Judgment D.H. Waghela, J.—These groups of appeals under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988(“the Act”, for short) are preferred from the common judgment and award dated 16.09.2004 of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal(Aux.), Surendranagar in total 33 claim petitions. Basic facts of the cases are that, on 13.09.1996 at about 4.00 a.m., all the injured claimants and three deceased victims of the accident were returning from their pilgrimage in the luxury bus No. GJ-3T-9475 which dashed against the truck No. MIU 8331 coming from opposite direction. An ambassador car bearing No. GJM 7065 also dashed with the luxury bus from behind at that time. The Insurance Companies concerned were Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and National Insurance Co. Ltd. in relation to the bus, truck and car respectively. Since, the Insurance Companies insuring the bus and the truck have filed appeals in various claim petitions and joined the original claimants and the other insurers as party-respondent, they are referred hereinafter by the name of the Insurance Company and the claimants are addressed as such. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. has been aggrieved by apportionment of 70% of the liability for payment of compensation and the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. has preferred appeals to dispute even 30% of the liability apportioned to it as also to challenge the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants in each of the appeals. 2. Arguing the appeals on behalf of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., learned Counsel Ms. Megha Jani, appearing with Ms. Anushree Kapadia, submitted that the Tribunal had, in the impugned award, clearly recorded the finding that the accident was a case of composite negligence and relied upon FIR at Exhibit 72 and Panchnama at Exhibit 73 for arriving at that conclusion. However, only on the ground that the bus was stated to have been damaged approximately to the extent of Rs. 1,35,000/- and the offending truck was assessed to have, been damaged to the extent of Rs. 55,000/-, negligence on the part of the driver of the luxury bus was assessed to be 70% and the driver of the truck was assessed to be responsible to the extent of 30%. 1,35,000/- and the offending truck was assessed to have, been damaged to the extent of Rs. 55,000/-, negligence on the part of the driver of the luxury bus was assessed to be 70% and the driver of the truck was assessed to be responsible to the extent of 30%. It was submitted that the basis for fixing responsibility of the drivers of both the vehicles and consequently fixing the financial liability of paying compensation by the Insurance Companies also on that basis was irrational and arbitrary. Learned Counsel Ms. Jani relied upon decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Gurunath Shahu [1989 ACJ 394] as quoted in Amarsi Jugabhai Driver vs. Vijyaben Hemantlal Dhulia [1996(3) GLR 8493]. It was observed in the latter judgment that it would always be better to sue all joint tort-feasors in one proceeding. It would not only enable the Tribunal to apportion negligence between the joint tort-feasors, but would also facilitate the task of claimants in recovering the amount of compensation awarded and in appropriate cases directions can always be issued by the Tribunal to joint tort-feasors to share the liability of paying compensation in proportion to negligence established on the record of the case. Recent judgment of Allahabad High Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajani and Others, [ 2007 ACJ 1771 ] was relied upon for the proposition that while directing payment of compensation to the victims or legal representatives of deceased of motor accident arising out of composite negligence of two motor vehicles, it was duty of the Claims Tribunal to apportion and specify the respective liability of owners or drivers or insurers of vehicles involved in the accident to the extent of damage contributed by them provided they were impleaded and heard by the Claims Tribunal. It was, however, also observed in Para 32 of the judgment that there can be no scope for doubt to hold that when an accident takes place on account of composite negligence of two or more motor vehicles, the claimant was entitled to proceed against all or any of the joint tort-feasors for full compensation for the injuries suffered or death caused as the liability of joint tort-feasors was joint and several . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In a case where all the joint tort-feasors have been brought on record, it is needless to say that Tribunal is under statutory duty to specify the amount which shall be paid by driver or owner or insurer of the vehicles involved in the accident. It was also pointed out from recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Bijoy Kumar Dugar vs. Bidyadhar Dutta and Others [ 2006 ACJ 1058 ] that when vehicles had a head-on collision, drivers of both the vehicles should be held responsible for having contributed equally to the accident. 