1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27.8.1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Cachar, Silchar, in Title Appeal No. 56 of 1994 by reversing and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff No. 2, Cachar, Silchar dated 27.9.1994 decreeing Title Suit No. 207 of 1988 filed by the present appellant/plaintiff. 2. Heard Mr. N. Dhar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and also learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1, State of Assam and Mr. P. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 6. 3. Neglecting un-necessary details, the concise facts which would be sufficient for deciding the present appeal are that the appellant-plaintiff filed the Title Suit No. 207 of 1988 in the Court of Munsiff No. 2, Cachar, Silchar for declaration of the ownership title in respect of the patta land described in Schedule-1 to the plaint, declaration of possessory title in respect of the khas land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint and also for recovery of possession in respect of the suit land described in Schedule-3 to the plaint. The case of the appellant-plaintiff pleaded in the plaint in Title Suit No.207 of 1988 are that the patta land described in Schedule-1 to the plaint measuring 3 kathas 15 chattaks covered by Dag No. 116/890 of 2nd R.S. Patta No. 120 was originally belonged to one Bhulua Rabidas who sold the same to one Shri Bipin Bhor by executing a registered sale deed dated 11.11.1976 [Ext-3] and delivered the possession of the said land to him. Shri Bipin Bhor died leaving behind two sons, namely - Shri Sibdhari Bhor and Sri Sib Narayan Bhor. Shri Sibdhari Bhor and Sri Sib Narayan Bhor sold the suit land at Schedule-1 to the plaint to the appellant-plaintiff by executing the sale deed dated 25.7.1983 [Ext-1] and delivered the possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant. 4. The further pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff was that the suit land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint measuring 5 kathas covered by khas Dag No. 1037, Mauja Chuto Dudhpati, District Cachar was originally belonged to Dudhpati Tea Estate and after closure of the said tea garden it was made khas land. 4. The further pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff was that the suit land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint measuring 5 kathas covered by khas Dag No. 1037, Mauja Chuto Dudhpati, District Cachar was originally belonged to Dudhpati Tea Estate and after closure of the said tea garden it was made khas land. But the possession of the said Government khas land at Schedule-2 was with the ex-labourer of the said garden namely Shri Sibdhari Bhor who sold the schedule-2 land to the appellant-plaintiff by executing a deed dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-4). Shri Sibdhari Bhor also delivered the possession of the schedule-2 land to the appellant-petitioner on the very day of executing the said deed dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-4). 5. During the year 1985, the father of the respondents/defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and the husband of the respondent/defendant No. 6 initiated a proceeding under section 107, Cr.PC against the appellant-plaintiff by claiming a right of way through the Schedule-2 land. But the said proceeding was dropped after hearing the appellant-plaintiff. The defendant Nos. 2 to 6 in collusion with the interested officers of the respondent-defendant No. 1, State of Assam had started an Encroachment Case No. 93 of 1986 against the appellant-plaintiff in respect of the Schedule-2 land. In that case, the appellant-plaintiff was arrested illegally and was forcibly dispossessed the land described in Schedule-3 of the plaint, which is a part of the land, described in Schedule-2 of the plaint. Over and above, the defendants-respondents tried to carve out a path over the land described in Schedule-3 of the plaint by cutting earth, felling of trees and also by filing up water well. Accordingly, the appellant/respondent filed the Title Suit No. 207 of 1988 after issuing notice under section 80 of the CPC to the respondent/defendant No. 1, State of Assam and the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 for reliefs : - (1) Declaration of ownership title of the appellant/plaintiff over the land described in schedule-1 to the plaint. (2) Possessory title of the appellant/plaintiff over the land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint and (3) for recovery of possession of the land described in Schedule-3 to the plaint. 6. Respondents/the defendant Nos. 2 to 6 filed a joint written statement. (2) Possessory title of the appellant/plaintiff over the land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint and (3) for recovery of possession of the land described in Schedule-3 to the plaint. 