatnagar for respondents. CM No.2752/2000 in CR 1169/99 This petition was disposed of by consent order dated 8.9.2000. Petitioner has filed this application for review/correction of the order regarding description of the dispute premises. According to her the premises comprised of only two rooms and a kitchen in property No.C-155, Lajpat Nagar and not a bathroom but bathroom stands wrongly included in the order. Petitioner has filed this application for review/correction of the order regarding description of the dispute premises. According to her the premises comprised of only two rooms and a kitchen in property No.C-155, Lajpat Nagar and not a bathroom but bathroom stands wrongly included in the order. Similarly the other property was wrongly described as C-1/155 when it should have been C-1/150. Even though description of the property was picked up from the petitioners review petition, still requisite correction is made on the no objection of the other side. Hence consent order dated 8.9.2000 shall related to only two rooms and a kitchen in C-155 (Sic 151), excluding bathroom. Similarly in 5th line of order, C-1/150 shall be read in place in C-1/155. CM is disposed of accordingly. B.A. Khan, J. December 8, 2000” 9. In view of the aforesaid, it appears that the petitioner delivered possession of only two rooms and a kitchen in property No.C-1/155, Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi, to the respondent. 10. In the light of the controversy raised by the objector, it fell for the learned Additional Rent Controller to determine whether property Nos. C-1/150 and C-1/155 are separate and distinct properties and whether the objectors are in possession of any part of C-1/150 and C-1/155 in their independent capacity and, therefore, outside the purview of the execution petition. The question about the independent title of the petitioner arose in the light of Section 25 of the Act, which states that where the interest of a tenant is determined under the Act, and any order is made by the Controller for recovery of possession, subject to provisions of Section 18 (with which we are not concerned in this case), the same shall be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises, and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom: provided that “nothing in this Section shall apply to any persons who has an independent title to such premises”. The learned Additional Rent Controller after considering the rival submissions of the parties came to the conclusion that property bearing No.C-1/150 and C-1/155 are not two separate properties but built on a single plot of land bearing Nos.C-1/150 and C-1/155. The objections as well as the application filed under Section 151 CPC filed by the petitioner were dismissed as being devoid of merit. 11. The objections as well as the application filed under Section 151 CPC filed by the petitioner were dismissed as being devoid of merit. 11. The first submission of Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner was that the tenanted premises in respect of which the eviction petition was filed was demarcated in “red” in the site plan Ex.AW-7/1, which comprised of two rooms and a kitchen. Admittedly, possession of this portion had been delivered to the respondent in pursuance of the order passed by this Court on 08.09.2000, as modified on 08.12.2000. Consequently, he argued that the execution filed by the respondent ought to have been dismissed by the learned ARC as satisfied. He also referred to the undertaking filed by the petitioner No.1 in this Court in C.R. 1169/1999 wherein she had stated that the respondent shall withdraw the execution petition pending before the Court of Sh. T.S. Kashyap and also before the Court of Sh. S.N. Dhingra, Additional District Judge, Delhi and that the respondent shall not cause any harassment to the petitioner in respect of her possession of a hall and bath room in premises bearing No.C-150, Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi, and also the First Floor portion of premises bearing No. C-1/155 Lajpat Nagar,New Delhi, which consists of two rooms and a store and also an open terrace on C-150, Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi. 12. Before proceeding further, I consider it appropriate to deal with these submissions here and now. A perusal of the eviction petition shows that in column 8 while giving details of accommodation available, the landlord late Pandit Bhimsen had described the same as under: - “Two rooms, one store used as kitchen as well by the respondent and joint use of courtyard, bathroom and latrine, staircase and terrace above the premises. Plan attached. The premises in dispute are marked as red”. 13. The submission of Mr. Chandhiok that the tenanted premises consisted only of two rooms and the store used as kitchen bounded in red in the plan Ex.AW-7/1, therefore, is not entirely correct. The plan Ex. AW-7/1 cannot be seen in isolation and has to be read in conjunction with the details provided by the landlord in column 8 of the eviction petition. Chandhiok that the tenanted premises consisted only of two rooms and the store used as kitchen bounded in red in the plan Ex.AW-7/1, therefore, is not entirely correct. The plan Ex. AW-7/1 cannot be seen in isolation and has to be read in conjunction with the details provided by the landlord in column 8 of the eviction petition. It appears that the landlord coloured only those portions in red in the plan, which were given to the tenant for exclusive use and occupation, and that the other portions namely the