Judgment : 1. Challenge in this appeal is to judgment rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Jalgaon, in an appeal (R.C.A. No. 119/1983) whereby and whereunder judgement and decree of Trial Court in Spl. Civil Suit No. 28/1977 came to be reversed. 2. Original defendants No. 2 to 14 are appellants herein. Respondent No. 1 - Shaikh Gaffar is original plaintiff and respondent No. 2 – Sugrabi is original defendant No. 2. Respondent No. 1 Shaikh Gaffar is son of respondent No. 2 - Sugrabi. He filed suit (Spl. C.S. No. 28/1977) for setting aside alienation made by her and for his 7/8th share by way of partition and separate possession in respect of the suit fields. 3. Briefly stated, case of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) before the Trial Court was that he and respondent No. 2 had filed a partition suit bearing Spl. C.S. No. 3/1956 against his uncles, etc. That suit ended in a compromise decree passed on 30th November 1956. By virtue of such compromise decree, the suit properties were allotted to him as shown in the schedule appended with the plaint. They comprised of agricultural fields bearing Survey No. 353 admeasuring 1 acre 29 gunthas, situated at village Savda, Taluka Raver and fields bearing Survey No. 91/2, admeasuring 0 acre 29 gunthas and Survey No. 91/4, admeasuring 3 acres 4 gunthas, situated at village Waghode, Taluka Raver. He was minor, aged about 2 years, at the relevant time. The respondent No. 2 - Sugrabi filed an application (Misc. Appln. No. 86/1956) in the District Court for her appointment as his guardian under provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Court appointed her as his guardian as per order dated 27th April, 1957, under section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. She was in possession of the suit properties after the partition decree for and on behalf of both of them. She alienated the field Survey No. 353 situated at village Savda by virtue of sale-deed dated 14th February 1961 in favour of original defendants No. 2 and 3. They subsequently got the said field partitioned. She also alienated the fields Survey No. 91/2 and Survey No. 91/4 to original defendant No. 9, which lateron changed hands and came to the shares of original defendant No. 10 Sudhakar. They subsequently got the said field partitioned. She also alienated the fields Survey No. 91/2 and Survey No. 91/4 to original defendant No. 9, which lateron changed hands and came to the shares of original defendant No. 10 Sudhakar. He transferred the same in favour of defendant No. 11 Hemantkumar during implementation of the Consolidation Scheme. 4. The respondent No. 1 - plaintiff asserted that the transactions were not binding on him. He demanded partition of his share. The defendants did not accede to his demand and, therefore, he sued them for partition and separate possession alongwith declaration that the sale-deeds executed by the respondent No. 2 - original defendant No. 1 were not binding on him. He also claimed mesne profits. 5. Therespondent No. 2 (original defendant No. 1) filed consent written statement (Exh-72). 6. The appellants resisted the suit. It was their contention that the suit fields were in exclusive possession of defendant No. 1- Sugrabi who represented to them that she was competent to alienate the same. They were unaware of the fact that she was appointed as guardian of the plaintiff. They asserted that the suit was barred by limitation. They further asserted that the suit fields were alienated by defendant No. 1 Sugrabi for the welfare and benefit of her minor son - respondent No. 1 - Shaikh Gaffar. They further asserted that she purchased a house property bearing M.C. No. 68 at Jalgaon by utilizing the consideration amount in respect of the sale transactions. They asserted further that they are the bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and deserved legal protection. They also contended that they have become owners by adverse possession. Consequently, they sought dismissal of the suit. 7. The parties went to trial over issues struck below Exhibit-73 by the learned Civil Judge. They adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of the rival contentions. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The Trial Court held that the appellants were bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and deserved legal protection. The first Appellate Court reversed such findings. The first Appellate Court came to conclusion that the suit was not barred by limitation. The first Appellate Court held that the defendants could not acquire ownership by virtue of adverse possession, nor they were bonafide purchasers. The first Appellate Court reversed such findings. The first Appellate Court came to conclusion that the suit was not barred by limitation. The first Appellate Court held that the defendants could not acquire ownership by virtue of adverse possession, nor they were bonafide purchasers. Hence, the appeal was allowed and the suit came to be decreed. .8. This second appeal was admitted on a single substantial question of law, which the then Hon’ble Judge referred to as ground No. 2 in the appeal memo. Instead of reproducing the said ground, I deem it proper to redraft the substantial question of law as follows : ."Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, respondent No. 2 Sugrabi (original defendant No. 1) was competent to transfer the suit properties without prior permission of the Court under provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and that due to her omission to alienate the suit properties without such permission, the transactions became voidable at instance of respondent No. 1 Shaikh Gaffar (plaintiff)?" 9. Mr. V.J. Dixit, learnedSenior Counsel, would submit that the appellants were bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and should have been protected by the Court. He would submit that the transactions of sale were entered into by respondent No. 2- Sugrabi for welfare of the minor and, hence, could have been saved by the first Appellate Court. He would point out that a house property was purchased by her by utilizing the consideration amount received from the purchasers of the suit property. .10. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it is amply clear that the question of limitation is properly addressed by the first Appellate Court. The respondent No. 1 - Shaikh Gaffar was minor at time of both the sale transactions. He was born on 17th July, 1954. He was aged 21 years at the time of .filing of suit. He became major on 17th July, 1975. The suit was instituted on 27th January, 1977. Obviously, it was filed within period of three (3) years after he attained majority. The first Appellate Court considered legal provisions contained in Article 8 of the Indian Limitation Act in this behalf. The finding of the Trial Court that the suit was barred by limitation is totally incorrect and has been rightly reversed by the first Appellate Court. 11. Obviously, it was filed within period of three (3) years after he attained majority. The first Appellate Court considered legal provisions contained in Article 8 of the Indian Limitation Act in this behalf. The finding of the Trial Court that the suit was barred by limitation is totally incorrect and has been rightly reversed by the first Appellate Court. 11. The only significant question to be determined is whether the respondent No. 2 Sugrabi was legally competent to alienate the suit properties during minority of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff). There is no dispute about the fact that he was appointed as his guardian under provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act. In case of a minor governed by Mahomedan Law, the guardians of the property of a minor can be only persons from following categories. .(i) the father; .(ii) the executor appointed by the father’s will; (iii) the father’s father; (iv) the executor appointed by the will of father’s father. The mother, brother or uncle, etc. cannot act as legal guardian of a minor. The mother may be a de facto guardian but would never be regarded as a de jure guardian in respect of property of the minor. The power of a guardian appointed by a Court to dispose of movable property is limited to the extent of movable properties. That too, it shall be so disposed of carefully as a prudent man deal with it if it were his own. This legal position is quite clear in view of section 27 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890. Article 364 of the Mahomedan Law (by Mulla), (19th Edition by M. Hidayatullah and Arshad Hidayatullah) would make it manifest that a de facto guardian under Article 361 has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor. Such a transfer would not be merely voidable, but would be void. A mother is only a de facto guardian and a bare custodian of property of minor son. She does not possess power to sell, mortgage, or otherwise deal with immovable property belonging to the minor. She has no larger powers to deal with her minor child’s property than a stranger or non-relative who happens to have charge of the minor for time being. 12. The principles of Mahomedan Law stated in the treatise by Syed Ameer Ali (Vol. She has no larger powers to deal with her minor child’s property than a stranger or non-relative who happens to have charge of the minor for time being. 12. The principles of Mahomedan Law stated in the treatise by Syed Ameer Ali (Vol. II, 5th Edition) at pages 548 and 549 deal with the topic. It is well settled that the mother has no right, whatsoever, to alienate the property of the minor. There is no representation of estate in such a case. For, no sooner deceased father of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) died, the shares of his only son and the widow have been crystalized. They would inherit his property as per their shares as tenants-in-common. The separation of their shares by way of mutual partition remains only to be done by way of subsequent act of partition as a formality or matter of their mutual understanding, as the case may be. They do not inherit jointly. In other words, the mother cannot represent the share of her minor son. She cannot bind him by acts of her alienation. There is no question of existence of legal necessity in such case of alienation likewise a concept available under the Hindu Law. It is obvious that respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) could have avoided sale transactions entered into by the respondent No. 2 within period of three (3) years after attaining majority. His suit ought to have been decreed by the Trial Court in view of the settled legal position. The first Appellate Court was right while granting the decree of partition and separate possession. The defence of bonafide purchase is not available in such a case. For, the purchasers were quite aware that the respondent No. 1 was minor. For, the sale deed dated 11th November, 1961 (Exh-158) clearly shows that minority of the respondent No. 1 was within knowledge of the purchaser. So also, all the revenue entries as shown in the revenue record go to show that she was appointed as guardian of respondent No. 1 Shaikh Gaffar. The evidence of the appellant do not show that they made necessary inquiry as regards her competency to alienate the suit fields. They did not obtain legal advice before effecting purchases of the properties of the minor. No inquiry was made as to whether the respondent No. 2 Sugrabi had obtained sale permission from the Court. The evidence of the appellant do not show that they made necessary inquiry as regards her competency to alienate the suit fields. They did not obtain legal advice before effecting purchases of the properties of the minor. No inquiry was made as to whether the respondent No. 2 Sugrabi had obtained sale permission from the Court. Considering these legal aspects, the impugned judgement is quite legal and proper. 13. In the result, the appeal is without merits and as such, is dismissed. No costs.