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2008 DIGILAW 1603 (MAD)

The Managing Director v. K. Subramaniam & Others

2008-06-09

K.CHANDRU

body2008
Judgment :- Heard the arguments of Mrs. Sudarsana Sundar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and Mr. D. Hariparanthaman, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent in each of the writ petition and perused the records. 2. These writ petitions are filed by the Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board [for short, TWAD Board] against the common Award dated 27.02.1998 passed by the second respondent Labour Court. 3. It is seen that W.P. No. 15111 of 1998 is filed against the Award passed in I.D. No. 29 of 1997 where the first respondent is one K. Subramaniam. W.P. No. 15112 of 1998 is directed against the Award in I.D. No. 30 of 1997 where the first respondent is one Iyenthurai. W.P. No. 15113 of 1998 is directed against the Award in I.D. No. 31 of 1997 where the first respondent is one Jokkupaiyan. In the common Award dated 27.02.1998, the second respondent Labour Court held that the termination of the three workmen was illegal and directed the petitioner to reinstate them but without backwages. 4. These three workmen were employed as NMR workers. In respect of I.D. No. 29 of 1997, the case of the first respondent was that he had worked from 212. 1987 to 07. 1989 with breaks which were deliberately given by the petitioner Management. In the counter statement filed before the Labour Court, the petitioner had admitted the following spells of employment put in by the first respondent. .(a) 211. 1989 to 212. 1989 .(b) 04.01.1990 to 23. 1990 .(c) 04. 1990 to 14. 1990 .(d) 05. 1990 to 35. 1990 .(e) 17. 1991 to 212. 1991 In the same way, the first respondents in the other two writ petitions have also given the details of the employment. 5. The Labour Court had also, as a matter of fact, found that these workmen have completed 240 days of service within a period of 12 months by including weekly off and festival holidays. The contention of the petitioner was that no worker had put in 240 days in any calendar year and no one had worked beyond 480 days in two calendar years to get the benefit of T.N. Act 46 of 1981. The contention of the petitioner was that no worker had put in 240 days in any calendar year and no one had worked beyond 480 days in two calendar years to get the benefit of T.N. Act 46 of 1981. Each time when the first respondent in each of the petitions were appointed, it was a specific appointment, which also came to an end as found in the terms of contract. 6. The Labour Court held that in view of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, [for short, I.D. Act], it would be a retrenchment. It also held that the action of the petitioner in granting deliberate breaks was an act of "unfair labour practice" and since they had worked for more than 240 days within a period of 12 calender months, their termination ought to have been brought to an end by following the conditions precedent found in Section 25 F of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court also held that since the disputes were raised after several months, they were not eligible for any backwages. The Labour Court also took note of the settlement dated 08. 1996 reached between the petitioner and the workmen under Section 12(3) of the I.D. Act (marked as Ex. W.4) wherein similarly placed workmen were reinstated. It is against this Award, the present writ petitions have been filed. 7. Pending the writ petitions, this Court by an order dated 12.01.2000, directed the petitioner Management to pay Rs.18,000/-to the first respondent in each of the writ petition and also to pay Rs. 750/-as last drawn wage in terms of Section 17 B of the I.D. Act. 8. Mrs. Sudarsana Sundar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Award of the Labour Court was illegal and the Labour Court had not found, as a matter of fact, that the workmen had not completed 240 days in any calendar year. In any event, each appointment is a specific appointment and in the light of the exception found under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act, it would not amount to retrenchment. She also submitted that in any event, the orders of reinstatement in such cases ought not to have been granted. 9. Mr. In any event, each appointment is a specific appointment and in the light of the exception found under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act, it would not amount to retrenchment. She also submitted that in any event, the orders of reinstatement in such cases ought not to have been granted. 9. Mr. D. Hariparanthaman, learned counsel for the first respondent in all these writ petitions relied upon the following decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court for the proposition that when an employer gives deliberate breaks in service, that would not come within the exception carved out in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act:- .(a) K. Rajendran vs. Director (Personnel), Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., New Delhi and another [1992 (1) L.L.J. 150] .(b) P. Shanmuganathan vs. The Registrar, Tamil University, Thanjavur and others [1997 Writ L.R. 180] (DB) .(c) S.M. Nilajkar and others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka [ 2003 (4) SCC 27 ] .(d) Manager (P&A), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., Chennai vs. G. Radhakrishnan [2005 (2) L.L.N. 881] (DB) 10. He also further relied upon the judgment of this Court in P.R. Ramachandran and others vs. Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and another [ 1996 (1) L.L.J. 823 ] wherein in similar circumstances, this Court granted relief to several workmen by entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. The following passages found in paragraphs 5 and 6 of P.R. Ramachandrans case (cited supra) can be usefully extracted below: Para 5: "In the instance case, the respondents have acted quite contrary to the principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and when admittedly, the impugned orders were passed in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, this Court should not only come to the aid of the aggrieved party, but it has a duty to do so. Para 6: In an identical situation Raju, J. rejected the plea of driving the workman to forums under the Act and held that for non compliance of Section 25F of the Act, writ remedy is very much available and directed the workmans reinstatement with backwages...." In view of the above, the first two contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner must fail. 12. Subsequent to the aforesaid judgment rendered on 19.01.1996, the TWAD Board itself had entered into a settlement on 08. 12. Subsequent to the aforesaid judgment rendered on 19.01.1996, the TWAD Board itself had entered into a settlement on 08. 1996 under Section 12(3) of the I.D. Act (marked as Ex. W.4) granting relief to workmen similarly placed. Therefore, this takes care of the third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the present case, the Labour Court did not grant backwages for the workmen. 13. Therefore, in the light of the above binding precedents, all the three writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed and the Award impugned in these writ petitions are confirmed. However, there will be no order as to costs.