Gurlal Singh v. Mata Gurmail Kaur Charitable Trust (Regd. )
2008-09-10
MAHESH GROVER
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 27.11.2007 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Fast Track Court, Ludhiana. 2. The dispute pertains to the functioning of a trust known by the name of Mata Gurmail Kaur Charitable Trust (Regd.) which was set up by one Sant Prasad Singh Grewal. The suit was preferred by petitioner Gurlal Singh who was appointed as sole trustee at the time of inception of the trust. A power of attorney was executed by Sant Prasad Singh Grewal in favour of Pritpal Singh, respondent No. 2 in the year 1971. The arrangement continued till 1992 and no change was effected in so far as the status of respondent No. 2 as executor of the trust was concerned. He continued to discharge the business on behalf of the trust. 3. The petitioner filed a suit on 3.4.2007 and made multifarious prayers which are reproduced as under- It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the suit be decreed: (i) by way of granting a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 2-Shri Pritpal Singh Grewal from acting, posing and conducting himself as the Trustee of Mata Gurmail Kaur Charitable Trust (Regd.); (ii) decree of possession of the properties of the Trust defined in the plaint and/or any other property which may have come into existence as consequential relief inclusive of any actionable claims of the Trust be granted in favour of the plaintiff-the Sole Trustee of the Trust; (iii) the accounts of the Trust be rendered from the date of constitution of the Trust and as well from the date when defendant No. 2 projected himself, fraudulently and illegally, the Trustee of Mata Gurmail Kaur Charitable Trust (Regd.); (iv) any other additional or alternative relief to which the plaintiff is found entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case which have been explained in the plaint or which may emerge during the course of the proceedings before this Honble Court, be also granted to the plaintiff. 4. Along with the suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. was filed which was disposed of by the learned trial Court vide order dated 30.4.2007.The operative part of the order of the trial Court reads as under: So, in my view the plaintiff is not entitled for relief of injunction at this juncture.
4. Along with the suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. was filed which was disposed of by the learned trial Court vide order dated 30.4.2007.The operative part of the order of the trial Court reads as under: So, in my view the plaintiff is not entitled for relief of injunction at this juncture. However, it is made clear that because the defendant No. 2 is not Trustee of the Trust, hence he has no right to alienate the property of the Trust to any 3rd party and the defendant No. 2 in reply to application under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C. specifically admitted that he is not trying to alienate the property of the Trust to any 3rd party. Hence, it is made clear that the defendant No. 2 will not create any 3rd party right of the property of the Trust except by giving the property on Chakota as he was giving it for the last 18 years and all the income and expenditure will be done by the defendant No. 2 through bank and the accounts of the Trust duly audited by the competent person will be rendered in the court after every three months. The defendant No. 2 will not represent himself as a Trustee to anyone. He can only manage the property of the Trust as he was managing the property of the Trust for the last 18 years and all the income and expenditure will be done by the defendant No. 2 through bank and the accounts of the Trust duly audited by the competent person will be rendered in the court after every three months. The defendant No. 2 will not represent himself as a Trustee to anyone. He can only manage the property of the Trust as he was managing the property of the Trust for the last 18 years. The question regarding disclaimer of the Trust of the plaintiff will be decided after taking of evidence in this case. With these observations, the application in hand is disposed off. 5. Aggrieved by this order respondent No. 2 went in appeal wherein the appellate Court partly accepted the appeal and modified the order of the learned trial Court by giving following directions: 8.
With these observations, the application in hand is disposed off. 5. Aggrieved by this order respondent No. 2 went in appeal wherein the appellate Court partly accepted the appeal and modified the order of the learned trial Court by giving following directions: 8. For the aforesaid reasons, instant appeal partly succeeds and order passed by the lower court is modified to the extent that defendant No. 1, shall not alienate land of the trust, during pendency of suit, in any manner whatsoever. However, he is at liberty, to act and represent himself as trustee, of the defendant trust and to maintain the accounts thereof, as he had been doing, before passing of impugned order, and conditions imposed by the lower court to that extent, shall be deemed as removed by the lower court to that extent, shall be deemed as removed. 6. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of the trial Court was perfectly in order and in the interest of the trust. It was then contended that once a serious dispute has arisen regarding the status of respondent No. 2 as a trustee, then in such eventuality the terms incorporated in the order of the learned trial Court were justified. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents contended that if the terms of the learned trial Court are accepted then in such eventuality it would amount to decreeing the suit altogether, which is impermissible under the law. Besides, the petitioner has not disputed that respondent No. 2 was the trustee for the last 18 years and was managing its affairs which is also evident from the fact that the wife of the petitioner had been taking on Chakota for the purposes of floriculture from the trust through the agency of respondent No. 2. In this eventuality to dispute the status of respondent No. 2 without any cogent material seems to be absolutely without any basis. It was also contended that in any eventuality the only condition of the trial Court that has been diluted is one in which respondent No. 2 was restrained from representing to anyone that he is a trustee and further the condition that the audited accounts shall be submitted to the trial Court after every three months.
It was also contended that in any eventuality the only condition of the trial Court that has been diluted is one in which respondent No. 2 was restrained from representing to anyone that he is a trustee and further the condition that the audited accounts shall be submitted to the trial Court after every three months. In so far as the alienation of the property is concerned, the respondent No. 2 had himself conceded in reply to the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. that he shall not alienate the property of the trust in any manner, which is also accepted in both the Courts. In this view of the matter, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 contended that the order of the appellate Court is in the interest of the trust and does not prejudice the petitioner as well. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 9. There is no dispute about the fact that the property belongs to the trust and the parties are related. It is also not in dispute that the arrangement and existed for almost two decades and the wife of the petitioner has been a beneficiary when she took some land on lease from the trust through the agency of respondent No. 2. Therefore, in this admitted background of facts if respondent No. 2 is restrained from representing himself to be a trustee, that would amount to throttling the affairs of the trust. If he has been permitted to continue for the last 18 years, then there is no reason as to why he should be restrained from operating and representing himself as a trustee now. However, since serious doubts have been expressed regarding the functioning of respondent No. 2 and the very status as a trustee has been questioned, which of course will be subject to the test of evidence which shall come on record, during the course of proceedings, and also keeping in view the interest of the trust which in the given set of circumstances can be termed to be paramount, it would be just and in the fitness of things if the other conditions which have been imposed by the lower appellate court are permitted to stand except the one which pertains to the furnishing of accounts and which was totally done away with even though directed by the learned trial Court.
In this eventuality, the order of the appellate court is modified marginally and it is directed that respondent No. 2 shall continue to submit the accounts of the trust after every six months to the Court and also submit audited reports to the Court annually during the course of proceedings. Rest of the conditions as determined by the learned appellate Court shall stand. Disposed of.