Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1574 (MAD)

Elumalai v. State, by Inspector of Police

2008-06-09

K.N.BASHA, P.D.DINAKARAN

body2008
Judgment :- P.D. Dinakaran, J. The appellant is the sole accused in Sessions Case No.297 of 2005 on the file of Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore and he was tried and convicted for the offence of murder of one Govindasamy on 24. 2004 at about 2.30 a.m. and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been preferred. 2. The charge against the appellant is that on 24. 2004 at about 2.30 a.m., with an intention to cause the death of one Govindasamy due to enmity, as the fire set by the deceased to destroy the beehive that was a menace in his land, spread over to the adjacent lands and consumed the crops and also three heifers, which were under the care of the accused, stabbed him with a knife on his neck and also hit with stone on his head and chest and thus caused his death and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. 1. The facts, in nutshell, are that P.W.1 - Pachaiyammal and P.W.2 - Thanjiammal are the wife and mother of the deceased respectively. They are the residents of Kalampoorankottai, Kollaimedu, Vellore Taluk. The deceased Govindasamy owned two acres of land and forty days prior to the date of occurrence, he set fire to the beehive of wasp in order to destroy it and while so, the fire spread over the adjacent lands which also caught fire and destroyed the crops, trees, etc. and also three heifers belonging to one Krishnaveni. The accused who was working under the said Krishnaveni and who was taking care of the field and the heifers, got enraged over the conduct of the deceased and picked up quarrel with him, which ended in a panchayat. The deceased offered to compensate the loss sustained but, the accused who got annoyed over the deceased, threatened him with his life. Even a few days prior to the occurrence, the appellant/accused threatened the deceased with extinction. This is said to be the motive for the occurrence. 2. On the night of 24. 2004, while P.W.1 and the grand parents of P.W.1 took their bed in front of their house, the deceased took his bed at the backyard. At about 2.30 a.m. on 24. This is said to be the motive for the occurrence. 2. On the night of 24. 2004, while P.W.1 and the grand parents of P.W.1 took their bed in front of their house, the deceased took his bed at the backyard. At about 2.30 a.m. on 24. 2004, on hearing the dog barking, they woke up and with the help of a light, saw the accused cutting the deceased on his head, neck with a knife. The accused also dropped a stone on the head and chest of the deceased. Witnesses raised alarm and neighbours gathered. The deceased was found dead and P.W.1 and another went to the Vellore Taluk Police Station and lodged the complaint, Ex.P.1. 3. P.W.9, Sub-Inspector of Police, based on Ex.P.1, registered a case in Crime No.164 of 2004 under Section 302 I.P.C. He prepared printed F.I.R., Ex.P.13 and sent the same to the Court and copies thereof to higher officials. 4. P.W.10, the Inspector of Police, on receipt of copy of F.I.R., took up investigation and proceeded to the scene of occurrence at about 10.00 a.m. and in the presence of witnesses, he prepared observation mahazar, Ex.P.4 and rough sketch, Ex.P.14. He recovered M.Os.1 to 5, 8, 10 and 11 from the scene under a cover of mahazar. He conducted inquest between 11.00 a.m. and 1.30 p.m. in the presence of panchayatdars and witnesses and prepared inquest report, Ex.P.15. Thereafter, he sent the body to the hospital with a request to conduct autopsy. 5. P.W.3 is the medical officer who conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased Govindasamy and he noticed seven external injuries on the body and issued Ex.P.3, post-mortem certificate. He opined that the deceased would have died on account of head injury due to fracture of skull about 12 to 20 hours prior to autopsy. 6. P.W.10, the investigating officer, examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. He arrested the accused at about 4.30 p.m. and in pursuance of the admissible portion, Ex.P.6, of the statement given by the accused, P.W.10 seized M.O.9 on being produced by the accused from the backyard of his house. Thereafter, he sent the accused to Court for judicial remand and issued a requisition to the Court to send the material objects for chemical examination. He further examined official witnesses and recorded their statements. Thereafter, he sent the accused to Court for judicial remand and issued a requisition to the Court to send the material objects for chemical examination. He further examined official witnesses and recorded their statements. He received Exs.P.10 to P.12, toxicology report and serology reports, which revealed that the material objects were found to contain human blood of A group, however, grouping test was inconclusive. After completing the investigation, P.W.10 laid the charge sheet against the accused on 30.5.2004 for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. 7. After initial questioning of the accused about the commission of crime, the case was committed to Court of Sessions. Since the accused denied his complicity in the crime, trial commenced. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses, produced 15 exhibits and marked 13 material objects. 8. After the completion of prosecution witnesses, the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to the incriminating materials found in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which he denied as false. He examined D.W.1 on his side, but did not mark any document. 9. The trial Court, after careful scrutiny of the materials placed before it and on hearing the submissions of either side, found the appellant/accused guilty of the charge of murder and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as referred to earlier. Hence, the present appeal by the appellant/accused. 4. The contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant are: (i) The motive alleged by the prosecution is too flimsy; (ii) There is delay in lodging the F.I.R. to the police; (iii) In the absence of any specific evidence as to the availability of light at the backyard of the house, the witnesses could not have witnessed the occurrence in that odd hours when it was very dark; (iv) The conduct of P.W.1 in not going for the rescue of the deceased goes to show that she really could not have been present and witnessed the occurrence; and (v) There is no reason for the police to summon the sniffer dogs to the scene, inasmuch as the F.I.R. contains the name of the appellant/ accused and this reflects that the F.I.R. would have been fabricated in order to implicate the appellant/accused. 5. 5. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, sustaining the Judgment of the trial Court, submits that (i) In view of the direct ocular testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 and the motive for the occurrence having been strongly established through witnesses, the above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant could be construed as trivial in nature; and (ii) Though there is no need for the police to summon sniffer dogs to the scene, the fact remains that the evidence with regard to the same is not ordinarily of much weight. 6. We heard and considered the rival submissions of both sides and perused the entire materials placed on record. 7. From the evidence of the Doctor P.W.3, who conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased and issued Ex.P3, the post-mortem certificate, we get that the deceased had seven external injuries on his person, and on the basis of the objective findings, the Doctor gave detailed reasons in support of his opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of head injury of fracture skull 12 to 20 hours prior to autopsy. Thus, the medical evidence clearly depicts that the death was homicide. 8. Then the question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? 9. The prosecution case mainly rests on the ocular evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2. P.W.1 is none else than the wife of the deceased Govindsamy and hence, she is a natural witness. According to her, the accused was harboring a grudge against the deceased for his act of destroying the adjacent lands and three heifers, while he set fire to his land in order to wipe out the hives put up by wasps, about forty days prior to the date of occurrence. It is her further evidence that even few days prior to the occurrence, the accused was threatening the deceased. As far as the occurrence, she has stated that on the midnight of the fateful day, she heard the barking of a dog at the backyard, where the deceased was sleeping, she woke up and saw the accused stabbing her husband/deceased on the head and neck with a knife and even after she raised alarm, the accused continued and took a stone and smashed on the head and chest. She has stated that after the witnesses gathered, the accused went away leaving the stone at the scene and taking the knife with him. The deceased was found dead by the witnesses and after she was told by the villagers to lodge a complaint, she proceeded to the police station along with her brother and lodged the complaint at about 8.00 a.m. P.W.2, mother of the deceased, who was also present at the scene, corroborates the evidence of P.W.1 as to the occurrence proper. Even assuming that P.W.2 could not have witnessed the occurrence proper in view of her age and her evidence in cross that she has very less vision, the evidence of P.W.1, being a natural witness, is cogent, convincing and trustworthy. On going through the evidence of P.W.1, we find that it is natural and can be acted upon to base the conviction of the appellant/accused. 10. Let us now take up the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused. The first contention is that the motive as alleged by the prosecution is too flimsy. According to the witnesses, the fire set out by the deceased in his land to destroy the hives put up by the wasp, spread over to the adjacent lands and destroyed the crops as well as three heifers, which were under the control of the accused and due to this act of the deceased, the accused was nurturing grievance against the deceased. Though motive lacks significance in view of the direct evidence of eye witnesses to the occurrence proper, it can be used as a corroboration. Apart from P.W.1, the motive part is also spoken to by P.Ws.2, 4 and 5 on the same lines as spoken to by P.W.1. 