Judgment ( 1. ) IN the aforesaid two petitions under Article 227 of the constitution of India common questions of facts and law are involved, therefore, both these petitions were heard together and a common order is passed. ( 2. ) THE facts are referred to from W. P. No. 4822/2006 (S), Sushil Kumar kanungo and others vs. M. P. Rajya Sahkari Bank Maryadit and others. The petitioners by way of filing this petition have challenged the order dated 29-3-2006 (Annexure P-1) passed by the M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal Bhopal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal" ). The Tribunal has allowed the application of amendment submitted by the respondents on 9-9-2005 (Annexure p-2) whereby permission was - sought to amend the written statement. The tribunal has further remanded the case for its fresh adjudication by the Joint registrar. ( 3. ) THE facts leading to the present petition are that the petitioners were initially employed by the respondents on probation on 20-1-1996. Thereafter, the respondents directed to terminate the services of the petitioners by passing an order on 27-10-1997. As the termination orders of the petitioners are common, therefore, they have filed the copy of one such order as Annexure P-4 to the petition. This order was passed by the respondents in exercise of their powers vested with them under Rule 62 of the Staff Service Rules. The Rules 61 and 62 of the Staff Service Rules reads as under :- "61. The services of a permanent employee may be terminated by the managing Committee or Staff Committee of the Bank, after giving three months notice or three months pay in lieu of notice. 62. The services of a probationer may be terminated by the Staff committee/chairman without assigning any reasons. " ( 4. ) THE petitioners filed a dispute before the Registrar, Co-operative societies, Bhopal under section 55 (2) read with section 64 of the M. P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") which was made over to the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies. Before the Joint registrar, Co-operative Societies various grounds were alleged by the petitioners to challenge their termination. The respondents were noticed and they filed their written statement. Copy of the same is placed on record as Annexure P-6. The joint Registrar, thereafter, decided the said dispute by passing an order on 10-8-2001 (Annexure P-7 ). Before the Joint registrar, Co-operative Societies various grounds were alleged by the petitioners to challenge their termination. The respondents were noticed and they filed their written statement. Copy of the same is placed on record as Annexure P-6. The joint Registrar, thereafter, decided the said dispute by passing an order on 10-8-2001 (Annexure P-7 ). The Joint Registrar held that the order of termination has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and directed for the reinstatement of the petitioners. The Joint Registrar further directed that the respondent-Bank may take an action to terminate the services of the petitioners by taking recourse to the powers vested with them under the Staff Service Rules 61-62. ( 5. ) BEING aggrieved by the order passed by the Joint Registrar, the petitioners as well as the respondents both preferred first appeals to the Tribunal. Before going further to the facts it would be appropriate to mention that the appeal which was preferred by the respondents before the Tribunal was withdrawn. The appeal preferred by the petitioners before the Tribunal was heard. Before the Tribunal an application for amendment was moved on behalf of the respondents to amend the written statement (Annexure P-2 ). The Tribunal found that the amendment which is sought to be incorporated in the written statement is necessary as earlier the relevant and necessary facts were not pleaded in the written statement by the respondents, therefore, the Tribunal considered the relevancy of the amendment and the said application of amendment was allowed. ( 6. ) BEFORE this Court the present petitions have been preferred by the petitioners challenging the order dated 29-3-2006 (Annexure P-1 ). Before considering the facet of the said amendment it is appropriate to refer to certain provisions. The M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal was constituted by the respondents and the State Government framed the M. P. State Co-operative tribunal Regulations, 2000. These regulations have been brought into force after the constitution of the M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal. The Regulation 31 of the said Regulations reads as under :- "31. Rules relating to civil rules of practice and procedure to be followed.-Whenever these regulations are silent on the question of any procedure, the Tribunal shall follow the procedure stipulated under the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908 ). " ( 7. The Regulation 31 of the said Regulations reads as under :- "31. Rules relating to civil rules of practice and procedure to be followed.-Whenever these regulations are silent on the question of any procedure, the Tribunal shall follow the procedure stipulated under the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908 ). " ( 7. ) THE constitution of the M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal was after the amendment in the Act. Earlier Chapter-X was repealed and new Chapter X was inserted by the M. P. Amendment Act 14 of 1976, which was brought into force by the State Government w. e. f. 1-5-1999. According to the same, section 77-B of the Act states that in exercise of the powers conferred on the Tribunal, the tribunal shall have all the powers which are vested in Civil Courts while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of proof of facts by affidavits; summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; compelling discovery or the production of any document; and issuing commissions for the examination of the witnesses. Section 77 (17) further prescribes that the Tribunal hearing an appeal under the Act shall exercise all the powers conferred upon an appellate Court by section 97 and Order XLI in the first Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the application for amendment which was submitted by the respondents could not have been allowed by the Tribunal as the first appeal submitted by the respondents against the order passed by the Joint Registrar was already dismissed as withdrawn and on this basis it is submitted that it was the petitioners appeal which was pending and in the petitioners appeal the respondents cannot file application for amendment. