Judgment Harbans Lal, J. 1. This petition has been moved by Bhajan Lal as well as Ramji Dass under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the award dated 1.3.1988 Annexure P.4 refusing to interpret the award dated 31.10.1983 Annexure P.3 and directing respondent No. 2 to treat the petitioners as T-mates with effect from 12.10.1976, i.e., the date of settlement without benefits. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioners were appointed as Skilled Mazdoor in the Power Wing of the respondent-Bhakhra Beas Management Board, (hereinafter to be referred as the Board) in the year 1972 and May, 1975 respectively. They continued serving in the same capacity without interruption in their service upto 31.7.1976 and 1.8.1976 respectively, whereafter their services were terminated abruptly. They raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, the Act). A settlement under Section 12 (3) of the Act was arrived at between the petitioners-workmen and the Board before the Conciliation Officer-cum-the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Chandigarh. The settlement dated 12.10.1976 was duly signed by the representatives of both the parties where by, the Board agreed/promised to take back the petitioners within a weeks time as T-mates. They were re-employed by the Board with effect from 14.10.1976 only as skilled Mazdoor. The Board retracted from the assurance given before the Assistant Labour Commissioner and refused to give them the status of T-mates. They filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act before the Labour Court, Jalandhar claiming the difference between the wages of Tmates and skilled Mazdoor from 14.10.1976 to 15.12.1976 on the basis of the settlement dated 12.10.. 1976. Instead of honouring their commitment made, in the settlement, the Board devised to defeat their claim by taking a technical plea of non-signing of the settlement by the workmen. The Labour Court, realising the limited scope of jurisdiction vested in it under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act refrained from giving the appropriate relief claimed by the workmen but at the same time advised the Board to act nobly and fulfil its promise. The petitioners were further given an option to raise an industrial dispute in case the Board failed to act upon the observations of the Court. The petitioners were served with notice dated 24.1.1978 terminating their services with effect from 28.2.1978. The petitioners were further given an option to raise an industrial dispute in case the Board failed to act upon the observations of the Court. The petitioners were served with notice dated 24.1.1978 terminating their services with effect from 28.2.1978. They were forced to again raise an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Act challenging their termination orders 1.8.1976 and 2.8.1976 respectively, the non-implementation of the settlement dated 12.1.0.1976 and also the termination dated 28.2.1978. Despite making its intentions clear in the body of the award about the non-justification of the Board in not implementing the settlement, the Labour Court forgot to record a finding on this point in the concluding paragraphs. The Board filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the order of reinstatement but the same was dismissed by this Court in limine. The Board taking advantage of the omission of the Labour Court in recording a specific finding on the second issue in the concluding paragraphs, refused to employ the petitioners as T-mates. The petitioners made a complaint to the Office of Regional Labour Commissioner (C), Chandigarh about the non-implementation of the award dated 31.10.1983. On the initiative of the Regional Labour Commissioner to bring about an understanding, both the parties agreed that the issue should be clarified by Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh, (for short, the Tribunal) which gave its award. Consequently, the dispute was referred to the Tribunal under Section 36-A of the Act. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh vide award dated 1.3.1988 answered the reference against the workmen on the ground that if their claims of re-employment as T-mates were to be granted, it would amount to a modification of the award, dated 31.10.1983 of which the Tribunal had no power/jurisdiction under Section 36- A of the Act. The awards Annexure P.3 and Annexure P.4 are illegal, perverse and against the provisions of law. 3. In its written statement, the Board has admitted that Bhajan Lal and Ramji Dass both daily wages workmen were disengaged with effect from 1.8.1976 and 2.8.1976 as they were engaged for specific work and on completion of work, their engagement automatically came to an end. The alleged settlement dated 12.10.1976 was invalid for want of personal attestation of the workmen as required under Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter to be called as the Central Rules). The alleged settlement dated 12.10.1976 was invalid for want of personal attestation of the workmen as required under Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter to be called as the Central Rules). The Board behaved as a good employer and both the petitioners were re-engaged on daily wages with effect from 14.10.1976. There was no reason to give workmen two benefits from the invalid settlement (i) to take them back on work and (2) to give them promotion by taking them as T-mates which is of higher grade than the skilled labour on which they had been working and were disengaged on completion of work. The petitioners were not entitled to be reinstated as T-Mates as the alleged settlement was invalid. The Board had re-employed the petitioners as daily wagers. There is no question of giving them promoted rank of T-Mates on which they had never worked. Lastly, it has been prayed that the writ petition may be dismissed with costs. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, besides perusing the findings in both the impugned awards with due care and circumspection. 