3. Learned Counsel Ms. Bhaya, appearing for New India Assurance Co. Ltd., insurer of the truck, submitted that, in the facts of the present case, driver of the bus was entirely responsible for the accident insofar as greater damage was suffered by the bus and no brake-marks were seen at the time of making of the Panchnama. Learned Counsel relied upon the Panchnarna at Exhibit 73 to submit that, immediately after registration of offence, the bus was found to have been extensively damaged on its right-hand-side and the truck was lying on its side on the left-hand-side of the road after such impact that its front wheels and axle were detached from the body. 4. It could be seen from plain reading of language of Section 168 of the Act that the Claims Tribunal was required to hold an inquiry into the claims and make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and also specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and, in making the award, it has to specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. Thus, where more than one party is held responsible for paying compensation, it is necessary that the Tribunal specifies the amount required to be paid by each party. However, it is also well-settled that, in case of composite negligence, the liability is normally not apportioned as both the wrong doers are held jointly and severally liable for the loss. Thus, where more than one party is held responsible for paying compensation, it is necessary that the Tribunal specifies the amount required to be paid by each party. However, it is also well-settled that, in case of composite negligence, the liability is normally not apportioned as both the wrong doers are held jointly and severally liable for the loss. It is recently held by Division Bench of this Court in Kusumben Vipinchandra Shah vs. Arvindbhai Narmadashankar Raval [AIR 2007 Gujarat 121] that, as held in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Gurunath Shahu(Supra), the finding given by the Tribunal in such a case regarding apportionment of liability would be tentative for the purpose of subsequent proceeding which might be filed by the defendant tort-feasor against the other joint tort-feasor who was not a party to the first proceeding. But such tentativeness for the purpose of contribution between two joint tort-feasors did not at all affect the right of the plaintiff-claimant to recover full damages from the defendant tort-feasor against whom the first proceeding was filed. 5. Unfortunately, in the facts of the present case, no evidence whatsoever is led on behalf of the defendants before the Tribunal, none of the drivers of any of the vehicles involved in the accident entered the box and the Tribunal was left with no alternative but to rely only upon the complaint Exhibit 72 lodged by one of the passengers of the bus and the Panchnama Exhibit 73 which hardly threw any light even on the distance at which both the vehicles were found from their respective correct side of the road. In such circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the accident was attributable to the drivers of both vehicles and it was a case of composite negligence. It could also not be gainsaid that assessing the proportion of negligence on the part of driver of either of the vehicles on the basis of the extent of damage suffered by the vehicle was obviously illogical. Under such circumstances, the Tribunal ought to have held the drivers and consequently the Insurance Companies of both the vehicles to be jointly and severally liable for payment of compensation. Under such circumstances, the Tribunal ought to have held the drivers and consequently the Insurance Companies of both the vehicles to be jointly and severally liable for payment of compensation. As for apportionment of liability inter se between two insurance companies, in absence of any clear evidence or indication of liability of one driver being greater than the other, both the Insurance Companies were required to contribute equally the amounts of compensation due to the claimants, even as the claimants would have liberty to recover the full amount of compensation from either of the Insurance Companies. The submission that driver of the car which dashed with the bus from behind could also be held partly responsible for damage and the compensation was wholly devoid of any basis or substance. Therefore, the appeals preferred by the Oriental Insurance Company are required to be partly allowed. 6. Even as the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. is, by the impugned award, held to be liable for paying 70% of the amounts of compensation, it has not challenged the quantum of compensation in any of its appeals. But quantum of compensation has been the bone of contention between New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and the claimants. Learned Counsel Ms. Bhaya, appearing for the insurer of the truck, vehemently argued that, in each of the claim petitions from which the appeals were preferred, the amount of compensation was on the higher side and required to be substantially reduced in the interest of justice. The quantum of compensation was defended by learned Counsel Ms. Amrita Ajmera, appearing for the claimants in each appeal. The rival contentions in each claim petition are discussed here under with reference to the number of each appeal. 7. However, it was generally submitted on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company that in all the claim petitions made under the provisions of Section 166 of the Act, multiplier higher than the ones prescribed under Section 163-A and the Second Schedule of the Act could not have been applied; and, in absence of cogent and proper evidence of income of the deceased or injured victims of the accident, the Tribunal ought not to have assessed monthly income at higher rates. It was also submitted that assessment of higher income and higher prospective income without any evidence in that regard multiplied by higher multiplier had resulted in each case into award of unreasonable amounts of compensation which were required to be reduced. It was conceded that each appeal was restricted to challenging only a part of the award. 8. Learned Counsel Ms. Bhaya relied upon recent Division Bench decision dated 30.11.2006 of this Court in First Appeal No. 1069 of 2006 wherein it is held that compensation under the head of conventional amount for loss of expectation of life falling under the broader head of loss to the estate should be Rs. 25,000/- and the compensation to the surviving spouse under the head of conventional amount for loss of consortium should be Rs. l5,000/- . 