6. Respondents/the defendant Nos. 2 to 6 filed a joint written statement. In their written statement, they pleaded that the land described in Schedule-A of their written statement covered by periodic patta No. 58 (subsequently amended as Periodic Patta No. 217), Mouza Chuto Dudhpati was originally belonged to their predecessor late Lachman Rabidas and also that they have been using the path described in Schedule-B of their written statement as incidence of service of their predecessor late Shri Lachman Rabidas from Dudhpati Tea Estate. Accordingly, they filed their counter claim in respect of the lands described in their written statement. Respondents/Defendants in their written statement did not make any claim to the suit lands described in Schedule-1, Schedule-2 and Schedule-3 to the plaint. 7. The appellant-plaintiff examined six (6) witnesses, namely - (1) Md. Tamizur Rahman Borbhuiya, PW-2, Shri Sibdhari Bhor, PW-3, Shri Shyam Deo Bhor, PW-4, Md. Allauddin, PW-5 Abdul Aziz Barbhuiya, PW-6, Md. Kamrul Islam Barbhuiya and exhibited 12 documents, i.e. - (A) Ext. 1 Sale Deed dated 25.7.1983. Ext. 1(1) to 1(3) signature of Sibdhari Bhor. Ext. 1(4) to 1(6) thumb impression of Sibnarayan Bhor. Ext. 2 original patta for 1st Schedule land. Ext. 3 Original Registered Sale Deed dated 11.11.1976 Ext. 4 Sale Deed dated 6.6.1981. Ext. 4(1) and (2) signature of Sibdhari Bhor. Ext. (3) and 4(4) signature of Lakshmindar Bauri. Ext. 4(5) and 4(6) signature of Shyamdeo Bhor. Ext. 4 (7) and 4(8) signature of writer. Ext. 5, 5(1) to 5(5) rent receipts. Ext. 6 certified copy of petition in 53 M/85 under section 107, Cr.PC. Ext. 7 certified of order dated 29.6.1990 in Misc. Case 7/90. Ext. 8 copy of proceeding notice in 437 M/90. Ext. 9 certified copy of order dated 8.1.92 in 437 M/90. Ext. 10 notice of collectory court in Encroachment Case No. 93/86. Ext. 11 copy of notice under section 80 CPC. Ext. 12 postal receipt. Ext. 1 (7) to 1(9) signature of Shyam Deo Bhor. Ext. 1(10) to 1(12) signature of witness Lakshindar Bauri. 8. The contesting respondents/defendants Nos. 2 to 6 examined only one witness, i.e., DW-1, Shri Paitu Robidas (defendant No.2) and exhibited three (3) documents, i.e. B. Defendants Exhibits Ext. 11 copy of notice under section 80 CPC. Ext. 12 postal receipt. Ext. 1 (7) to 1(9) signature of Shyam Deo Bhor. Ext. 1(10) to 1(12) signature of witness Lakshindar Bauri. 8. The contesting respondents/defendants Nos. 2 to 6 examined only one witness, i.e., DW-1, Shri Paitu Robidas (defendant No.2) and exhibited three (3) documents, i.e. B. Defendants Exhibits Ext. AHazira datsd 9.12.1993 of the plaintiff and his witnesses. Ext.A(1) signature of Sibdhari Bhor. Ext (B) original patta No. 217. Ext. C&D rent receipts. 9. The respondent No. 1, State of Assam on receipt of summon appeared before the trial court, i.e., Munsiff No. 2, Cachar District but did not contest the suit and also did not file the written statement in the suit. 10. PW-1 (appellant-plaintiff) deposed that he acquired the suit land described Schedule-1 to the plaint by purchasing it from Shri Sibdhar Bhor and Shri Sib Narayan Bhor, i.e., both sons of late Bipin Bhor under the registered sale deed dated 25.7.1983 (Ext-1) which was executed by the said two sons of late Bipin Bhor. He also deposed that the original owner of the land described in Schedule-1 to the plaint, Shri Bhulua Rabidas sold the same by executing a registered sale deed dated 11.11.1976 to Bipin Bhor. The original registered sale deed dated ll.ir.1976 was exhibited as Ext-3 and admitted in evidence without objection from the respondents-defendants. He also deposed that the land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint belonged to Dudhpati Tea Estate and Shri Sibdhar Bhor who worked in said Tea Estate was in possession of the same. Shri Sibdhar Bhor sold the land described in Schedule-2 of the plaint by executing a sale deed dated 6.6.1981 and also delivered the possession of the land described in schsdule-2 to the plaint to the appellant-plaintiff on the very day of executing the deed dated 6.6.1981. The said deed dated 6.6.1981 was admitted in evidence and exhibited as Ext-4. PW.1 also stated that he had possessed the land described in Schedule-1 to the plaint as owner thereof by paying land revenue, and revenue receipts were exhibited as Ext-5 series and admitted in evidence without objection from the defendants. He further deposed that defendants trespassed into the suit land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint in the year 1987 and dispossessed him (plaintiff) from a part of the land described in Schedule-2 of the plaint. He further deposed that defendants trespassed into the suit land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint in the year 1987 and dispossessed him (plaintiff) from a part of the land described in Schedule-2 of the plaint. The said portion of the land in scheduie-2 to the plaint from which the plaintiff had been dispossessed was described in Schedule-3 to the plaint. 