courtyard, bathroom latrine, staircase and terrace above the premises, which were stated to be in joint use were not so bounded and shown in the plan in red colour. A perusal of the eviction order dated 07.05.1974 shows that the petition was allowed and the tenant was granted six months time to vacate the “disputed premises”. To determine as to what was the disputed premises one has to fall back on paragraph 8 of the eviction petition. Pertinently, there is nothing on record, and nothing has been pointed out by the petitioner to show that the tenant Shri Inderjit Singh ever disputed the extent of tenanted premises described in column 8 of the eviction petition, or that he claimed that the portions aforesaid shown as in joint use were not a part of the tenancy premises. It is, therefore, clear that the eviction order was in respect of entire premises as described in para 8 of the eviction petition and not merely in respect of two rooms and one store, which was used as a kitchen, as contended by the petitioner. I, therefore, do not find merit in the submission that merely upon delivery of possession of the two rooms and the store, being used as a kitchen bounded in red in Ex.AW-7/1 it amounted to satisfaction of the eviction decree. Consequently, the learned ARC was right in not accepting this submission of the petitioner and in proceeding to examine the objections of the petitioner on merits. 14. The argument of Mr. Chandhiok based on the undertaking filed by the petitioner in this Court in CR No.1169/1999 is neither here nor there. The said undertaking was a self-serving undertaking given by the petitioner herself and the obligations attributed to the respondent in that undertaking obviously did not bind the respondent. 14. The argument of Mr. Chandhiok based on the undertaking filed by the petitioner in this Court in CR No.1169/1999 is neither here nor there. The said undertaking was a self-serving undertaking given by the petitioner herself and the obligations attributed to the respondent in that undertaking obviously did not bind the respondent. In my view, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the said undertaking given by the petitioner, and it is not open to the petitioner to contend that in view thereof the execution filed before the learned ARC could not have proceeded. 15. It was next contended by Mr. Chandhiok that the learned ARC had no jurisdiction to determine the controversy namely, whether property No.C-1/150 and C-1/155 are separate and distinct properties and whether the objectors are in possession of any part of C-1/150 or C-1/155 in their independent capacity i.e. on the basis of an independent title. This submission of Mr. Chandhiok is also merit less. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that all questions arising between the parties to a suit in which the decree is passed, or their representative and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. It further provides that where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not a representative of the party, such question shall, for the purpose of this Section be determined by the Court. The scope of the said Section is wide. For instance it covers even the disputes about the purchase of a property at a sale and execution of a decree and all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representatives are also deemed to be questioned relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of that Section. Consequently, the question whether there had been discharge or satisfaction of the decree, as claimed by the petitioner, and whether the petitioner/her predecessor-in-interest and late husband were the representatives of the tenant or they had an independent title were questions, which arose for consideration by the learned ARC in the execution proceedings. It is also important to note that it was the petitioner who herself approached the executing Court by filing objections to the execution. It is also important to note that it was the petitioner who herself approached the executing Court by filing objections to the execution. Consequently, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to now contend that the learned ARC, acting as the executing Court, ought not to have gone into the said issues, which even otherwise squarely fell within his jurisdiction to decide. 16. Mr. Chandhiok further contended that the impugned order is contrary to the aforesaid order dated 08.09.2000 passed in CR No.1169/1999, as corrected on 08.12.2000. He submits that the said order dated 08.09.2000 was passed with consent of parties; the respondent/landlord had accepted the position that the tenanted premises consisted of only two rooms and one kitchen in property bearing No.C-155, since the consent recorded in the said order pertains only to that portion; not only the respondent landlord, but even the Court was conscious of the fact that the other premises bearing No.C-150 did not form part of the eviction decree and, consequently, it was left upon to the respondent/landlord to take appropriate remedy to seek and claim its possession. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord submitted that on account of the fact that the petitioner was raising a dispute, though a frivolous one, with regard to the scope and ambit of the eviction decree by belatedly setting up a case of there being two different properties bearing No.C-150 and C-155, and also on account of the fact that, admittedly, so far as two rooms and a kitchen situated in property No.C-155 was concerned there was no dispute raised even by the petitioner that the same formed part of the tenancy premises, it was agreed that so far as that portion consisting of two rooms and one kitchen is concerned, the petitioner would deliver possession within three months. She also argues that at the relevant time the execution proceedings for execution of the eviction decree were pending before the Additional Rent Controller and even this Court was conscious of the pendency of the said execution petition and the pendency of the objection raised therein by the petitioner. In those circumstances, this Court with the consent of parties observed that the consent as aforesaid “shall have no bearing on the pending execution proceedings before the Rent Controller.” 18. In those circumstances, this Court with the consent of parties observed that the consent as aforesaid “shall have no bearing on the pending execution proceedings before the Rent Controller.” 18. I find myself in agreement with the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. Had it been the admitted position between the parties that the eviction order pertained only to two rooms and one kitchen in premises No.C-1/155, Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi, there was no question of the petitioner consenting to the pending execution proceedings before the Rent Controller being continued, and it being recorded that the consent given as aforesaid would have no bearing on those proceedings. Obviously, the petitioner would have insisted that the execution proceedings should simultaneously be dropped by the respondent. There is no admission of the respondent discernible from the order dated 08.09.2000 and 08.12.2000 that the tenanted premises consisted of only two rooms and a kitchen in property No.C-1/155, Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi. In fact, that was the precise issue that was vehemently being litigated between the parties in the execution proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller. It is clear that the consent given by the respondent was only to be able to obtain possession of that portion, which was admitted by the petitioner to comprise of the tenanted premises, without the landlord in any way conceding that the other portions did not form part of the tenanted premises, or that he was not entitled to recover their possession under the eviction order. 19. The next submission of Mr. Chandhiok is that the learned Additional Rent Controller could not have arrived at his finding with regard to the number of the property without a full-fledged trial. No trial was conducted by him before deciding the objections filed by the petitioner. This submission of the petitioner is also in my view, devoid of merit. It is clear from paragraph 4 of the impugned order itself that a large number of documents were produced before the executing court and thereafter arguments were heard at length from both the sides. It is not the case of the petitioner that she had expressed the desire to lead any further evidence in support of her objection and that the executing court had prevented the petitioner from leading such evidence. It is not the case of the petitioner that she had expressed the desire to lead any further evidence in support of her objection and that the executing court had prevented the petitioner from leading such evidence. The petitioner does not dispute the authenticity or veracity of any of the documents/statements recorded in earlier proceedings between the parties which were produced before the Learned ARC. These statements are anyway relevant as per section 33 of the Evidence Act. Pertinently, Mr. Chandhiok had no answer to the observations of the learned ARC contained in paragraphs 5 to 7 of the impugned order wherein the materials produced before the executing court have been discussed. These paragraphs contain the reasoning of the learned ARC and read as follows: “Admittedly, the eviction order of which, the execution is filed, was passed in the year 1974. It is also not disputed that suit for specific performance, based on agreement to sell, on the basis of which the execution proceedings were stayed stands dismissed. Though the appeal against the said judgment was pending before Honble High Court of Delhi, but stay application in respect of the same has been dismissed by Honble High Court vide order dated 4.8.1999 holding that present objectors have absolutely no right to resist the execution of the said eviction order. The crux of the controversy now lies in determination of a single fact that whether property No.C-150 and C-155 are separate and distinct properties and whether the objectors are in possession of any part of C-150 of C-155, in their independent capacity which is outside the purview of this execution. It is also an established and undisputed fact that as per eviction petition, the suit premises comprised of two rooms, one kitchen, one bathroom and one open courtyard. As per the site plan proved on record, and exhibited before the court, the Bathroom and the courtyard are not in property No.C-155, but in the portion, which is now claimed to be marked as C-150, by the objectors. If the portion marked by the objector as suit premises is taken to be correct, just for the sake of argument, there is no bathroom or open courtyard as such in portion marked as C-155 whereas it was part of tenancy. The eviction petition was filed in 1968 which was hotly contested. If the portion marked by the objector as suit premises is taken to be correct, just for the sake of argument, there is no