JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—List has been revised thrice. Learned Counsel for the respondents is not present. Learned Counsel for the petitioner is present. Heard him and perused the record. 2. The fact, in brief, are that Sri Manohar Singh, respondent No. 2 filed an application raising an industrial dispute regarding his termination from services before Conciliation Officer, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Conciliation proceedings having failed, the following matter of dispute was referred to the Labour Court, Agra where it was registered as Adjudication Case No. 1 167 of 1996, Mohan Singh v. Divisional Director, Social Forestry, Mathura. ^^D;k lsok;kstdksa }kjk eksgj flag iq= Jh x.kskh dh fnukad 1-2-1994 ls lsok,a lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oSèkkfud gS\ ;fn ugha rks Jfed fdl mike@{kfriwfrZ ikus dk vfèkdkjh gS rFkk fdl fooj.k lfgr\** 3. The petitioner’s representative appeared before the Tribunal on the date fixed for filing objection against the application. Thereafter 26.12.1996 was fixed as the first date for filing objection of the petitioner. According to the petitioner’s Counsel due to illness the representative of the petitioner could not appear before the Court on that date, hence objection could not be filed. An adjournment application moved by the petitioner was accepted fixing 20.1.97 for filing objection of the petitioner before the Tribunal. However, due to continuous illness of the Counsel for the petitioner objection could not be filed on the next date i.e. 20.1.97 also, hence the petitioner again moved an application for adjournment which was rejected and the judgment was reserved. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner is said to have appeared before the Court below on 30.1.97 and moved an application for recall of the order dated 20.1.97. 5. It is stated that on the direction of the Court the representative of the petitioner filed an application for recall of the order along with an affidavit which was not considered by the Labour Court and without considering the same the award has been made on 8.4.1997. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petitions which are application of the recall of the order and a receipt showing that the award was published on 4.8.97 by the concerned clerk of the Court. 6. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petitions which are application of the recall of the order and a receipt showing that the award was published on 4.8.97 by the concerned clerk of the Court. 6. The contention of the Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the aforesaid award dated 8.4.97 has been passed without considering the relevant provisions of law and fact and the application of the petitioner for recall of the order was not considered and in fact the said award is based on surmises and conjecture inasmuch as respondent No. 2 did not come under the definition of workman, hence the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application as such the exparte award passed by the Labour Court is liable to be quashed. 7. From the record it appears that the aforesaid award was notified by publication on the notice board on 7.11.1997 and was received in the office of the petitioner on 30.11.1997.The petitioner again moved a recall application dated 9.2.98 which has been appended as Annexure-5 to the writ petition which was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 11.3.98 appended as Annexure-6 to the writ petition is also under challenge in the writ petition on the ground that it is bad in law and that the impugned order is cryptic and non-speaking order which has been passed by the Tribunal without considering the ground given in the application. 8. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that only ground for rejecting the application of the petitioner was time barred. While considering this aspect the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has over looked the fact that the petitioner’s Counsel has already filed an application for recall of the order dated 20.1.97 on 30.1.97 which has been rejected without rhyme and reasons and consideration of the fact averred therein. In so far as point of limitation is concerned, it is stated that award dated 8.4.1997 which was notified on 7.11.1997 was received in the office of the petitioner only on 30.11.1997. The period of limitation of 30 days should be computed from the date of receipt of the award and not from the date of enforcement of the award by publication. 9. The period of limitation of 30 days should be computed from the date of receipt of the award and not from the date of enforcement of the award by publication. 9. It is submitted that the Labour Court does not become functus officio after passing the order and that the petitioner had filed recall application dated 30.1.97 for recall of the order dated 20.1.97. In this regard he has drawn attention of the Court towards paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit in which it has been stated that there is no such direction as mentioned in paragraph under reply and the receipt which has been filed by the petitioner as well as the application appended as Annexures-2 and 3 are manipulated documents. In fact, the Labour Court after hearing both the parties has dismissed the application of the petitioner. 