JUDGMENT: TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and final order dated 24th of July, 2006 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 126/2006 whereby the High Court had affirmed the decision of the Trial Court dismissing the suit ofthe appellant for partition and separate possessionalong with mesne profits. 3. The relevant facts leading to the filing of thisappeal, as emerging from the case made out by theappellant in the plaint, are as under:- Late Anjanappa had twosons viz.,Ramakrishnappa and Venkataramachar, arrayed asdefendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit. DefendantNo.2/respondent No.2is the father of theplaintiff/appellant. Defendant No. 3/respondent No.3 isthe wife of Defendant No. 1/respondent No.1. WhenAnjanappa was alive, he was serving as an Archak ofSri Anjaneya Swamy Temple situated in Belesivalayaand there were Devadaya inam lands attached to thetemple, which were cultivated by him. AfterAnjanappas death, the said lands were granted to the respondent No. 1 with the consent of the Tehsildarobtained on the ground that he was the eldest son ofAnjanappa. Apart from these inam lands, LateAnjapppa also possessed ancestral and self acquiredproperties and after his demise, the respondent No.1was acting as the manager of the family but the jointfamily of the appellant and the respondents possessedall these properties as joint family properties describedin Plaint Schedule A to D of the plaint. 4. Schedule Aconsisted of ancestral properties viz., two agriculturallands measuring 4.11 acres and 1.34 acres respectivelyand five house sites. Schedule B property was a vacantsite. Schedule C property consisted of two agriculturallands, which were inam lands, granted subsequently inthe name of respondent No.1. Schedule D propertieswere moveable properties. There was no partitioneffected by metes and bounds and the respondent No.1, taking advantage of the simplicity of respondent No.2was managing all the properties and had also refused toeffect partition. 5. On 4th of July, 1988, the appellantissued a legal notice to the respondent No.1 demandingpartition of the joint family properties. The respondentNo.1 replied to the said notice alleging that themoveable properties had already been partitioned on23rd of April, 1962 and subsequently on 8th of May,1996, the immoveable properties were also partitioned.Since the respondent No. 1 refused to partition theimmovable properties, the appellant was constrained tofile the suit for partition and separate possession of hisshare in Plaint A to D schedule properties along withmesne profits. 6. 6. The respondent no.1 and 3 entered appearance byfiling a written statement in which they denied the material allegations made in the plaint. In the writtenstatement, it was alleged by them that since partitionhad already been effected between respondent no.1 andrespondent no.3 i.e. the father of the appellant and thatthey were separately enjoying the properties that hadfallen to their respective shares. It was further allegedthat after the death of Anjanappa, respondent No.1,became the archak of the said temple and he waslooking after and cultivating the lands attached to thesaid temple i.e. `C schedule properties of the plaint. 7. After coming into force of the Mysore (Religious andCharitable Inams) Abolition Act, 1955, (in short `theAct) the respondent No.1 filed an application for grantof occupancy rights in respect of `C scheduleproperties as the Archak of the temple which wasconferred on him. 8. The respondent No.2 supported the plaint caseand deposed that there was no partition of theproperties by metes and bounds and that therespondent No.1 did not allow him to cultivate thelands belonging to the joint family but only a smallportion of the same was allowed to be cultivated. Thereason behind staying under separate mess was statedto be the quarrel between the women in the family. 9. The Trial Court by the judgment and order dated25th of January, 1996 dismissed the suit filed by theappellant on the ground that the parties were shown tobe in possession of separate portion of the lands andhaving separate mess. Relying on the deposition ofrespondent No.2, it held that prior partition wasestablished in view of the admission of respondent No.2 and as such the appellant could not demandpartition. Against this decision of the trial court, theappellant filed an appeal before the High Court, which,however, was dismissed. The appellant filed a reviewpetition in the High Court, which was also dismissed.It is this decision of the High Court, which isimpugned in this appeal in respect of which leave hasalready been granted. 10. Before we proceed further, we may note that thenotice in the instant appeal has been issued confined tothe claim in relation to Schedule `C properties of theplaint and accordingly, the dispute in the instant appealalso revolves only concerning Schedule `C propertiesof the plaint. 11. Let us, therefore, look at the rival submissions ofthe parties advanced before us. The learned seniorcounsel for the appellant, Mr. 11. Let us, therefore, look at the rival submissions ofthe parties advanced before us. The learned seniorcounsel for the appellant, Mr. S.B. Sanyal, stronglycontended that in respect of the Schedule C properties(inam properties granted to respondent No. 1), theHigh Court had committed an error by holding thatsince the appellant and the respondent No.2 had notperformed the duties as Archak of the Inamdar Templeand they had not personally cultivated the said lands,they were not entitled to the grant of the Inam lands. Inthis regard, he submitted that the courts below werenot justified in holding that Inam lands were granted tothe respondent No.1 in his individual capacity asArchak of the temple. In support of his contention, herelied on a decision of this court in Nagesh BishtoDesai Vs. Khando Tirmal Desai [ (1982) 2 SCC 79 ]. 