11. Before filing the suit, i.e., Title Suit No. 207 of 1998, the plaintiff also is sued notice under section 80 of the CPC to the respondent-defendant No. 1, State of Assam. A copy of the said notice under section 80 of the CPC was produced before the trial court and marked as Ext-11 and also postal receipt for sending the said notice under section 80 of the CPC was also produced before the trial court and marked as Ext-12 and, admitted in evidence without objection from the defendants-respondents. 12. PW-2, Sibdhari Bhor deposed that he sold the land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint by executing a deed dated 6.6.1981 to the appellant-plaintiff and also delivered the possession thereof to the appellant plaintiff. Since 1981, appellant-plaintiff had been possessing the same till a part of which, i.e., Schedule-3 to the plaint had been forcibly dispossessed by the defendants. He also deposed that before the land described in Schedule-2 to the land had been sold to the appellant-plaintiff he had been in peaceful possession of the same. 13. The said registered sale deed dated 25.7.1983 (Ext-1) was also proved by the attesting witness, i.e., PW-3 Shri Shyam Deo Bhor and also he exhibited his signature, i.e., Ext-1 (7), 1(8) and 1(9) appeared in the said sale deed, i.e., 25.7.1983. His statement was also corroborated by the statement of the PW-1 (appellant-plaintiff) that the said Shri Sibdhari Bhor and Shri Sib Narayan Bhor sold the land described in Schedule-1 to the plaint to the appellant-plaintiff. 14. PW-5 Abdul Aziz Borbhuiya deposed that he wrote the said deed dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-4) on the dictation of the said Shri Sibdhari Bhor and also that Sibdhari Bhor put his signature in his presence in the said deed dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-4) and also proved the signature of Sibdhari Bhor appearing in the Ext-4. He exhibited and identified the signature of Sibdhari Bhor on the said sale deed (Ext-4) as Ext-4(1) and 4(2). He exhibited and identified the signature of Sibdhari Bhor on the said sale deed (Ext-4) as Ext-4(1) and 4(2). He also identified and exhibited the signature of another attesting witness Shri Shyam Deo Bhor as Ext-4(5) and 4(6). PW-5, Abdui Aziz Borbhuiya also identified his signature as a scribe in the said document dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-4) as Ext-4(7) and 4(8). Other PWs also supported the pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff by corroborating the statement of the plaintiff PW-1. 15. Registered sale deed dated 25.7.1983 (Ext-1), registered sale deed dated 11.11.1976 (Ext-3) and the said deed dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-A) are not the documents required to be compulsorily attested by the attesting witnesses. 16. The document, which is required to be attested compulsorily by the attesting witness, is required to be proved in compliance with the procedures contemplated in section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The proof of signature and handwriting of a person alleged to have signed on written document produced can be made by taking recourse to section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Apex Court in Mobarik All Ahmed - v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 held that the proof of genuineness of the document is proof of the authorship of the docume'nt and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or of the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or, signature by one of the modes provided in section 45 and section 47 of the Evidence Act. The scribe could prove the contents of the document. The Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf and Another v. D. and Another, AIR 1968 Bom. 112 (Division Bench] held that the evidence of the contents contained in the document is hearsay evidence unless the writer thereof is examined before the court. An attempt to prove the contents of the document by proving the signature or the handwriting of the authorship is to set at naught the well-recognized rules that hearsay evidence cannot be admitted. The Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf and Another (supra) had followed the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed (supra). An attempt to prove the contents of the document by proving the signature or the handwriting of the authorship is to set at naught the well-recognized rules that hearsay evidence cannot be admitted. The Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf and Another (supra) had followed the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed (supra). This court is of the similar view in Lourembam Heramot Singh v. Laisram Augahal Singh and Others, AIR 1979 Gau. 68 ." 17. Keeping in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed (supra) and the decision of this court in Lourembam Heramot Singh (supra) and also the decision of the Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf and Another (supra), it is required to see whether or not the appellant-plaintiff could prove the registered sale deed dated 11.11.1976 (Ext-3), registered sale deed dated 25.7.1983 (Ext.1) and also the said sale deed dated 6.6.1981 (Ext-4). On perusal or the statement of DW-1, Paltu Rabidas, the statement of the attesting witness of the said registered sale deed who were examined as PW-3 and PW-5 respectively and also the Statement of PW-1 it is clear that the appellant-plaintiff could prove the said registered sale deeds i.e. Sale deed dated 11.11.1976 (Ext-3) and sale deed dated 25.7.1983 (Ext-1) and also the deed dated 6.6.1981. 