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioners that the judgment passed by the Tribunal allowing amendment has resulted into substantial prejudice and injustice to the rights of the petitioners. It is also contended that by way of amendment a new case has been substituted which was inconsistence to the earlier written statement filed by the respondents and on this basis it was submitted that the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error while allowing the application for amendment submitted by the respondents. ( 9. It is also contended that by way of amendment a new case has been substituted which was inconsistence to the earlier written statement filed by the respondents and on this basis it was submitted that the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error while allowing the application for amendment submitted by the respondents. ( 9. ) WITH a view to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners with respect to prejudice, the arguments of the respondents to justify the application for amendment are to be appreciated. The order passed by the joint Registrar has set aside the order of termination on the ground that no opportunity was given to the employees before passing the order. The Joint registrar after passing the order further gave a direction to the employer-bank to pass a fresh order to terminate the services of the respondents by exercising their powers under Rules 61 to 63. This order was challenged by both the parties in appeal before the Tribunal. The impact and effect of the order passed by the tribunal had been that no Us on merits was decided finally but on technical ground of non-observation of principles of natural justice the order was set aside. It appears that the Joint Registrar was of the view that on the basis of the evidence which was adduced by the parties, the Bank has failed to comply with the principles of natural justice and for this reason the orders of termination were set aside. When the appeal was pending before the Co-operative Tribunal of the employees, an application for amendment was moved highlighting all relevant facts to justify the termination and also to show that the appointment was bad. Under the circumstances, if the order passed by the Joint Registrar even assuming is held to be good then the employer since was given an opportunity to proceed with the matter by effecting the termination afresh then the petitioners again would have approached the Joint Registrar challenging their termination. ( 10. ) ON the basis of the same, if the purpose of Order 6, Rule 17 is seen, then the dominant purpose of the same is to minimise the litigation so that all relevant facts could be decided finally on merits in the same suit without permitting for further litigation. ( 10. ) ON the basis of the same, if the purpose of Order 6, Rule 17 is seen, then the dominant purpose of the same is to minimise the litigation so that all relevant facts could be decided finally on merits in the same suit without permitting for further litigation. The dominant purpose for amendment to minimise the litigation has been considered by the Apex Court in Ragu Thilak D. John vs. S. Rayappan and others, 2001 (2) SCC 472 wherein the Apex Court has considered all the earlier judgments relating to amendment and ultimately came to a conclusion that the purpose and object of filing the application for amendment is also to minimise the litigation. The relevant para 5 from the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Ragu Thilaks case (supra) is reproduced as under :-"after referring to the judgments in Charan Das vs. Amir Khan, L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. vs. Jardine Skinner and Company, Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar, Ganesh Trading Co. vs. Moji Ram and various other authorities, this Court in B. K. Narayan Pillai vs. Parameswaran Pillai held: (SCC p. 715, para 3): "3. The purpose and object of Order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure code is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. " ( 11. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. " ( 11. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid if all the pleadings and facts by way of amendment are permitted to be raised by allowing the amendment then there would have been no occasion for the employer to take an action to terminate again, which may ultimately result to the fresh litigation. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, I do not find that the amendment which has been allowed in the written statement had been of any prejudice to the petitioners but the amendment is bona fide. ( 12. ) THE question in this reference could also be viewed from a different angle. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 41 Rule 33 would also be relevant to decide the present case. The same is reproduced as under :-"33. Power of Court of Appeal.- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection, and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees : provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35-A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. " ( 13. " ( 13. ) THUS, the power of the appellate Court under the Code of Civil procedure wherein the appellate Court has been conferred with a power notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection, then the appellate Court in exercise of powers vested under Order 41 Rule 33 can also pass an order in favour of the respondents or parties although the respondents have not preferred any appeal or objection. Thus, the vesting of power is writ large with the Court under Order 41, Rule 33 even to allow the amendment in an appeal of the other side and even no appeal has been preferred by the respondents yet the order in favour of the respondents can be passed by the appellate Court. ( 14. ) IN this reference it would be appropriate to refer to the power of the tribunal conferred upon it under the regulations of the M. P. State Co-operative tribunal Regulations, 2000. These regulations have been framed by the State govt. in exercise of its power under section 77 (12) of the Act. The Regulation 31, which has already been reproduced above states that whenever these regulations are silent on the question of any procedure, the Tribunal shall follow the procedure stipulated under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Tribunal is equipped with the power to deal with the amendment under Chapter X of the act. Even otherwise if the powers of the Tribunal under Chapter X including the regulations are seen then they are silent with regard to the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal while deciding the appeal. If the procedure is not specifically provided under Chapter X read with the Regulations of 2000, as aforesaid, then the power vested with the Tribunal under Regulation 31 will apply and the Tribunal shall follow the procedure stipulated under the Code of civil Procedure, 1908. On this basis, I am of the view that the Tribunal has rightly followed the principles while deciding the application for amendment of the employer/respondents and the power as such is in consonance with the Order 41, Rule 33. ( 15. On this basis, I am of the view that the Tribunal has rightly followed the principles while deciding the application for amendment of the employer/respondents and the power as such is in consonance with the Order 41, Rule 33. ( 15. ) AN argument has also been advanced on behalf of the respondents that by submitting an application for amendment of the written statement the relevant and proper facts, which could not brought on record earlier which were necessary for the adjudication, have merely been brought on record for the sake of justice in the case. Since the Tribunal has already exercised its discretion in allowing the amendment, therefore, the Tribunal has not committed any error jurisdictional or otherwise in allowing the amendment. ( 16. ) THE rival submissions so made by the parties are considered. In the present case, as it has been put forth, against the order passed by the Joint registrar a first appeal was preferred to the Tribunal. The appeal being in continuation of the original suit, the application for amendment can be filed by the respondents. There is no prohibition in filing an application for amendment on behalf of the respondents in an appeal preferred by the petitioners. ( 17. ) THE Apex Court in its judgment rendered in Baldev Singh and others vs. Manohar Singh and another, 2006 (6) SCC 498 , after considering the earlier judgments, has held that in view of the provisions made under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code it cannot be doubted that wide power and unfettered discretion has been conferred on the Court to allow amendment of the pleadings to a party in such manner and on such terms as it appears to the Court just and proper. Further, the Apex Court in para-15 of its judgment held that amendment in a plaint is entirely different than an amendment in the written statement. The amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written statement are not necessarily governed by exactly the same principle though some general principles are common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or substitute his cause of action or the nature of his claim has necessarily no counterpart in the law relating to amendment of the written statement. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action. On this basis, the Apex Court held that in case of amendment to the written statement, the Courts are inclined to be more liberal in allowing amendment of the written statement than of plaint and question of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in the former than in the latter case. The relevant paras 15 and 16 from the case of Baldev Singh (supra) are reproduced as under :- "15. Let us now take up the last ground on which the application for amendment of the written statement was rejected by the High Court as well as the trial Court. The rejection was made on the ground that inconsistent plea cannot be allowed to be taken. We are unable to appreciate the ground of rejection made by the High Court as well as the trial Court. After going through the pleadings and also the statements made in the application for amendment of the written statement, we fail to understand how inconsistent plea could be said to have been taken by the appellants in their application for amendment of the written statement, excepting the plea taken by the appellants in the application for amendment of written statement regarding the joint ownership of the suit property. Accordingly, on facts, we are not satisfied that the application for amendment of the written statement could be rejected also on this ground. That apart, it is now well settled that an amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written statement are not necessarily governed by exactly the same principle. It is true that some general principles are certainly common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or substitute his cause of action or the nature of his claim has necessarily no counterpart in the law relating to amendment of the written statement. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action. Accordingly, in the case of amendment of written statement, the Courts are inclined to be more liberal in allowing amendment of the written statement than of plaint and question of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in the former than in the latter case. 16. This being the position, we are therefore of the view that inconsistent pleas can be raised by defendants in the written statement although the same may not be permissible in the case of plaint. In the case of M/s modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and anr. vs. M/s Ladha Ram and Co. , this principle has been enunciated by this Court in which it has been clearly laid down that inconsistent or alternative pleas can be made in the written statement. Accordingly, the High Court and the trial Court had gone wrong in holding that the defendants/appellants are not allowed to take inconsistent pleas in their defence. " ( 18. ) ON the basis of the same, the question in the present case is whether amendment in the written statement could have been ignored because of the prejudice as according to the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Baldev Singh (supra) the question of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in case of amendment in the written statement and thereafter the Apex Court held that in the written statement even an inconsistent plea can also be raised and the new grounds of defence or substituting or altering a defence can also be raised in the written statement but the same may not be permissible in case of an amendment in the plaint. The Apex Court in the said judgment further held that in the amendment of the written statement additional ground by way of defence can be introduced as an additional plea by altering the pleadings. ( 19. The Apex Court in the said judgment further held that in the amendment of the written statement additional ground by way of defence can be introduced as an additional plea by altering the pleadings. ( 19. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid yardsticks as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Baldev Singh (supra), since the Tribunal has already examined the relevancy of the amendment and thereafter the Tribunal came to the conclusion that earlier there had been no proper defence raised in the written statement by the employer and the amendment which was sought to be incorporated throws light substantially on the lis for its proper adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal after considering the nature of the amendment has allowed the said application. ( 20. ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Tribunal after considering the application for amendment has also considered the merits of the amendment. The submission so raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is considered. While examining the judgment passed by the Tribunal it cannot be said that the Tribunal has entered into the merits of the amendment and thereafter the said amendment was allowed. The Tribunal has only examined the relevancy of the amendment and found that the amendment which is sought to be incorporated in the written statement is prima facie necessary and relevant for the proper and final adjudication of the case. It is not a case that the Tribunal has taken over a task to amend the pleadings by deciding the case against the petitioners. As I have held earlier that the Tribunal has only examined the nature of the plea raised by the respondents and whether the amendment as such was necessary. Thus, the submission so put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners is misconceived. ( 21. ) IN this reference, it would also be appropriate to refer to the written statement submitted on behalf of the respondents before the Joint Registrar. In the written statement though the allegations have been denied but no specific facts were stated in the written statement for the denial of the claim and the facts. ( 21. ) IN this reference, it would also be appropriate to refer to the written statement submitted on behalf of the respondents before the Joint Registrar. In the written statement though the allegations have been denied but no specific facts were stated in the written statement for the denial of the claim and the facts. In the application for amendment the reason for amendment, which has been stated is that since at the time when the written statement was submitted an elected Board of Directors was functioning, who appointed the petitioners into the services, therefore, no proper written statement could be filed by the Officer-in-charge and no details were given to deny the pleadings and ultimately when the Board of Directors was superseded on 7-5-2004, the Officer-in-charge was appointed by the State Government to look into the affairs of the respondent-Bank, has examined the papers and thereby came to the conclusion that for the purposes of arriving at a correct conclusion and decision in the case, certain facts are necessary to be brought on record by way of an application for amendment. ( 22. ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the same officer who has filed application for amendment has also filed the earlier written statement. The same Officer-in-charge has subsequently come out with a plea that because of connivance no proper written statement could be filed. On this basis it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the reason behind the amendment is connivance and prejudice, therefore, it would be inappropriate to allow the amendment because both the written statement as well as the application for amendment were filed by the Officer-in-charge of the case. ( 23. ) THE aforesaid submission put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners is considered. In the present case the application for amendment has not been submitted only because there had been connivance. The reason to move an application for amendment, as discussed hereinabove, was that at the time when the written statement was filed an elected Board of Directors was functioning which appointed the petitioners and ultimately when the said Board of Directors was superseded by order dated 7-5-2004 and the Officer-in-Charge was appointed to look after the affairs who studied the case and after considering the case he found that there had been no proper pleadings and material submitted in the written statement. Therefore, he found that it was necessary to file a proper written statement and thereafter an application for amendment was moved. Merely because the same officer has filed the application for amendment who earlier filed the written statement that does not mean that the institution cannot subsequently file application for amendment when the new officer-in-charge was appointed after supersession of the Board by order dated 7-5-2004 but on instructions of such officer-in-charge the same officer was bound to follow the instruction of the institution who was party. