Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—The short facts of the case appear to be that the petitioner is registered trust, which came to be formed on account of the trust deed dated 17.03.1961, and it is registered vide Registration No. A/2132 at Rajkot. As per the petitioner, the purpose and the object of the trust is to provide facility to the pilgrims, who visit Virpur to offer their prayers to Shri Jalarambapa, while on the way of Somnath, Drawka etc. As per the petitioner, the trust is running guest house, and for maintenance of the guest house, it is incurring expenses like electricity, bedding and other expenses, and the amount/charge is being collected for maintenance of such expenses on token basis from the visitors/pilgrims. As per the petitioner running of guest house is a business activity, which would fall in the category of Rule 32(4) of the Bombay Public Trust (Gujarat) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred as to ‘Rules’). It appears that demand notice was issued for recovery of the contribution, by the Asst. Charity Commissioner. The petitioner raised objection, and contended that it has paid the amount of contribution, based on the net income, after deduction of the expenses. The Asst. Charity Commissioner, ultimately passed the order on 11.08.1995, whereby held that the assessment be treated under Rule 32(4). It appears the Joint Charity Commissioner, in suo motu exercise of the power under Rule 33(6), initiated the proceedings against the order of the Asst. Charity Commissioner. The petitioner submitted written reply, and contended that the order passed by the Asst. Charity Commissioner is legal. The Joint Charity Commissioner, ultimately found that running of guest house (Atithi Gruh) cannot be said as trade/business and, therefore, not falling within the category of Rule 32(4) of the Rules and therefore, he allowed the proceedings, and set aside the order passed by the Asst. Charity Commissioner, and directed for the recovery of the remaining amount. It is under these circumstances, the present petition before this Court. 2. Heard Mrs. Sangeeta Pahwa learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Ms. Trusha Patel learned AGP for the respondent. 3. The principal aspect which may deserves consideration in the present proceedings is the scope of ambit of Rule 33(4), and as to whether the activity of the petitioner for running guest house at Virpur can be said as falling under Rule 33(4) of the Rules or not. 4. Trusha Patel learned AGP for the respondent. 3. The principal aspect which may deserves consideration in the present proceedings is the scope of ambit of Rule 33(4), and as to whether the activity of the petitioner for running guest house at Virpur can be said as falling under Rule 33(4) of the Rules or not. 4. In order to examine the above referred aspect, certain statutory provisions, which may have the relevance, deserves to be considered. 5. Section 58 of the Bombay Public Trust Act (hereinafter referred as to the ‘Act) reads as under: “58. Contributions by public trusts to Public Trusts Administration Fund. [(1)] Every public trust shall pay to the Public Trusts Administration Fund annually such contribution on such date and in such manner as may be prescribed: [Provided that the contribution prescribed under this section shall— (i) In the case of a dharmada, be fixed at rates in proportion to the gross annual collection or receipts of the dharmada; (ii) in the case of other public trust, be fixed at the rates in proportion to the gross annual income of such public trust.] [Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the gross annual income shall include gross income from all sources in a year excluding donations given or offering made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the public trust; Provided that the interest or income accruing from such donations or offerings in the years following that in which they were given or made shall be taken into account in calculating the gross annual income.] [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), the State Government may, by rules, provide for exemption of any public trust or class of public trusts from the whole or any part of the contribution payable under that sub-section, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be prescribed.]’’ 6. As per Section 58(1) of the Act, and more particularly the proviso, two categories are mentioned for the purpose of collection of contribution. One being in case of Dharmada at the fixed proportion to the gross collection or the receipts of Dharmada, and the another being residuary, at the rate in proportion to gross annual income of such public trust. As per Section 58(1) of the Act, and more particularly the proviso, two categories are mentioned for the purpose of collection of contribution. One being in case of Dharmada at the fixed proportion to the gross collection or the receipts of Dharmada, and the another being residuary, at the rate in proportion to gross annual income of such public trust. Therefore, it appears that as per the scheme of Section 58(1) of the Act, the contribution is payable in case of Dharmada at the fixed rate in proportion to the gross annual collection or the receipts of Dharmada. Whereas in case of other public trust, such contribution is payable in proportion to the gross annual income of such public trust. Section 58(2) of the Act, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), the State Government may also provide by rules for exemption to any public trust from payment of the whole, or part of contribution payable. 