18. The sole witness of the contesting defendant, i.e., DW-1 Paitu Rabidas deposed that he is defendant No.2 in the suit. He also deposed that the respondent/defendant Nos. 2 to 6 had/have not claimed any land except the land described in Schedule-A of their written statement covered by patta No. 217 Mouza Chuto Dudhpati and also the land which was used as path described in Schedule-B of their written statement. PW-1 also clearly deposed that they were/are not claiming the lands of the appellant-plaintiff described in Schedule. 1, Schedule-2 and Schedule-3 to the plaint. The learned trial court after careful appreciation of the statement of the witnesses, i.e., PWs and the DW as well as the exhibited documents had considered and decided eleven (11) issues by giving reasons and decreed Title Suit No. 207 of 1998 by his judgment and decree dated 27.9.1994. 1, Schedule-2 and Schedule-3 to the plaint. The learned trial court after careful appreciation of the statement of the witnesses, i.e., PWs and the DW as well as the exhibited documents had considered and decided eleven (11) issues by giving reasons and decreed Title Suit No. 207 of 1998 by his judgment and decree dated 27.9.1994. By the said judgment and decree in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, the learned trial court held that the appellant-plaintiff has ownership right and title over the suit land described in Schedule 1 to the plaint and also the appellant-plaintiff has the possessory right over the land described in Schedule-2 to the plaint and also that the appellant-plaintiff is entitled to recover the khas possession of the Schedule-3 land by evicting the defendants. 19. The defendant Nos. 2 to 6 preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 56 of 1994 against the judgment dated 27.9.1984 and decree dated 30.9.1994 of the learned trial court, i.e., Sadar Munsiff/Civil Judge No. 3 of Silchar in the Court of the Assistant District Judge No. 1/Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1 Cachar, Silchar. The learned First Appellate Court without considering all the issues formulated in the said Title Suit No. 207 of 1998 had picked up only four (4) issues, i.e., issue No. 2 it is the suit maintainable ? Issue No. 3, i.e., is the suit barred by limitation ? Issue No. 4, Is the suit bad for waiver, estoppel and acquiescence and Issue No. 6, whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land of Schedule-1 and possessory right for use of the Schedule-2 land, for consideration and allowed the Title Appeal No. 56 of 1994 by passing cryptic judgment and decree dated 27.8.1998. 20. The Apex Court in a catena of cases had discussed and considered the duties of the first appellate court and held that - A. The First Appellate Court is duty bound to make a critical analysis of all issues. B. It cannot mechanically affirmed the finding of trial court without due and proper application of mind. C. The First Appellate Court is further duty bound to give reasons in the case of reversing the findings of the trial court, which are based on appreciation of evidence by the trial court. Some of the cases are - 1. State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (2000) 5 SCC 652 2. C. The First Appellate Court is further duty bound to give reasons in the case of reversing the findings of the trial court, which are based on appreciation of evidence by the trial court. Some of the cases are - 1. State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (2000) 5 SCC 652 2. Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 . 3. Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 21. The Apex Court in Harphool Singh (supra) held that the First Appellate Court is duty bound to decide all the issues and make a critical analysis of the matter before it and further; the First Appellate Court has to show proper application of mind. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari (supra) held that the First Appellate Court while reversing a finding by the trial court must assign its own reason for the different finding. Para 15 of SCC in Santosh Hazari (supra) reads as follows : - "15. A perusal of the judgment of the trial court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandni Devi v. Bitendra Narain Choudhury). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court's not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai). The rule is - and it is nothing more than a rule of practice - that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should riot interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact1. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh). (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 22. The finding of the first appellate Court in the impugned judgment and order dated 27.9.1994 that there was no proper notice under Section 80 of the CPC to the State-respondent is perverse inasmuch as the State of Assam did not contest the suit and also did not file his written statement stating that the State of Assam did not receive the notice under section 80 of the CPC addressed to the Collector of the District. The appellant-plaintiff had exhibited the copy of the notice under section 80 of the CPC as Exhibit-11 and it was admitted in evidence without any objection from the side of the defendant. The appellant-plaintiff had exhibited the postal receipt for the said notice under section 80 of the CPC as Ext-12 and admitted in evidence without any objection from the side of the defendant. 23. The appellant-plaintiff had exhibited the postal receipt for the said notice under section 80 of the CPC as Ext-12 and admitted in evidence without any objection from the side of the defendant. 23. The Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 held that section 80, CPC requires prior notice of two (2) months to be served on the Government as a condition for filing the suit except when there is urgency of interim order in which the court may not insist on the rigid rule of prior notice. The Government, Government Department or the statutory authorities are duty bound to send reply to the notice under section 80, CPC. Para 38 of the SCC in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. (supra) reads as follows : "38. Section 80(1) of the Code requires prior notice of two months to be served on the Government as a condition for filing a suit except when there is urgency for interim order in. which case the court may not insist on the rigid rule of prior notice. The two months' period has been provided for so that the Government shall examine the claim put up in the notice and has sufficient time to send a suitable reply. The underlying object is to curtail litigation. The object is also to curtain the area of dispute and controversy. Similar provisions also exist in various other Legislations as well. Wherever the statutory provision requires service of notice as a condition precedent for filing of suit and prescribed period therefore, it is not only necessary for the Governments or departments or other statutory bodies to send a reply to such a notice but it is further necessary to properly deaf with all material points and issues raised in the notice. The Government, Government departments or statutory authorities are defendants in a large number of suits pending in various courts in the country. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in a large number of cases either the notice is not replied to or in the few cases where a reply is sent, it is generally vague and evasive. The result is that the object underlying section 80 of the Code and similar provisions gets defeated. It not only gives rise to avoidable litigation but also results in heavy expenses and costs to the exchequer as well. The result is that the object underlying section 80 of the Code and similar provisions gets defeated. It not only gives rise to avoidable litigation but also results in heavy expenses and costs to the exchequer as well. A proper reply can result in reduction of litigation between the State and citizens. In case a proper reply is sent either the claim in the notice may be admitted or the area of controversy curtailed or the citizen may be satisfied on knowing the stand of the State. There is no accountability in the Government, Central or State or the statutory authorities in violating the spirit and object of section 80." 24. It appears from the records that no substantial question of law was formulated in the second appeal at the time of admission. Therefore, this court after considering the rival submissions of the parties had to formulate the substantial question of law in the present second appeal taking into consideration of the cryptic judgment and order of the learned First Appellate Court, which was passed without discharging duties of the First Appellate Court. 25. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434 , the Apex Court held that under section 100, CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was permissible. In the above situation the substantial question of law can arise. Para 10 to 13 of the SCC in Ishwar Dass Jain (supra) reads as follows : - "10. Now under section 100, CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. 11. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. 11. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this court in relation to section 100, CPC after the 1976 Amendment. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra while dealing with a second appeal of 1978 decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 20.8.1981, L.M. Sharma, J (as he then was) observed that (SC. Pp. 712-13, para 5). "The court (the first appellate court) is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorized to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case." In that case, an admission by the defendant tenant in the reply notice in regard to the plaintiffs. We and the description of the plaintiff as "owner" of the property signed by the defendant were not considered by the first appellate court while holding that the plaintiff had not proved his title. The High Court interfered with the finding on the ground of non-consideration of vital evidence and this court affirmed the said decision. That was upheld. In Jagdish Singh v. Nattu Singh with reference to a second appeal of 1978 disposed of on 5.4.1991, Venkatchaliah, J, (as he then was) Held : (SCC p.652, para 10). ".....Where the findings by the court of facts is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matyter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings." Again in Sundra Naicka Vadiyar v. Ramaswami Ayyar it was held that where certain vital documents for deciding the question of possession were ignored - such as a compromise, an order of the Revenue court - reliance on oral evidence was unjustified. In yet another case in Mehrunnisa v. Visham Kumari arising out of second appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996, it was held by Venkataswami, J that a finding arrived at by ignoring the second notice issued by the landlady and without noticing that the suit was not based on earlier notices, was vitiated and the High Court could interfere with such a finding. This was in second appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996. 12. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In Sri Chand Gupta v. Gulzar Singh it was held that the High Court was right in interfering in second appeal where the lower appellate court relied upon an admission of a third party treating it as binding on the defendant. The admission was inadmissible as against the defendant. This was also a second appeal of 1981 disposed of 24.9.1985. 13. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is - Whether the courts below had failed to consider vital pieces of evidence and whether the courts relied upon inadmissible evidence while arriving at the conclusion that the mortgage was sham and that there was no relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as mortgagor and mortgage but the real relationship was as landlord and tenant ?" Point 1 is decided accordingly. 26. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari (supra) held that the improper functioning of the first appellate court would give rise to substantial question of law. 27. It is fairly well settled that the question of whether the finding of a lower court is perverse would come within the meaning of substantial question of law. However, there must be a clear finding in the judgment of the High Court as to perversity in order to show compliance with the provision of section 100, CPC. Para 34 of SCC in Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262 reads as follows : "34. Admittedly, section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Para 34 of SCC in Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262 reads as follows : "34. Admittedly, section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference he had to section 103 of the Code which reads as below : "103. In any second appeal, the High Court may if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal - (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100." The requirements stand specified in section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that section 100 of the Code stands complied with. 28. For the reasons above, the substantial question of law in the present second appeal is formulated as follows : - "Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court ignoring evidence and materials in the case record and also the fact that the defendant No. 1, i.e., State of Assam did not contest the suit and also particularly the evidence D.W. 1 in the nature of an admission regarding claim of the plaintiff over the suit land, for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court without deciding all the issues in the suit are perverse and unsustainable in law ?" 29. The Apex Court in Prataprai N. Kothari v. John Braganza, (1999) 4 SCO 403 held that it is the well settled principle of law that a person who has been in long continuous possession of an immovable property can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person in the world other than the true owner and it is also well settled principle of law that even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to the due process of law. Para 11 of the SCC in Prataprai N. Kothari (supra) reads as follows : - "11. We have already extracted the summary of conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. That shows that his conclusions were vitiated by his view that the appellant had title and possession followed title. It is quite obvious that the learned Single Judge had not taken note of the principle of possessory title or the principle of law that a person who has been in long continuous possession