bathroom or open courtyard as such in portion marked as C-155 whereas it was part of tenancy. The eviction petition was filed in 1968 which was hotly contested. It was always the case of the respondent first and thereafter even of Sharanjeet Singh, predecessor in interest of the objector that Shri Sharan Jeet Singh was residing in the suit premises alongwith the respondent only as his family member. Never was it claim of Shri Sharanjeet Singh, or objectors prior to these objections that they were in possession of any part of C-155 or C150 in their independent capacity. As pointed out by ld. Counsel for DH, in the entire objection petition, it is nowhere disclosed by the objectors as to in what capacity, they were put in possession of any part of C-150 or C-155. In the objection, it is their claim that they are in continuous and uninterrupted possession of back portion of C-150 since 1960 but the amendment application, and in application under Section 151 CPC filed before Honble High court of Delhi, their claim was that they are in possession of these portions since 1969-70. This gap of 10 years, remains unexplained till date. It is also not clarified as to where was the bathroom or open courtyard which formed part of tenanted premises as described in the original petition and admitted by the objector Sharanjeet Singh, in his objections filed before Shri J.D. Kapoor, the then Ld. ARCT. As observed above, these portions were part of the premises now marked as C150 by the objector. At the cost of repetition, it is also observed that the amendment application dated 27.10.1999 filed by the present objector, seeking indulgence of the court to amend the grounds of appeal was got dismissed by them as withdrawn while another application under Section 151 CPC for clarification that order dated 4.8.99 pertains only to two rooms and kitchen was dismissed as not maintainable. This shows that the objectors are trying to raise this plea belatedly, in every forum but without success. Even in the objections presently under consideration, the description of the premises in property No. C-150 is contradictory. This shows that the objectors are trying to raise this plea belatedly, in every forum but without success. Even in the objections presently under consideration, the description of the premises in property No. C-150 is contradictory. No site plan has been filed to clarify as to what was the portion originally in tenancy and in what portion they were in possession in their independent right. Admittedly, these objectors are successors in interest of Shri Sharan Jeet Singh and they step into his shoes. Said Shri Sharan Jeet Singh in civil suit admitted that he was in possession of the suit premises only in his capacity as brother of the respondent/JD and never in his independent capacity. He nowhere, claimed any independent right in respect of any portion of C-150 either in rent proceedings or in the civil case. In his objections dated 5.5.78, he admitted the same facts. In his cross examination, in the civil suit, as PW-4 in page 6 of his cross, he categorically and unequivocally made an admission that the tenanted premises, comprise of portion of C-150 and C-155. The present objectors being successor of said Shri Sharan Jeet Singh cannot wriggle out of this admission made by him. In addition to these facts, the documents placed on record by learned counsel for DH i.e. copy of the lease deed executed in favour of petitioner. Bhim Sen by L&DO, letter dated 2.11.1966 issued by MCD again, to the DH Bhim Sen, the property tax receipt dated 4.12.1992 and 15.10.91 go a long way to establish that property C-150 and 155 are not two separate properties but built on a single plot of land bearing a dual No.C-150-155. Last but not the least, the affidavit of Shri Sharan Jeet Singh as well as Suman Sodhi, one of the objectors speak for themselves. In all these affidavits, the objectors as well as their predecessor in interest, are shown as resident of C-155 and not of C-150. These affidavits are sworn by them to be correct and now they cannot say that they are in possession of any property No.C-150 different from the suit premises in their individual capacity or that it does not form part of eviction order. The property was admittedly single storey having portion being in possession of the JD and thereafter the objectors being successor of Sh. The property was admittedly single storey having portion being in possession of the JD and thereafter the objectors being successor of Sh. Sharan Jeet Singh, brother of the JD, if any construction is raised by them on the first floor, that will form subject matter of the eviction order and the present execution proceedings. They never came into possession of these portions except through the tenanted premises nor it is their claim. Hence, the objections as well as application under Section 151 CPC devoid of any merits and same are dismissed.” 20. The procedure adopted by the executing court cannot be said to have caused failure of justice and there is no irregularity, much less a material irregularity, in the proceedings as conducted by the learned Additional Rent Controller. 