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2008 DIGILAW 1543 (ALL)

COMMISSIONER, TRADE TAX, U. P. v. D. C. M. LIMITED.

2008-08-06

PRAKASH KRISHNA

body2008
JUDGMENT Prakash Krishna, J. - The present revision under section 11 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 arises out of an order passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal on an application for rectification filed under section 22 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act") by the dealer - opposite party. The dealer - opposite party carries on the business of foreign liquor, cotton yarn, sugar, chemicals, etc. It is a private limited company. It realised the tax of Rs. 5,48,055.62 from ex-U.P. purchasers on sale of rectified and denatured sprit and deposited it along with the return. A claim laid before the assessing authority with regard to the refund of the tax deposited by it in respect of certain inter-State sales was refused. Against, the assessment order dated July 27, 1991, Appeal No. 288 of 1991 was filed. The appeal was allowed in part and benefit of three forms C which were filed before the authority concerned was extended. Further aggrieved, the dealer opposite party filed second appeal before the Tribunal. The appeal was heard and decided by the order dated December 17, 1997 rejecting the claim of the dealer - opposite party for refund of the amount of Central sales tax deposited by it on the turnover of Rs. 1,37,01,378. Subsequent thereto, an application for rectification of a mistake in the said order was filed by the dealer - opposite party on the ground that it is entitled for refund of the Central sales tax wrongly deposited by it on the aforestated turnover. The Tribunal by the order under revision allowed the application and rectified its earlier order and accepted the claim of the dealer regarding refund of the Central sales tax on the aforestated amount. In the memo of revision, the following three questions of law have been sought to be raised : "(1) Whether the Tribunal was legally justified to refund the amount of the tax which has been realised and deposited in spite of the fact that the tax had become legally payable and section 29(3) prohibited such refund ? (ii) Whether the Tribunal was legally justified to completely ignore a retrospective amendment made by U.P. Act No. 11 of 1997 regarding taxability of rectified sprit and alcohol ? (ii) Whether the Tribunal was legally justified to completely ignore a retrospective amendment made by U.P. Act No. 11 of 1997 regarding taxability of rectified sprit and alcohol ? (iii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal is not legally justified to accept the additional evidence by passing the order on miscellaneous appeal filed under section 22 of the Act without giving opportunity to the Department for verification or rebuttal of the evidence ?" But during the course of the argument, Sri B. K. Pandey, learned standing counsel for the Department confined his argument to question No. (iii) only and submits that the application under section 22 of the Act, on the facts of the present case, was not maintainable. The Tribunal according to him, in the guise of hearing of the rectification application has, as a matter of fact, reviewed its earlier order and taken a different view of the matter. He submits that the application under section 22 of the Act was not at all maintainable. Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing for the dealer - opposite party, submits that there was an error apparent in the earlier order of the Tribunal which has been rightly rectified by it by passing subsequent order. Elaborating the argument he submits that it has been held in the case of dealer itself that if the amount of tax wrongly realised by a dealer has been refunded to its purchasing dealers by issuing credit vouchers, in the present case in the year 1991, the Department is under legal obligation to refund the Central sales tax to the dealer - opposite party. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. A bare perusal of the aforestated section would show that it deals with "rectification of mistake". The said section authorises any officer, authority or Tribunal or the High Court to rectify any mistake in any order passed by him or it under the Act apparent on record within the prescribed period of limitation. It has been held by numerous decisions that power of rectification given under a fiscal statute is different than the power of review. For invoking the provisions of section 22 of the Act, two things are required to be there. It has been held by numerous decisions that power of rectification given under a fiscal statute is different than the power of review. For invoking the provisions of section 22 of the Act, two things are required to be there. First, there should be an error and second, it should be apparent on the face of the record as held by a Division Bench of this court in Concrete Spun Pipe Works v. Sales Tax Officer, Sector V, Kanpur [1969] 24 STC 48. Section 22 as held therein does not envisage rectification of error in judgment. It must be a mistake which will appear upon a glance at the record and not a mistake which emerges after a prolonged debate on the merits of the case. Reliance was placed on a decision of the apex court in Master Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1966] 17 STC 360 wherein it was held that there is another qualification, namely, such an error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, it is not an error which depends for its discovery, elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. Coming to the facts of the present case, it may be noted that the plea regarding refund of Central sales tax was examined and considered by the Tribunal in its parent order dated December 17, 1997 and was rejected vide para 4 of the order. While doing so, the Tribunal considered the judgment of Constitution Bench of the apex court in Kasturi Lal Harlal v. State of U.P. [1987] 64 STC 1; [1987] UPTC 135 and of this court in Bansal Caterers v. State of U.P. [1990] ATJ 889, Mahavir Machinery Corporation