can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person in the world other than the true owner. It is also well settled that even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to the due process of law." 30. It is also well settled that even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to the due process of law." 30. This court in Smt. Parija Dutta v. Shri Santi Ranjan Dutta, 1995 (2) GLT 174 held that even a trespasser in possession can file a suit for recovery of possession if dispossessed by another trespasser. Paras 19 and 20 of the judgment in Smt. Parija Dutta (supra) reads as follows : - "19. Mr. Deb Roy has, therefore, argued that in the instant case Purna Chandra Noatia transferred the suit land along with other land by sale to Juljalal mian by Ext-6 Kabala, the execution of which had taken place on 25.6.1965 A.D. and this execution having taken place before first of January, 1969 A.D. the revenue officials in view of the provisions laid down under section 187(3) of the Act are not entitled to eject the transferee. The question, therefore, remains to be answered is what will happen in case a member of Scheduled Tribe Community transfers some land to a member of any Community and also delivers possession thereof before first of January, 1959 without obtaining previous permission as required under clause (b) of section 187(a) of the Act. The reply to this question given by Mr. Dutta is that Revenue officials will not be entitled to eject the transferee. In the Instant case it is an admitted fact that the Revenue Officials did not take any step whatsoever under sub section 3 of section 187 of the Act. The case of the answering defendants as would appear from Para 5 of their written statement is that Ananda Mohan Noatia purchased the suit land on auction sale and thereafter he sold the suit land to Nandalal Noatia by executing a deed of sale on 8.1.1971 A.D. and this Nandalal Noatia put them in possession of the land in suit as labourers for cultivation. So admittedly the defendants acquired to title to the suit land. They claimed the suit land through Nandalal Noatia who according to them purchased the land in suit on 8.2.1971 A.D. from Ananda Mohan Noatia, the auction purchaser. In course of his arguments Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents did not dispute the fact that the suit land appertains to C.S. Plot Nos.1319 and 1320 of Khatian No.390 of Mouja Garjeechhara. 20. In course of his arguments Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents did not dispute the fact that the suit land appertains to C.S. Plot Nos.1319 and 1320 of Khatian No.390 of Mouja Garjeechhara. 20. So, even if it is assumed that purchase of the suit land by the husband of the plaintiff was hit by section 187(1) of the Act, are the defendants who admittedly acquired no right, title and interest to the suit land excepting their claim to cultivate the land acquired any right to get a decree in their favour ? It may be noted here that even a trespasser in possession can file a suit for recovery of possession if dispossessed by another trespasser. Possession is prima facie a proof of title and a previous possession though without title will constitute a good foundation for a suit in ejectment against a person who is equally a trespasser and has no better title to the disputed property. It has already been stated above that Mr. Dutta has quite fairly conceded that in view of the provision laid down under sub-section (3)(a) of section 187 of the Act the Revenue Officials will not be entitled to take any action against the transferee if the transfer is found to have taken place before first of January, 1969." 31. For the reasons discussed above, the substantial question of law formulate above is answered in favour of the appellant-plaintiff inasmuch as the impugned judgment and decree of the 1st appellate is not only perverse but also cryptic. As a result the present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the learned First appellate court dated 27.8.1998 passed in Title Appeal No.56 of 1994 is hereby set aside and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court passed in Title Suit No.207 of 1988 with a simple modification that the appellant-plaintiff has possessor right over the Schedule-2 land which is a khas land till the appellant-plaintiff is evicted from the said land Schedule-2 land (khas land) by the Govt. khas land by following the due process of law and also has the right for recovery of possession of Schedule-2 land and Schedule-3 land by evicting the respondent-defendant Nos. 2 to 6 and also by demolition of structures that may found thereon. khas land by following the due process of law and also has the right for recovery of possession of Schedule-2 land and Schedule-3 land by evicting the respondent-defendant Nos. 2 to 6 and also by demolition of structures that may found thereon. It is made clear that the appellant-plaintiff has the ownership title over the Schedule-1 land. 32. The decree be prepared accordingly. 33. Parties are to bear their own costs.