Judgment : Heard learned counsel Mr. S.B.Rohile for the petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. S.P.Daund for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and learned Senior counsel Mr. Pravin Shah instructed by Advocate Mr. Girish Rane for respondent Nos. 5 and 6. 2. Rule made returnable forthwith and by consent of the parties, heard finally. 3. This petition takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner, Nashik in Grampanchayat Appeal No. 59/2008. 4. Facts, which are not seriously disputed, may be enlisted as follows. a). Gram panchayat Pilode, Tal. Amalner, Dist. Jalgaon is constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1958" for short). b). This Gram panchayat comprises of 7 members, elected from various wards and in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1958. c). The election of Gram panchayat Pilode was declared. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 had filled in their nomination papers. The husband of petitioner had objected the nominations of respondent Nos. 5 and 6. d). Ground raised for objection was that, respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were convicted for the offence punishable under sections 143, 342, 448, 148, 324 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Adhoc Sessions Judge, Amalner in sessions case No. 18/2001. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and other accused persons were directed to suffer simple imprisonment for three months on each count. They were also convicted under sections 148, 324 r/w. 149 and directed to suffer simple imprisonment for one year on each count. Substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The respondent Nos. 5 , 6 and other accused persons were acquitted for the offence punishable under section 436 r/w. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. They were directed to surrender their bail bonds. e). The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 filed criminal appeal No. 161/2005 in the Court of learned Sessions Judge at Amalner. The learned Sessions Judge, Amalner, suspended the sentence inflicted upon respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and released them on bail by the order passed on 31st May, 2005. After the conviction by learned Adhoc Assistant Sessions Judge, Amalner, the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were released on bail. f). The learned Sessions Judge, Amalner, suspended the sentence inflicted upon respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and released them on bail by the order passed on 31st May, 2005. After the conviction by learned Adhoc Assistant Sessions Judge, Amalner, the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were released on bail. f). Their appeal i.e. criminal appeal No. 161/2005 is pending before the learned Sessions Judge at Amalner which, now is transferred to learned District and Sessions Judge at Jalgaon and is pending. g). The objection raised by the husband of the petitioner to the nominations of respondent Nos. 5 and 6, was turned down by the Returning Officer. h). Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 contested the elections and in due course of time, were declared elected somewhere on August 28, 2005 from ward Nos. 1 and 3, respectively. i). The petitioner submitted an application on September 15, 2005, to the Collector Jalgaon, seeking disqualification of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 under section 14(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, 1958. j). This application was inquired in to by the Additional Collector, Jalgaon. The learned Additional Collector, Jalgaon heard petitioner, respondent Nos. 5 and 6. k). The learned Additional Collector disqualified respondent Nos. 5 and 6 by the order passed on October 26, 2005. l). The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 meanwhile, had filed criminal appeal No. 161/2005 in the Court of learned Sessions Judge at Amalner. m). Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 took an exception to the order passed by learned Additional Collector on 26th of October, 2005 by filing appeal before the learned Divisional Commissioner on 7/11/2005. n). The learned Additional Commissioner dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 by passing the order on November 28, 2005. Consequently, the order passed by the Additional Collector, disqualifying the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 was upheld. o). Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 challenged the order passed by the learned Additional Divisional Commissioner by filing writ petition No. 406/2006. The ground raised was that the learned Additional Divisional Commissioner was not empowered to entertain and decide the appeal. p). This Court heard the writ petition No. 406/2006, quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner dated 21.11.2005 and remitted the matter to Divisional Commissioner for determination of the said appeal in accordance with law. p). This Court heard the writ petition No. 406/2006, quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner dated 21.11.2005 and remitted the matter to Divisional Commissioner for determination of the said appeal in accordance with law. This order was passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 08.02.2008 in writ petition No. 406/2006. q). After remand, the learned Divisional Commissioner heard the petitioners/respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned Additional Collector dated 26th of October, 2005 on the ground that criminal appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, is pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Amalner and conviction inflicted upon respondent No. 5 and 6 has been suspended. This order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner, noted in forgoing paragraphs, is assailed by the petitioner in this writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have been convicted and thus have acquired disqualification. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that conviction inflicted upon respondent Nos. 5 and 6 is suspended by the learned Sessions Judge, Amalner and said conviction is not stayed. According to him, respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have incurred disqualification as contended by the petitioner and order passed by the learned Additional Collector is legal, proper, however, said order has been illegally turned down by the learned Divisional Commissioner. 6. Senior Advocate Shri. Pravin Shah submitted that section 14 of the Act, 1958 needs to be read as whole. According to him, not only section 14, but the provisions laid down under section 8, sub-section 4 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 requires tobe read with it. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 cannot be subjected to multiple disqualifications. He further submitted that section 14(A) has also enumerated disqualification out of certain convictions and corrupt practices under this Act. The counsel for the respondent No. 5 and 6 has strenuously urged before this Court that section 14(1)(a)(ii) and provisions laid down under section 14(1)(a)(i) to be read together and to be reconciled. According to him, this section 14 in the manner in which he submitted, if read, the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 cannot be said to have incurred disqualification. He, therefore, sought dismissal of the writ petition. 7. According to him, this section 14 in the manner in which he submitted, if read, the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 cannot be said to have incurred disqualification. He, therefore, sought dismissal of the writ petition. 7. On my query, the learned senior counsel fairly concedes that respondent No. 5 and 6 have not challenged the virus of section 14 of Act, 1958 by filing independent petition before this Court. Mr. Pravin Shah, the learned senior counsel, also admits the conviction recorded by the Adhoc Assistant Sessions Judge, Amalner and pendency of criminal appeal No. 161/2005 filed by them. 8. The Divisional Commissioner has allowed the appeal filed by respondent Nos. 5 and 6, on the ground that conviction inflicted upon respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has been suspended by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Amalner. Mr. Pravin Shah, learned senior counsel, has invited my attention to the reply filed by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6. In para 2 of the reply affidavit filed by respondent Nos. 5 and 6, it has been stated that the judgment and order passed in Sessions Case No. 18/2001 dated 6.5.2005, is carried in criminal appeal No. 16/2005, the application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail was preferred and allowed by the Appellate Court on 31.05.2005 and thereafter, granted bail to respondent No. 5 and 6 along with other appellants therein by suspending the sentence. It has further averred that respondents No. 5 and 6 have not undergone imprisonment. In para 5 of this affidavit, it has been stated that the learned Appellate authority (learned Divisional Commissioner) has properly considered the fact that criminal appeal arising out of the conviction and sentence is still pending for final adjudication and the sentence is suspended and hence, the provisions of section 14(1)(a)(ii) are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. At this stage, it is apposite to reproduce the provision laid down under section 14(1) (a)(i),(ii). 14. 9. At this stage, it is apposite to reproduce the provision laid down under section 14(1) (a)(i),(ii). 14. Disqualifications.-(1) No person shall be a member of a panchayat or continue as such, who- (a) has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, has been convicted- (i) of an offence under the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, or under the Bombay Prohibition act, 1949 or any law corresponding thereto in force in any part of the State, unless a person of five years, or such lesser period as the State Government may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his conviction, or (ii) of any offence and been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months, unless a period of five years, or such lesser period as the State Government may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his release; or The provisions laid down under section 14(1)(a)(i), in my view, has no concern whatsoever to the facts available in the case on hand. It is nobodies case that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have been convicted for an offence under the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 or any law corresponding thereto in force in any part of the State. Therefore, provisions laid down under section 14(1)(a)(i) has no application in the case on hand. The facts obtaining in the case on hand have been listed in forgoing paragraphs. At the cost of iteration, it is to be observed that the case alleged by the petitioner, is under section 14(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, 1958. 10. Therefore, now the provisions laid down under section 14(1)(a)(ii) needs consideration in the case on hand. It has been provided under this provision that no person shall be a member of a panchayat or continue as such, who has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, been convicted --of any other offence meaning thereby except the offences under the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 or any law corresponding thereto. This part has been further conjuncted by conjunction "and". Further it has been provided that such member has been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months. This part has been further conjuncted by conjunction "and". Further it has been provided that such member has been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months. In the case on hand, we have no concern for the later part of this clause i.e. 14(1)(a)(ii), which lays down a period of five years, or lesser period in a case the State Government has exercised the jurisdiction in a particular case. We have also no concern so far as last part of this clause that "since the release of such member". Thus, all we are concern with, is the conviction of the member for any other offences except mentioned in section 14(1)(a)(i) and has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months. In the case on hand, on careful examination of the facts and submissions of the learned counsel, in my view, this clause clearly applies. The grounds raised by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in their reply affidavit that conviction has been suspended and is pending for final adjudication, is devoid of merit. In my view, the judgment and order of the learned Divisional Commissioner, Nasik is perse illegal and diametrically opposite to the reported judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court, in the matter of Lalsai Khunte Vs. Nirmal Sinha & Ors. , reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 1591. It was case of election of legislative assembly under the provisions of Representation of People Act, (1950). The Supreme Court considered the provisions laid down under section 8 of the Representation of People Act, 1950. There, the appellant was convicted by the Courtof Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sakti in criminal