JUDGMENT: It is to be noted that these proceedings were initially filed as Civil Revision Application under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887, read with Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. When the matter was called out on 29.08.2008, this Court has in view of the judgment in the case of Dilip Bidesh vs. Shiv Gopal, reported at 2005 (4) Mh. L.J. 967, found that said revision was not maintainable. The revision applicant then sought permission to convert revision into a writ petition and that permission was accordingly granted by reasoned order, after noticing the fact that revision was filed way back in 1995 and the matter was going on before various Courts since 1986. 2. After conversion of revision into present writ petition, the matter has been again listed for final hearing. Shri Panpalia, Advocate, who had filed Vakalatnama for the respondent, has stated that on 24.01.2002 itself, he filed pursis vide Stamp No. 679 of 2002, seeking leave to withdraw Vakalatnama in view of the letter of client dated 15.1.2002 annexed with that pursis. The perusal of xerox copy of that letter on record shows that the respondent instructed Shri Panpalia, Advocate to hand over the papers and file with him to Shri G.B. Lohiya, Advocate and also to give no objection to said advocate. Shri Panpalia, Advocate states that accordingly, he had handed over the papers and no objection. Nobody has thereafter appeared for the respondent. In view of the statement made by Shri Panpalia, Advocate, he is discharged from the matter. 3. Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel states that the controversy in this writ petition is very narrow. He also states that in view of the judgment of this Court dated 29.08.2008 in Civil Revision Application No. 654 of 1995, the controversy stands concluded in his favour. As such, the only question which arose was whether it is necessary to issue notice of the matter again to the respondent after its conversion into a writ petition. 4. Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Noor Abdul Jaleel vs. V. Achuthan , reported at AIR 1982 Kant. 4. Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Noor Abdul Jaleel vs. V. Achuthan , reported at AIR 1982 Kant. 237, judgment of learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Krishnamurthy vs. Y. Ramamurthi, reported at AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 654 and judgment of learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Maya Devi & Anr. V/s. Hari Singh , reported at 2002 A I H C NOC 26. 5. The perusal of Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court shows that the Division Bench there found that Civil Procedure Code, particularly Order 3, Rule 4 of CPC does not require Court to invite a party whose advocate out of disgust retires from the case. It has been observed that as per sound principle, before permitting an advocate to retire, the Court has to enquire whether the advocate has intimated his intention to client, not to proceed with the case. But after the advocate is permitted to retire, the Court is not required to adjourn the case and issue notice to party in default. The other discussion is about the enquiry to be conducted after permitting the advocate to retire and the discretionary powers in the matter. 6. In Madhura Krishnamurthy vs. Y. Ramamurthi (supra), the Hon'ble High Court has observed that Vakalatnama in favour of an advocate in proceedings seeking leave to sue in forma pauperis, does not come to an end till the suit is properly disposed of. If the proceedings are returned by the Court for want of jurisdiction, the Vakalatnama can be used for other purposes in the same matter. The High Court has observed that such Vakalatnama could be used along with other papers returned back by the Court. The Hon'ble Rajasthan High court in Maya Devi & Anr. vs. Hari Singh (supra) has observed that when the application for restoration of suit is dismissed in default, it is part of proceedings in the suit and advocate for the defendant does not require fresh appointment to contest such application. With the result of suit in default, authority of advocate does not stand determined. 7. Here, it is apparent that the respondent himself has communicated his desire to Shri Panpalia, Advocate and discharged him from his obligation. With the result of suit in default, authority of advocate does not stand determined. 7. Here, it is apparent that the respondent himself has communicated his desire to Shri Panpalia, Advocate and discharged him from his obligation. In view of the position emerging on record, it is clear that the respondent himself is at fault for not taking appropriate steps to see that other advocate mentioned by him in the letter or some other advocate appears to protect his interest. It is, therefore, obvious that when revision is allowed to be converted into a writ petition, Vakalatnama had not come to an end and had the advocate for the respondent appeared in Civil Revision Application, he could have continued to appear even in present writ petition. Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage states that the petitioner has also not filed any fresh Vakalatnama and advocate representing him in revision has continued to appear for him even in writ petition. 8. Coming to the controversy on merits, Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that when tenancy was duly determined vide notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, on 08.03.1986, and Small Cause Civil Suit was filed for recovery of possession against the respondent . tenant or then till its decree, the provisions of C.P. & Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as Rent Control Order) were not applicable to lease of open sites. He states that after decree was passed in favour of present petitioner, the amendments were made and the permission of Rent Controller became necessary. In view of this position, on 27.10.1994, the Joint District Judge, Akola, allowed appeal No.193 of 1989 preferred by the respondent and then the petitioner approached this Court in Civil Revision Application. It is his contention that the Rent Control Order as amended could not have been applied to the case of present petitioner as his suit was already decreed. He, however, points out that after the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, became applicable with effect from 31.3.2000, the requirement of permission under Rent Control Order ceased to exist. It is his contention that the Rent Control Order as amended could not have been applied to the case of present petitioner as his suit was already decreed. He, however, points out that after the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, became applicable with effect from 31.3.2000, the requirement of permission under Rent Control Order ceased to exist. In view of this subsequent development, he urges that right of the petitioner landlord which was eclipsed on account of amendment to Rent Control Order, again revived and therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of appellate Court needs to be quashed and set aside and the decree of trial Court needs to be restored. 