Judgment Nagamohan Das, J. These appeals are directed against the common Judgment and Decree dated 30.11.2004 in O.S. No.1703/03 to 1707/2003 passed by the City Civil Judge, Bangalore City partly decreeing the suits granting decree of permanent injunction. 2. The Appellant in these appeals was the defendant and the respondents were the plaintiffs before the Trial Court. In this Judgment the parties are referred to their status before the Trial Court. 3. As we see the subject matter in these appeals is 3 Acres 36 guntas in Sy.No.10/3 of Gangenahalli (hereinafter for the sake of convenience called as ‘Schedule land’). As on 8.12.1977 the notified khatedars of the schedule land were Smt. Byakka, Jarakamma, M.N. Ramaswamy, S.V. Indiramma, K. Kamaraj, Honnamma and G.P. Padmavathamma. On 16.3.1976 the defendants issued a notification under Section 17(1) and (3) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (for short called as ‘BDA Act’) for acquisition of certain lands including the schedule land for formation of layout called Matadahalli Layout. 4. On 30.11.1977 a final notification under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act was issued, on 16.9.1978 an award came to be passed and the award amount was sent to the Civil Court due to rival claims made in respect of the schedule land. On 25.1.1980 the defendants took possession of the schedule land on 8.3.1988 a notification under Section 16(2) was issued notifying the fact of taking over the possession of schedule land along with other lands. 5. When the matter stood thus, the defendants by their resolution dated 30.7.1988 bearing No.1101 admitted that Smt. Laxmamma, D/o Byakka, one of Khatedars, continued to be in possession to an extent of 2 Acres 34 Guntas out of 3 acres 36 guntas of schedule land and that the defendants could not take possession of this land in view of the fact that certain litigations relating to acquisition proceedings were pending in the High Court. Further in the said resolution the defendants resolved to make bulk allotment of the schedule land in favour of M/s. Kamal Builders and Developers under Group Housing Scheme for construction of apartments. Subsequently the defendants by their resolution dated 3.8.1989 bearing No.1619 rescinded its earlier resolution dated 30.7.1988 making bulk allotment on the ground that the High Court of Karnataka in its order in W.P. No.12119/98 held that defendant-BDA has no power to make bulk allotment of acquired lands. 6. Subsequently the defendants by their resolution dated 3.8.1989 bearing No.1619 rescinded its earlier resolution dated 30.7.1988 making bulk allotment on the ground that the High Court of Karnataka in its order in W.P. No.12119/98 held that defendant-BDA has no power to make bulk allotment of acquired lands. 6. Thereafter the Kathedar, Smt. Lakshmamma sold the lands in her possession in favour of first plaintiff M/s. Addi Housing Industries Limited under seven registered sale deeds on different dates during the period from 27.5.1992 to 18.6.1992. The first plaintiff on the strength of the sale deeds in its favour filed civil suits in O.S. No.1235/1994, 1236/1994, 1238/1994, 1565/1994 and 4135/1994 against the defendants for decree of permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with the first plaintiff’s possession and enjoyment of the sites formed in the schedule land. The suit filed by the plaintiff bearing O.S. No.1238/1994 came to be dismissed for non-prosecution whereas suits in O.S. No.4135/1994, 1565/1994 and 1236/1994 came to be dismissed as withdraw and further the suit in O.S. No.1235/1994 came to be dismissed on contest by a considered judgment. In the meantime, the first plaintiff under five agreements of sale, sold portions of the suit land in question in favour of plaintiff No.2 in each of the suits in question. The plaintiff No.2 in each of the suit filed separate writ petitions in W.P.16712-13/2000 and W.P.No.16473-45/2000 on the file of this Court against the defendant-BDA for a direction to regularise the sites in their possession under Section 38 of the BDA Act and the same came to be dismissed vide order dated 18.8.2000. Thereafter on 14.2.2003, BDA demolished the structures put up by plaintiff No.2 in each of the suit sties. Consequently, the plaintiffs have filed the present suits for declaration that they are in settled position as absolute owners of the schedule sites and for consequential injunction. 7. The defendants entered appearance before the Trial Court and filed written statement interalia contending that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule land attained finality and as such the suit for declaration of title is liable to be dismissed. It is further contended that the construction put up by the plaintiffs on the schedule sites are unauthorised and the defendants have rightly demolished the same. It is further contended that the construction put up by the plaintiffs on the schedule sites are unauthorised and the defendants have rightly demolished the same. As on the date of filing of the suits the plaintiffs were not in possession of the schedule sites and as such they are not entitled for decree of permanent injunction. The defendants opposed the claim of the plaintiffs. The following are the identical issues framed by the Trial Court in all the suits. i) Whether plaintiffs prove, that they are the absolute owner of the suit schedule property with a given boundaries and measurement as on the date of filing of the suit? ii) Whether plaintiffs further prove, that they are in lawful and settled possession of the suit schedule property with a given boundaries and measurement as on the date of filing of the suit? iii) Whether the plaintiffs prove, that the defendants without having any right, title or interest over the suit schedule property interfering in their peaceful enjoyment thus caused interference? iv) If so, whether plaintiffs are entitled to have a relief of perpetual injunction against the defendants as prayed? v) To what order and decree? 