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners as such is accepted, then no institution shall be permitted to amend their pleadings, which may result into prejudice and injustice to the institution while deciding the case. The purpose of adjudication is to hold an enquiry. The facts as such are permitted to be enquired into and the Courts cannot ignore to decide the case merely because of technicalities. ( 24. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the reason for amendment is not alone the connivance but the reasons in detail have been submitted in the application for amendment of the written statement and on the basis of the reasons, which have been discussed hereinabove, I am of the view that in the present case moving of an application for amendment is bona fide particularly keeping in view the earlier written statement which was filed wherein no details were given. ( 25. ) IN this reference it has to be seen whether merely because there had been a change in political scenario whether the action against the petitioners is mala fide. The question in this regard has been considered by the Apex Court firstly in P. V. Jagannath Rao and others vs. State of Orissa and others, AIR 969 SC 215 and in paragraphs 7 and 8 the following law has been laid down which is reproduced as under :- "we pass on to consider the next question arising in these appeals, namely whether the power was exercised by the State Government for a purpose alien to the statute. It was contended by Mr. It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the appellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Singh deo and the other persons who are at present in charge of the Orissa administration. Reference was made by Mr. Asoke Sen to the political history of the State of Orissa from 1947 up to the General Elections, 1967 and in particular to the rivalry between Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri singh Deo who was the leader of Opposition in the previous Government and also to the internal rivalry between the two political groups in the congress Legislative Party, one led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab and the other led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra. It was urged that the commission was set up by the present Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a collateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of Shri biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa. Mr. Asoke Sen said that the object of the enquiry was character assassination of Shri Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and so the commission was set up for a collateral purpose and the notification must be struck down as illegal and ultra vires. It is not possible, in our opinion, to accept this argument as correct. It is admitted that there is political rivalry in Orissa between the appellants and the present Chief Minister of orissa Shri R. N. Singh Deo and also as between the appellants and the group of Congress dissidents led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik. But we do not think that the existence of political rivalry is in itself sufficient to hold that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry is illegal. Having perused the affidavits of the appellants and also those filed by the respondents in this case we are of opinion that the appointment of the Commission of inquiry was not due merely to the existence of political rivalry of the parties but was impelled by the desire to set up and maintain high standards of moral conduct in the political administration of the State. As we have already pointed out, the object of appointing the Commission is stated in the notification itself as"the rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future". In the affidavit of Shri pabitra Mohan Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the general Elections of 1967. As a result of the popular mandate the swatantra Party and the Jana Congress coalition took charge of the reins of Government and in accordance with the solemn promise made by those parties to the people of Orissa the Government decided to appoint a commission of Inquiry in order to investigate the widespread corruption practised by the persons named in the Schedule to the impugned notification. The decision to appoint a Commission was also announced in the first address of the Governor to the Orissa Legislative Assembly after the 1967 General Elections. In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri pabitra Mohan Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana congress and the Swatantra Party was "to set up a clean administration, so that the States resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the State". za 6 of the affidavit Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan further states: "i have always believed and still believe that politics is not for the purpose of serving the selfish ends and to satisfy the greed of any politician or any person or any group of persons. Politics is for the service of the people and involves sacrificing ones life and comforts