8.1. Decision of the Supreme Court in T.N. State Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. S. Rajapriya and Others [(2005) 6 SCC236] was relied upon to show that in case of the victim aged 38 years and receiving salary of Rs. 56,208/- per annum, multiplier was reduced from 16 to 12 by the Supreme Court. Division Bench judgment of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Virambhai Ranchhodbhai Patel & Others [AIR 2007 Gujarat 119, was relied upon to submit that value of the services rendered by the deceased wife to the family was put by the Tribunal at Rs. 2,250/- and it was upheld by this Court. A recent decision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jashuben decided on 14.02.2008 was relied upon for the propositions as under: “16 . . . . In Black’s Law Dictionary, “compensation” is shown as equivalent in money for a loss sustained; or giving back an equivalent in either money which is but the measure of value, or in actual value otherwise conferred; or recompense in value for some loss, injury or service especially when it is given by statute. It means when you pay the compensation in terms of money it must represent, on the date of ordering such payment, the equivalent value . . . . . “25. It means when you pay the compensation in terms of money it must represent, on the date of ordering such payment, the equivalent value . . . . . “25. We, therefore, are of the opinion that what would have been the income of the deceased on the date of retirement was not a relevant factor in the light of peculiar facts of this case and, thus, the approach of the Tribunal and the High Court must be held to be incorrect. It is impermissible in law to take into consideration the effect of revision in scale of pay w.e.f. 01.01.1997 or what would have been the scale of pay in 2002.” (Emphasis added) It may be noted here that, in the aforesaid case, Division Bench of this Court had taken into consideration revision of pay effective from 01.01.1997 while the accident had taken place on 23.06.1994. 8.2. Learned Counsel thus sought reduction of the amount of compensation awarded in each case mainly on the grounds of it being excessive, unsupported by positive evidence of income or prospective income; higher multiplier having been applied and less than one-third of income of the deceased having been deducted towards his own expenditure. 9. As against that, learned Counsel Ms. Amrita Ajmera, appearing for the claimants, generally submitted that, in each of the claim cases, the Tribunal had relied upon deposition of the claimants who were subjected to cross-examination by the appellant and, in absence of documentary evidence of income, the amounts of income were suitably reduced. It was submitted that in case of labourers and artisans, housewives or agriculturists, the survivors may not always be in a position to produce documentary evidence of income of the deceased, but the undisputed fact of the deceased being a bread-winner maintaining a large family should be the basis of presuming income at the minimum rates prevailing in the market for such unskilled or semi-skilled labourers. She also submitted that in case of people belonging to lower strata of society with low level of literacy and income, it would be wholly unrealistic to presume in every case that one-third income of the deceased would have been spent by the deceased on himself while the other members of a large family might be suffering deprivation of even basic amenities of life. 9.1. 9.1. Learned Counsel relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Late Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar [ AIR 2001 SC 3218 ], as quoted in Division Bench judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Babubhai Dipubhai Chauhan [2006(2) GLR 1514], wherein it is also observed : “Apart from earning by the deceased, role of the housewife in running a house is not that of rendering services as a slave. Her contribution to keep family together, providing household services besides matrimonial duties cannot be treated lightly. It has got nothing to do with the earning capacity of the husband which is an addition to what is taken care of by the housewife. No matter what the status of the family may be, contribution of the housewife towards household may be treated to be at minimum Rs. 3,000/- p.m.” 9.2. Judgment of the Apex Court in Supe Dei vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [1(2005) ACC 63(SC)] was relied upon for the following observations: “8. While considering the question of just compensation payable in a case all relevant factors including the appropriate multiplier are to be kept in mind. The position is well settled that the Second Schedule under Section 163-A to the Act which gives the amount of compensation to be determined for the purpose of claim under the section can be taken as a guideline while determining the compensation under Section 166 of the Act. . . .” The following observations were pointed out from recent judgment of the Supreme Court in A.P.S.R.T.C. vs. M. Pentaiah Chary [ AIR 2007 SC 3141 ]. “14. We do not, however, intend to lay down a general law. We wish to point out that minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should he considered from the sufferings of disability undergone by the victim. We are not suggesting that in certain situations, the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule cannot and should not be altered but therefore there must exist strong circumstances. In the year 1995, the rate of interest was lower than the rate of interest taken into consideration in Susamma Thomas(Supra). Application of multiplicative factor should also be considered from that angle. Susamma Thomas(Supra) or the other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel do not lay down any law in absolute terms.” 9.3. In the year 1995, the rate of interest was lower than the rate of interest taken into consideration in Susamma Thomas(Supra). Application of multiplicative factor should also be considered from that angle. Susamma Thomas(Supra) or the other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel do not lay down any law in absolute terms.” 