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2008 DIGILAW 1597 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra v. Yashwant @ Manohar s/o Rushi Kodape

2008-11-12

A.P.BHANGALE, D.D.SINHA

body2008
JUDGMENT : (A.P. Bhangale,J.) The present Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 14.10.2003 passed by the learned 4th Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, in Sessions Trial No. 46/2002 acquitting the accused for the charges framed for offences punishable under section 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is as under : A report was made to Police Station Officer, Nagbhid by a political Party's worker of Talodhi, informing by an inland letter on 9.2.2002, that relations between Manohar Kodape the Respondent and his wife were not cordial as she had developed an illicit relationship with Ganesh Sonule of Talodhi. The wife of the respondent had started residing separately as tenant in the house of one Belabai (PW 1). Manohar and his brother during the season of threshing paddy, had taken away deceased from the field and had assaulted and killed her by means of a bamboo stick and after digging a pit buried her body. On the basis of an anonymous inland letter, L K Mante, Police Inspector, Nagbhid lodged the complaint dated 12.2.2002 against Yashwant @ Manohar Rushi Kodape (respondent-accused) and another Dilip Kawdu Kodape, for offences punishable under sections 302, 201 read with section 34 of the IPC, giving rise to FIR No.12 of 2002 at Nagbhid Police Station. The accused were arrested on 12.02.2002 under Panchnama (Exh.32) drawn by the Police Inspector, Nagbhid. After investigation by PSI V.B. Mohitkar (PW 9) and Police Inspector Mante ( PW 11), charge-sheet was submitted before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagbhid, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions Chandrapur on 9.4.2002. Charge was framed on 2.7.2003 for offences punishable under sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. The prosecution has examined witnesses and closed evidence. The defence of the respondent-accused was of total denial. 4. The trial Court acquitted both the accused of all offences with which they were charged. 5. We have heard Mr. A.S.Sonare, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State; as also Mr. R.M. Patwardhan, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused and also examined evidence led in trial Court. 6. In support of the Appeal, Mr. 4. The trial Court acquitted both the accused of all offences with which they were charged. 5. We have heard Mr. A.S.Sonare, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State; as also Mr. R.M. Patwardhan, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused and also examined evidence led in trial Court. 6. In support of the Appeal, Mr. A.S.Sonare, the learned APP submitted the following circumstances as incriminatory evidence against the accused :- (a) Discovery of dead body during the course of investigation under Panchnama Exh.33; (b) Deceased and the accused were 'last seen' together when accused was seen armed with Surkanda ( bamboo stick); (c)Want of explanation under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, made by the accused regarding whereabouts of his wife: (a) As regards circumstantial evidence, the dead body of deceased was recovered during the course of investigation under Panchnama (Exh.33 ) as deposed by Ramarao Kawale (PW 6). It is submitted that the accused Yashwant had shown the place where dead body was buried. Panchnama was drawn and signed by him. We find from the evidence that the place allegedly discovered was inside a small tank and entire skin of the body was decayed. The circumstance of alleged recovery of the dead body appears hopelessly inadequate because there is no evidence as to whether dead body in this case is discovered in consequence of voluntary disclosure statement or information distinctly relating the fact discovered. Furthermore, there is no evidence rule out the possibility of any inducement, threat or promise made by the Investigating agency to the accused while he was in police custody and to indicate that the Police had no previous knowledge of the spot or place prior to the alleged disclosure statement made by the accused. We find the evidence of Ramrao ( PW 6) lacking in vital requirements of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the contention that the accused was required to give explanation in his statement u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not acceptable because there was no sufficient evidence to raise presumption against the accused about his knowledge of the dead body recovered by the Investigating Officer under Panchnama. The identity of the dead body could not be established as it was in highly decomposed state. It appears from the evidence led that, Dr. Naringe (PW 8) who had performed post-mortem examination (Exh. The identity of the dead body could not be established as it was in highly decomposed state. It appears from the evidence led that, Dr. Naringe (PW 8) who had performed post-mortem examination (Exh. 41) over the dead body and noticed that dead body was in highly decomposed state and it was only skeleton. Dr. Naringe could not opine about the cause of death; as to whether it was homicidal, suicidal or accidental. In the absence of such vital evidence as to the proof of homicidal death, the trial Court could not have answered in favour of the prosecution. We do not find reliable and acceptable evidence to fix identity of the dead body allegedly recovered at the instance of accused as also cause of death. (b) As regards, the Respondent-accused was lastseen in the company of his deceased wife, the learned APP made a reference to the evidence of PW 1 Belabai and PW 2 Yashoda. From the evidence of Belabai (PW 1), it appears that the accused Yashwant @ Manohar is husband of the deceased Sunandabai ( her foster daughter) who had stayed with her. Evidence of Belabai is hearsay in nature as, according to her, the field owner in whose field Sunanda had gone to collect residues of paddy, told that her daughter was taken away by her son-in-law from the field, while Yashoda (PW 2) deposed that she had an occasion to see the accused no.1 holding hair of Sunanda and she had snatched a surkanda (bamboo stick) from the hands of accused no.1 and again handed it over to him. Sunanda was followed by the accused no.1 with surkanda ( a bamboo-stick). The evidence of Yashoda (PW 2) as to “ last seen” the accused no.1 with his deceased wife Sunanda, also do not inspire confidence as possession of surkunda by it self, is not incriminatory since admittedly most of the agriculturists are possessing surkanda (bamboo stick) and furthermore PW 2 -Yashoda came to know about death of Sunanda after two-and-a-half months from the date of incident of “last seen”, circumstance deposed by her. Her evidence also suffers from material omission as she did not inform the police about the incident that accused no.1 had held the hair of Sunanda and that Yashoda had snatched a surkanda ( a bamboo stick) from the hand of