JUDGMENT : [P.R. BORKAR,J.] :- 1. Appellant - Balaji s/o. Gangaram Navghare has filed this appeal being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed in Sessions Case No. 47 of 1999, decided by learned First Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Parbhani on 02.05.2006, whereby the present appellant is convicted of offences punishable under Sections 363, 376 and 302 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer different sentences for each offence. Learned First Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge has sentenced the accused to suffer simple imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs.100/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for offence punishable under Section 363 the I.P.C. The appellant is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for seven years and to pay fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for offence punishable under Section 376 of the I.P.C. For offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. the appellant is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for life (sic) and to pay fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. 2. At the outset we express our shock, surprise and displeasure for awarding simple imprisonment of seven years for each of the offences under Sections 363 and 376 of the I.P.C. when as per the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the case of the prosecution is that the appellant had kidnapped, raped and murdered a ten years old girl. We are also surprised to find phrase "simple imprisonment for life". 3. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal may be stated as below:- . Dropadabai was ten years old daughter of P.W.2-Dwarkabai Alne. Both were living by begging alms and were residing at Parbhani. On 13.07.1998 at about 12=00 noon, the appellant who was knowing Dwarkabai, took Dropadabai on promise of giving her food and went away. Thereafter Dropadabai did not return. Dwarkabai, her sister and others searched Dropadabai, but she was not found. They approached Police on the next day and police took them to the Hospital to show a dead body. It was identified as that of Dropadabai. There were several injuries on the person of Dropadabai and thereafter P.W.2-Dwarkabai lodged complaint with Police. 4. Thereafter Dropadabai did not return. Dwarkabai, her sister and others searched Dropadabai, but she was not found. They approached Police on the next day and police took them to the Hospital to show a dead body. It was identified as that of Dropadabai. There were several injuries on the person of Dropadabai and thereafter P.W.2-Dwarkabai lodged complaint with Police. 4. It is prosecution case that on 14.07.1998 at 12=00 noon Police Inspector Bhosale (P.W.1) who was holding additional charge of Nananpeth Police Station, received information from one Ashok Pralhad Shinde (P.W.4) that his servant had seen a dead body of female child in his field. Thereafter, P.I. Bhosale recorded statement of P.W.4-Ashok Shinde and made entry in the station diary. P.I. Bhosale went to the spot and found the dead body of female child. He drew inquest panchanama (Exh.22). It appears that the child was raped and subsequently murdered. A handkerchief was found tied around her neck. There were injuries on the person and private part. So, P.I. Bhosale lodged complaint against unknown person for committing rape and murder of the unknown female child. Accordingly, he registered offence punishable under Section 302 and 376 of the I.P.C. He had also drawn panchanama of place of incident. Thereafter, Police Constable Indrajit Ghule and Police Constable Punjaba Thite were approached by P.W.2-Dwarkabai and others, complaining that Dropadabai, daughter of Dwarkabai, was missing and therefore these two Police Constables took Dwarkabai and relatives to the Hospital. Dwarkabai identified the dead body. Her statement was recorded. Both these constables were in the police station when P.W.2-Dwarkabai and others had approached them. Thereafter, present appellant was arrested as Dwarkabai had disclosed that the appellant had taken away deceased Dropadabai and since then Dropadabai was missing. Finally, charge-sheet was sent to the Court. The prosecution examined in all nine witnesses. Three witnesses were examined as Court witnesses. Ultimately the appellant was convicted and sentenced, and it is this order which is challenged before this Court. 5. Dr. Tukaram Gacche (P.W.3) examined at Exh.28 had performed post mortem on the dead body of Dropadabai. He found blood coming out of mouth and nostrils. There were following external injuries to genitals :- (1) Lacerated wound to libia minora 1/2 cm x 1/4th cm. (2) Hymen torn, clotted blood present adherent to the margin. (3) Vagina lacerated and congested. (4) Whitish colour fluid was present in the vagina. He found blood coming out of mouth and nostrils. There were following external injuries to genitals :- (1) Lacerated wound to libia minora 1/2 cm x 1/4th cm. (2) Hymen torn, clotted blood present adherent to the margin. (3) Vagina lacerated and congested. (4) Whitish colour fluid was present in the vagina. (5) Anus faecal matter coming out. There were other surface wounds, which were as follows:- (1) A continuous ligature mark around the neck horizontal in position below the thyroid cartilage 10 cm x 5 cm. Parchment line appears. (2) Fracture of hyoid bone present. (3) Echymoses present. (4) Carotid vessels congested. (5) Abrasion on chin 1 cm x 1/2 cm. (6) Abrasion on neck 1 cm x 1/4 cm below the left ear. (7) Abrasion on the neck 1 cm x 1/4th cm below the right ear. (8) Abrasion on right shoulder 4 cm x 1 cm anterior aspect. (9) Abrasion on right elbow joint, posterior aspect 2 