9.3. Division Bench of this Court in Ritaben alias Vanitaben vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service [1998(2) GLH 670] was relied upon for the following propositions laid down therein: “9. It is a settled proposition of law that with a view to award a just and reasonable amount of compensation in a case of fatal injury, it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to consider as to what was the income at the relevant time of the accident and what would have been or probable prospective earnings in the later years of the life. The amount of income prevalent at the relevant time, in absence of any other evidence, is required to be doubled and then divided by half so as to reflect the prospective average income for the purpose of determining the datum figure . . . .” 9.4. It was pointed out from the decision in Rakhiya vs. Rajendra Singh [ 1999 ACJ 364 ] that, in case of an illiterate rural rustic lady, who was confused during cross-examination, the Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that, even if the evidence about earning of the deceased was not satisfactory, the Tribunal ought to have directed the owner to produce wage record of the deceased. The Court had also taken into account the minimum wages of an unskilled labourer for determining the multiplicand in that case. Recently, in a Division Bench decision dated 31.01.2007 of this Court in First Appeal No. 1254 of 2006 etc., it was observed as under:— “19. Coming to the question of awarding compensation, we find that the Tribunal erred in accepting the income of the claimant at Rs. 1,200/- per month. There is no dispute that the claimant was working as a Cleaner in the Mini truck on the date of accident. His assertion, therefore, that he was being paid a monthly salary of Rs. 1,500/- was imminently believable. The Tribunal, therefore, ought to have worked out compensation on basis of such income of the claimant. 1,200/- per month. There is no dispute that the claimant was working as a Cleaner in the Mini truck on the date of accident. His assertion, therefore, that he was being paid a monthly salary of Rs. 1,500/- was imminently believable. The Tribunal, therefore, ought to have worked out compensation on basis of such income of the claimant. With passage of time and with falling purchasing power of money and general increase in salaries, it would not be unreasonable to accept the average income of the claimant at one and half times that much or Rs. 2,150/- per month for the rest of his working span.” 9.5. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Heirs of deceased Mer Ranmal Bhima [ 1996(2) GLH 938 ], Division Bench of this Court had observed that, when one member of the family departs from this world, the other members in a middle class family would have to spend almost the same amount on overheads like rent and taxes for the house or taxes and other expenses on the house when owned by the family. Looking to the amount which is ordinarily required to be spent on education and upbringing of minor children these days, it cannot now be said that only one unit should be taken for a minor child. 9.6. The following paragraphs from Division Bench judgment of this Court [Coram: P.D. Desai, J.(as His Lordship then was) and M.K. Shah, J.) in Babu Mansa vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation [ 1978 ACJ 485 ], were referred in support of the award : “28. It is well settled that a person injured by another’s wrong is entitled to general damages for non-pecuniary loss such as his pain and suffering, past and future, and his loss of amenity and enjoyment of life. Damages are also recoverable for loss of expectation of life. Damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenities constitute a conventional sum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair, fairness being interpreted by the Court in the light of previous decisions. Thus, there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury will currently fall. Thus, there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury will currently fall. The particular circumstances of the plaintiff, including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the award. The fall in the value of money leads to a continuing reassessment of these awards and to periodic reassessments of damages at certain key points in the pattern where the disability is readily identifiable and not subject of large variations in individual cases(see Halsbury’s Laws of England; Volume 12, Paragraphs 1146 and 1147 at Pages 446 and 447). In the foot-note, the learned authors have pointed out that the age of the injured person may make a considerable difference because, for example, an old lady with a broken and deformed leg will have fewer years to suffer than a young woman with a similar injury. As regards continuing reassessment of awards for non-pecuniary loss, the learned authors have given in the foot-note a comparative assessment of various awards made by the Courts in England for the loss of sight in one eye as an ‘illustration. The pattern, according to the learned authors, has been as follows: Pound 1500 - 1960 “2000 - 1961 Between “2000 & 3000 - 1965 “3500 - 1971 “4000 to 4500 - 1974 This analysis shows that the Courts in England have raised the awards in such cases under the head of non-pecuniary loss almost three times within a period of 14 years. This consideration has to be borne in mind even by the Courts in our country while assessing damages, for, as observed by Lawton L.J. in Cunningham vs. Harrison [1974 ACJ 218), “conventions, however, change and if Judges do not adjust their awards to changing conditions and rising standards of living their assessments of damages will have even less contact with reality than they have had in the recent past or at the present time.” 29. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30. We cannot conclude the discussion on this subject without referring to the data relating to the fall in the value of money in our country so that the need of periodical reassessment of damages at certain key points is highlighted and the requirement of adjusting awards to changing conditions is realised. The consumer price index numbers for industrial workers-all India General Index-discloses the following state of affairs: (Base: 1960-100) Month/Year General Index(Annual Average) 1961 104 1965 137 1970 184 1975 321 1976 296 1977 321 January, 1978 325 This table illustrates the fall in purchasing power of rupee and, hopefully may be, rising standards of living. From 1961 to 1977 the annual average has almost tripled. Under these circumstances, if we still continue to be governed by the conventional figure adopted in pre-1960 awards, the current awards will have lost contact with reality. The conventional principle providing a broad guideline for the bracket of damages into which a particular injury, having regard to its comparative severity, will fall thus requires to be up-to-dated.” (Emphasis added) The Apex Court judgment in Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh & Others [2003(1) GLH 225] was relied upon for the observations made in Para 27 thereof which read as under: “27. The dates of accident resulting in similar injuries have great relevance. For example, if a particular conventional sum of(say) Rs. 10,000/- was awarded towards the non-pecuniary damages of loss of expectation of life, loss of amenities and pain and suffering-all put together in a case of amputation of a leg consequent to an accident in 1970, the award to be made for an identical loss today would have to be upgraded from the 1970 value to its value in 1987, having regard to the erosion of the value of the rupee. This can be done by comparing the cost of living index in 1970 with that in 1987. Charlesworth on Negligence, 6th Edn. 1977, Para 14, says, the ‘conventional figures’ must keep ‘pace with the time in which we live’. This can be done by comparing the cost of living index in 1970 with that in 1987. Charlesworth on Negligence, 6th Edn. 1977, Para 14, says, the ‘conventional figures’ must keep ‘pace with the time in which we live’. He says that this can be well illustrated by considering the class of injury resulting(say) in the loss of sight in one eye and the conventional sum lay around 2000 pounds about a quarter of a century ago but today in 1977 it will probably exceed 5000 pounds or it ought to do Kemp & Kemp on Damages, 1982, Chapter 7, Para 7001, say: If a Court is seeking to make a comparison with some earlier award(for non-pecuniary losses) and if by the date of the comparison, the currency in which the earlier award was made has declined by, say, 50 per cent, one must surely double the earlier award in order to make a valid comparison. The authors have compiled two tables(at Paras 7007 and 7008), one showing the current level of general damages for ‘pain and suffering’ and ‘loss of amenities’ in cases of severe injury and the other showing similar earlier years, and have compared whether Courts are or are not keeping pace with inflation. The authors ask, why tort-feasors alone, as a class should be excused from paying the value-based price? In Walker vs. Johan McLean & Sons Ltd., 1980 ACJ 429(CA, England), the Court found that while the value of the pound fell by 50% between 1957 and 1972(over a period of 15 years), there was a steeper fall between 1973 to 1978(within 5 years) when it again fell by 50%(vide Kemp & Kemp’s Tables). ‘Conventional’ figures, if they do not keep pace with inflation, might indeed become ‘contemptible’. Kemp & Kemp point out that an award of 16000 Pounds in 1879 would be about 500,000 Pounds in 1982. After Walker’s case(Supra), Courts in England are carefully adjusting awards for ‘pain and suffering’ and ‘loss of amenities’ to keep pace with inflation.” (Emphasis added) It was pointed out from the judgment in Popatlal Parshottamdas Shah vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad [ 1982(1) GLR 765 ] that, even quarter of a century ago, high and higher amounts were awarded for pain, shock and suffering and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. The Division Bench had concluded in that case that awards had varied from Rs. 15,000/- for a single fracture in the right leg coupled with other injuries to Rs. 35,000/- for amputation of both legs above the knee. It was further observed in Para 52 that the age of the injured person would necessarily make a considerable difference because the claimant would have lived with post-accident disability for a number of years and it also cannot be overlooked that the claimant would have suffered pain and inconvenience for a prolonged period and undergone extensive medical treatment including several operations. In the above context, learned Counsel Ms. Ajmera pointed out from the official figures of Consumer Price Index that, while it was around 475 in the year 1982, it had almost quadrupled by the end of 1996 and reached to 1646. It was also argued on the basis of the statistics published by Labour Bureau of Government of India that average of Indian Consumer Price Index(General) for industrial workers(base 1960 = 100) had reached 2534 by the end of the year 2004 after applying the linking factors to the new index of 1982 series. Currently, the index has reached the figure of 3059(new series, base 2001 = 100) in January, 2008 after applying the official linking factor. The official rate of inflation in consumer price index numbers for industrial workers(base 1982 = 100) has been ranging from 2% to 10%. In the chart of point to point rate of inflation, highest rate of inflation appears to have been registered in July to December, 1998 when it went upto 19.7% in November, 1998. 