v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1991] 82 STC 345; [1990] ATJ 381 and Mohan Coal Traders v. State of U.P. STI 2458 and held that the provisions of section 29A of the Act is not ultra vires and the order declining the grant of refund of tax is perfectly justified. The Tribunal specifically confirmed the order of the two authorities, below to it. The above portion of the order of the Tribunal has been sought to be rectified under section 22 of the Act and the rectification was sought for on a new and different plea which was not raised earlier. The Tribunal specifically confirmed the order of the two authorities, below to it. The above portion of the order of the Tribunal has been sought to be rectified under section 22 of the Act and the rectification was sought for on a new and different plea which was not raised earlier. The rectification was sought for, on the ground that the dealer - opposite party by issuing credit vouchers to the concerned purchasers has refunded the tax in the year 1991. It has placed reliance upon certain decisions of the apex court in Modi Industries Ltd. Modinagar, Ghaziabad v. State of U.P. [1991] UPTC 266, Kumaun Diesels, Nainital v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1991] UPTC 734 and Hotel Clarks Shiraz v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1992] UPTC 986 wherein it has been laid down that power of rectification can be exercised when the order was passed in ignorance of judgment of the High Court. In the order of the Tribunal it is mentioned that some order was passed by the High Court in the case of the dealer - opposite party itself relating to the assessment year 1986-87 delivered in revision No. 334 of 1999 decided on August 23, 1999 wherein it was laid down that if the amount has been refunded by a dealer to its purchasing dealer through refund vouchers, the Trade Tax Department is liable to refund the Central sales tax to the dealer if the tax was deposited wrongly. Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel for the dealer - opposite party, submits that in view of the judgment of this court in Hotel Clarks Shiraz v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1992] UPTC 986, if subsequent to an order passed by an authority, the High Court gives a ruling which is contrary to the view taken by the authority, then it is a mistake apparent on the face of the record and hence the application under section 22 of the Act is maintainable. There may not be any quarrel to the aforesaid legal proposition. But, its applicability to the facts of the present case is a different issue. As it has been noticed hereinabove, the refund was sought for before the authorities below including the Tribunal on the ground of wrong deposit of tax by the dealer - opposite party. There may not be any quarrel to the aforesaid legal proposition. But, its applicability to the facts of the present case is a different issue. As it has been noticed hereinabove, the refund was sought for before the authorities below including the Tribunal on the ground of wrong deposit of tax by the dealer - opposite party. The contention of the dealer was that it has realised and deposited Central sales tax at the rate of four per cent on the turnover of rectified and denatured sprit along with the return. The said amount has been forfeited under section 29A of the Act. The only ground raised before the Tribunal earlier was that the said amount is refundable to the dealer - opposite party. It may be noted that earlier section 29A was, declared ultra vires but has been declared subsequently a valid piece of legislation. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the apex court in the case of Kasturi Lal Harlal [1987] 64 STC 1; [1987] UPTC 135 and other decisions, the Tribunal was of the opinion that section 29A has retrospective effect and will not entitle the dealer - opposite party to claim refund. Only this aspect was urged before it when the appeal was heard and decided on merits. By way of rectification application, altogether a new ground to claim refund was urged in the rectification application, i.e., the tax realised from the purchasers has been refunded to them by issuing credit vouchers and as such, the dealer is entitled for refund of the tax from the Department. This plea, as noted above, was never pressed into service before any of the authorities below including the Tribunal earlier. Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing for the dealer - opposite party, could not point out from any of the orders of the three authorities below that the manner in which the plea of refund was set out in the rectification application was raised earlier at any stage of the proceedings. It is equally true that an argument which has not been raised earlier cannot be raised by way of rectification application. A new argument cannot be raised in rectification proceedings as held by the apex court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Hero Cycles Pvt. Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 463 AIR 1998 SC 1555 , wherein it has been held as follows : "... A new argument cannot be raised in rectification proceedings as held by the apex court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Hero Cycles Pvt. Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 463 AIR 1998 SC 1555 , wherein it has been held as follows : "... Rectification under section 154 can only be made when glaring mistake of fact or law committed by the officer passing the order becomes apparent from the record. Rectification is not possible if the question is debatable. Moreover, the point which was not examined on fact or in law cannot be dealt with as mistake apparent on the record." The rectification provisions of the Income-tax Act are pari materia to the provisions of the present Act. In addition to above, the apex court in a recent judgment in Deva Metal Powders Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. [2007] 10 VST 751; [2008] 36 NTN 4 has examined the matter in great depth with, reference to section 22 of the Act. The contents of paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 are reproduced below : "9. An error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to effect rectification must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 need to be noted : 'An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.' 