Judgment Harbans Lal, J. 1. This judgment shall dispose of C.W.P. No. 7914 of 1987 preferred by Sardul Singh (hereinafter to be referred as the workman) as well as .C.W.P. No. 9414 of 1987 filed by the Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited, Chandigarh (for brevity, the Markfed) under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned award dated 27.5.1987 (Annexure P.8) whereby the workman is held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service but without back-wages. The reason for Sardul Singh posing a challenge to this award is that he has not been awarded his full back-wages, whereas the Markfed is aggrieved with this award for allowing reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service. The facts are being garnered from C.W.P. No. 9414 of 1987. 2. The brief facts giving rise to these petitions are that Sardul Singh- workman was appointed as a Field Assistant by the Markfed vide letter dated 9.9.1980. As per the terms and conditions laid in his appointment letter, he was put on probation for a period of one year. He joined the service of the Markfed on 22.9.1980 at Faridkot. He served the Markfed from 22.9,1980 to 25.9.1980, whereafter he absented from duty. After repeated warnings, he joined his duties on 22.10.1980. He was again irregular in his attendance. He remained on duty upto 21.1.1981. Thereafter, he again absented from duty without any leave. He was informed by the Markfed vide letter dated 3.2.1981 to join the duty but he failed to resume the same. A telegram was also sent to him on 10.2.1981 asking him to join the duty but he did not respond. The Markfed was thus left with no alternative except to terminate his services and thus his services were terminated vide order dated 16.2.1981. He worked for only 97 days. He issued a demand notice to the Markfed after more than five months of the termination of his services. Then, he filed an application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (to be called as the Act) before the Government which referred industrial dispute to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhatinda. He filed claim petition before the Labour Court in October, 1982 contending that his services have been terminated without any notice, charge-sheet, inquiry or compensation. Then, he filed an application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (to be called as the Act) before the Government which referred industrial dispute to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhatinda. He filed claim petition before the Labour Court in October, 1982 contending that his services have been terminated without any notice, charge-sheet, inquiry or compensation. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court framed the following issues :- (i) Whether the order of termination of services of the workman is justified ? (ii) Relief. 3. After hearing the representatives of both the parties and examining the evidence on record, the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court vide impugned award dated 27.5.1987 held that the workman is entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service but without back-wages. Feeling aggrieved therewith as noted supra, both the parties have filed the above- mentioned petitions. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties besides perusing the findings returned by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court with due care and circumspection. 5. Mr. Arun Nehra, Advocate appearing on behalf of Markfed eloquently urged that order of termination dated 16.2.1981 is discharge simpliciter, which is neither stigmatic nor punitive in nature as it does not cast any aspersion on the work and integrity of the workman and thatbeing so, no inquiry was required to be held. Furthermore, the same has been passed in conformity with the terms and conditions of appointment letter. In this order, there are no words used by the Management against the workman which could convey the intention of Markfed to stigmatize him or to convey the sense of inefficiency or negligence in the discharge of his duties. It has been authoritatively pronounced that the services of a probationer can be terminated during his probation period without holding any inquiry. Thus the findings recorded by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court are contrary to the law laid down from time to time. To fortify these submissions, he has sought to place reliance upon the observations made in re: State of Punjab and others vs. Sukhwinder, Singh, 2005(5) Supreme Court Cases 569, Abhijit Gupta vs. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences and others, 2006(4) Supreme Court Cases 469. 6. To overcome these submissions, Ms. To fortify these submissions, he has sought to place reliance upon the observations made in re: State of Punjab and others vs. Sukhwinder, Singh, 2005(5) Supreme Court Cases 569, Abhijit Gupta vs. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences and others, 2006(4) Supreme Court Cases 469. 6. To overcome these submissions, Ms. Deepinder Kaur, counsel for the workman argued that the services of the workman have been terminated without holding domestic inquiry and without calling for his explanation, and thus he has been condemned unheard in derogation of the doctrine of audi alteram partem" which contemplates that nobody should be condemned at his back. 7. I have given a deep and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions. As per Annexure P.2 in C.W.P. No. 9414 of 1987, the workman was transferred at his own request to Kotkapura from Moga vice Roop Singh, F.A. He joined Branch Office, Kotkapura on 30.12.1980. Thenceforth he was directed many times to take over the charge but he continued avoiding on one pretext or the other. He applied for medical leave for 10 days i.e. from 27.1.1981 to 5.2.1981 vide his leave application dated 27.1.1981 which was not duly supported by any medical certificate nor he had given his address for the correspondence. Then it was recorded in Annexure P.2 that under the circumstances, it is clear that Shri Sardul Singh, F.A. is not interested to serve the Markfed and as such disciplinary action is recommended against him. As per Annexure P.3 in C.W.P. 9414 of 1987, a copy of telegram "Treated absent join duty at once" in confirmation by post was forwarded to Sardul Singh, F.A. at his home address otherwise disciplinary action will be initiated against him. Annexure P.4, termination order reads in the following terms : "The services of Shri Sardul Singh, Field Assistant, on probation, posted in the Markfed Branch Office, Kotkapura are hereby terminated with immediate effect." 