for raising the living standard of the overwhelming poverty-stricken people of our State and our country so that they may enjoy a good life and hold up their heads with pride. " In para 5 he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of Shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and their group. " In para 5 he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of Shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and their group. It is true that the appointment of the Commission of inquiry may have been made partly on account of the political rivalry between the parties but having perused the affidavits filed by the appellants and the respondents in this case, we are satisfied that the main object of the appointment of the Commission Inquiry was not to satisfy the political rivalry of the politicians at present in power in Orissa but to promote measures or maintaining purity and integrity of the administration in future in the Orissa State. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr. Asoke Sen is unable to make good his argument that the impugned notification is a mala fide exercise of the statutory power and it should be struck down as illegal. 8. It is well settled that if a statutory authority exercises its power for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the statutory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In other words, it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law, i. e. , an exercise of power by a statutory authority for a purpose other than that which the Legislature intended (See The King vs. Minister of Health, 1929-1 KB 619 ). But the question arises as to what is the legal position if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In such a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act ? The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied, in Rex vs. Brighton Corporation; ex parte shoosmith, (1907) 96 LT 762. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied, in Rex vs. Brighton Corporation; ex parte shoosmith, (1907) 96 LT 762. A Borough Corporation expended a large sum of money upon altering and paving a road, which was thereby permanently improved, but they decided to do the work at the particular time when it was done in order to induce the Automobile Club to hold motor trials and motor races upon it. The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divisional Court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by Fletcher-Moulton, L. J. at page 764 as follows :- "it cannot be denied that the physical act of changing the surface of a road when the corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powers and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives. The case would be quite different if one came to the conclusion that under the guise of improvement of a road, certain moneys had been used really for diminishing the expenses of the Automobile Club or anything of that sort and that there had been a turning aside of public moneys to illicit purposes". The principle was applied by Denning, L. J. in Earl Fitzwilliams wentworth Estate Co. Ltd. vs. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1951-2 KB 284. It was a case concerning the validity of a compulsory purchase made by the Central Land Board, and confirmed by the minister, under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in respect of a plot of land, ripe for development, which the owner was not prepared to sell at the existing use value. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Boards function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Boards policy of sales at existing use values. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Boards function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Boards policy of sales at existing use values. The majority (consisting of Somerwell and Singleton, L. J.) held that, though the main purpose of the Board may well have been to induce landowners in general and the company, in particular, to adopt one of the methods of sale favoured by the Board, it was nevertheless in connection with their function as the authority operating the development charge scheme, and at any rate, "the case was not one in which it could be said that powers were exercised for a purpose different from those specified in the statute". Denning, L. J. disagreed with the majority and held that the dominant purpose of the Board was not to assist in their proper function of collecting the development charge, but to enforce their policy of sales at existing use value only. The dominant purpose being unlawful, the order was invalid, and could not be cured by saying that there was also some other purpose which was lawful. The Board and the Minister had misunderstood the extent of their compulsory powers and their affidavits showed that they had overlooked that their ultimate purpose in exercising their powers should be connected with the performance of the Boards functions under the Act. At page 307 of the Report Denning L. J. observed as follows :- "what is the legal position when the board have more than one purpose in mind ? In the ordinary way, of course, the Courts do not have regard to the purpose or motive or reason of an act but, only to its intrinsic validity. For instance, an employer who dismisses a servant for a bad reason may justify it for a good one, so long as he finds it at any time before the trial. But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is done-as in the case of a conspiracy-and in such a case, when there is more than one purpose, the law always has regard to the dominant purpose. But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is done-as in the case of a conspiracy-and in such a case, when there is more than one purpose, the law always has regard to the dominant purpose. If the dominant purpose of those concerned is unlawful, then the act done is invalid, and it is not to be cured by saying that they had some other purpose in mind and which