10. A bare look at section 22 of the Act makes it clear that a mistake apparent from the record is rectifiable. In order to attract the application of section 22, the mistake must exist and the same must be apparent from the record. A bare look at section 22 of the Act makes it clear that a mistake apparent from the record is rectifiable. In order to attract the application of section 22, the mistake must exist and the same must be apparent from the record. The power to rectify the mistake, however, does not cover cases where a revision or review of the order is intended. 'Mistake' means to take or understand wrongly or inaccurately; to make an error in interpreting; it is an error, a fault, a misunderstanding, a misconception. 'Apparent' means visible; capable of being seen, obvious; plain. It means 'open to view, visible, evident, appears, appearing as real and true, conspicuous, manifest, obvious, seeming'. A mistake which can be rectified under section 22 is one which is patent, which is obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument or elaboration. In our view rectification of an order does not mean obliteration of the order originally passed and its substitution by a new order. What the Revenue intends to do in the present case is precisely the substitution of the order which according to us is not permissible under the provisions of section 22 and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in holding that there was mistake apparent on the face of the record. In order to bring an application under section 22, the mistake must be 'apparent' from the record. Section 22 does not enable an order to be reversed by revision or by review, but permits only some error which is apparent on the face of the record to be corrected. Where an error is far from self-evident it ceases to be an apparent error. It is, no doubt, true that a mistake capable of being rectified under section 22 is not confined to clerical or arithmetical mistake. On the other hand, it does not cover any mistake, which may be discovered by a complicated process of investigation, argument or proof. As observed by this court in Master Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1966] 17 STC 360, an error which is apparent from record should be one which is not an error which depends for its discovery on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. 11. 'Mistake' is an ordinary word but in taxation laws, it has a special significance. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1966] 17 STC 360, an error which is apparent from record should be one which is not an error which depends for its discovery on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. 11. 'Mistake' is an ordinary word but in taxation laws, it has a special significance. It is not an arithmetical error which, after a judicious probe into the record from which it is supposed to emanate is discerned. The word 'mistake' is inherently indefinite in scope, as to what may be a mistake for one may not be one for another. It is mostly subjective and the dividing line in border areas is thin and indiscernible. It is something which a duly and judiciously instructed mind can find out from the record. In order to attract the power to rectify under section 22, it is not sufficient if there is merely a mistake in the order sought to be rectified. The mistake to be rectified must be one apparent from the record. A decision on a debatable point of law or a disputed question of fact is not a mistake apparent from the record. The plain meaning of the word 'apparent' is that it must be something which appears to be so ex facie and it is incapable of argument or debate. It, therefore, follows that a decision on a debatable point of law or fact or failure to apply the law to a set of facts which remains to be investigated cannot be corrected by way of rectifications." The learned senior counsel for the dealer - opposite party sought to distinguish the aforestated decision on the ground that therein question of classification of a particular commodity was involved, here it is not so. The distinction pointed out by the learned senior counsel is hardly of any significance so far as the scope and ambit of section 22 of the Act is concerned. The Supreme Court in the above case in express words has delineated the limited scope of section 22, as quoted above. The Tribunal while deciding the appeal earlier, had placed reliance upon certain decisions of the apex court and of this court as well, to take a particular view of law on the issue. The said view can be set aside or corrected in a properly constituted revision as provided by section 11 of the Act. The Tribunal while deciding the appeal earlier, had placed reliance upon certain decisions of the apex court and of this court as well, to take a particular view of law on the issue. The said view can be set aside or corrected in a properly constituted revision as provided by section 11 of the Act. But, in the guise of rectification application, it is not permissible to take a different view in a proceeding under section 22 of the Act even if it is wrong. A decision on a debatable point of law or disputed question of fact is not a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Viewed as above, the order of the Tribunal passed on rectification application is indefensible and the same is liable to be set aside. The rectification application so far as it relates to the refund of Rs. 5,48,055.62 is concerned stands rejected. It may be added that by the said order the Tribunal has corrected certain mistakes in respect of three forms C. No argument was advanced by the learned standing counsel in this regard and as such, the said portion of the order of the Tribunal stands confirmed, being not subject-matter of the present revision. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside, as indicated above. No order as to costs.