10. It is submitted that the Labour Court has passed the award after considering the fact of the case and the evidence adduced by the workman respondent in his written statement on affidavit ; that the Labour Court has considered all the aspects of the case in its award and it does not suffer from any defect; and that the petitioner was adopting delaying tactics. 11. It is urged that the action of the employer in terminating the services of the workman were arbitrary. The second application for recall was filed on 9.2.2008 on the ground that there was no delay in filing of the recall of the award passed by the Labour Court which was not ex parte as the petitioner’s representative had appeared in the case which is not a case where summons had not been served upon the petitioner. 12. It is settled law that even if an order to proceed ex parte is passed by the Labour Court, the same could be set aside if an application is made within 10 days from the date of passing of the order as provided under Rule 16 of U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 that if a party is entitled to participate in the proceeding from the next stage as the order to proceed ex parte only operates prior to the stage of proceedings. It is lastly urged that the Labour Court has rightly dismissed the application for recall of the award as having become infructuous. 13. It is lastly urged that the Labour Court has rightly dismissed the application for recall of the award as having become infructuous. 13. From the record of the writ petition it appears that the petitioner’s representative had appeared before the Tribunal on the first date fixed for filing objection and application for recall dated 20.1.97 said to have been filed on 30.1.97 was rejected. Thereafter, the proceedings took place and the award was published on 8.4.97. The petitioner did not participate in the proceedings from the date of filing of the recall application on 30.1.97 up to the date of award submitted by the Labour Court. Moreover, the order and judgment of the Labour Court has also been confirmed by the Appellate authority holding that the Labour Court has become functus officio after 30 days from the date of publication as provided under Section 6A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Moreover, the order and judgment of the Labour Court has also been confirmed by the Appellate authority holding that the Labour Court has become functus officio after 30 days from the date of publication as provided under Section 6A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The relevant extract of the judgment and order of the Labour Court dated 8.4.97 is as under : ^^vfHkfu.kZ; miJek;qDr vkxjk us vius vknsk la[;k fnukad 12-9-1996 }kjk mijksDr izfr"Bku ds lsok;kstdksa ,oa muds Jfed ds e/; mRiUu fuEu fookn m0 iz0 vkS|ksfxd fookn vfèkfu;e 1947 dh èkkjk 4&ds vUrxZr vfHkfu.kZ; gsrq bl U;k;ky; dks Hkstk gS % ^^D;k lsok;kstdksa }kjk eksgj flag iq= Jh x.kskh dh fnukad 1-2-1994 ls lsok,a lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/kkfud gS\ ;fn ugha rks Jfed fdl mike@{kfriwfrZ ikus dk vfèkdkjh gS rFkk fdl fooj.k lfgr\** 2- okn iathd`r dj i{kkssa dks uksfVl Hksts x,A i{k U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gq,A Jfed i{k us lkiFk fyf[kr dFku izLrqr fd,A volj fn, tkus ij Hkh lsok;kstdksa dh vksj ls dksbZ fyf[kr dFku izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k] ftlds dkj.k muds fyf[kr dFku nkf[ky djus dk volj lekIr fd;k x;kA pwafd lsok;kstdksa us Jfed ds fyf[kr dFku dk dksbZ [kUMu ugha fd;kA vr,oa Jfed ds fyf[kr dFku ij cgl lqurs gq, fnukad 20-1-1997 dks vokMZ vkjf{kr fd;k x;kA 3- Jfed i{k dk dFku gS fd lacaf/kr Jfed lsok;kstdksa ds ;gk¡ fnukad 7-7-1986 dks ekyh ds in ij fu;qDr gqvk] tgk¡ mlus 31-1-1994 rd yxkrkj dk;Z fd;k] vUr esa mldk osru :i;s 750@& ekfld FkkA fnukad 1-2-1994 dks just vf/kdkjh us Jfed dh lsok,a fcuk fdlh uksfVl] N¡Vuh HkÙks dh lekIr dj nhA cgkyh ds Jfed us ekax dh ,oa fnukad 8-3-1995 dks i= Hkh Hkstk] fdUrq mls cgky ugha fd;k x;kA 4- lsok;kstdksa ds fdlh izfrjks/k ds vHkko esa Jfed ds mDr lkiFk fyf[kr dFku dks u ekuus dk dksbZ dkj.k Árhr ugha gksrk gSa vr% esjk fu.kZ; gS fd lsok;kstdksa }kjk Jfed dh lsok,a 1-2-1994 dks lekIr djuk mfpr ,oa oSèkkfud ugha gSA vkSj og cgky gksus ;ksX; gS rn~uqlkj Jfed dks mDr frfFk ls gh lsok esa losru cgky fd;k tkrk gSA lsok;kstd Jfed dks :i;s 200@% okn O;; ds Hkh nsxsaA bl fookn esa ;gh esjk vfHkfu.kZ; gSA 5- bl vfHkfu.kZ; dh ,d izfr kklu dks izdkkukFkZ Hksth tk,A g0v0 ¼,l0 ih0 flag½ ihBklhu vf/kdkjh** 13. The award was notified on 7.11.1997 which was received by the petitioner on 30.11.97 i.e. within 30 days and therefore, application for recall of the award could not have been moved before 30 days from the date of the publication. However, the recall application was admittedly filed on 9.12.98 i.e. much after expiry of 30 days and for that reason too the application for recall of the award appears to have rightly been rejected and cannot be faulted with. 14. Admittedly, respondent No. 2 workman was a daily wager, hence according to the recent judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court a daily wager cannot be granted continuity in service with full back wages while reinstating him in service. 15. The petitioner may, therefore, reinstate the workman in service forthwith within one month from today and shall also pay 20% back wages and in view of the fact that the workman was a daily wager and might have not regularly worked for the time during the pendency of the writ petition. 16. With the aforesaid modification the impugned award is up­held. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. ————