5. Mr. Sanjiv Bindra, Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners argued that the Tribunal has erred in not exercising jurisdiction legally vested in it under Section 36-A of the Act. It was apparent on the face of the award dated 13.10.1983 that the adjudicator in that award wanted to make the settlement binding upon the Board who was contriving to thwart the legitimate claims of the petitioners on a mere technical irregularity. The point of justification of the Board in not adhering to the settlement dated 12.10.1976 has been extensively argued and thoroughly, discussed, but no finding to that effect has been returned by the Tribunal in the award dated 31.10.1983. Therefore, this award is illegal. Even otherwise, a settlement which was made to bring about cordiality and dispel the attitude of confrontation between the parties, should not be dismissed merely on technicalities. The Board cannot backtrack from the settlement by taking advantage of a technical defect especially when the settlement was duly signed by the Management. An objection as to the proper signing of the settlement would have carried some weight, had the settlement not been signed by an officer of the Board as enumerated in Rule 58(2)(a) of the Central Rules. The Board cannot backtrack from the settlement by taking advantage of a technical defect especially when the settlement was duly signed by the Management. An objection as to the proper signing of the settlement would have carried some weight, had the settlement not been signed by an officer of the Board as enumerated in Rule 58(2)(a) of the Central Rules. The Board is now estopped from raising an objection of the settlement not being signed by the workmen themselves. The word workman in Rule 58 ibid includes within its purview, the obvious authority of the representative to sign the settlement. To buttress these stances, he has sought to place abundant reliance upon the observations made in re: Johnson & Johnson Limited vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and others, 1997(2) LU 1157; and The Management of M/s. Natarajan Engineering Works, Madras vs. Govindaswami Naicker and others, 1970 Lab. I.C. 334. 6. In response, Mr. Arun Nehra, Advocate representing the Board canvassed at the bar that the memorandum of alleged settlement Annexure P. 1 having not been signed by the petitioners, by no stretch of speculation could be described to be a settlement in the estimation of law and that being so the Tribunal has rightly ignored it. He further puts that the petitioners were working as skilled Mazdoor and they have been taken back in service with continuity of service and all the benefits including full backwages. They by way of the alleged settlement could not be reinstated as T-Mates. Even the equity does not demand that merely on the basis of a settlement, they could be prompted to the higher post of T-Mates. Thus no holes can be picked in the impugned award. In view of Rule 58 ibid, until and unless a workman is found to be signatory to such settlement, no legal recognition can be given thereto for the reason that as ruled by the Apex Court in re : Workmen of M/s. Delhi Cloth General Mills Limited vs. The Management of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited, 1970 Lab. IC. 1407, Rule 58 of the Central Rules is mandatory. The settlement during pendency of conciliation proceedings before the Conciliation Officer without compliance with this rule is illegal. He has also referred to the observations made in re: Adil K. Patel vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited and others, 1.994 Lab. I.C.2394. IC. 1407, Rule 58 of the Central Rules is mandatory. The settlement during pendency of conciliation proceedings before the Conciliation Officer without compliance with this rule is illegal. He has also referred to the observations made in re: Adil K. Patel vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited and others, 1.994 Lab. I.C.2394. At this juncture, he pressed into service that no fault can be found with Ex. P.4 for the reason that in view of the provisions of Section 36-A of the Act, the Tribunal could not review or modify its own order in view of the observations rendered by the Supreme Court in re : Kirloskar Oil Engines Limited, Kirkee vs. The Workmen and others, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1903. 7. I have given a deep and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions. The real controversy centres around the non-signing of the memorandum of settlement Annexure P. 1 dated 12.10.1976 by the workmen, i.e., the present petitioners. It is to be adjudicated as to whether such a settlement to which the workmen are not signatories can partake the character of a valid settlement. Rule 58 of the Central Rules reads in the following terms :- "58. Memorandum of settlement. - (1) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings or otherwise, shall be in Form H. (2) The settlement shall be signed by - (a) in the case of an employer, by the employer himself, or by his authorised agent, or when the employer is an incorporated company or other body corporate, by the agent, manager or other principal officer of the corporation; [(b) in the case of the workmen, by any officer of a trade union of the workmen or by five representatives of the workmen duly authorised in this behalf at meeting of the workmen held for the purpose;] [(c) in the case of the workman in an industrial dispute under Section 2A of the Act, by the workman concerned.]" 