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2008 DIGILAW 1631 (RAJ)

Ramswaroop v. Raghuveer

2008-07-04

G.K.TIWARI, GIRISH K.PANDEY

body2008
Honble TIWARI, M.—This is an appeal under Section 224of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (`the Act in short) against the order dated 6.8.01 of Revenue Appellate Authority Alwar by which he quashed the order dated 31.12.82 of Assistant Collector passed in suit No. 208/82. 2. The facts in brief arising out of the case are that Shyonath (the father of the respondent No. 1 to 3 herein) and Surja (the father of respondents No. 5 to 9 and husband of respondent No. 4 herein) filed a suit against Mst. Meva widow of Sawant (respondent No. 10 herein) for declaration of khatedari rights in the suit land bearing old khasra No. 218 (corresponding new No. 842) located in village Dhundhariya of Tehsil Behror in Alwar District. The suit was dismissed by Assistant Collector on 31.12.1982, aggrieved against which, an appeal was preferred before Revenue Appellate Authority who quashed the impugned order of assistant Collector vide his decision dated 16.8.93 which was challenged before Board of Revenue in second appeal. The Board of Revenue, vide its decision dated 8.9.99 accepted the appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 16.8.93 and remanded the case to Revenue Appellate Authority, who vide its impugned order dated 6.8.01 quashed the order dated 31.12.82 of Assistant Collector Behror accepting the appeal. Hence, the second appeal. 3. We have heard both the learned counsels. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the Assistant Collector framed eleven issues in the suit and after properly deliberating upon all the issues dismissed the suit, which is legally correct. He argued that Mst. Meva widow of Sawant is a recorded khatedar tenant of the disputed land. Initially the disputed land was in possession of Umada and Sawant. After Sanwants death his widow Mst. Meva came into the possession which is duly recorded in the old khasra girdawari of Svt. 2014 to 2018. Thereafter Mst. Meva was recorded as a khatedar tenant. The appellant has purchased the disputed land through registered deed from Mst. Meva who has right to sale the land recorded in her khatedari rights. The plaintiffs-respondents had prayed for declaring this sale null and void which cannot be done by the revenue court. 2014 to 2018. Thereafter Mst. Meva was recorded as a khatedar tenant. The appellant has purchased the disputed land through registered deed from Mst. Meva who has right to sale the land recorded in her khatedari rights. The plaintiffs-respondents had prayed for declaring this sale null and void which cannot be done by the revenue court. He further argued that Revenue Appellate Authority erred in quashing the order of Assistant Collector and declaring the plaintiffs as khatedar of the disputed land on the mistaken presumption that biswedari right revives after the death of the male occupant of the alleged biswedari land. The plaint of the plaintiffs does not have any pleading about the disputed land being his khudkhast holding but Revenue Appellate Authority has gone beyond the pleadings and declared the plaintiffs-respondents as khatedars under Section 13 of the Act, which is illegal. He cited 1988 RRD 143 in support of his contention. It is argued that the main basis of declaring the plaintiffs-respondents as khatedars is the alleged possession found during proceedings of section 145 of the Cr.P.C. before a criminal court. Khatedari rights cannot be granted on the basis of any finding of possession under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. which is for the maintenance of public tranquility and law and order. Citing 1969 RRD 298, it was argued that the revenue court has to determine possession through its own evidence andnot on the basis of any finding of section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The appellant has become khatedar tenant pursuant to the registered sale deed and consequently got recorded in the jamabandi of Svt. 2034 as a khatedar. Now he cannot be divested of his khatedari rights. Citing 1995 RRD 360, it was argued that the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, safeguards widows right in the property of her deceased husband and as such Mst. Meva was rightly recorded khatedar tenant of the disputed land. 5. Countering the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondents contended that fathers of the respondents (plaintiffs) were the biswedars of the suit land. The disputed old khasra No. 218 was initially under the occupation of Umda who adopted Sawant as his son. Sawant died on 30.7.1954 during the lifetime of Umda. After death of Sawant, Mst. Meva got remarried. The disputed old khasra No. 218 was initially under the occupation of Umda who adopted Sawant as his son. Sawant died on 30.7.1954 during the lifetime of Umda. After death of Sawant, Mst. Meva got remarried. Under the revenue laws of the then Alwar State, after Sawants death the land vested in Umda who was alive and after Umdas death in 1955 the land got vested in the concerned biswedar (Shyonath) and not the widow of Sawant. Thus, Mst. Meva was wrongly entered as khatedar of the disputed land whereas it should have been recorded in the name of Shyonath. Assistant Collector, Behror vide his decision dated 6.5.58 in a suit for grant of permanent injunction by Mst. Meva declined to give any relief of injunction holding the defendants in possession of the land. In a case filed under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. respondents-plaintiffs were found in possession of the land. As such suit land should have been recorded in the name of the respondents. Now this has been done by Revenue Appellate Authority vide his impugned decision which should be upheld. 6. We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of both the learned counsels and carefully gone through the impugned orders of both the courts below as well as record available on the file. 7. The most important matter in this case is whether the plaintiffs are khatedar tenants of the disputed land bearing khasra No. 842 measuring 2 bighas 13 biswas. According to the jamabandi Svt. 2020 (Ex. 4) the suit land of khasra No. 842 is recorded in the khatedari right of Mst. Meva. In khasra girdawari Svt. (Ex. 5) also Mst. Meva is recorded as the cultivator of the land. The old khasra girdawari of Svt. 