11. The next contention is that there is delay in lodging the complaint by P.W.1. For the occurrence that took place at 2.30 a.m. as stated by P.W.1, the complaint was lodged only at 8.00 a.m. as is evident from the evidence of P.W.9, Sub-Inspector of Police. P.W.1, in her cross-examination has stated that from 2.30 a.m. to 5.00 a.m., she was explaining the incident to the villagers who gathered there and that even none of the villagers informed her to lodge a complaint immediately. P.W.1, in her cross-examination has stated that from 2.30 a.m. to 5.00 a.m., she was explaining the incident to the villagers who gathered there and that even none of the villagers informed her to lodge a complaint immediately. P.W.1, being an illiterate woman, obviously lacks knowledge of informing a heinous crime to the police and she being the wife of the deceased, could have been under shock and only after recovering, she could have gone to the police and lodged the complaint. That apart, the F.I.R. reached the hands of the Magistrate within one hour of its lodging to the police. Hence, we do not attach much importance to the delay in lodging the complaint. 12. The contention that there could not have been any light available at the scene of occurrence and hence, the witnesses could not have witnessed the occurrence proper cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the rough sketch, Ex.P.14, clearly shows the availability of the light at the backyard and even then, the accused is not a stranger to the witnesses, he being their close relative. 13. The next attack is that if P.W.1 was really present at the time of occurrence, she could have gone to the rescue of her husband and in the absence of the same, her presence is very much doubtful. This contention is to be stated only to be rejected. P.W.1, being the wife of the deceased, would have been shocked on seeing the brutal attack on her husband and any normal person would be afraid to go near to the person who is having a dangerous weapon, like knife in the instant case, and hence, we reject the contention. 14. The last contention is that there is no need for the police to summon sniffer dogs to the scene to identify the accused, inasmuch the F.I.R. contains the name of the assailant. This contention does not hold good because the investigating agency has their own way of investigation and merely because the name of the assailant is found mentioned in the F.I.R., it cannot halt the investigating agency from proceeding with the investigation. Summoning of sniffer dogs is one kind of investigating process. This contention does not hold good because the investigating agency has their own way of investigation and merely because the name of the assailant is found mentioned in the F.I.R., it cannot halt the investigating agency from proceeding with the investigation. Summoning of sniffer dogs is one kind of investigating process. Moreover, as held by the Apex Court in catena of decisions, the first information statement is not a substantive piece of evidence and it is just an information received by the police, based on which the police register a case and proceed with the investigation. Thus, in the instant case, the investigating officer, P.W.10, before he proceeded to the scene of occurrence, summoned for the sniffer dogs. The purpose of summoning of sniffer dogs is not necessarily to identify the accused in a case where the accused is not named, but also in cases in which the accused is known, where the purpose is to trace out the direction in which the accused escaped from the scene of occurrence, to locate and to apprehend the accused. Thus, even though the summoning of the sniffer dogs is one kind of investigating process, it serves different purposes from the point of view of the investigating agency, which cannot be restricted in the manner as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Of course, P.W.2 has admitted in her cross-examination that only after the sniffer dog stopped in front of the house of the accused, the police effected the arrest. But, the said admission does not affect the substratum of the prosecution version since the answer of P.W.2 could only be a snap answer obtained from an illiterate and aged woman. That apart, the investigating officer has denied the suggestion made to him in this regard. In any event, it is not the case of the defence that only because of the sniffer dog, the real culprit was brought on record. It is the evidence of P.W.10, the investigating officer, that only on receipt of credible and secret information, he went in search of the accused at Pairakottai, which is situated at the foot of two hills and caused the arrest of the accused. We do not see any reason to disbelieve the evidence of the investigating officer in this regard. 15. We do not see any reason to disbelieve the evidence of the investigating officer in this regard. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. In the result, we hold that there is no infirmity or illegality in the judgment of the trial Court and accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant/accused are confirmed. The appeal is therefore dismissed.