21. The contention of the petitioner that the tenancy premises fell exclusively in property No.C-1/155 and that property bearing No. C-1/150 was a separate and distinct property and that it did not form part of the tenanted premises is also patently false and is belied by the admission made by her husband (through whom she claims) as far back as on 16.12.1978, during his cross-examination, wherein Sh.Saranjeet Singh, husband of the petitioner had stated, inter alia, as follows: - “Pt. Bhim Sain Sharma never delivered me possession rather my brother Inderjit Singh delivered me the possession and he so delivered the possession after institution of the petition u/s 45 but I do not recollect as to how much after the said possession was given to me.” “No writing about the delivery of possession was executed. I do not know that Bhim Sain Sharma gave any writing to my brother or not that the possession be delivered to me. I have not made any inquiries from my brother regarding it until today. I did give a receipt to my brother about taking possession from him. I did not tell my counsel before institution of the suit regarding that writing. I do not know that my brother produced that receipt in the court or Rent Controller or Tribunal or not. I did file objections in the court of Rent Controller when the execution application was filed by the defendants but that receipt was not filed in those proceedings. Notice of that execution was served on my brother and who told me about this and then I filed the objections. I did file objections in the court of Rent Controller when the execution application was filed by the defendants but that receipt was not filed in those proceedings. Notice of that execution was served on my brother and who told me about this and then I filed the objections. I did mention in my objections that I had taken possession but there was no mention about receipt of possession in those objections. I have not mentioned about the receipt any where uptil today. This agreement to sell relates to House No.C-1/155. I have not purchased any part of property No.C-1/150. In tenancy of my brother in addition to property No.C-1/155 some portion of C-1/150 was included. I did not at the time of agreement to sell that the tenancy premises of my brother Inderjit Singh was comprised of some portion of property C-1/155 and some portion of property C-1/150. I did mention in my objections in the executing court that I had taken possession of whole of the tenanted premises as owner under the agreement to sell.” “I did not confirm that the property included in the agreement to sell was whole of House No.C-1/155. It was mentioned in the agreement to sell that I was to purchase vide this agreement, half portion of House No. C-1/155 and C-1/150. The property in tenancy of Inderjit Singh is shown by green in this plan EX-1.” (emphasis supplied) 22. The objections dated 05.05.1978 by the said Sh.Saranjeet Singh categorically state to the effect that the present objector who is related to the judgment debtor as his brother, had entered into an agreement with the decree holder for purchase of House No.C-1/155, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, of which the suit premises are a part. 23. Therefore, the stand of the petitioners husband had been that the agreement to sell was in respect of property No.C-1/155 and that the tenancy in favour of his brother late Inderjit Singh comprised of portions of both C-1/150 as well as C-1/155. At the same time, the husband of the petitioner had also stated that possession qua whole of the tenanted premises was handed over by his brother to him. However, late Bhim Sen did not handover possession of any portion of the premises to the husband of the petitioner. At the same time, the husband of the petitioner had also stated that possession qua whole of the tenanted premises was handed over by his brother to him. However, late Bhim Sen did not handover possession of any portion of the premises to the husband of the petitioner. These admissions are made by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, through whom she claims her rights and are binding upon the objector/petitioner (see Section 18 of the Evidence Act; also see ILR 1964 Cut 274; AIR 1943 PC 83; AIR 1974 Bom 12 ). Therefore, it is amply clear that the tenancy created was comprised of the property having No.C-1/150 and C-1/155 and not only in respect of property No.C-1/155. 24. The petitioners have also contended that there were two rooms constructed on the First Floor and since the same did not form part of the eviction order, possession thereof could not be taken in execution of the said eviction order. Admittedly, the stand of the petitioner as pleaded in para 9.1 and 9.2 of the proposed amended Memorandum of Appeal dated 21.10.1999 sought to be placed on record by way of an application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 was that the construction of these rooms was raised by her/her predecessor-in-interest in 1987. This was clearly an admission made by her, for an admission may be in any form (see AIR 1974 SC 471 ). Though the application was withdrawn, the admissions made therein can be used against the petitioner and bind the petitioner. (See AIR 1956 Cal 577 ). How her predecessor came in possession is clearly discernible from his statement as reproduced above. No other explanation as to how the objector came in the possession of first floor has been put forth. Merely because a tenant/sub-tenant or an unauthorized occupant, on his own, without the express consent and authority of the landlord/owner raises construction in a portion of the tenanted premises, he cannot object to the delivery of possession of the same in the execution of the eviction order on the ground that the said unauthorized construction did not form part of the eviction order. If such an argument is accepted, it would be putting premium on an illegality. The tenant/sub-tenant or other occupant cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 25. If such an argument is accepted, it would be putting premium on an illegality. The tenant/sub-tenant or other occupant cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 25. In view of the aforesaid I find absolutely no merit in this Petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. 