8. Plaintiffs examined one witness as PW.1 and got marked Ex.P1 to P88. The defendants examined two witnesses as DW.1 and 2 and got marked Ex.D1 to D9. The Trial Court after hearing both the parties and on appreciation of pleadings, oral and documentary evidence held that the plaintiffs are in settled possession of the schedule sites and consequently granted the decree of permanent injunction. The Trial Court reserved liberty to the plaintiffs to agitate the remedy for ownership before the proper forum. Hence these appeals by the defendants/BDA. 9. Sri Nanjundareddy, learned Senior Counsel for the defendants contend that the Trial Court committed an error in holding that the plaintiffs are in settled possession of the schedule sites though the material on record establishes that they have put up unauthorised structures. The Trial Court committed an error in not considering Ex.D5, the Mahazar drawn by the defendants evidencing the fact that they have taken possession of the schedule sites and also Ex.D6, the Notification dated 8.3.1988 issued under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act evidencing the taking over possession of the schedule land. The Trial Court committed an error in not considering Ex.D5, the Mahazar drawn by the defendants evidencing the fact that they have taken possession of the schedule sites and also Ex.D6, the Notification dated 8.3.1988 issued under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act evidencing the taking over possession of the schedule land. The Trial Court committed an error in not noticing the fact that the first plaintiff has not derived any right, title and interest in the schedule sties under the registered sale deeds executed by Smt. Laxmamma and consequently the plaintiffs No.2 in each of suit under the alleged agreement of sales. The plaintiffs are not in possession of the schedule land as on the date of filing the suit and as such the grant of decree of permanent injunction is bad in law. The plaintiffs have filed to prove and establish the necessary ingredients to show that they are in settled possession of the schedule sites. The reasoning of the Trial Court to hold that the plaintiff are in possession of schedule sites is contrary to the law declared by the Apex Court and this Court in several decisions. Reliance is placed on the following decisions: 1. Poornaprajna Housing Building Co-operative Society Vs. Bailamma, ILR 1998 Kar 1441. 2. Tamilnadu Housing Board Vs. Viswam, AIR 1996 SC 3377 . 3. M/s. Larsen and Toubro Limited Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1998 SC 1608 . 4. Munahi ram Vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702 . 5. East India Hotel Vs. Syndicate Bank, 1992 Supp (II) SCC 29. 6. Rame Gowda Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769 . 7. John B James Vs. BDA, ILR 2000 Kar 4134. 8. B.T. Sakku Vs. Commissioner, BDA, AIR 1995 Kar 192 . 9. P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy Vs. Revamma, 2007 SAR (Civil) 403 (SC). 10. Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 . 11. S. Muninanjappa Karim Vs. Bidi Sakinal, AIR 1964 SC 1254 . 12. Mohan Lal Vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1969) 1 SCC 639. 13. Alla Baksh Vs. Mohd. Hussain, ILR 1996 Kar 1340. 10. Sri Ashok Harnahalli, Learned Counsel for the impleading applicants support the claim of the defendants. The contends that the impleading applicants are the allottees of the sites formed by the defendants in the schedule land. 12. Mohan Lal Vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1969) 1 SCC 639. 13. Alla Baksh Vs. Mohd. Hussain, ILR 1996 Kar 1340. 10. Sri Ashok Harnahalli, Learned Counsel for the impleading applicants support the claim of the defendants. The contends that the impleading applicants are the allottees of the sites formed by the defendants in the schedule land. The impleading applicants have credited the allotment charges to the defendant - BDA and they have secured the registered sale deeds. Because of the impugned Judgment and Decree the impleading applicants are prevented from developing the sites allotted to them. 11. Sri Shantaraj, Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs support the impugned Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court. He contends that the defendants in their resolution dated 30.7.1988 admitted that plaintiffs’ vendor Smt. Laxmamma who is the daughter of one of Khatedars of schedule lands by name Byakka continued to be in possession and that the defendant–BDA is not able to recover the possession. There is no other evidence to show that subsequent to 30.7.1988, the defendants have recovered the possession in accordance with law either from the plaintiffs or from their vendor. In the absence of any evidence on record, the Trial Court is justified in holding that the plaintiffs are in settled possession of the schedule land. Therefore he pressed to dismiss the appeals. 12. Heard arguments on both the side and perused the entire appeals papers and Trial Court records. 