7. At this stage Rule 32 may have the relevance. Rule 32(1) provides that if the public trust other than exclusively for the purpose of advancement and propagation of secular education or exclusively for the purpose of medical relief or veterinary treatment of animals shall pay annual the contribution in the Administration Fund at the rate of 2 percent of its gross annual income, or, where public trust is Dharmada, its gross annual collection or the receipts, subject to maximum limit of Rs. 50,000/- per year. Rule 32(1-A) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rule (1), for the period between 01.04.1978 and 31.03.1979 assessment shall be at the rate of 1 percent as against 2 percent as provided by Sub-rule (1). Rule 32 (2) provides that the contribution shall be assessed on the basis of the gross annual income or collection or the receipts, as the case may be, based on the period of previous 12 months from first day of March or any other day which were fixed by the Charity Commissioner for the purpose of Section 33(1) of the Act. Rule 32(3) provides for the mode of calculation of gross annual income of a public trust or the gross collection/receipts of a public trust in case of Dharmada for the purpose of assessment of the contribution and various heads are provided for permissibility of the deductions. Rule 32(3) provides for the mode of calculation of gross annual income of a public trust or the gross collection/receipts of a public trust in case of Dharmada for the purpose of assessment of the contribution and various heads are provided for permissibility of the deductions. Rule 32(4) which mainly arise for consideration in the present petition reads as under: 32 (4) If a public trust conduct a business or trade, for the purpose of assessing the contribution, the net annual profits of such business or trade shall be treated as the gross annual income of the business or trade. 8. The aforesaid Rule 32(4) provides that if a public trust conduct a business or trade, then for the purpose of assessing contribution, the net annual profits of such business or trade shall be treated as the gross annual income of the business or trade. Therefore, in case of a public trust conducting the business or trade, such contribution is payable on net annual profit of such business or trade. 9. As the impugned decision is based on aspect of activity, which cannot be termed as business, as per the view taken by the Joint Charity Commissioner in the impugned order, it may be required to examine the meaning of word “business” or word “trade”. In order to understand the meaning “trade”, there is no much difficulty, and it can be said understood to mean, if there is sale and purchase or dealing of any product or items, such can be terms as “trade”. It appears that learned Joint Charity Commissioner has misdirected himself in the proceedings, on the basis that activity of trade and of the business are the same. Whereas it was the contention of the petitioner that it is conducting business. Since, the legislature has used word “business” or “trade”, both the words “business” and “trade” would be required to be given proper meaning. Had the legislature, intended to include only conducting of “trade” under Rule 32(4), it might not have used the word “business”. The fact that the word “business” is also used, Rule 32(4) can be read to the effect that if a public trust conducts the “business” or conducts a “trade” for the purpose of assessment of the contribution, the net annual profit shall be treated as the gross annual income for the purpose of calculation of the contribution. 10. The fact that the word “business” is also used, Rule 32(4) can be read to the effect that if a public trust conducts the “business” or conducts a “trade” for the purpose of assessment of the contribution, the net annual profit shall be treated as the gross annual income for the purpose of calculation of the contribution. 10. As the activity of the petitioner trust of running guest house, is not a trade, it is not required for this Court, to examine the matter in detail for understanding the meaning of the word “trade”, but as the contention of the petitioner is that running of guest house would fall in the word “business”, it may have the relevance for the purpose of deciding the present petition. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the incorporation of the word ‘business’ in the present Act, read with the rules, the meaning deserves to be given. Whereas it is the contention of Ms. Trusha Patel learned AGP that trust is not formed with the essential purpose, of conducing business, and if trust is not formed for principal object of contending business, incidental object or the incidental activity of running guest house, by the trust cannot be permitted to travel beyond the main object of the trust and, therefore, would not fall within the definition of the word “business”, nor can be said that the. petitioner trust conducts the business while running guest house. 12. In support of her contention learned AGP Ms. Trusha Patel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Sai Publication Fund, reported at 2002 (3) GLH 149. 13. If the matter is examined, in light of the documents on record, the trust deed shows that the same is formed for establishing the guest house, and with the object to provide residential accommodation to the pilgrims, who may stay at Virpur for offering prayers or while visiting Girnar, Kund-Damodar, Jyotirling of Somnath, Dwarka, Temple of Sudama etc. Therefore, the principal object is to provide residential accommodation to the pilgrims. Therefore, the principal object is to provide residential accommodation to the pilgrims. In view of the expressed language of the trust deed, for providing residential facility/accommodation to the pilgrims on the way to various places of Saurashtra, by establishing Atithi Gruh (Guest House), I cannot accept the contention of the learned AGP that the principal object is different and its only by way of incidental object the trust is running guest house. Therefore, the said decision is of no help to the State Government. 14. It deserves to be recorded that as such the meaning of the word under any statute can be given in context on the principal statute and if similar circumstances exists, the reference to the another statute may assume importance. Merely because the particular word under different statute which has different object altogether, is interpreted, the same meaning, as such cannot be incorporated in toto. The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in case of S. Mohan Lal vs. R. Kondiah, reported at AIR 1979 SC 1132 , more particularly the observations made at Para 3 wherein the Apex Court inter alia observed as under: “3. . . It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act; more so if the two Acts in which the same word is used are not cognate Acts, Neither the meaning, nor the definition of the term in one statute affords a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which the term should be understood generally. On the other hand it is a sound, and, indeed, a well known principle of construction that meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. . .” 