9.7. Decision of Delhi High Court in Kamla Devi vs. Government of NCT of Delhi [ 2005 ACJ 216 ], was relied upon for the following proposition: “17. . . . .The whole idea behind the quantification of the conventional sum being that its real value should not get eroded through time due to inflation. Thus, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in 1989 may be just and fair but the same sum of Rs. 50,000/- in the year 1996 would be worth much less in real terms because of inflation in the intervening years. Thus, if the figure for the conventional sum has to be worked out for 1996, the base figure of Rs. Thus, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in 1989 may be just and fair but the same sum of Rs. 50,000/- in the year 1996 would be worth much less in real terms because of inflation in the intervening years. Thus, if the figure for the conventional sum has to be worked out for 1996, the base figure of Rs. 50,000 as on 1989 has to be enhanced by factoring in the inflation and consequent decline in the real value of the rupee in the intervening years. A good index to work with is the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers [CPI(IW)](Source : Labour Bureau, Government of India). With the base year 1982(=100), the average CPI(IW) for the year 1989 was 171 and for 1996 it was 3343. Hence, the inflation-corrected value of Rs. 50,000/- in 1989 would work out to Rs. 97,660.829 in 1996, which can be rounded off to Rs. 97,700/-. So in this case, the conventional sum for non-pecuniary loss would be Rs. 97,700/-.” In the above context, learned Counsel Ms. Ajmera also submitted that, even while making provisions for payment of compensation on structured formula basis, in Section 163-A by its addition by Amendment of 1994, the Legislature has taken care by inserting Sub-section(3) empowering the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule keeping in view the cost of living from time to time. Lord Diplock, giving unanimous opinion of the House of Lords in Wright vs. British Railways Board [(1983) 2 AC 773],(as reproduced in Damages For Personal Injuries And Death by John Munkman, Eighth Edition, at Pages 189 and 190) observed: “. . . It is an important function of the Court of Appeal to lay down guidelines both as to the quantum of damages appropriate to compensate for various types of commonly occurring injuries and as to the rates of interest . . . . such guidelines . . . . should be simple and easy to apply though broad enough to permit allowances to be made for special features of individual cases which make the deprivation to the particular plaintiff . . . . greater or less than the general run of cases involving injuries of the same kind. . . . such guidelines . . . . should be simple and easy to apply though broad enough to permit allowances to be made for special features of individual cases which make the deprivation to the particular plaintiff . . . . greater or less than the general run of cases involving injuries of the same kind. Guidelines laid down by the appellate Court are addressed directly to Judges who try personal injury actions; but confidence that trial Judges will apply them means that all those who are engaged in settling out of the Court the many thousands of claims that never reach the state of litigation . . . . or . . . . do not proceed as far as trial will know very broadly speaking what the claim is likely to be worth . . . . A guideline as to quantum of conventional damages . . . . . is not a rule of law nor is it a rule of practice. It sets no binding precedent; it can be varied as circumstances change . . . . . But, though guidelines should be altered if circumstances relevant . . . . change, too frequent alteration deprives them of their usefulness in providing a reasonable degree of predictability....and so facilitating settlement of claims without going to trial. As regards assessment of damages for non-economic loss in personal injury cases, the Court of Appeal creates the guidelines as to the appropriate conventional figure by increasing or reducing awards . . . . by Judges . . . . for various common kinds of injuries. Thus, so-called ‘brackets’ are established, broad enough to make allowance for circumstances which make the deprivation suffered by the individual plaintiff . . . . greater or less than in the general run of cases, yet clear enough to reduce the unpredictability of what is likely to be the most important factor in . . . . settlement of claims. ‘Brackets’ may call for alteration not only to take account of inflation, for which they ought automatically to be raised, but also, it may be, to take account of advances in medical science which may make particular . . . injuries less disabling or advances in medical knowledge which may disclose hitherto unsuspected long-term effects . . . . .” 9.8. . . injuries less disabling or advances in medical knowledge which may disclose hitherto unsuspected long-term effects . . . . .” 9.8. Following basic principles contained in Para 9 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.D. Hattangadi vs. Pest Control(India) Ltd. [1995ACJ 366], were relied : “9. Broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts, pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant:(i) medical attendant;(ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial;(iii) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include(i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future;(ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit;(iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened;(iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.” After referring to the above observations, Division Bench of this Court has in Mahendrakumar Manilal Patel vs. Ramjibhal Dalsibhai Chaudhary [ 2006(1) GLR 637 ], observed that, in disablement cases, compensation payable was higher than in fatal cases, since, it was the claimant himself who utilized compensation amount and it was he who had to suffer the impact of accident throughout his remaining life. The same Bench of this Court in Manohar Madhukar Tambe vs. Bhagubhai Liladhar and Ors. [ 2005(3) GLH 651 ], also observed, that persons suffering from serious injuries are not expected to maintain accounts of every amount spent during the treatment due to seriousness