case No. 208/1991 under section 420 read with section 34 and 468 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and was punished for two years rigorous imprisonment on each count and convicted under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. There also, appeal was filed and the learned Additional Sessions Judge by the order dated 31st May, 2002 had released the appellant on furnishing bond and security and suspended the judgment and order of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, dated 9.5.2002. The Supreme Court, referring to its earlier judgment in the matter of K. Prabhakaran Vs. There also, appeal was filed and the learned Additional Sessions Judge by the order dated 31st May, 2002 had released the appellant on furnishing bond and security and suspended the judgment and order of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, dated 9.5.2002. The Supreme Court, referring to its earlier judgment in the matter of K. Prabhakaran Vs. P. Jayarajan reported in (2005) 1 SCC 754 held that a person convicted may have file an appeal, he may also have secure a order suspending execution of the sentence or order under section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, but that again of no consequences. The Supreme Court ultimately held that mere suspension of the sentence by Appellate Court in the absence of any order of stay of conviction does not amount to temporary washing out conviction, candidate in that case, it was held, disqualified from contesting election. 11. The facts in case on hand are nearer to the facts in the cited judgment of the Supreme Court. In the case on hand, both the learned counsel could not supply the date of scrutiny of the nomination. However, other dates are on record and conviction, pendency of appeal and suspension of sentence is fairly conceded by both learned counsel. Admittedly, it is not the argument of respondent Nos.5 and 6 that their conviction and sentence is stayed by the Appellate Court in pending appeal. In the case on hand, in my view, order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner needs to be quashed and set aside. 12. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of learned senior counsel. In my view, section 14(1)(a)(i) contemplates altogether different situation and conviction under the provision of Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 or any law corresponding thereto in force. The legislature while enacting, have fairly visualized and considered various contingencies. There may be manifold circumstances under which a person can be said to have been convicted and sentenced for offence or offences under the provisions of any law. Acquisition of the disqualification for conviction, is a matter of legislative competence and wisdom. In the case on hand, the submission of learned senior counsel that section 14(1)(a)(i) has to be read with section 14(1)(a)(ii) even though the facts are being governed by clause 14 (1)(a)(ii) is not sustainable. Acquisition of the disqualification for conviction, is a matter of legislative competence and wisdom. In the case on hand, the submission of learned senior counsel that section 14(1)(a)(i) has to be read with section 14(1)(a)(ii) even though the facts are being governed by clause 14 (1)(a)(ii) is not sustainable. These two sub sections are operating in two different spheres and have to be considered and interpreted on the proved facts brought before the interpreter (Court). In the case on hand, in my view, therefore, there is no case for consideration of section 14(1)(a)(i). 13. This takes me to last submission of learned senior counsel regarding the provisions laid down under section 14(1)(a-1). This section seems to have been inserted by the Maharashtra No. 36 of 1965. This section provides a disqualification by or under any law for the time being in force for the purpose of elections to the Legislature of the Maharashtra State. The learned senior counsel fairly concedes election to the legislature of the Maharashtra State means elections to the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council. Advocate Mr. Shah submitted that section 14(1)(a-1) applies in the case on hand. I have given thoughtful consideration to this submission also and in my view, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not possible to acede to this submission. With this in my view, this writ petition needs to be allowed and the order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner, Nashik needs to be quashed and set aside. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner seeks cost in this writ petition. He fairly concedes that he is not aware as to how much allowance is received by the respondent No. 5 and 6 from village Gram panchayat up till now. Mr. Rane for respondent Nos. 5 and 6 submits that question of interpretation of law was involved in the matter, objection raised by the petitioner’s husband was rejected by the Returning Officer, therefore, cost may not be imposed. Ordinarily this Court is not imposing cost and leaving the parties to bear their own costs. This ordinary course has been considered by the Apex Court in the matter of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 Supreme Court 3353. As of today this High Court has not framed and published rules for imposition of costs. This ordinary course has been considered by the Apex Court in the matter of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 Supreme Court 3353. As of today this High Court has not framed and published rules for imposition of costs. However, in the case on hand, I have seen the journey of the litigation from authority to authority, one round to this Court, after remand of the matter, it has been decided again by the Divisional Commissioner and thereafter, this petition by the citizen (petitioner) lady (housewife) in this Court. Mr. Girish Rane’s submission that question of interpretation of law is involved, has also been considered by me. In the case on hand, it is not a dispute between the two individual citizens for their own interest in movable or immovable property. Considering the status of the petitioner and respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and the circumstances which I have referred to , in my view, cost of Rs. 2500/- each on respondent Nos. 5 and 6 needs to be imposed and awarded to the petitioner. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are directed to deposit cost of Rs. 2500/- each in this Court within eight weeks. The petitioner is permitted to withdraw the said amount. In case of failure on the part of respondent Nos. 5 and 6, petitioner is permitted to move appropriate Civil Application before this Court. Rule made absolute in above terms.