x 1/2 cms. (10) Three abrasions on right forearm 1/2 cm x 1/2 cm. (11) Abrasion on left shoulder, posterior aspect 3 cms x 2 cms. (12) Abrasion on left lumber region 5 cms x 2 cms. (13) Abrasion on the abdomen just below the umbilicus, 3 cms x 2 cms. (14) Abrasion on right buttocks with upper part of the thigh posterior aspect 7 cms x 3 cms, irregular in outline. (15) Abrasion on left buttock lateral aspect 8 cms. (16) Abrasion on left thigh posterior aspect 10 cms x 5 cms. (17) Five abrasions on right leg, posterior aspect, 1/2 cms x 1/4th cms. (18) Multiple abrasion on left leg posterior aspect 1/2 cms x 1/4 cms. 6. According to the Doctor injury No. 2 to 15 were caused with hard and blunt object. All were antemortem injuries. In his opinion cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation associated with rape. The Doctor stated that the muddemal article handkerchief was the one with which strangulation could have been effected. He proved P.M. report at Exh.29. In the cross-examination, it is brought on record that on the basis of appearance of the injuries the Doctor calculated that death could have been caused within 48 hours of his examination. The Doctor stated that the muddemal article handkerchief was the one with which strangulation could have been effected. He proved P.M. report at Exh.29. In the cross-examination, it is brought on record that on the basis of appearance of the injuries the Doctor calculated that death could have been caused within 48 hours of his examination. As per evidence of P.W.2-Dwarkabai, deceased Dropadabai was missing from 12 noon on 13.07.1998 and the post mortem was started on 14.07.1998 at 4.30 p.m. and completed at 5.30 p.m. 7. P.W.4-Ashok Shinde stated that his servant Chandu Lot told him that a female child of 7-8 years age was lying dead in his field and therefore he went to the Police Station and informed the police. Along with police, he went to the spot where the dead body was lying. It was in land Survey No.254 of Parbhani. His evidence is corroborated by evidence of P.W.1-P.I. Bhosale, who stated that P.W.4-Ashok Shinde came to him at about 12=10 p.m. on 14.07.1998 and orally informed that his servant had seen a dead body of female child in his field. Therefore, he recorded statement of P.W.4-Ashok Shinde, made entry in the station diary and proceeded to the spot. He saw the dead body of female child. So he called panchas and drew inquest panchanama which is proved at Exh.22. Inquest panchanama clearly shows that there were injuries on the dead body. The child was of 10 years old. There was white handkerchief tied around her neck. There were injuries on her private part. P.I. Bhosale further stated that, thereafter he drew spot panchanama (Exh.24) and attached the handkerchief. He identified handkerchief, which is a muddemal article. The dead body was lying in the field Survey No.254 of Parbhani. P.I. Bhosale also proved complaint lodged by him at Exh.23. 8. P.W.2-Dwarkabai is the star witness. She is examined at Exh.25. She stated that Dropadabai was her daughter. Dropadabai was of 8-10 years old. She was knowing the appellant/accused. The accused was paramour of one Gangubai. The appellant had taken away her daughter on a bicycle at 12=00 noon on the pretext of giving her food and thereafter the daughter did not come back. They searched the daughter everywhere. She stated that Police had taken her to Hospital and showed dead body of her daughter. There were injuries on the dead body. Her daughter was throttled. The appellant had taken away her daughter on a bicycle at 12=00 noon on the pretext of giving her food and thereafter the daughter did not come back. They searched the daughter everywhere. She stated that Police had taken her to Hospital and showed dead body of her daughter. There were injuries on the dead body. Her daughter was throttled. P.W.2-Dwarkabai identified clothes of the deceased. The cross-examination shows that P.W.1-Dwarkabai and the appellant were working in Shaniwar Bazar on daily wages. Dwarkabai was knowing the appellant by his first name. She was knowing that he resided near Khandoba Bazar in a room. Dwarkabai further said that since her husband was not maintaining her, she and her daughter were begging alms. She further stated that twice she had gone to Police Station for informing police about her daughter being missing. It may be noted that she is a woman who was a beggar, obviously an illiterate person. Moreover, police might have asked her to search daughter before recording her complaint. Witness further stated that she was residing in a public forest, called Babul Ban, adjacent to Railway Station, where many buggers reside in open. 9. In the cross-examination of P.W.2-Dwarkabai, it is brought on record that P.W.2-Dwarkabai and one Gangubai used to go for work with a mason. There was quarrel between Dwarkabai and Gangubai. At that time the appellant had taken side of Gangubai. Gangubai was working as a labour contractor. Since the quarrel, Gangubai had not given any work to Dwarkabai. Gangubai had even beaten her with Chappal in the square. It is admitted by Dwarkabai that she was on cross terms with Gangubai. It was suggested that in order to wreck vengeance against Gangubai, the accused was falsely involved. In our opinion, it is very difficult to believe that in such case Gangubai would not be named as an accused by Dwarkabai. There is nothing on record to show that there was enmity between the appellant and P.W.2-Dwarkabai. Moreover, in that case, Dwarkabai would not have allowed her child to be taken away by the appellant. 