accused no.1 and again handed it over to him. Her evidence also suffers from material omission as she did not inform the police about the incident that accused no.1 had held the hair of Sunanda and that Yashoda had snatched a surkanda ( a bamboo stick) from the hand of accused no.1 and again handed it over to him. In view of the inordinate time gap between the “last seen” circumstance as deposed and knowledge of the witness as to death of deceased, the evidentiary value or importance of such circumstance is substantially reduced, as on the basis of such evidence one cannot jump to the conclusion that the respondent was the author of the crime. In such a case, the prosecution is required to rule out the possibility that deceased was not subsequently seen with any one else after she was last seen with the accused no.1 (c)The Respondent/ accused was residing separately from his wife Sunanda and could not have been obliged to explain her absence from his house. Be that as it may; in a criminal trial prosecution cannot take advantage of weakness of defence. It must stand on its own legs to establish serious murder charge by reliable, convincing and acceptable evidence and prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 7. In our opinion, when a case is resting upon circumstantial evidence, circumstances from which inference as to the guilt is to be drawn, must be fully established conclusively pointing towards the guilt. Circumstances shall exclude the possibility of guilt of any other person other than the accused in other words forming a chain complete in itself to conclude that crime was committed by the accused and nobody else. 8. Let us now turn to the legal position canvassed in this case : In State of Maharashtra vs. Suresh; reported in (2000) 1 SCC 471 it is observed in para no.26: 26. We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is well-justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 9. The observations are based upon possibilities when an accused pointed out the place where a dead body was concealed or incriminating material was concealed by himself but did not state that he had concealed it. The Court may be justified to raise presumption against accused on the basis that accused was only person who can offer explanation but did not. We are afraid, these observations are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand for want of adequate legal proof as to disclosure statement and consequent discovery of dead body. 10. In our opinion, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to lead medical evidence about identity of the dead body and furthermore that deceased met with homicidal death. The dead body was found in highly decomposed state, to rule out the medical evidence as to homicidal death. The Doctor could not give opinion about cause of death whether it was homicidal, accidental or suicidal. In the absence of circumstantial or direct evidence, no adverse inference can be drawn against the accused. One may refer to ruling in the State of Punjab vs. Bhajan singh and others reported in AIR 1975 SC 258 more particularly para 13 thereof which reads thus: 13.....................There is no eye witness of the occurrence and the conviction of the accused is sought to be secured on the basis of circumstantial evidence. One may refer to ruling in the State of Punjab vs. Bhajan singh and others reported in AIR 1975 SC 258 more particularly para 13 thereof which reads thus: 13.....................There is no eye witness of the occurrence and the conviction of the accused is sought to be secured on the basis of circumstantial evidence. We, however, find that the evidence which has been adduced in this case is far from satisfactory and that it suffers from a number of infirmities. In the first instance, there is no evidence on record to show that the two dead bodies which are alleged to have been recovered in pursuance of the disclosure statement of Bhajan Singh were those of Bachan Singh and Harbans Singh deceased. The evidence of Dr.Saluja is clear on the point that the features of the persons on whose dead bodies the doctor performed post-mortem were unrecognisable. Question then arises as to whether the death of the two persons whose dead bodies were recovered was homicidal. So far as this aspect is concerned, we find that Dr. Saluja has deposed that he found no marks of ligature on either of the two dead bodies. According further to the doctor, he could not find the cause of death because the two dead bodies were in a decomposed state. In the face of the above evidence of the doctor, it is not possible to hold that the death of the two persons, whose bodies were recovered, was homicidal. 11. The Apex Court in Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1957 SC 637 ( para 12), observed that there may be element of truth in the prosecution story against accused. Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true but between may be true and must be true there is quite a difference and, therefore, in order to breach a gap, the prosecution is required to adduce reliable and unimpeachable evidence, before it can be concluded that the accused is guilty of the crime. 12. When a case is based upon circumstantial evidence consisting of chain of continuous circumstances linked up with one another, the Court has to take the cumulative effect of the entire evidence led before acquitting or convicting the accused. 12. When a case is based upon circumstantial evidence consisting of chain of continuous circumstances linked up with one another, the Court has to take the cumulative effect of the entire evidence led before acquitting or convicting the accused. The observation made in Sheikh Jahangir vs. State of Maharashtra in 2001 (2) Mh.L.J. 67 is that there is heavy burden upon husband to explain as to how his wife was missing after evidence as to last seen together is adduced against him pre-supposed that husband and wife resided together. This is not the situation in the present case in hand as circumstances are different because respondent-husband and his deceased wife were residing separately from each other. Hence the observations cannot be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. In appeal against acquittal, High Court do not ordinarily set aside the judgment of acquittal in case where two views are possible, although the Appellate Court sview is more probable, as observed in para No.12 in the case of S. Rama Krishna vs. S. Rami Reddy & others reported in {2008 Cr.L.J. 2625}, which reads thus: 12. The High Court failed to take into consideration the fact that it was dealing with an order of acquittal and, thus, the principle of law which was required to be applied was that, if two views are possible, a judgment of acquittal should not ordinarily be interfered with. 14. We have, thus, no option but to conclude that circumstances relied upon by the prosecution were hopelessly inadequate to bring home guilt of the accused. We do not find any merit in the Appeal. 15. In view of the above discussion, the Appeal has to be dismissed as it is without merit and, is accordingly dismissed.