26. However, that is not the end of the matter. As aforesaid on account of the unscrupulous conduct of the petitioner and her late husband the Respondent has been denied the complete fruits of the eviction order passed as early as on 7.5.1974 on the ground of bonafide requirement. Even the part possession was delivered only after passing of the order dated 8.9.2000 and 8.12.2000. Learned counsel for the res pointed out that in all these years not a penny has been paid by the petitioner and her late husband for the use and occupation of the premises. It is clear to me that the petitioner has grossly abused the judicial process by setting up a totally dishonest case, which she has been altering from time to time, to some how thwart the execution of the eviction order. It is litigants like the petitioner who give a bad name to our judicial system. In this case, the cause of justice has suffered manifestly and this is a deserving case where the petitioner should be subjected to exemplary and punitive costs. In Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar and another, (2003) 8 SCC 289 , the Supreme Court observed as follows: “Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment-debtors to deny the decree-holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These types of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing laws delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system.”. The aforesaid, observation of the Honble Supreme Court squarely apply in the facts of the present case. In Salem, Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 , while dealing with the aspect of costs that a Civil Court may award, the Apex Court held as follows: “Section 35 of the Code deals with the award of cost and Section 35-A with award of compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences. Section 95 deals with grant of compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds. Section 95 deals with grant of compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds. These three sections deal with three different aspects of award of cost and compensation. Under Section 95 cost can be awarded upto Rs.50,000/-and under Section 35-A, the costs awardable are upto Rs.3,000/-. Section 35-B for award of cost for causing delay where a party fails to take the step which he was required by or under the Code to take or obtains an adjournment for taking such step or for producing evidence or on any other ground. In circumstances mentioned in Section 35-B an order may be made requiring the defaulting party to pay to other party such costs as would, in the opinion of the court, be reasonably sufficient to reimburse the other party in respect of the expenses incurred by him in attending the court on that date and payment of such costs, on the date next following the date of such order, shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit or the defence. Section 35 postulates that the cost shall follow the event and if not, reasons thereof shall be stated. The award of the cost of the suit is in the discretion of the Court. In Sections 35 and 35-B, there is no upper limit of amount of cost awardable. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs as awarded on the unsuccessful party. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs. In large number of cases, such an order is passed despite Section 35(2) of the Code. Such a practice also encourages filing of frivolous suits. It also leads to taking up of frivolous defences. Further wherever costs as awarded, ordinarily the same are not realistic and are nominal. When Section 35(2) provides for cost to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party except in those cases where the Court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons thereof. Further wherever costs as awarded, ordinarily the same are not realistic and are nominal. When Section 35(2) provides for cost to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party except in those cases where the Court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons thereof. The costs have to be actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost besides the payment of the court-fee, lawyers fee, typing and other cost in relation to the litigation. It is for the High Courts to examine these aspects and wherever necessary make requisite rules, regulations or practice direction so as to provide appropriate guidelines for the subordinate courts to follow.” 27. Considering the fact that in this case the order of the eviction was passed in the year 1974 i.e. nearly 34 years ago, and even part possession was delivered only some time in December 2000 or thereafter and also the fact that the Respondent has been subjected to absolutely frivolous and unnecessary litigation by a totally unscrupulous petitioner, and the respondent has had to defend these proceedings for nearly six years. I award costs at Rs.2 lakhs, which shall be paid by the petitioner to the Respondent. The said costs may be recovered through execution by the executing court before which the Respondents execution is pending. I further direct that the executing court should now forthwith proceed to execute the eviction order.