10. Learned Trial Judge found evidence of Dwarkabai reliable and we do not find any reason to disbelieve Dwarkabai. There is nothing on record to show that there was enmity between the appellant and P.W.2-Dwarkabai. Moreover, in that case, Dwarkabai would not have allowed her child to be taken away by the appellant. 10. Learned Trial Judge found evidence of Dwarkabai reliable and we do not find any reason to disbelieve Dwarkabai. Police Constables Indrajit Ghule and Punjaba Thite examined at Exh.47 and 49 have corroborated statement of P.W.2-Dwarkabai that her daughter was missing and she had approached them complaining that her daughter was missing from earlier day. Thereafter, they took Dwarkabai to the Hospital, where the dead body was identified by Dwarkabai. 11. Dwarkabai had admitted in cross-examination that it was her mere suspicion that accused committed the act. Obviously, she had seen the accused taking away her daughter on the pretext of giving her food and since then her daughter was missing. In the circumstances she was bound to suspect the appellant/accused. 12. If we consider the injuries on the person of Dropadabai as proved by Dr.Gacche, it is clear that the child was ravished and was subjected to severe violence. Enmity is a double edged weapon. After giving anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant and on considering the evidence and totality of the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court has rightly believed evidence of P.W.2-Dwarkabai that it was the appellant who had taken away deceased Dropadabai on 13.07.1998 at about 12=00 noon on the pretext of giving her good and since then Dropadabai was missing. Evidence of Dr. Gachhe shows that death of Dropadabai was immediately after the appellant was last seen in the company of the deceased. There is no explanation coming from the accused. There is only denial. 13. Certain cases are cited before us. In the case of Amit @ Ammu V/s. State of Maharashtra, JT 2003 (Supp.1) SC 423, there was circumstantial evidence against the accused. Deceased was last seen in the company of the accused by the witness. Dead body was discovered by the same witness on following day. Time of death found near about the time when deceased and accused were last seen. There was no explanation by the accused. It was held that circumstantial evidence established guilt of the accused. 14. Deceased was last seen in the company of the accused by the witness. Dead body was discovered by the same witness on following day. Time of death found near about the time when deceased and accused were last seen. There was no explanation by the accused. It was held that circumstantial evidence established guilt of the accused. 14. In the case of State of U.P. V/s. Satish, (2005) 3 S.C.C.114, in para 22 it is observed that the last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. 15. In the case of State of Goa V/s. Sanjay Thakran and another, (2007) 3 S.C.C.755, the Supreme Court after referring various cases, in para 13 and 34 observed as follows:- "13. The prosecution case is based on the circumstantial evidence and it is a well-settled proposition of law that when the case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. (See State of U.P. v. Satish, Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, SCC p.355, para 9 and Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.). 34. (See State of U.P. v. Satish, Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, SCC p.355, para 9 and Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.). 34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out. The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straitjacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author of the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case." 16. For all above-said reasons, we agree with the conclusion of the Trial Court that circumstances proved as against the appellant are sufficient to base conviction for offences punishable under Sections 363, 376 and 302 of the I.P.C. 17. Now coming back to the question of sentence, the learned Judge has convicted the appellant of offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for life. Indian Penal Code does not recognize any punishment called "simple imprisonment for life". It is clear that there is no term like "simple imprisonment for life" or "rigorous imprisonment for life". Section 53 is as follows:- "53. Punishments.-The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are- First.-Death; Secondly.-Imprisonment for life; Fourthly.-Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:- (1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour; (2) Simple; Fifthly.-Forfeiture of property; Sixthly.-Fine. Section 302 of the I.P.C. is as follows:- "302. Punishment for murder,- Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine." So, there is nothing like "simple imprisonment for life" and we hold that it is mere error on the part of the Judge, which we can rectify and correct under Section 386 of the Cr.P.C., as thereby we would not be enhancing punishment, but only altering nomenclature of the sentence maintaining the sentence. 18. Position of law was made clear long back in the case of Naib Singh s/o. Makhan Singh V/s. State of Punjab and others, (1983) 2 S.C.C.454. In that case the Supreme Court has made it clear that "imprisonment for life" means "rigorous imprisonment for life". 