12. These submissions of the learned senior counselfor the appellant were contested by the learned seniorcounsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 3, Mr. A.K.Ganguli. Mr. Ganguli submitted that the respondentno.1 had got the Schedule `C properties vacated fromthe tenants who were cultivating the same and waspersonally cultivating them and accordingly, aftercoming into force of the act, an application for grant ofoccupancy rights was moved on his behalf which wasconferred on him by the competent authority afterproper inquiry and therefore, the `C scheduleproperties were the self acquired properties of therespondent no.1 and accordingly, the appellant couldnot claim partition of the same. 13. Mr. Ganguli relied onSection 6A of the Act and submitted that therespondent no.1 was admittedly the archak of thetemple and he was also cultivating the properties personally for a continuous period of 3 years prior tothe date of vesting and therefore, he was entitled toapply for registration of his rights under the act to thecompetent authority. He vehemently contended that thegrant of such right is a personal right which cannot becharacterized as an ancestral right because in this case,even if Anjanappa was alive, he could not havebecome entitled to grant of occupancy rights becausehe was not cultivating the lands and that the lands werebeing cultivated by the tenants. He also submitted thatthe authority relied upon would not apply to thepresent case as it pertains to Karnataka Village OfficesAbolition Act whose scheme is entirely different fromthe present act. 14. At this stage, we may note the findings of theHigh Court as also the trial court with regard to the properties comprised in Schedule `C only. He also submitted thatthe authority relied upon would not apply to thepresent case as it pertains to Karnataka Village OfficesAbolition Act whose scheme is entirely different fromthe present act. 14. At this stage, we may note the findings of theHigh Court as also the trial court with regard to the properties comprised in Schedule `C only. The HighCourt arrived at the following findings: - ".........once there is division of status, thesame is applicable to the granted ortenanted lands also. It is also to be notedthat Anjanappa died in the year 1964 andthereafter, admittedly and undisputedly it isdefendant no.1 who alone was the Archak ofthe temple. Only after coming into force ofthe land reforms act, he has got theoccupancy rights conferred on himself. Onperusal of the evidence of both plaintiff andhis father/defendant No.2, it is clear thatthere was absolutely no evidence to showthat at any point of time either plaintiff ofhis father/defendant no.2 acted orperformed the archakship of the temple andalso enjoyed the lands................If oneperuses the Karnakata Land Reforms Actand the Karnataka Hindu ReligiousInstitution and Charitable Endowments act,under Section 6(a) of the Act which cameinto force on 7.12.1973 two types of peoplewere entitled to grant of occupancy rights...............As we find that neither plaintiff hasperformed the duties of Archak to the templenor there is any material to show that alongwith the defendant no.2, he cultivated andenjoyed the lands, the grant of occupancyrights of these inam lands must be held in the individual capacity of the Archak viz.,defendant no.1......." 15. Having heard the learned counsel for the partiesand after examining the judgment of the High Court aswell as of the trial court and other materials on recordincluding the depositions of respondent Nos.1 and 2before the trial court, we are of the view that thisappeal deserves to be allowed for the reasons set outhereinafter. 16. Let us first see if the submission of the appellantregarding Schedule C properties, which, as notedherein earlier, are the inam lands granted to therespondent no.1 holds any water. In order to ascertainthis, we need to see whether the respondent no.1 hadbeen granted occupancy rights in his individual capacity as an Archak under Section 6A of the Act. Itis clear from the judgment of the High Court that it hasproceeded on the assumption that since only the archakof the religious institution is entitled to be granted suchinam lands, it becomes self acquired and individualproperty of such grantee. 17. Itis clear from the judgment of the High Court that it hasproceeded on the assumption that since only the archakof the religious institution is entitled to be granted suchinam lands, it becomes self acquired and individualproperty of such grantee. 