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2008 DIGILAW 164 (CHH)

STATE OF C. G. v. KALAWATI LAMA

2008-06-30

RAJEEV GUPTA, S.K.SINHA

body2008
JUDGMENT Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. :_ 1. The State has filed this appeal against the order dated 28.2.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition No.322/2006 whereby and where under it has been held that the petitioner who was working on the post of Public Health Tutor, comes under the definition of teacher and she was entitled to continue on said post till the age of 62 years. 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Woman Health Visitor and subsequently she was promoted to the post of Public Health Tutor vide order No.9/NursingiCell- 1/95/797, dated 08.2.1995. In the year 2005, she was working as Public Health Tutor in Chhattisgarh Institute of Medical Science (CIMS), Bilaspur. She was served with a notice dated 22.11.2005 that as per entry of her date of birth in the service records i.e., 04.02.1946, she would be superannuated on 28.2.2006 after attaining the age of 60 years. It is at that stage, the petitioner filed the writ petition and challenged the validity of the aforesaid notice dated 22.11.2005 with a contention that the age of superannuation of Public Health Tutor is 62 years, therefore, the aforesaid notice be quashed and she be allowed to continue till the completion of 62 years of age. The Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the notice dated 22.11.2005 holding that the post of Public Health Tutor comes under the definition of teacher, therefore, the petitioner shall continue in service up to the age of 62 years. 3. Shri Kishore Bhaduri, Learned Add!. Advocate General appearing for the State-appellants would submit that in Rule 56 of the M.P. and C.G. Fundamental Rules, (hereinafter referred to as FR), the word "teacher" has been defined for the purpose of the said rule in the Explanation appended to this rule, according to which, the petitioner was not entitled to continue in service up to the age of 62 year"" because she will not be covered under the definition of teacher within the meaning of FR-56, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge be set 4. On the other hand, Shri Anupam Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was a teacher for the purpose of FR-56, therefore, the learned single Judge has rightly extended the benefit of retirement at the age of 62 years. 5. On the other hand, Shri Anupam Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was a teacher for the purpose of FR-56, therefore, the learned single Judge has rightly extended the benefit of retirement at the age of 62 years. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of the writ appeal. 6. Admittedly, ER.56 deals with the provisions of compulsory retirement. It reads as follows: (Only relevant portion quoted) A perusal of the aforesaid rule would show that the age of superannuation of a teacher has been fixed at 62 years and while doing so, an Explanation has been appended to the rule explaining that who shall be held to be a teacher for the purpose of the said rule. This Explanation can be divided into two parts. Part- 1 i.e., the earlier part clearly provides that a Government Servant who has been "appointed" as a teacher in any educational institution, including the technical and medical educational institutions, for the purpose of teaching under the prevailing rules applicable for appointment to the said post shan be a teacher for the purpose of this rule. The second part, which is the later part of the Explanation, further provides that it shall also include such teachers who have been appointed on administrative posts either by promotion or otherwise and who were engaged in teaching for a minimum period of 20 years and have also a lien over the post in their concerned educational institutions. 7. It has not been disputed before us that the post of Public Health Tutor is a teaching cadre post but the point raised is that since the petitioner was not appointed on this post under the prevailing rules for appointment, as she was promoted from a lower post in the year 1995, therefore, she would not be deemed to be a teacher for the purpose of FR. 56. 8. In the facts and circumstances of this case, what is the import of the Explanation appended to the Rule has to be seen. It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that an explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. In the facts and circumstances of this case, what is the import of the Explanation appended to the Rule has to be seen. It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that an explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. The meaning to be given to an 'Explanation' must depend upon its terms, and "no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used". But if the language of the explanation shows a purpose and a construction consistent with that purpose can be reasonably placed upon it, that construction win be preferred as against any other construction which does not fit in with the description or the avowed purpose. An explanation may be added to include something within or to exclude something from the ambit of the main enactment or the connotation of some word occurring in it. An explanation, normally, should be so read as to harmonize with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. Please see Principles a/Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P Singh, Sixth Edn., 1996, Pg. 151, 152 & 153. 9. If we examine the provisions ofER.56 which provides for retirement of the teachers after attaining the age of 62 years, in light of the Explanation appended to the proviso thereof, it would appear that the Explanation has clearly explained that who shan be the "teachers" for the purpose of the said rule. The definition of, teacher' iii the Explanation appended thereto is not inclusive as the same is exclusive and defining particular category of employees who shall only be deemed to be a teacher for the purpose of the said rule and the words deliberately chosen by the legislature like "appointment" in the former part and "promotion or otherwise" in the later part have their own significance. A conjoint reading of both parts of the Explanation would clearly indicate that for being a teacher for the purpose of this Rule, one must have been appointed in a government institution for the purposes of teaching under any nomenclature according to the rules applicable for the appointment on such post and if the appointment of an employee was not done on any such post, he/she would not be a teacher for the purpose of FR-56 and would not be entitled to the benefit of retirement at the age of 62 years. 10. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was not initially appointed as the Public Health Tutor but she was promoted on the said post in the year 1995. Therefore, by applying the strict principle of interpretation to the above Explanation and by not enlarging the ambit of the rules, it can safely be determined that the petitioner was not a teacher for the purpose of FR. 56. Since the definition of word 'teacher' is exclusive in nature in the Explanation, adding more to the categories of employees defined therein was not justified and the Learned Single Judge erred in law by holding the petitioner a teacher for the purposes of FR-56. 11. In light of the above discussions, in our considered view, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by the petitioner stands dismissed with no orders as to costs. Appeal Allowed.