15. On the other hand it is a sound, and, indeed, a well known principle of construction that meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. . .” 15. Therefore, as such while giving correct meaning to the word “business” under Rule 32(4), it has to be kept in mind that such rule as referred to for the activity is of the public trust for the purpose of calculation of the administration fund, and the word “business” is not used in the language by legislature in taxing statute, or an act governing or regulating only absolutely commercial activity. If the plain and simple meaning of the word “business” is to be extracted, it would mean a regular activity in contradiction to single action or single act. Therefore, if any particular singular transaction or singular activity is undertaken, it may not fall in the regular activity for example, a trust in building constructed, permits accommodation of the pilgrims, once or twice, it cannot be construed as the business of the trust, but if it is regular activity run for providing of accommodation to the pilgrims in guest house, it can be said that such activity would fall within the meaning of the word “business”. At this stage reference may be made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in case of M/s. Bakhtawar Singh Balkrishan, New Delhi vs. Union of India and Another, reported at AIR 1983 Delhi Page 201, wherein question arose for consideration before the High Court of Delhi for interpreting the word “carries on business” or “business” with reference to Section 20 of CPC, which provides for the cause of action either in whole or in part. In the said decision the meaning of the expression “carries on business” from Halsbury’s Law of England fourth edition volume 10 Pages 66-67 as considered by the English Court in some cases was considered that “the person who merely works for another for gain or was employee about the business of another, could not be said to be “carries on business” within the meaning of the expression “carries on business” because such person was merely working for gain for another. 16. After considering aforesaid, at Para 7 it was observed as under: 7. 16. After considering aforesaid, at Para 7 it was observed as under: 7. “The expression “business” has a very wide import and is understood in different sense in varying contexts. In its generic sense, “business” is any purposeful activity, any activity, directed towards some end, an activity engaged in as normal, logical or inevitable and usually extending over a period of time. It has been used in that sense as being synonymous with “role” or “function”. While in its narrow sense, it is confined to activity of a commercial nature with a profit motivation, in its wide sense, it is used to denote conduct of his or its affairs by any person, body or authority. There has been considerable difficulty in defining the expression “business” and while the meaning to be attributed to the expression would depend largely on the context, there is, by and large, unanimity that the expression has a very wide import and would encompass in the word of Lindley, L.J., (1884) 27 Ch D 71 “almost anything which is an occupation, as distinct from a pleasure-anything which is an occupation or duty which requires attention is a business”. These words have since found their echo in the subsequent decisions on the interpretation of the expression “business” and of analogous terms both in England and in this country. The expression “carries on business” has the connotation of permanence and of regularity to distinguish it from an isolated act or activity. The amplitude of the expression “carries on business”, however, could not possibly be construed as having been restricted merely because it is used in conjunction with “personally works for gain” nor it is possible to read into the expression “carries on business” the element of gain or of profit in the activity that is carried on. The expression “carries on business” is much wider than what the expression in normal parlance connotes because of the ambit of a civil action. . . .” 17. I am in agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Delhi. I find that keeping in view the provisions of the present Act, which is essentially meant for regulation of the activity of a public trust, there may not be element of profit making, but may be element of rendering services to the beneficiary, or to the public at large. I find that keeping in view the provisions of the present Act, which is essentially meant for regulation of the activity of a public trust, there may not be element of profit making, but may be element of rendering services to the beneficiary, or to the public at large. Therefore, meaning of the word “business” must be read in wider sense instead of restricting it only for such activity having element of profit or commercialisation. However, such would apply to the trust, which is exclusively running such activity on regular basis. Further if the trust is a Dharmada and also running regular activity for rendering services to the society, then the Dharmada would stand on separate footing, and the regular activity of rendering service to the public would stand on separate footing for the purpose of payment of contribution, but subject to maximum limit prescribed. 18. If the facts of the present case are examined in light of the aforesaid observations, it can be said that the activity of the trust for regularly maintaining the guest house for providing residential accommodation to the pilgrims, can be said as conducting of business, which would fall within the provisions of Rule 32(4) of the Rules. Therefore, the order passed by the Deputy Charity Commissioner for insistence of the contribution based on the gross receipts, and not based on the net actual profit/income cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Hence, the same is quashed and set aside. 19. The petition is allowed. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.