13. The only question that arise for our consideration in these appeals is “whether the Trial Court is justified in holding that the plaintiffs are in settled possession of the schedule land?” 14. It is necessary at this stage to notice the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court on the question of settled possession. The Supreme Court in Tamilnadu Housing Board Vs. Viswam, (supra) held in paras 9 and 12 as under: “9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted mods of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not co-operative in taking possession of the land.” 12. Thus considered, the title of the land is Survey No. 140/4 having been vested in the appellant, to whomsoever it belonged earlier, it stood divested from him/them and no one can lay any claim to the said acquired land once over and claim injunction of that basis. The injunction, therefore, cannot be issued against the true owner, namely the Housing Bord in whom the land ultimately stood vested and then stood transferred to Municipal Corporation. A trespasser cannot claim injunction against the owner nor can the Court to issue the same.” In Munshi Ram V. Delhi Administration Supra the Supreme Court held as under: It is true that no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in due course of law he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the righful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which the never been lost. The persons in possession by a stray act of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force.” In East Inida Hotel Vs. Syndicate Bank 1992 Supp (II) SCC 29 the Supreme Court held as under: “In Puran Singlh Vs. State of punjab, while following the ratio in Munshi Ram Case, this Court held that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. Syndicate Bank 1992 Supp (II) SCC 29 the Supreme Court held as under: “In Puran Singlh Vs. State of punjab, while following the ratio in Munshi Ram Case, this Court held that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. But what this Court really meant was that the possession of a trespasser must be effective, undistrubed and to the knowledge of the owner or without any atempt at concealment. There is no special charm or magic int he words “settled possession” nor is ita ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket but it has been used to mean such clear and effective possession of a person, even if he is a trespasser, who gets the right under the criminal law to defend his property against attack even by the true owner. It would be reiterated that the possession must be within the knowledge either express or implied, of the owner or withouut any atempt at concealemnt and which contains an element of animus possidendi. In the case possesson for 14 days was held to be settled possession since they raised the crops in the land. This view was reiterated againin Ram Rattan Vs. state of U.P laying therein that the true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or porcess of trespassing but this right is not avalable to the true owner if the trespsser has been sucessful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse ot the remedies under the law.” A Division Bench of this Court in John B. James & others Vs. Bangalore Development authority & Another (Supra) held as under: “71. Having regard to the principles laid down in the said decisions, we may conveniently cull out the legal pos sition in regard to a true owner vis-a-vis a trespasser as under: i) A true owner (even if it is the State or a statutory body) has no right to forcibly dispossess an unauthorised occupant (including a trespasser) in settled possession, otherwise than in accordance with law. ii) A trespasser or unauthorised occupant in settled possession can be dispossessed, only in accordance with an order/decree of a competent court/tribunal/authority r by exercise of any statutory power of dispossession/demolition entrusted to the state or statutory Authority. iii) A person in unauthorised possession shall be deemed to be in settled possession, if his entry into the property was lawful or authorised. iv) A person in unauthoised possession, whose entry into the property is illegal or unauthoised, can claim to be in unsettled possession, only if he is in open, continuous and actual physical possesson over a sufficiently long period, with the knowledge of the true owner: v) A surreptitious and unauthorised entry into another’s land and stealthy trespasser, will not have the effect of dispossessing the true owner of giving possession to the trespasser. Such acts will lead to settled possession only when thetrue owner having knowledge of it acquiesces in it. vi) Where the trespasser is not in settled possession, all acts of the trespasser in regard to the property will be considered as only attempts to secure possession. The true and rightful owner can re-enter and reinstate himself by removing the obstruction or the unauthorised construction put up by the trespasser by usingthe minimum force. Such action by the true owner will be considered as defending his possession and resisting an intrustion with his property and not forcible dispossession of an unauthorised occupant. vii) Where however the trespasser is in settled possession and such settled possession adverse to the true owner continues for 12 years, the right of the true owner is extingushed and the trespasser as possessiory owner acquires absolute title to the property in question. 