of illness, therefore, general assessment of such expenditure can be made. And, merely computing the economic loss on the basis of the medical certificate regarding physical disability will amount to turning a blind eye to the reality of actual economic loss. And, merely computing the economic loss on the basis of the medical certificate regarding physical disability will amount to turning a blind eye to the reality of actual economic loss. The claimant is going to suffer with physical disability throughout his life, therefore, he will have the disadvantage in every sphere of activity, earning or non-earning. In that case the claimant, aged 15, had suffered compound fracture and hospitalization for two-and-half months after which he remained in bed for four months and was awarded Rs. 15,000/- for pain, shock and suffering, Rs. 12,000/- for medical expenses, attendant and transportation and Rs. 12,600/- for his disability against the claim of Rs. 50,000/-. The appeal was preferred for enhancement by Rs. 10,000/-; but this Court awarded Rs. 50,000/- towards pain, shock and suffering. 10. Since, the provisions of Section 168 only empowers the Claims Tribunal to hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just, the question of quantum of compensation has to be dealt with in light of the judgments and the principles laid down therein. The following propositions of law emerge from the decisions discussed hereinabove: (a) While fixing the amount of compensation payable to the victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages would be the amount which the victim would have lost or would stand to lose on account of accidental injuries to or death of a person. Pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the victim or the claimant, medical expenses, loss of earning and such other material loss. Non-pecuniary damages would include damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future, compensation for loss of amenities of life, damages for the loss of expectation of life and compensation for the inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress; (b) The Tribunal, in order to award just and reasonable amount of compensation, may have to ascertain the amount of income earned by the victim at the time of accident as well as his or her probable prospective earnings in the later years of life. In absence of any other evidence, his income may be doubled and then divided by half so as to reflect the prospective average income for the purpose of determining the future loss of income; (c) The Tribunal has to bear in mind and give effect to constant fall in the value of money. If the Tribunal fails to adjust its awards to changing conditions and rising standards of living, assessment of damages would have less contact with reality. Particularly conventional figures, if they do not keep pace with inflation, might become contemptible; (d) The amount of compensation must represent the equivalent value in money for the loss sustained and that equivalence must be as on the date of the order and not on the date of the accident. It is, however, impermissible in law to take into consideration the effect of subsequent revisions in the scale of pay or the scale of pay at the time of retirement of the victim; (e) While adopting the method of applying proper multiplier, even in the cases under Section 166 of the Act, for the purpose of awarding just compensation, the Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act could be referred as a guideline and different multiplier could be adapted for a valid reason; (f) The value of services rendered by a housewife in all cases may be presumed to be not less than Rs. 3,000/- per month and the earning capacity of the husband of such woman would be irrelevant; (g) Deduction of one-third of the income of a deceased victim of motor accident is not an inflexible rule but it would depend on the facts and circumstances and lesser amount may be deducted in view of the number of dependents and poor level of income. (h) Going by the official statistics of Consumer Price Index, just compensation under the head of conventional amount in the year 1982, may have to be quadrupled in the year 1997 and may have to be multiplied five times for the awards made in the year 2004; just to award the same amount in terms of real value. Division Bench of this Court has, after extensive reference to the legal aspect and the amounts awarded in different prior cases thereto, concluded in 1982 that amounts varying from Rs. 15,000/- for a single fracture in the right leg coupled with other injuries to Rs. Division Bench of this Court has, after extensive reference to the legal aspect and the amounts awarded in different prior cases thereto, concluded in 1982 that amounts varying from Rs. 15,000/- for a single fracture in the right leg coupled with other injuries to Rs. 35,000/- for amputation of both legs above the knee were being awarded towards pain, shock and suffering and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. In order to award the same amount of compensation in terms of real value in the year 2004, the figures have to be revised from Rs. l5,000/- to Rs. 75,000/- & Rs. 35,000/- to Rs. l,75,000/-. The conventional amount, however, has to be determined after taking into account seriousness of the injury and its aftermath for the remaining life of the victim, duration and type of the treatment undergone and required in future as also the pain, suffering and frustration involved; (i) Since, constant erosion in the purchasing power of money and inflation are relevant factors in determining the amount of compensation under several heads of damages, the Tribunal may have to take into consideration the figures of consumer price index as on the date of accident and at the time of determining the due amount. While loss of earning or loss of dependency benefit would be calculated on the basis of average probable income after considering the prospective future rise in