18. Position of law was made clear long back in the case of Naib Singh s/o. Makhan Singh V/s. State of Punjab and others, (1983) 2 S.C.C.454. In that case the Supreme Court has made it clear that "imprisonment for life" means "rigorous imprisonment for life". The Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Prison Act, jail manual, provisions of the I.P.C., amendment to the I.P.C. carried out by Amending Act 26 of 1955. At the end of Para 14, it is observed that:- "In our view the legislative intent has been clearly spelt out and expressed that the nature of punishment required to be suffered under a sentence of "imprisonment for life" awardable on and after January, 1956 is rigorous imprisonment." At the beginning of para 16 it is pointed out that even thereafter there is no dearth of judicial precedents where, in the matter of nature of punishment, imprisonment for life has been regarded as equivalent to rigorous imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court also considered case of State of M.P. v. Ahmodulla, K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra. We may quote para 17, which is as follows:- "17. During the hearing our attention was invited to a decision of the Kerala High Court in Mathammal Saraswathi v. State of Kerala, where that High Court has taken the view that while passing the sentence of imprisonment for life a criminal court should keep in view the provisions of Section 60 of the I.P.C. and choose one or the other form so as to clarify exact nature of punishment intended to be inflicted on the accused, and went on to clarify the position by stating that the imprisonment for life in that case shall be simple imprisonment and not rigorous. It is not possible to sustain the aforesaid view of the Kerala High Court. In the first place, a distinction between "imprisonment for life" and imprisonment for a term" has been maintained in the Penal Code in several of its provisions. Secondly, by its very terms Section 60 is applicable to a case where "an offender is punishable with imprisonment which may be either description" and it is only in such case that it is competent for the Court to direct that "such imprisonment shall be either wholly rigorous or wholly simple or that any part of such imprisonment shall be rigorous and the rest simple". And it is clear that whenever an offender is punishable with "imprisonment for life" he is not punishable with "imprisonment which may be of either description", in other words Section 60 would be inapplicable." So, position of law regarding punishment involving any sentence of imprisonment for life is well settled and we accordingly propose to clarify for the benefit of jail authorities. 19. We wonder, whether there should have been charge under Section 363 of the I.P.C. particularly when kidnapping is with rape and murder. At the time of charge there could have been consideration whether framing of charge under Section 364 and 363-A of the I.P.C. was more advisable than under Section 363 of the I.P.C. Be that as it may. 20. We are unable to understand why simple imprisonment of seven years was awarded for each of the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of the I.P.C. In this case it was a rape on a minor girl of 10 years who was kidnapped, raped and murdered. There was no justification for awarding simple imprisonments for offence punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of the I.P.C. Offence under Section 363 is punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to seven years. If a person is sentenced to seven years, it is difficult to know what purpose would be served by awarding simple imprisonment. That would not do any good to the convict or to the society. There was no point in keeping him idle for such a long period. The appellant is a young healthy man of 35 years age and his services could have been utilised for beneficial purpose, such as by giving him training of some craft or trade, so that he could become a skilled worker. Even assuming that the appellant was a labourer and could not have learnt any craft or trade, his time and energy could have been better utilised in some work. That would keep him physically and mentally fit. The distinction between simple imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment and their effect do not appear to have been properly understood. Both have significance not only from the point of society, but also from the point of convict. In our opinion, simple imprisonments awarded for offence under Sections 363 and 376 of the I.P.C. are totally unjustified. 21. The distinction between simple imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment and their effect do not appear to have been properly understood. Both have significance not only from the point of society, but also from the point of convict. In our opinion, simple imprisonments awarded for offence under Sections 363 and 376 of the I.P.C. are totally unjustified. 21. Not only the award of simple imprisonment was unjustified but so far as offence under Section 376 of the I.P.C. is concerned, it is illegal. Section 376 (1), (2) (f) of the I.P.C. and proviso below it are as follows:- "376. Punishment for rape - (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may be for life, or for a term which may extent to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both; Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (2) Whoever, - (f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years." 22. The appellant has committed offence which is punishable under Section 376(2)(f) of the I.P.C.in the present case and the learned Judge should not have awarded punishment lesser than rigorous imprisonment for ten years without recording adequate and special reasons. In this case after coming to the conclusion that guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned Additional Sessions Judge proceeded to hear the accused on sentence and made following observations in para 54 and 55 of his judgment:- "54. Heard the accused on the point of sentence. In this case after coming to the conclusion that guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned Additional Sessions Judge proceeded to hear the accused on sentence and made following observations in para 54 and 55 of his judgment:- "54. Heard the accused on the point of sentence. He still claims that he has not done anything. Heard Shri S.N. Shinde, learned counsel for the accused. He argued that lenient view be taken against the accused. 