73. The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out that to claim settled possession a trespasser’s possession must be effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of the true owner and for a sufficiently long period to show acquiescence by the true owner. ‘What is sufficiently long period’ depends on the facts of cach case. Ithas been held that in the case of a cultivable land, if a trespasser enters possession and grows and crop with the knowledge of the true owner, then it is possible to say that he completes and accomplishes the act of settled possession. In the case of BDA land, the position is completely differnt. Ithas been held that in the case of a cultivable land, if a trespasser enters possession and grows and crop with the knowledge of the true owner, then it is possible to say that he completes and accomplishes the act of settled possession. In the case of BDA land, the position is completely differnt. The land is urban land and not cultivable land, BDA being a statutory authority owning large tracts of land, cannot be expected to take action for demolition or efect resistance immediately after it comes to know abut the unauthorized construction. Firstly the unauthoised occupation and construction should come to the notice of BDA secondly, BDA has to verify whether the occupant has obtained any order of stay or injunction. Thirdly, the matter should be brought to the concerned section and appropriate orders should be obtaind to obsertuct or demolish the construction. Having regard to the verification process involved and hierachal system in vague, the administrative machinery moves slowly and by the time a demolition squad visits the site, three to four months might elapse from the date of knowledge. Therefore a trespasser cannot, merely by putting up a shed clandestinely in BDA land or by staying in such shed for a few months claim that he is in settled possession and that BDA can not demolish his structure or that BDA can dispossess him only by intiating legal action in a Court or Law or under the public premises Act. Unless and untill the possession of a trespasser or unauthorized occupant become settled prossession, BDA continues in possession and can therefore demoblish the unauthorized structure put up in its land and forcibly evict the unauthorised occupant or trespass by using the minumum force. 77-2. Where the vacant urban land has vested in BDA as a consequence of acquisition followed by taking over of possession, BDA becomes the absolute owner of such land in possession, freed from all claims and encumbrances. Consequently, the original owner ceases to have any right, title or interest in such vacant land. Therefore, the question of such ex-owner continuing in possession of such vacant land or transferring title or delivering possession of such land or any part thereof to any one else either by exceuting a sale deed or an agreement of sale or a power of sttorney, does not arise. Therefore, the question of such ex-owner continuing in possession of such vacant land or transferring title or delivering possession of such land or any part thereof to any one else either by exceuting a sale deed or an agreement of sale or a power of sttorney, does not arise. Consequently, neither the original oner nor any alleged transfereed holder or attorney holder can claim to be in possession of such vacant land, belonging to BDA. Therefore, the claim of possession of all petitioners in regard to BDA land, which continues to be vacant, is liable to be rejectd. 78. As stated above, any trespasser or other person can be said to be a person in possession of a land belonging to another. Only if he has actual physical possession or effective possession. While there can be an absentee landlord or absentee owner, there cannot be an absentee trespasser or absentee unauthoized occupant in regard to the vacant land. A person who does nto have title can claim a right over a property only on the basis of possession and not otherwise. It will be absured for a person who admiteldy does not have title, to say or contended that he is in possession of a vacant land belonging to another person, unless he has actual physical possession. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that to claim settled possession a trespasser or unauthorized occupant should be in actual physical possesson of the property continuously for a suffciently long period demonstrating the accomplishment of possession. Supreme Court has held that a stray or causal act of possession can not give raise possession. 78.1. Therefore, a person cannot, mejrely by entering BDA land and putting up a comopoujnd wall or a foundation contend that he is in possesison. Such act or acts would at best amount to causal or stray acts of possession. If such a person who puts merely a compound wall or foundation does not continue in actual possession, he will not be entitled to contend that he is isn settled possession. Therefore, petitoners who have merely put up a foundation or compound wain BDA land, cannot claim to be in possession of such land and BDA continues in possession of such land and any act done by BDA to demolish such foundation or compound wall, will be w4ell within its right to protect its possession against trespass/encroacment. 15. Therefore, petitoners who have merely put up a foundation or compound wain BDA land, cannot claim to be in possession of such land and BDA continues in possession of such land and any act done by BDA to demolish such foundation or compound wall, will be w4ell within its right to protect its possession against trespass/encroacment. 