17. In Nagesh Bishto Desai Vs.Khando Tirmal Desai etc. [ (1982) 2 SCC 79 ], it washeld that inam lands granted to a member of jointfamily upon abolition of inams cannot be considered asindvidual property of such grantee and should beconsidered as a joint family property available forpartition. In the present case, the grant in favour ofrespondent no.1 was made because his father was thearchak of the temple and he, being the eldest in thefamily, there was no objection expressed for grantingthe land to him. In this view of the matter, we are ofthe considered opinion that the inam lands cannot be regarded as the individual property of the grantee andthe High Court has committed an error by holding thatsince the appellant has not performed functions asarchak, nor cultivated the land personally, he was notentitled to seek partition. We are not inclined to acceptthe submission of the learned counsel for therespondent Nos. 1 and 3 that the decision in NageshBishtos case (supra) would not apply to the facts ofthe present case. 18. There is another aspect of the matter. Under thescheme of the Act, inam lands are liable to be grantedto the tiller of such lands, be, as it may, as tenants,archaks or office bearers of the inamdar temple.Accordingly, we are of the view that such grants aremeant for the benefit of the family of the tiller and nothim individually and for this reason, there can be no justification to disregard the rights of the juniormembers of the family if their eldest member wasperforming the duties of archak with the consent ofothers. For this reason and in view of the decision ofthis court in Nagesh Bishtos case [supra], we are ofthe view that grant of land to archak cannot disentitlethe other members of the family of the right to the landand such granted land, therefore, is also available for partition. 19. Furthermore, it also emerges from thejudgment of the Trial Court that the tenants cultivatingthe land had stated that respondent no.2 had requestedhis father, Anjanappa to allow him to cultivate thelands who accordingly gave his consent before the landtribunal also. 19. Furthermore, it also emerges from thejudgment of the Trial Court that the tenants cultivatingthe land had stated that respondent no.2 had requestedhis father, Anjanappa to allow him to cultivate thelands who accordingly gave his consent before the landtribunal also. Such being the position, if othermembers of the family had not objected to hisbecoming the archak of the temple because he was theeldest and also allowed him to cultivate the lands then, if subsequently he was, by virtue of the fact that hewas the archak and also personally cultivating thelands, granted the lands, he cannot take away the rightsof such other members of the family in the grantedlands. 20. We may look at this case from yet another angle.It is pellucid that respondent no.2 is relying only onSection 6A to submit that he was granted theoccupancy rights. When we look at Section 6A, it isclear that the respondent no.2 satisfied the conditionsenumerated therein and for that reason, he was grantedthe occupancy rights. If we look at this in isolation, wemay well come to the conclusion that since respondentno.2 had fulfilled the conditions of Section 6A, he wasgranted the occupancy rights and the question ofbringing the other family members did not arise. However, we are not inclined to look at Section 6A inisolation. 21. If seen in totality, it is discernible that thefather of respondent no.2 gave his consent and allowedrespondent no.2 to cultivate the land after taking thesame from the tenants. Even the land tribunal, whilepassing the order granting occupancy rights, had notconfined itself to the fact that the conditions in Section6A were fulfilled. Rather, the land tribunal hadobserved that the father of respondent no. 2 was thearchak and anubhavdar of the temple and this was aprime consideration in granting occupancy rights to therespondent no.2. Therefore, it would be wrong to holdthat simply because the conditions in Section 6A werefulfilled, the respondent no. 2 was granted occupancyrights and it was his individual rights. The truth is thatthe respondent No.2 became the Archak after the deathof his father because he was the eldest in the family and only then came the question of satisfying theconditions of Section 6A. 22. Apart from this, it is wrong on the part of therespondent no.2 to say that his father, even if he hadbeen alive, would not have been granted occupancyrights because the lands at that time were cultivated bythe tenants. 22. Apart from this, it is wrong on the part of therespondent no.2 to say that his father, even if he hadbeen alive, would not have been granted occupancyrights because the lands at that time were cultivated bythe tenants. For grant of occupancy rights, personalcultivation is just one condition. The other conditionsinclude that if a person is managing the properties,which his father was doing, would also be entitled tothe grant of occupancy rights. We are, therefore,clearly of the view that the respondent no. 1 was madearchak after the death of his father because he was theeldest member of the family. Being the archak, hecultivated the lands and obtained occupancy rights. Insuch circumstances, it would be highly unjust todeprive the other members of the family from getting their share in Schedule `C properties by relying onlyon Section 6A. Therefore, we are also of the opinionthat the granted lands are also available for partition.In our view, grant of occupancy to one member willnot disentitle the other members. This principle canalso be found in the case of Appi Belchadthi & Ors.vs. Sheshi Belchadthi & Ors. (1982) 2 KarnatakaLaw Journal 565. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned Judgment is set aside and the appeal is remanded back to the High Court to decide the share of each party in respect of Schedule `C properties within 3 months from the date of supply of a copy of this judgment to it. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.