was lawful see what Lord Simon, Lord maugham and Lord Wright said in Crofter Hand Woven Harris tweed Co. vs. Veitch, (1942 AC 435, 445, 452-3, 469, 475 ). So also the validity of government action often depends on the purpose with which it is done. There, too, the same principle applies. If parliament grants a power to a government department to be used for an authorized purpose, then the power is only validly exercised when it is used by the department genuinely for that purpose as its dominant purpose. If that purpose is not the main purpose, but is subordinate to some other purpose which is not authorized by law, then the department exceeds its powers and the action is invalid. " ( 26. ) THE aforesaid judgment has been considered by the Apex Court in krishna Ballabh Sahay and others vs. Commission of Inquiry and others, AIR 1969 SC 258 and in paragraph 8 it is held as under :- "this brings us to the main question. As we pointed out above the first argument consists of two limbs. We shall examine them separately. The contention that the power cannot be exercised by the succeeding ministry has been answered already by this Court in two cases. The earlier of the two has been referred to by the High Court already. The more recent case is P. V. Jagannath Rao vs. State of Orissa, Civil Appeals Nos. 1148-1150 of 1968, D/-30-4-1968 = AIR 1969 SC 215 . It hardly needs any authority to state that the inquiry will be ordered not by the Minister against himself but by someone else. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny. The high Court has adequately dealt with this point and we see no error. " ( 27. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court merely because there had been a change in the political scenario that does not mean that an unauthorized act can be legalized and new body coming shall have no power to take an action to correct the unauthorized acts of the earlier body. ( 28. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the Apex Court in M/s Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. , and another vs. M/s Ladha Ram and Co. , AIR 1977 SC 680 , Heeralal vs. Kalyan Mal and others, AIR 1998 SC 618 and also the judgment passed by the Division bench of this Court in Shantibai and others vs. Ganpat Rao Gujar and others, 2001 (3) MPLJ 439 . While placing heavy reliance on the judgment passed by the apex Court in the case of M/s Modi Spinning (supra) and referring to paras 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the apex Court has held that the defendant cannot be permitted by way of amendment in the written statement to change the case completely which was earlier set up by the defendant by substituting the entire different and new case. ( 29. ) TO appreciate the aforesaid submission and the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, I have already held earlier that a new case or inconsistent case has not been set up by way of defence by the respondents by applying to amend their pleadings in the written statement. Earlier there was nothing submitted by the respondents other than the denial. The averments with reference to para-7 of the application submitted on behalf of the petitioners under section 55 (2) before the Joint Registrar were denied but no facts in detail for the denial as such were stated. There was no explanation in the written statement as why the facts or grounds raised by the petitioners in their application are denied. The averments with reference to para-7 of the application submitted on behalf of the petitioners under section 55 (2) before the Joint Registrar were denied but no facts in detail for the denial as such were stated. There was no explanation in the written statement as why the facts or grounds raised by the petitioners in their application are denied. It is not a case where the respondents have made out a case different than the earlier one but the present case falls in the category of a case where merely to explain the denial by giving facts in detail the amendment was sought. Therefore, I am of the view that the aforesaid judgments so relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners shall have no application in the present case. ( 30. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners also referred to and relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 4481/2007 arising out of slp (C) No. 12236 of 2006, M. P. State Co-op. Bank Ltd. , Bhopal vs. Nanuram yadav and ors. , reported in 2007 (8) SCC 264 and on that basis it is submitted that there was no necessity to amend the pleadings as the matter was squarely covered by the said judgment. The judgment as such is perused and on an analysis of the same I am of the opinion that the facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the said judgment. In the case before the Apex court an action was taken by the employer under Rule 61 of the Staff Service rules, which provides for termination of a permanent employee by giving three months notice. But, in the case in hand the action has been taken under Rule 62 of the Staff Service Rules, which provides for the termination of a person employed on probation. Both these rules have already reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. Thus, in the present case, the termination was effected of the petitioners at the time when they were on probation and the present petitioners are not permanent employees. Thus, the judgment rendered by the apex Court in Nanuram Yadavs case (supra) shall also have no application in the present case. ( 31. Thus, in the present case, the termination was effected of the petitioners at the time when they were on probation and the present petitioners are not permanent employees. Thus, the judgment rendered by the apex Court in Nanuram Yadavs case (supra) shall also have no application in the present case. ( 31. ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, I do not find any substance in the petitions and the present petitions are as such dismissed. Petitions dismissed.