8. It has been manifested in plain words in the above language that in the case of the workman in an industrial dispute, the Memorandum of Settlement shall be signed by the workman concerned. On going through the matter in the perspective of this provision of law, Annexure P.1 ought to have been signed by the present petitioners being the workmen. It has been manifested in plain words in the above language that in the case of the workman in an industrial dispute, the Memorandum of Settlement shall be signed by the workman concerned. On going through the matter in the perspective of this provision of law, Annexure P.1 ought to have been signed by the present petitioners being the workmen. The word settlement has been defined in Section 2(p) of the Act as under :- "(p) "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to [an officer authorised in this behalf by] the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;]" The word "prescribed" figuring in the above language has been defined in Section 2(m) of the Act as under :- "(m) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act" 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Johnson and Johnson Limited (supra) as well as The Management of M/s. Natarajan Engineering Works, Madras (supra) whereas the Apex Court in re: Workmen of M/s. Delhi Cloth General Mills Limited (supra) has ruled as under:- "The Management and the Union cannot, when a dispute is referred to the Conciliation Officer, claim absolute freedom of contract to arrive at a settlement in all respects binding on all workmen, to which no objection whatsoever can ever be raised by the workmen feeling aggrieved. The question of a valid and binding settlement in such circumstances is governed by the statute and the rules made thereunder. In the light of definition of settlement in Section 2(p) and the provisions of Section 18 (1) it is clear that Section 18(1) does riot vest in the Management and the Union unfettered freedom to settle the dispute as they please and clothe it with a binding effect on all workmen or even on all member workmen .of the Union. The settlement has to be in compliance with the statutory provisions. Hence where there is non-compliance with Rule 58 (4) the settlement is invalid. The settlement has to be in compliance with the statutory provisions. Hence where there is non-compliance with Rule 58 (4) the settlement is invalid. It is incumbent in such a case on the Tribunal to satisfy itself that the settlement relied upon by the management in support of the plea of legality of settlement, which vitally affected its jurisdiction, was in accordance with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and the statutory rules." 10. Obviously, the compliance of the provisions enshrined in Rule 58 ibid is mandatory in nature. In re: Adil K. Patel (supra), it has been observed as under :- "From the above definition, it is clear that in order to be a settlement within the meaning of Section 2(p) of the Act (i) it has to be a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding (ii) such agreement should be signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and (iii) a copy of it should be sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government." 11. The rule laid down in these authorities is that the settlement has to be in compliance with the statutory provisions and the same ought to be signed by the workmen. It is not the petitioners case nor pleaded before the Tribunal that they had authorised the President or Secretary or such other Officer of their trade union or their representatives or their duly authorised representatives to sign on their behalf. Thus on the dint of the alleged settlement, they are not within their right to claim that the Board has not promoted/adjusted them as T-Mates by honouring the same. This settlement has been invalidated by reason of their being non-signatories thereto. In re: Kiloskar Oil Engines Limited, Kirkee (supra), the Apex Court has laid down that "a proceeding contemplated by Section 36A of the Act is not a proceeding intended to enable the Tribunal to review or modify its own order. It is intended to enable the Tribunal only to clarify the provisions of its award where a difficulty or doubt arises about the interpretation of the provisions. It is intended to enable the Tribunal only to clarify the provisions of its award where a difficulty or doubt arises about the interpretation of the provisions. In the impugned award Annexure P.3, it has been observed as under: "The settlement dated 12.10.1976 before the A.L.C. (C) Chandigarh was not admitted with the reservation that it was invalid for want of personal attention by the workmen but, even then behaving a good Employer, the Board reemployed them as daily wages Skilled Labourers w.e.f. 14.10.1976 till they were again offered similar jobs which they refused to accept under some wrong notion, and that was how that at one stage even the appropriate Govt/ had also declined to refer the dispute to the Tribunal." 12. In view of the preceding discussion, not fault can be found with the impugned award Annexure P.3. As regards Annexure P.4, the Tribunal has observed as under:- "Granting the relief at this stage will amount to modify the award which power this court does not possess. So, I am of the view that Award is clear enough and in the award, at this stage, it cannot be held that the workmen are entitled to the post of T.mate." 13. In view of Kiloskar Oil Engines Limited, Kirkees case (supra), no interference is warranted in these observations. The reason being that in view of the provisions of Section 36-A ibid, the Tribunal could not review or modify its own order. In the written statement, the Board has taken up the plea that there was no reason to give workmen two benefits from the invalid settlement; i.e., (i) to take them back on work and (ii) to give them promotion by taking them as T-Mates which is of higher grade than the skilled labour on which they had been working. Admittedly, the petitioners have been reinstated with continuity of service and they have been given full backwages. Even otherwise, it does not stand to the logic that in the course of the alleged settlement, the petitioners could have been promoted to the posts of T-Mates from that of skilled labour as the formers grade is higher than the latter one. By restoring all the benefits to the petitioners, equity has been done. 14. Even otherwise, it does not stand to the logic that in the course of the alleged settlement, the petitioners could have been promoted to the posts of T-Mates from that of skilled labour as the formers grade is higher than the latter one. By restoring all the benefits to the petitioners, equity has been done. 14. In view of the ultimate analysis, I do not consider it proper to interfere with the impugned awards in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Sequelly, this petition is dismissed.