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 show Mst. Meva as cultivator of the land. Thus, from old and new revenue records, it is evident that Mst. Meva is the recorded khatedar of the disputed land. 8. Learned Revenue Appellate Authority has erroneously held that the plaintiffs-appellants acquired khatedari rights by operation of law under Section 13 of the Act. 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 show Mst. Meva as cultivator of the land. Thus, from old and new revenue records, it is evident that Mst. Meva is the recorded khatedar of the disputed land. 8. Learned Revenue Appellate Authority has erroneously held that the plaintiffs-appellants acquired khatedari rights by operation of law under Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act runs as follows:- "Khatedari rights upon resumption [or abolition]-On the resumption [or abolition] of an estate under any law in force in the whole or any part of the State, the estate-holder holding khudkasht shall be come a khatedar tenant thereof and shall entitled to all the rights conferred, and be subject to all the liabilities imposed, on a khatedar tenant by or under this Act]. [Provided that the Zamindar or Biswedar holding khudkasht land on the abolition of this estate under the Raj. Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959, shall become the Malik of such Khudkasht land and shall be entitled to all the rights conferred and be subject to all the liabilities imposed on a khatedar tenant by or under this Act." 9. There is no evidence to prove that the plaintiffs were jagirdar or biswedar of the disputed land. Only an estate-holder holding khudkasht becomes a khatedar tenant thereof on resumption of the Jagir land as is clear from perusal of section 13 of the Act. In the case, it is not proved through oral and documentary evidence that the disputed land is a khudkasht land and plaintiffs were the holder of khudkasht with regard to the suit land. Besides it, there is no pleading in the plaint relating to the land being khudkasht and plaintiffs being khudkasht holder of the suit land. No issue was framed in respect of the plaintiff being khudkasht holder of the disputed land. As such the interference of learned Revenue Appellate Authority is factually incorrect and illegal as well as beyond the pleadings. 10. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority has derived inference that after the death of Sawant-initial cultivator/occupant of the land- the land vested in his father Umda and not his widow Mst. Meva and after death of Umda on 23.4.55, the land vested in the ex-biswedar with the revival of biswedari. This inference is patently illegal and incorrect. 10. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority has derived inference that after the death of Sawant-initial cultivator/occupant of the land- the land vested in his father Umda and not his widow Mst. Meva and after death of Umda on 23.4.55, the land vested in the ex-biswedar with the revival of biswedari. This inference is patently illegal and incorrect. There is no provision under the Act which leads to revival of the biswedari system and lapsing of land of cultivator into the ex-biswedar. The suit was filed after coming into force of the Act. If the plaintiff had any right to be claimed or relief to be sought under the law of the then Alwar State, he shold have agitated the same when the old laws of Alwar State were in force. They cannot seek retrospective implementation of any alleged law of Alwar State under the provisions of Act of 1955, in which suit was filed. According to 1995 RRD 603, on the death of husband if any right is creasted in the property to the wife under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937 that right will become a full right of ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, recording of Mst. Meva as khatedar tenant of the disputed land is quite in order and legal. 11. Another ground on which learned Revenue Appellate Authority declared the plaintiffs-respondents khatedar was inference of possession drawn in a case of section 145 of the Cr.P.C. A revenue court has to independently determine factum of possession on the basis of oral and documentary evidence adduced. Any inference of possession by a criminal court in this regard can be only corroborative. Whenever there is a dispute between two parties relating to possession of the disputed land which can escalate into the breach of public peace and tranquility, action under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. is taken. Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. has a limited purpose of maintaining public peace and tranquility; and possession at the time of dispute is ascertained with this end in view. This purported possession under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. cannot become ground for conferment of khatedari right. On the contrary defendants have been in possession of the land since the time before coming into force of the Act as is evidenced by revenue record cited above. 12. This purported possession under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. cannot become ground for conferment of khatedari right. On the contrary defendants have been in possession of the land since the time before coming into force of the Act as is evidenced by revenue record cited above. 12. As far as registered sale deed of the land by Mst. Meva to Ramswaroop appellant is concerned. Mst. Meva as a khatedar tenant of the suit land had a right to transfer the land of her khatedari right by way of sale in keeping with the provisions of the Act. In this transaction of sale by Mst. Meva there is no violation of any provision of the transfer of land as provided under the Act. As such the sale is valid by which khatedari rights are transferred from Meva to Ramswaroop legally. Transfer of possession on the khatedari land which is sold through registered deed is natural corollary of the transaction and possession of the vendee on the land legally sold cannot be disputed. 13. In view of the above discussion, the contrary inferences drawn by learned Revenue Appellate Authority Alwar are incorrect and illegal whereas Assistant Collector has correctly decided the case issuewise which needs no interference. 14. In the result, the appeal succeeds; the impugned order dated 6.8.2001 of Revenue Appellate Authority Alwar is quashed and the order dated 31.12.1982 of the Assistant Collector Behror is upheld.