15. From the decisions referred to above the follwoing principle will emerge: i) Once the land stood divested from the owner and vested with the acquiring authority, no one can lay any claim to the acquired land. ii) A person who purchases the land subsequent to the issuired of notification will not get any title to the land. iii) A trespasser is not entitled for injuncion against true owner. iv) A trespasser in settled possesion o fthe acquired land is entitled to defend his possession even against true owner unless he is evicted by due porcess of law. v) Settled possession means, a trespasser’s possesson must be effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of the true owner and for a sufficintly long period to show acquiscence by the true owner. vi) What is sufficient long period depends upon the facts of each case. 16. Keeping in mind the above principles of law, it is necessary to examine the fact situation in the Present case. On 16.3.1976 under Section 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act, the defendants Notified the schedule land for acquisition. On 30.11.1977 a final Notification under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act was issued. On 16.9.1978 an award came to be passed. On 25.1.1980 the defendants took possession of schedule lands under a Mahazar. On 18.3.1988 a Notification was issued under Section 16(2) of the land Acquisition Act Notifying the fact of taking possession. This undissputed material on record established the fact that schedule lands are divested from the owner Khatedar Smt. Byakka and vested with the defendant BDA. The registered sale deeds in favour of first plaintiff between 27.5.1992 and 18.6.1992 as found at Ex. P3, P6, P22, P49, P65, P81 and P82 are subsequent to the vesting of schedule lands in favour of defendants and as such they are illegal and the first plaintiff has not derived any title and interest in the scheule lands. The possession of first plaintiff under these illegal sale deeds is not lawful. P3, P6, P22, P49, P65, P81 and P82 are subsequent to the vesting of schedule lands in favour of defendants and as such they are illegal and the first plaintiff has not derived any title and interest in the scheule lands. The possession of first plaintiff under these illegal sale deeds is not lawful. Consequently the sale of sites formed in the schedule land in favour of second plaintiff under different agreement of sales as found at Ex.P17, P30, 45, P75 and P160 are all illegal and unlawful. 17. The suits filed by the first plaintiff in O.S. No. 1235/1994, 1236/94, 1238/1994, 1565/1994 and 4135/1994 for grant of decree of permanent injunction are all dismissed. The writ petitons filed by the second plaintiff in writ petiton No. 16712-13/2000 and writ petiton 16743-45/2000 for regularisation of schedule sites came to be dismissed vide order dated 18.8.2000. Further the plaintiffs in their plaint admit that on 14.2.2003 the defendant BDA demolished the structures put up by them on the schedule sits. These admitted facts on records clearly establishes the fact that plaintiffs are not in settled possession of schedule sites and at best the same may be litigious possesison. 18. The defendants admit in their resolution dated 30.07.1988 that they could not take physical possession from the original khatedars Smt. Byakka and after her demise from her daughter Smt. Lakhsmanna. But Smt. lakshmanna Who was said to be in possession of the schedule lands ceased to be in possession when she executed registered sale deeds between 27.5.1992 and 18.6.1992 in favour of first plaintiff. Further first plaintiff admits that under five agreement of sales dated 30.1.1994, they delivered the possession of the schedule sites in favour of second plaintiff in each of the suit. This chronology of events mainifestly established the fact that no one continued in possession of schedule sites for reasonably log length of time to continue as an ingredient of the settled possession. 19. It is not in dispute that Smt. Lakshmamma ceases to be in possession of schedule land subsequent exceution of registered sale deeds in favour of first plaintiff between 27.5.1992 and 18.6.1992. Further first plaintiff ceases to be in possession of schedule land subsequent to execution of agreement of sale in favour of second plaintiff on 30.1.1994. Therefore transfer of possession of schedule land from one perosn to another person will not amount to settled possesison. Further first plaintiff ceases to be in possession of schedule land subsequent to execution of agreement of sale in favour of second plaintiff on 30.1.1994. Therefore transfer of possession of schedule land from one perosn to another person will not amount to settled possesison. The concept of settled possession is not tranferable for consideration b one person to antoher. Therefore the plaintiffs are not in settled possession of schedule land. 20. The plaintiff in their pleading and also int he evidence admit that the defendants demolished the structures put up on the schedule land on 14.2.2003. In the circumstances it cannot be sid that the plaintiff were in settled possession as on the date of filing the suit and consequently not entitled for a decree of permanent injunciton. The Trial Court without considering the evidence on record and the Law on the question involved committed an error in granging decree of permanent injunction. The judgment and drecree of the Trial Court is liable to be set aside. 21. For the reasons stated above, the following. ORDER I. The appeals are hereby allowed. II. The judgment and decree in O.S. Nos 1703/2003 to 1707/2003 passed by the Trial Court are hereby set aside. III. The suit of the plaintiff in O.S.Nos. 1703/2003 to 1707/2003 are hereby dismissed. IV. Parties to bear their own costs.