9. The facts demonstrated that on 02.05.1983, a registered lease deed for the period of 35 months i.e. from 02.05.1983 to 01.04.1986 was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent. On 08.03.1986, vide notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner terminated the respondent's tenancy and as the respondent did not vacate the premises, filed Small Cause Civil Suit No. 268 of 1987 for recovery of possession. On 27.4.1989, the trial Court decreed that suit with cost. The said judgment and decree of trial Court was then challenged by present respondent in Regular Civil Suit No. 193 of 1989 and Joint District Judge, Akola, vide judgment dated 27.10.1994 partly allowed that appeal. The perusal of said judgment shows that the appellate Court found that amendment to provisions of Rent Control Order required the petitioner . landlord to obtain permission of Rent Controller. 10. In this respect, it is to be noted that by first amendment effected on 21.7.1989, the word .house. appearing in Rent Control Order was replaced by word .premises. and then on 26.10.1989 clause 13A came to be added to Rent Control Order. As per that clause 13A, the landlord was prohibited from obtaining a decree or from executing a decree in relation to open plots without first obtaining permission of Rent Controller, as contemplated by clause 13(3) thereof. Clause 13(3) enumerates various grounds under which the landlord can move Rent Controller and seek permission to terminate the tenancy of the tenant. Those grounds are not very relevant for consideration in this writ petition. This position was prevailing even on 27.10.1994 when the lower appellate Court decided the appeal of the respondent. Clause 13(3) enumerates various grounds under which the landlord can move Rent Controller and seek permission to terminate the tenancy of the tenant. Those grounds are not very relevant for consideration in this writ petition. This position was prevailing even on 27.10.1994 when the lower appellate Court decided the appeal of the respondent. However, the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, then came into force on 31.3.2000 and the requirement of obtaining permission of Rent Controller even for determining the tenancy of open plots ceased to apply. When this amendment came into force, the matter was pending before this Court in Civil Revision Application, which has been later on converted into Writ Petition. 11. This position is considered by me in Civil Revision Application No. 654 of 1995 decided on 29.08.2008. The relevant observations as contained in paras 6 & 7 of said judgment. Those observations are as under : “6. Advocate Shri Haq, points out the judgment in judgment in the case of Marutrao Pandurang Zende vrs. Eknath Shivram Jagtap (1980 Mh.L.J. 238), in which in similar circumstances, this court has found that disability of landlord in relevant Rent Legislation in removing the tenant from the suit premises does not bestow a corresponding right upon the tenant to remain in possession of the suit premises. If the provision of Rent Act are withdrawn the disability upon the landlord is removed and landlord can proceed against the tenant in accordance with the general law as if protection under the Rent Act is not available to the tenant. It has been observed that if during the pendency of the appeal, provision of relevant Rent Act are withdrawn from the area in question, the appeal has to be disposed of in accordance with general law and in accordance with the provisions of Rent Act. This court has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1974 SC 396 (Qudrat Ullah .vrs. Municipal Board, Bareilly), in support of the conclusions drawn. Recently this court has in 2006 [2] All M.R. 133 (Maharaji wd/o Bajrangi Vishwakarma .vrs. Sayeedabi Haji Sayyad Gani), has again taken similar view and in this judgment, the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Act, 1999 with provisions of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949 are looked into. 7. Recently this court has in 2006 [2] All M.R. 133 (Maharaji wd/o Bajrangi Vishwakarma .vrs. Sayeedabi Haji Sayyad Gani), has again taken similar view and in this judgment, the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Act, 1999 with provisions of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949 are looked into. 7. All these three judgments conclusively show that right of landlord which got eclipsed on account of Rent Control Legislation revives after the Rent Control Legislation is removed and the landlord therefore can prosecute his suit further under the General Law i.e. as per the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. In the present matter, the suit was filed by the respondent / landlord on 5.5.1984 when the Rent Control Legislation was not applicable to open plots. At that time C.P. and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 with 1949 Order there under (hereinafter referred to as 1946 Act. and 1949 Order.) only regulated the tenancies of houses. In the year 1989 for the first time open plots were added in the 1949 Order and thus tenants of open plots also were protected. Hence when application was moved by the applicant tenant in 1995 the protection was available even to the tenants of open plots. However, with the repeal of the 1946 Act and 1949 Order, by virtue of provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 the said requirement is now not in existence. Thus the protection which was available to the revision applicant/tenant from 1989 till the year 2000 is now no longer available. The right of landlord to proceed as per general law stood eclipsed from 1989 to 2000, but as on the date of filing of the suit there was no such protection to the tenant filing a suit itself was not barred. After coming into force of the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Act, 1999 the revision applicant ceased to enjoy said protection. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to pass decree of eviction and execute it is restored and hence the respondent landlord therefore, can proceed further with his suit in accordance with the general law. 12. In view of these observations, it is clear that the present controversy is squarely covered by said judgment. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to pass decree of eviction and execute it is restored and hence the respondent landlord therefore, can proceed further with his suit in accordance with the general law. 12. In view of these observations, it is clear that the present controversy is squarely covered by said judgment. The right of landlord to proceed as per provisions of Transfer of Property Act, stood eclipsed from 1989 to 2000 and then revived again after coming into force Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The Civil Court, therefore, can pass a decree or execute a decree against a tenant of open plot under General law. In view of this position, it is apparent that in changed circumstances, the judgment and decree dated 27.10.1994 delivered by Joint District Judge, Akola, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 193 of 1989 is unsustainable. The same is accordingly quashed and set aside. The judgment and decree dated 27.4.1989 delivered in Small Cause Civil Suit No. 268 of 1987 by 5th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Akola, is hereby restored. 13. Writ Petition is thus allowed. Rule accordingly. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.