55. Accused has committed tripple offence i.e. kidnapping, rape and murder. In this view of the matter, the following order is passed." Thus, no adequate and special reasons are given for awarding simple imprisonment that too for a period less than 10 years for offence punishable under Section 376 of the I.P.C. So, the order passed is illegal. Here we may refer to the case of Md. Kalam v. State of Bihar, 2008 AIR SCW 4269. It is observed is para 3 that since the age of the victim was six years at the time of incident, the appropriate conviction would have been under Section 376 (2) (f), IPC if conviction would have been for rape. 23. In this case, the learned Judge did not consider totality of the circumstances before deciding to award seven years simple imprisonment. Though main punishment is for offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C. for imprisonment for life, still, the ignorance and carelessness shown by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, compel this Court to observe that Section 235 (2) or 248 (2) of the Cr.P.C., which require Sessions Judge or Magistrate to hear accused on quantum of sentence and then to pass sentence according to law, are not empty formalities. Circumstances which lead the Judge to award particular description of imprisonment, namely, rigorous i.e. with hard labour or simple, should be guided by proper reasons. There should be circumspection of all relevant factors. The Judge may take into consideration different theories of punishment, their aims and criticism against each, consider relevant facts of the case before it, such as, age, education, other background of the accused, the effect of offence on the victim, his/her family and society and then determine the sentence, keeping in mind provisions of law. The theories of the punishment with their respective merits and demerits should be borne in mind and the appropriate punishment be decided. There should be integrated approach. The theories of the punishment with their respective merits and demerits should be borne in mind and the appropriate punishment be decided. There should be integrated approach. Particularly heinous crimes like rape on child or kidnapping of child for ransom or other objects have to be viewed from their effect on the society, law and order and public order. There is also element of social desire for retribution arising out of indignation for such inhuman crime. 24. The Supreme Court recently in the case of Bantu V/s. State of U.P., 2008 AIR SCW 6401, has observed in paras 22, 28 and 30, as follows:- "22. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the Courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law continues to be -- as it should be -- a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. In Mahesh v. M.P. (1987) 2 SCR 710 ), this Court while refusing to reduce the death sentence observed thus: ‘It will be a mockery of justice to permit the accused to escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment for the accused would be to render the justicing system of the country suspect. The common man will lose faith in Courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon.’" 28. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter-productive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system." 30. Similar view has also been expressed in Ravji v. State of Rajasthan ( 1996 (2) SCC 175 ). It has been held in the said case that it is the nature and gravity of the crime but not the criminal, which are germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in a criminal trial. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminal". The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminal". If for extremely heinous crime of murder perpetrated in a very brutal manner without any provocation, must deterrent punishment is not given, the case of deterrent punishment will lose its relevance." We have quoted only few paragraphs as they are closely applicable to the facts of case in hand though entire judgment deserves to be read. In that case also the victim aged five years was raped and murdered. The murder was committed in a diabolical manner. 25. In view of above, we express our displeasure for the manner in which the simple imprisonments were awarded for offence punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of the I.P.C. We are also dissatisfied for not following directions of law as contained in Section 376 (2) of the I.P.C., which are reproduced earlier. 26. At the same time we record our caution to all Sessions Judges, Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Judges to be careful while considering the quantum of sentence in heinous crimes, such as one in the present case. We also draw their attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Bantu (Supra). 27. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The order of conviction and sentence is maintained with clarification that since there is no punishment like ’simple imprisonment for life’ contemplated by the Indian Penal Code and it is mere error committed by the Trial Court to describe "imprisonment for life" as "simple imprisonment for life", the punishment awarded to the appellant be considered as imprisonment for life as it is understood in law. 28. Adv. Shri Suresh Munde has appeared as amicus curae for the appellant. We quantify his fees at Rs. 3000/- (Rupees Three Thousand). Appeal dismissed.