income, it may partly take care of the inflation. But, in case of non-pecuniary or special damages, full effect of erosion in the purchasing power of money has to be reflected by adjusting the figure of compensation on the basis of the consumer price index. Although interest is usually awarded on the total amount of compensation from the date of claim petition which is fixed at the rates prevailing for fixed deposits, it can only compensate for deprivation of the amount due to the claimant by withholding of that amount by the defendant. It cannot fully take care of the constant erosion in the value of purchasing power of money. Therefore, in cases where claim petition remains pending, for whatever reasons, for inordinate period of more than five years, the Tribunal ought to take into account the reality of inflation and erosion in the value of money for determining just amount of compensation. It cannot fully take care of the constant erosion in the value of purchasing power of money. Therefore, in cases where claim petition remains pending, for whatever reasons, for inordinate period of more than five years, the Tribunal ought to take into account the reality of inflation and erosion in the value of money for determining just amount of compensation. (j) Since, the provisions of Section 163-A prescribe the amounts of compensation along a structured formula on “no-fault liability basis, where the victim or claimant himself might be responsible for the accident, and provide a broad guideline, the compensation awarded under section 166, after proof of negligence of someone else, should normally not fall short of the amount prescribed in the Second Schedule of the Act. 1[11. X X X] 12. Considering the facts and contentions in each appeal in light of the legal propositions culled out in Para 10, it would clearly appear that in the three fatal accident cases in First Appeal No. 2870 of 2005, First Appeal No. 2855 of 2005 and First Appeal No. 2856 of 2005, the Tribunal has, in absence of relevant documentary evidence, disbelieved the alleged income of the deceased and adopted a lower figure of income or value of services of the deceased and adopted conventional figure of Rs. 50,000/-; but has not awarded the full amount due as the claim was restricted to a lower amount. Therefore, even adopting the lesser amount of Rs. 40,000/- as conventional amount in view of the observations of this Court in recent decision dated 30.11.2006 in First Appeal No. 1069 of 2006, no amount was required to be deducted from the final figure of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. 13. In the cases where housewives were injured, the value of their domestic services, even disregarding the claim of actual income by agricultural labour, had to be taken to be Rs. 3,000/- per month under the binding decision of Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the argument for the insurer that claims of income of such ladies were not substantiated cannot be accepted; although in fact lesser amounts were assessed as their income in the cases under consideration. 3,000/- per month under the binding decision of Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the argument for the insurer that claims of income of such ladies were not substantiated cannot be accepted; although in fact lesser amounts were assessed as their income in the cases under consideration. It was also apparent that, even as the accident had occurred on 13.09.1996 and the award was made on 16.09.2004, erosion in purchasing power and the value of money during the whole period of eight years was not taken into account in considering either the loss of dependency benefit or in assessing the non-pecuniary damages. On the contrary, in most of the cases, even reasonable amount due as on the date of accident were not fully accommodated in the final figure of compensation because of lesser amounts claimed by the claimant. As for the application of multiplier in individual cases, it was seen that, in each of the cases, the multiplier applied by the Tribunal was lower than the multiplier prescribed in the Second Schedule. It was also seen that, in none of the cases, the Tribunal had awarded any amount towards loss of expectation of life or loss of amenities of life. Similarly, the inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life did not find even a mention in the calculation of non-pecuniary damages. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant was partly justified in submitting that the Tribunal had arbitrarily fixed several amounts under several heads, but the rough and inarticulate assessment of damages clearly appeared in each case to have resulted into award of less than just and reasonable amount of compensation. Therefore, the group of appeals filed by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. have to be dismissed with cost. 15. In the facts and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, the appeals of the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. are partly allowed with the direction that it shall equally share with the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. the liability of paying compensation to the claimants while the liability of both the Insurance Companies shall be joint and several as far as the claimants are concerned. The amounts paid or deposited by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., in excess of its liability of paying 50% of the total amount of compensation, shall be directly paid to it by the New India Assurance Co. The amounts paid or deposited by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., in excess of its liability of paying 50% of the total amount of compensation, shall be directly paid to it by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. There is no order as to costs in the appeals filed by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. The appeals preferred by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. are dismissed with cost.