JUDGMENT PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. - The present revision is directed against the order dated November 3, 2000 passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal, Allahabad in second appeal No. 422 of 1993 relevant to the assessment year 1987-88. The applicant is a partnership firm and was carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling of bricks. During the assessment year 1987-88 it disclosed the firing period from April 11, 1987 to April 19, 1987 and thereafter from June 1, 1987 to June 18, 1987. The said disclosed firing period was not accepted by the assessing authority in view of the fact that in surveys dated April 13, 1987 and July 18, 1987 the account books were not found on the spot. The explanation submitted by the dealer that as none of the partners of the firm was present at the time of survey, the account books could not have been produced before the surveying officer, has been rejected. While rejecting the disclosed firing period the assessing authority fixed it at 98 days, i.e., from April 1, 1987 to July 7, 1987. It is not in dispute that the brick-kiln has been finally closed down with effect from September 30, 1987 due to some differences among its partners. The assessment order was challenged in appeal and the first appellate authority granted marginal relief but confirmed the firing period. In further appeal the Tribunal by the order under revision has reduced the firing period to 91 days. In the memo of the revision following questions of law have been sought to be raised : 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally justified in upholding the rejection of account books which were kept in the regular course of business and no incriminating material regarding suppression of production and sale was found at the time of survey dated April 13, 1987 and July 18, 1987 ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally justified in estimating the firing period continuously from April 1, 1987 to June 30, 1987, i.e., a total of 91 days against the disclosed firing period of 27 days particularly when the intimations of start and closure of firing were given and no inquiry in respect of the same was ever conducted by the assessing authority ? 3. 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally justified in determining the production and sale of bricks on the basis of firing period which itself was determined arbitrarily and without any basis and evidence on record to the extent of 91 days ? 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally justified in not recording its own finding in regard to rejection of the claims of distribution of 2,92,520 and 2,19,390 bricks for self use in the contribution of houses of two other partners, namely, Sri Khaliq Hussain and Sri Ramesh Chandra despite the fact that certificates given by Nagar Palika, Fatehpur and respective Gram Pradhan were on record ? 5. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally justified in determining the average sale rate of Rs. 400 per thousand of bricks without appreciating the quality of bricks produced and relying on an exemplar whose situation of the kiln has not been mentioned ? Shri M. M. Rai, the learned counsel appearing for the dealer - applicant submits that the authorities below were not justified in rejecting the account books due to their non-availability at the time of surveys. In this connection reliance has been placed by him on a judgement of this court in Prem Narain Singh Int Udyog v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1993] UPTC 951. He further submits that even if the account books are rejected, there is no material in possession of the Department to fix the firing period at 91 days. The learned standing counsel, on the other hand, supports the order of the Tribunal. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Having gone through the order of the Tribunal, I find that the Tribunal was justified in not accepting the account books. The account books were not found at the time of two surveys dated April 13, 1987 and July 8, 1987. The authorities below have not accepted the explanation furnished by the dealer and the said matter is basically a finding a fact. Even otherwise also, the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the facts as found in the two surveys do show that the firing period disclosed by the applicant is not correct. The authorities below have not accepted the explanation furnished by the dealer and the said matter is basically a finding a fact. Even otherwise also, the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the facts as found in the two surveys do show that the firing period disclosed by the applicant is not correct. The apex court in a recent judgment in Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. v. Mohan Brickfield, Agra [2006] 148 STC 638 (SC); [2007] UPTC 1 has held that non-production of the books of account at the time of survey is a relevant factor which can be considered by the assessing authority. It has been further laid down that the burden is upon assessee to give plausible explanation as to why no adverse inference should be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, the explanation given by the dealer having not been accepted, I find that the rejection of the account books is perfectly justified. Then, it was contended that the firing period fixed by the Tribunal at 91 days is without any basis. He submits that in a relevant assessment year the brick-kiln was fired on April 11, 1987. It was found by the surveying officer that the chamber up to 95 lines was filled up with baked bricks. The Tribunal concluded that it is not possible to bake the bricks to such a large quantity within seven days if the firing, as stated, started on, April 11, 1987 is correct. Challenging the aforesaid approach of the Tribunal the learned counsel invited attention of the court towards the assessment order wherein the opening balance of the baked bricks in the kiln has been shown as 2,07,300. None of the authorities below has disbelieved the opening balance of baked bricks in the brick-kiln. In this view of the matter, there is some substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that there is no material in possession of the Department to show that the brick-kiln was fired on April 1, 1987. I, therefore, hold that the brick-kiln was fired on April 11, 1987. The period from April 1, 1987 to April 10, 1987 should be deducted from 91 days of the firing as was determined by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, the firing period is reduced to 81 days. I, therefore, hold that the brick-kiln was fired on April 11, 1987. The period from April 1, 1987 to April 10, 1987 should be deducted from 91 days of the firing as was determined by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, the firing period is reduced to 81 days. The Tribunal shall calculate the production of bricks for 81 days and pass consequential order accordingly. The revision succeeds and is allowed in part as indicated above. No order as to costs.