8. It is manifestly clear from this language that it is neither stigmatic or punitive in nature. As per Annexure P.1 in C.W.P. No. 9414 of 1987, he was put on probation for a period of one year. In this letter, it has been inter-alia mentioned that "we shall have an unquestionable right of terminating your appointment/service without notice or compensation of any kind in case of misconduct etc." It is worth pointing here that the workman had put in hardly 97 days of service. In this letter, it has been inter-alia mentioned that "we shall have an unquestionable right of terminating your appointment/service without notice or compensation of any kind in case of misconduct etc." It is worth pointing here that the workman had put in hardly 97 days of service. In re: Sukhwinder Singhs case (supra), the Apex Court held as under :- "The respondent was appointed as a Police Constable. Before completion of the probation period of three years, he absented from duty without seeking permission. After 22 days of his continuous absence, the SSP passed an order discharging him from service with immediate effect under Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short "the Rules") as the respondent was not likely to become an efficient police officer. The civil court held that order to be null and void and the appellate court upheld that decision. The High Court dismissed the second appeal of the State and held that absence from duty was a misconduct and the imposition of the punishment of discharge on the respondent without holding a formal inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the Rules vitiated the order of discharge. The State then filed the present appeal by special leave. 9. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant State contended that having not completed three years of service, the respondent was only a probationer in terms of the Rules. That the impugned order of discharge was neither stigmatic nor did it affect him with any evil consequences. That the impugned order was passed in exercise of the power conferred by the Rules. That since no disciplinary action had been taken against the respondent there was no necessity of holding any formal inquiry. 10. On the other hand, the respondent submitted that the impugned order of discharge, although apparently innocuous, had in fact been passed on the ground of misconduct viz. the continued absence from duty and therefore amounted to an order of dismissal. That therefore it was obligatory upon the appointing authority to have held a formal departmental inquiry. 11. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy himself whether the employee concerned should be continued in service or not makes inquiries for this purpose, it would be wrong to hold that the inquiry which was held, was really intended for the purpose of imposing punishment. 11. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy himself whether the employee concerned should be continued in service or not makes inquiries for this purpose, it would be wrong to hold that the inquiry which was held, was really intended for the purpose of imposing punishment. The superior authorities of the departments have to take work from an employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job. A probationer is on test and a temporary employee has no right to the post. In the present case neither any formal departmental inquiry nor any preliminary fact- finding inquiry has been held and a simple order of discharge had been passed. The respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight months back. The period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. The mere holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondents absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24 (ix) of the Rules." 12. Harking back to the facts of the instant case, in view of the afore- extracted observations, the termination order of the workman could not be set aside merely because of non-holding of the inquiry. To crown it all, termination order is neither stigmatic nor punitive in nature. To hold an order to be punitive, three factors should be present: (a) a full scale formal inquiry; (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct; and (c) which culminated any finding of guilt. If all the three factors are present, the termination has to be held to be punitive. Conversely, if any of the three factors is missing, the termination is to be upheld. If all the three factors are present, the termination has to be held to be punitive. Conversely, if any of the three factors is missing, the termination is to be upheld. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court in his award has observed that as is the respondents own stand in the written statement, the workman had absented from duty without leave over a long period which was a case of misconduct. If that is so, his service could be terminated only upon an inquiry or at least after complying with the principles of natural justice. These observations are unsustainable for the reason that as mentioned in the award itself a telegram copy of which is Ex.MW/11 was sent to the workman on 10.2.1981 but the same went unresponded from the workmans side. On putting together, the entire conduct of the workman, it transpires that the Markfed rightly took the decision to terminate his services. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court in the award has also observed that "since the workman himself abstained from the work for which he is demanding wages and since he submitted the notice more than five months after the termination of service and also because he failed to explain his absence convincingly even before the Court, he is in my opinion, not entitled to any back- wages." It is discernible from these observations that the workman did not have the courage even to explain his prolonged absence. Consequently, the findings returned by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court call for interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The same being unsustainable, the impugned award is set aside. In the ultimate analysis, C.W.P. No. 9414 of 1987 filed by Markfed is accepted and C.W.P. No. 7914 of 1987 moved by the workman, Sardul Singh is dismissed.